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A SYSTEM

OF

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

BY

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TRANSITION TO THE THIRD DIVISION.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD'S REVELATION OF HIMSELF IN A WORLD, OR OF THE ECONOMICAL TRINITY (cf. §§ 14, 28).

§ 33.

NEITHER to supply a deficiency in His perfect Essence, nor on account of a superabundance of which He is supposed not to be master, God, of His perfection and blessedness in love, sets forth as a really second object a world, which He calls out of non-existence into existence, that, loved and loving, it may be a relatively self-dependent image of His perfect triune nature and attributes.

1. Two opposite explanations are advanced with respect to the *reason of the origination* of the universe. According to the first, it is meant to supply a defect in God; according to the second, it is to be explained by a superabundance in the divine Essence, for which room is wanting in the divine sphere. But neither a deficiency (πενία) nor overflowing plenitude (πλοῦτος) in God can of itself explain anything.

Since God is to be conceived as all-sufficient in Himself, the world could add nothing to His perfection, because what it is it can only have from God. Further, were it meant, as pantheistic systems suppose, to supply a deficiency in God Himself, *e.g.* to serve as a means for generating the divine

self-consciousness, it would be a mere element in God; to a relatively self-dependent existence it could never attain, beyond a docetic form of being it could never come. Nor, lastly, would this harmonize with the perfection of God's moral nature. If by means of the world God were only seeking the perfecting of His own nature, it would be merely a seeking of Himself or His own, a course out of harmony with His love.

But were God, on the other hand, burdened with a *superabundance*, which on account of its infinitude He could not retain within Himself, the overflowing world would belong directly to the divine Essence, and—as the Emanationists suppose—that Essence would be divided and rent asunder by separation from God, and therefore by space or the Void. In this a *dualistic* strain is evident, as the void would be conceived in the light of a definite eternal power beside God apart from God's action. Moreover, God would not be at harmony within Himself, because burdened with a superabundance. His *power of self-comprehension* or self-command would be insufficient in relation to the plenitude of His being, so that this plenitude would again have its reason in a defect, nay, God would lie at the mercy of this superabundance, be bound and fettered by it.

2. In order to avoid the supposition of passivity and deficiency in God, nay, that God's all-sufficing Essence may have nothing to do with the creation of the world, it may be said, "By no means can God be as it were internally burdened with the world, or with that which will become the world, either through πενία or πλοῦτος; else there would be danger of confounding God with the world. All, therefore, is to be referred to the purposeless, absolutely spontaneous will of God, which called forth a world without necessity of any kind." But as an absolutely purposeless will would be mere caprice, whereas in God there is no will but one determined by the highest end—love, neither is this admissible. Moreover, springing from *merum supremum arbitrium*, the world would be merely contingent; no transition to it therefore could be gained in a scientific way; our knowledge of it would be but empirical. A certainty of its existence, a verification of it for us, otherwise than through the senses, were impossible. Finally, if the derivation of the world's origin from caprice were

accepted, if the world were absolutely contingent, this would be the same as saying, that it is utterly indifferent to God whether the world exists or not—a disparagement of the world contrary to Scripture.[1] God is a lover of life.[2] It is a good and precious thing in His sight. No doubt a purposeless, divine caprice would be conceived to be endowed with power. But this theory of derivation, like the former ones, would partake of a merely physical, unethical character, *i.e.* God would here be represented as arbitrarily performing a blind, purposeless act, just as there He is made the victim of deficiency or superfluity. We must therefore seek in God an eternal reason for the world, not in God's physical, but in His ethical Essence, to which the physical is subservient.[3] But our theory of moral derivation must not be of such a nature as to imply that God first became love, and thus blessed, by the founding of a world.[4] In Himself He must be love and blessedness already.

3. But how can the world be derived from God's moral Essence? Many suppose the question answered by the suggestion that "divine love is self-communicative." *But communication logically presupposes a second object, to which it is made. Whence do we obtain this second thing, which is empty or receptive of communication?* Thus the question recurs, Whence in the first instance comes even the idea of a second to God, an imperfect after the perfect, all-sufficient? Nor does it avail anything to desire to arrive at the notion of a world by supposing, with or without side-reference to the divine will, that God in some way transfers Himself into the condition of separateness, and out of Himself and through Himself the world arises. This has been attempted in various ways. According to the old Indian faith, a universe is arrived at by Brahma dividing himself, which is embodied in the image of Brahma's world-sacrifice,—a myth which lends itself to the interpretation that God of mere goodness, in order that a world might arise, sacrificed His divine, infinite majesty and rent Himself asunder. Akin to this is the supposition of Nicolas of Cusa,—and similarly Oetinger,—that the universe arose from manifold contractions (*contractiones*) of the divine Essence; for this also seems to imply a division of the divine Essence, or at least

[1] Gen. i. 31; Ezek. xviii. 23, xxxiii. 11. [2] Prov. viii. 31; Deut. v. 33.
[3] § 32. [4] § 32, 6.

"nature," even if it be in virtue of an act of volition. To the same category belongs the attempt, with several theosophists and mystics, to derive the world, as different from God, from a falling away of God from Himself, be it even in an ecstasy of love passing over into the other object, *e.g.* in the Valentinian doctrine of the Achamoth, although in this the other object, at least as the void (*κένωμα*), is usually already presupposed. Schelling, after availing himself of such a falling away, in his treatise *Philosophy and Religion*,[1] in the *Philosophy of Revelation*[2] supposes the three essential potencies, which are eternally and harmoniously blended in the divine life, to be separated by divine volition, in order that a real world may come into being. Moreover, Hegel's "principle of negativity in God" leads essentially to the same result, only that what Schelling conceives more realistically as a process of volition and freedom, Hegel regards as a logical process, which no doubt at the same time is meant to be conceived as an ontological one.[3] All these attempts agree in this, that in them we merely arrive at a different mode of being (or different modes of being) of the divine, not at an actual world as a separate object from God. God would only have therein a repetition of Himself; and His *Φύσις*, although not His personality, would be divisible, or, put in the best aspect, capable of multiplying and reproducing itself for ever in new forms. Besides, all these attempts do violence to the idea of love. They rend the one factor—self-communication or self-

[1] *Philos. and Religion*, 1804 (in reply to Eschenmayer's *Philos. in ihrem Uebergang zur Nichtphilosophie*, 1803), says: The transition from the region of the Absolute to the finite is only "thinkable as a complete breaking away from Absoluteness, only by a sudden leap (not, as the Emanationists suppose, as a continuous transition), only as the consequence of a falling away from the Absolute." No doubt in order to such a leap freedom is interpolated and postulated, which God, objectifying Himself in a counter-image—the universe of ideas—confers on this world, so that it includes the possibility of falling away. But this world of ideas is not merely in the Absolute as ideal, but also as real is "another Absolute," so that in it we still have a falling away of the Absolute from itself.

[2] Cf. Schelling's *Werke*, II. 1, Vorl. 11, II. Vorl. 1–6, *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* V. 1, respecting Schelling's doctrine of potencies, and Heyder's art. "Schelling" in Herzog's *Encycl.*

[3] The principle of negativity also comes specially into play in the transition from logic to natural philosophy, where the idea passes into its other form of being. Cf. on this point Trendelenburg's criticism in his *Logical Investigations*, 2d ed. 1862, I. 36 ff., II. 146–156 (Negation).

surrender—from the other—the divine self-affirmation—without which love were not love, but a self-destructive expenditure of its powers.

But even love itself seems to lead no farther. It may indeed be said that love is not hostile to a second existence, does not exclude it, on the contrary is able to include it; that love is not restricted and one-sided, nay, that it not merely loves the perfect, but is of such a nature as to condescend to the lowly. Still in all this no second object, such as must precede all exercise of love, is given. In order to come nearer to a solution of the problem, let us ask first, How does love first of all obtain the *conception* of a second? Without doubt through the fact that love is essentially intelligence as well (§ 32). As formerly shown, God's Intelligence is the primary seat of all possibilities. God's *scientia necessaria* embraces not only Himself, but all possibilities; for these too reside in Him, and His self-consciousness would not be absolute unless He were conscious of Himself as the primary cause of all possibilities, the eternal principles which govern these residing originally in Him alone (§ 27). From this follows the further consequence, that the divine self-consciousness is not complete in its perfection and self-sufficiency unless in idea it separate or distinguish itself from all that is not God, whether possible or actual. He Himself is *actus purissimus*, no mere potential existence. But the simply possible, as not actually existent, is distinct from Him, and God is therefore able to distinguish Himself from it, although, since it is only possible through Him, it is also encompassed by God. But when God distinguishes Himself, as the absolutely necessary—*actu* existent—Being, from the possible as distinct from Him, in this very act a second possible object is conceived.[1] Thus, from the consideration of God's all-sufficiency, not in spite, but in virtue of the same, directly follows the true transition to a second object. Through comprehending with infinite definiteness and enjoying Himself as what He is, God is the all-sufficient and blessed Personality. But in the act of comprehend-

[1] These possibilities of a second object are not to be viewed as actually existent potentialities of a seminal nature, striving as it were spontaneously after existence, as if they lay concealed in the depths of God's essence. They are to be regarded primarily as mere ideal possibilities.

ing Himself as what He is, is also given His absolute self-discrimination from every other object possible through Him, or every non-Ego. The conception of another, as a possible non-Ego of God, is given in the conception of the Ego, since with the clearness of the divine self-consciousness the inner (logical) distinction from everything possible, which is not God, must be also bound up. In this way God's comprehension of Himself would not be perfect, unless He were conscious of Himself as the actually existent plenitude or power, through which another object than Himself is possible. This conception of another is in the first instance not the conception of an actual, but merely of a possible something. Else creation would be simply a work of God's Nature.[1] The conception of a second object, the non-Ego, possible or able to exist through God, the counter-chime so to speak to the eternal self-affirmation of the absolute Personality, is withal and primarily merely a knowledge of the non-existence of a second, of a world outside God.

The question now is, whether this conception must perforce remain in a state of non-existence, or whether any reason can be discovered in God for this possible something being called into existence. Considered in the abstract, of course, even the irrational—evil—belongs to the domain of the possible. But for us this is precluded *a priori*, because we are speaking only of what is possible through God. The irrational can only belong to that region of the possible which His realizing will eternally precludes. It is otherwise with that region of the possible, which is not opposed in idea to God. Here comes into consideration the fact that God, who is holy Love, loves goodness as such, or goodness in itself, and not merely as it is in Him (§ 31*a*, 3). As holy Love He is not merely self-affirming personality, He also loves the sentiment of love in itself or absolutely, is *Amor Amoris*. Thus, not merely is there no reason in Him for wishing to make Himself the only abode of love, but, on the contrary, His love finds its delight in multiplying, aggrandizing the life of love, in forming a kingdom of love. Hence, the conception of a second to God

[1] [Without an act of volition on God's part.] In the first edition of his *Theol. Ethik*, Rothe had supposed that in the act of divine self-consciousness the reality of a second (Matter) is given; but in the second edition he corrected this.

being given it, Love, without which nothing can come into actual existence, will exert itself to bring this second, destined for the kingdom of love, into actual existence. In this way we reach the absolute derivation of a world, *i.e.* of a world of rational beings, who through communication of divine Love become themselves capable of love. But there is nothing to prevent divine Love desiring also another—Nature—in harmony, of course, with its desire for a kingdom of love, and even desiring the existence of another beside love in the world, and imparting to it of its fulness. Love is also a lover of life. Hence, were God to desire to keep or leave that portion of the possible, which is not opposed to God, in a state of non-existence, He would desire nonentity as such, whereas in love is delight in the existence and life of a second possible object, which it proposes to itself as an end. And thus, *at the impulse of love*, and inspired by it, *divine Wisdom*, ruling as spontaneous, creative imagination (Prov. viii. 22, 30), as architectonic intelligence, in the domain of possibilities, sketches *the idea of the world* as a separate rationally-organized object,—*one no longer merely possible in the abstract*, but *destined* to be realized, worthy of existence. The same pure, holy Love, that gives the impulse, withal so moulds the eternal conception of this world-idea, destined to realization, as to determine both the design of the world and the means of its accomplishment. This is the nature of divine Love, its "humility," that, absolutely assured through its all-sufficiency of its own perfection, it has a drawing towards that which is poor and destitute of existence and life, towards the merely possible forms of existence presented to it by intelligence. There is in it a drawing to that which is low and is not, that through love and its fulfilment it may come to be.[1] It is the very knowledge of the non-existence of a Second that is the starting-point for God's spontaneous, unfathomable Love, in union with divine Wisdom, to generate the idea not merely of a second existence that may be, but of the κόσμος that is to be; and this κόσμος as such is a diversity in unity, a harmoniously-blending whole. Hence this world-idea is the world already potentially, κόσμος δυνάμει ὤν. If not actual reality, neither

[1] Luke i. 42, 53; 1 Cor. i. 28: τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐξελίξατο ὁ Θεός; Ps. xxxiv. 10, cvii. 9.

is it the same as Nothing. But, on the other hand, it is not God. Primarily it is a purely internal product of God, for whose generation intelligence and love have combined. This He internally distinguishes as a product from Himself, but at the same time as containing the basis—lying within God—for the actual world, and especially its aim. To this inner creation is then added creation in external reality through divine Omnipotence—the minister of Love, and this again at the impulse of Love. Power transforms the ideal into visible reality.

The *world-idea*, therefore, is the idea of a second object over against God, which object *by means of the conception of its possibility* is converted by divine Wisdom and Love from merely possible into destined existence, and will be called into actual existence. And now, having grounded a second to God in God as the idea of the real universe destined to exist, we are in a position to find room for God's self-communication to and participation in the world, and at the same time to define the idea of the world more exactly.

4. The world-idea, conceived and willed by God, while on one hand the idea of a second to God, existing not through itself, but through God who alone has eternally independent existence (*Aseität*), on the other hand is the idea of a second, from which as a unity God withholds none of His communicable gifts. On the contrary, it is designed to be the object of His perfect, unreserving love, and by this means perfect, God's likeness outside God. To describe the world in virtue of its divine idea as God's likeness, as a perfectly faithful mirror of Himself, even when its design is taken into account, may seem too high. To Christian faith it is not too high. Faith claims to possess in the Son of Man the complete conception of divine self-communication, and yet to reckon Him part of the world in the fullest sense and for ever, yea, to regard Him as the world's centre and withal its true reality which He represents before God.[1] But with Christ God wills freely to give us all things.[2] Holy Scripture is not satisfied with saying merely, that God is willing to impart Himself to the world in a degree proportioned to its limited receptiveness for Him;

[1] 2 Cor. iii. 18, iv. 1–6.

[2] Rom. viii. 32; 1 Cor. iii. 21–23; John iii. 16; Matt. xxiv. 47.

for this might be said with respect to the least measure of receptiveness in the world for God. Rather, the kernel of the matter is, that God's wise love has so sketched the outlines of the world-idea, that the world is susceptible of God's perfect communication of Himself.[1] Beside His unfathomable love, desiring this, power stands ready to lend its aid. No doubt the objection is here raised: "In the creature is no room for God's infinitude, *finitum non capax infiniti.*" Nature, as such, must here be left out of sight, because it cannot be destined in the moral sense to bear God's image. Consequently the share it has in life and power is but a limited one; for it is in the moral world that the supreme seat of power, and supremacy over everything merely physical, lie. The objection would certainly retain its force, if God's self-communication extended to His absolute self-existence, which remains an eternal distinction between God and the creature, and a safeguard against the danger of confounding the two even by God's act of self-communication. So, again, the objection would have force if God were to be conceived as an infinitely extended being or Quantum. But God is rather to be conceived as intensive infinitude, which at its culminating point is love, and by reason of love omnipotence (§ 32, 19). But of the infinitely excellent and divine the creature is certainly receptive. It is not merely finite, but possesses as well receptiveness for the intensively infinite. Thus the finitude of the creature imposes no limit on divine love. As it is God's will to impart Himself in a peculiar sense to the world, in order that His triune life may be imaged and bodied forth even in cosmical form, so it is His will that there should be a world belonging in a peculiar sense to Him, His living temple, in which He wills to live His triune life. The distinction between the triune Image of God—God the Son in the immanent divine Essence—and the cosmical image, is not that in the latter God cannot have His dwelling-place,—for Christ is part of the world's constitution in the proper and full sense,—but this, that the latter, which is without the divine power of self-existence, through a state destitute of the divine perfection, yea, through a state of non-existence, is to come into existence and to receive perpetually what divine love

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 28; 1 John iii. 2; 2 Cor. v. 7; 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

wills. Without losing Himself in the act of self-communication, God wills to have cosmical existence as well as existence in Himself. This twofold state of the transcendent and immanent is no contradiction, but, as we have seen, has its ground in God's ethical essence. It is therefore part of the primary idea of the world that God exist in it, really know and will Himself in it, and that the world live, move, and have its being in Him.

Observation.—One thing, therefore, God cannot communicate, absolute self-existence or self-origination. The world remains eternally distinct from God,—even in Christ the human side remains distinct from the divine,—the ground of its existence being outside itself in God. It cannot be denied that even the world in a derivative sense has self-existence reflective of God's. It possesses a power of self-conservation and self-culture in a physical, spiritual, and moral respect, and thus participates in its own production, in shaping its own character. But its existence is every moment through God, and we are unable, with Rothe, after the creation to believe only in such a government of the world as excludes the idea of conservation, or to regard spirits in their perfection as living an absolutely self-dependent life. Self-existence in the proper sense God alone possesses and retains, and this secures the distinction between God and the world, whereas the continuance of the second existence alongside God is secured by the volition of divine love, which proposes this as its end.

5. Comprehensive as is the purpose of God's communication of Himself to the world, designing it for complete participation in His Life and Spirit, still the *separateness of the world*, its actual existence *præter Deum, is not thereby imperilled.* It might seem, indeed, as if by the perfect self-communication of God, creation, by reason of its very perfection, were again withdrawn.[1] But what divine love desires is a really separate object, not as if this second object as such had value for God's love, whatever its character, but as designed for goodness, with which of course happiness is bound up (§ 32). The design of God's love in regard to the rational creature, in

[1] So Marcellus of Ancyra seems to have wrongly understood the passage 1 Cor. xv. 28, which yet in the ἵνα ᾖ presupposes the continuance of the world, in which God will be all.

conformity with its own pure goodness, must be to bestow on the creature itself, and call forth in it, the sentiment of love. It is not therefore an object of love to God's self-communication, save in so far as He views it as destined to be a subject of love, and thus desires it for its own sake. Thus, in the ethical character of the divine self-communication the comparative independence of the creature is secured; and the divine life remains withal distinct from the creature. New homes of love are really gained in the world for God's life of love in it. Further, the ethical life of God's love, including in itself righteousness, desires freedom as the form in which God's moral communication is to be appropriated. Consequently the other existence desired by God is one that is not simply irresistibly determined by the force of His love (so that, *e.g.*, creation might immediately coincide with the period of consummation and absolute self-communication),[1] but one capable of entering into a *spontaneous* communion of love with Him, which is a fresh security for the abiding distinctiveness of the creature in relation to God's act of self-communication. Love cannot absorb the other existence for *this* reason, *that* it does not receive the other *into itself*, without at the same time making it objectively its end, for the accomplishment of which it even makes itself the means. The other existence, therefore, to which the gaze of creative love is at first directed, and in which alone it finds fitting, independent objects of love, is the world of the free designed for communion of love with God, but which can only itself become capable of love through the primal love itself. For the sake of this free existence and its consummation, on which the gaze of divine love is fixed as its goal, is the world created. Everything else is willed as an organ, means, and theatre of the kingdom of love, being also included under this point of view in the world-idea.

Observation 1.—Only by means of the free act of reception can the consummation of the world be brought about. Now both truths—first, the institution of freedom, which is not constrained to exercise love, and to which therefore the possibility of the opposite—of evil—must be left open; and secondly, that the world of the free is the scene of God's

[1] On the contrary, 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff.

self-communication or of His life of love—coincide in the proposition, first, that true freedom is only realized when it yields to the emancipating Spirit of God who desires the free, but desires it as destined for the morally necessary; and secondly, that the divine self-communication, not desiring to impart mere passive, dead gifts, but to receive love in return, by this very means becomes the instrument of confirming the living, personal independence of the creature. The formula expressing the truth, that the world can only be what it is meant to be in the communion of the divine life, is, that the world is meant to be God's real *image.* The formula expressing the truth, that God desires to give a perfect communication of Himself to the world, while not suppressing, but perfecting the free personality by His cosmical form of being, is, that He desires the perfect, absolute revelation of His love in the form of free personalities, or, that He desires *likenesses* of Himself.

Observation 2.—The idea of the world, as retained in God, not yet realized, is certainly in a manner a part of God Himself. Its separateness is not yet real, but merely a determination (*Bestimmtheit*) in God, in His wisdom and love. And herein lies the ultimate ground of its communion with God. But still the world-idea must not be identified with God. It is still conceived by God as other than Himself. Since it is the idea of the non-existent, and yet of the other than God destined to real existence, God already distinguishes Himself from the world-idea, which simply includes something possible through God. And this self-distinction already from the world as possible becomes in the world the self-distinction of the world from God, precisely in so far as in its life and spirit it resembles God.

THIRD DIVISION.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD.

THIS COMPRISES THREE POINTS: CREATION, CONSERVATION, PROVIDENCE AND GOVERNMENT.

FIRST POINT: CREATION.

§ 34.

GOD'S eternal love creates a free world, distinct from God, and distinguishing itself from God, in order to communion of love with it. In its character as an organism, which it is by the fact of its being destined to reflect God's triune life, the world needs two things, the requisite multiplicity or manifold diversity, and unity. Accordingly, we must come to a decision upon the questions as to the eternity of creation, the applicability to creative agency of the antithesis of rest and action, matter and form, with which the question as to creation out of nothing is related.[1]

1. BIBLICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE.—The doctrine of the origination of the world through God's creative action by no means involves a mere question of religious curiosity. All more cultured religious systems have their cosmogonies. But this doctrine has special fundamental importance for a

[1] Rothe, *Ethik*, 2d ed. 67, 1 Bd. § 40 ff.; Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 1855; Schultz, *Die Schöpfungsgeschichte nach Naturgewissenschaft u. Bibel*, 1865; Reinkens, *Die Schöpfung der Welt*, 1859; Keerl, *Der Mensch, das Ebenbild Gottes, Sein Verhältniss zu Christo u. zur Welt, Ein urgeschichtlicher Versuch*, Bd. 1; Zöckler, *Theologie u. Naturgewissenschaft*, 1877, 1879.

religion which lays down a *formal* doctrine of creation on its first page. By this doctrine, and the clear way in which it distinguishes God from the world, while avoiding deistic separation from it, the basis is gained for the Hebrew religion, and the possibility of secure progress in mutual intercourse between God and the creature. Where creation is ignored or wrongly defined, religion is most profoundly modified. Religious consciousness can only arise through the medium of consciousness of the world. When, therefore, the fundamental relation between God and the world, which is to be raised into the light of consciousness and inspired with life through religion, is wrongly defined, supposing a development of religion to survive, it can only be an abnormal one. There are numerous theories respecting the world's origin (§ 33), which prevent world-consciousness being elevated into God-consciousness, and obscure the latter. Now, while the Mosaic cosmogony is not indeed ratified in the N. T. as a whole, it is accepted in its essential elements.[1] It guards for us the right religious apprehension of the world against errors tending to confound and separate the two factors. Confusion is precluded, because the world as progressive issues from God's absolute, self-conscious volition; separation, because the world received life only through God's Spirit brooding over the original matter, and because in man—its goal—it is endowed by God with His own image.[2] Moreover, God looks on the world He has made with approval.[3] Nor does the N. T. contain the doctrine of an eternal ὕλη ἄμορφος simply moulded by God.[4] The N. T. rather coincides with the doctrine of this having been made from the non-existent,[5] provided only that Nothing is not regarded as matter. More important for us is what the Epistle to the Hebrews says:[6] The world was not made of what appears or is visible (μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων). The antithesis perhaps is: Rather was it made from the ῥῆμα, the omnipotent Word unapparent to sense, which converted into reality

[1] Acts xiv. 15, xvii. 24-28; Rom. i. 19, 20, xi. 33; Eph. iii. 15; Heb. ii. 10, xi. 2; as also Heb. i. 1-3; John i. 1-4; Col. i. 13 ff.; where, however, the cosmogony is placed in connection with Christology.

[2] Gen. i. 26; cf. ii. 7. [3] Gen. i. 31.

[4] Wisd. xi. 17 certainly seems to imply this.

[5] 2 Macc. vii. 28: ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. [6] xi. 3.

the world-idea likewise invisible. With this representation Genesis also essentially agrees, not laying down the doctrine of an eternal matter before creation.[1] Although it says nothing expressly respecting the origin of matter, still the act of creation, according to ver. 1, embraces heaven and earth. The origin of matter from God is not meant to be excluded.[2] An eternal matter alongside God is not in the author's thoughts. Else a simpler beginning would have been: "In the beginning was Thohu and Bohu," in the style of Hesiod. Instead of this, the mention of the divine act of creation comes first, which, if it were meant to denote a mere moulding expressly and exclusively, would necessarily presuppose matter, which yet is first spoken of in ver. 2. At all events the idea of the O. T. in general is, that God by His creative act constituted not only form, but matter with absolute freedom. Whether matter is derived from nothing or from God's invisible Essence itself, on this point no positive decision is given in the O. T.[3] Thohu, Gen. i. 2, signifies no doubt elementary existence, which, although not absolutely shapeless, is still without settled form. Whether creation, as

[1] Although בָּרָא may be used, where matter is already given, and where, consequently, only a Demiurgic fashioning is in question, still in the O. T. God is not contemplated merely as a Demiurge along with a like eternal power, Matter, Isa. xlv. 18; Ps. cxlviii. 5, cxxxv. 6, cxxi. 1, 2. In Gen. i. 1, matter is not conceived either as offering resistance to, or a limitation of, God's power, בָּרָא in the Kal (in distinction from the Piel) denoting free, easy production (Dillmann, *Genesis*, p. 18). In Hebrew usage the word does not of itself take the accusative of the material, from which, indeed, "it does not follow that the word of itself excludes the use of material and instruments, but that, where בָּרָא is applied to God, means and material are not thought of, but the absolute freedom of divine production is kept in view." Respecting the origin of the unformed matter in ver. 2, the passage says nothing expressly. But "we may concede without hesitation, that if the author had taken into consideration the question as to the origin of matter, he must have come to the decision, on the basis of his conception of God, that even as to its matter the world has its ground of possibility and existence in the divine will. God speaks, and it is done, Ps. xxxiii. 9" (Dillmann, p. 21). In any case the later representations of creation in the O. T. go back, beyond the formless condition of the earth in the beginning, to God's omnipotent word summoning forth matter and form. Cf. Oehler, *Theol. O. T.* I. 177, Eng. Tr. I. 169 (Clark), who sees in ver. 1 the creation of the *materia prima*, which, however, in this case would be identical with Thohu.

[2] That the word "earth" in ver. 1 cannot denote the form, shape of the earth, ver. 2 shows.

[3] Cf. Ps. xxxiii. 9, cxlviii. 5, with xc. 2, where creation is called a birth.

concerns *time*, is to be regarded as eternal, cannot be gathered from Gen. i. "In the beginning" signifies: "Before a world-structure existed, God the Creator was." The record professes to treat chiefly of the creation of the earth and our solar system, though ver. 1 puts the heaven before the earth. Respecting the period of creation, we might expect some information to be given in Gen. i. But in this case it must have been clear what the six days denote, whether earthly days or spaces of time, a question which does not seem to have occurred to the author at all. In the N. T. the passages respecting Christ's glory with the Father and the election of believers before the foundation of the world are not meant to give any information respecting the age of the world (which is not a religious question), or respecting an initial non-creation on the part of God, but merely imply that the eternal God and His world-idea are the logical *prius* of the world.

The Ecclesiastical Doctrine is contained in the Apostolic and Nicene Creeds. The ancient Church early guarded itself against Gnosticism, Manichæism, and vulgar Emanationism. The Reformation accepted this, as also the position that the world was created through the Son (Nicene), without excluding Father and Spirit (Schmalkaldian Art.). Concerning the matter, time, and design of the world, the Creeds contain no further detailed exposition.

2. That the world is to be derived from God's self-conscious, wise love (§ 33), is no assumption or makeshift, no pushing of the matter into the hypothetical; but while every other mode of derivation fails to afford light, this is not merely satisfactory, but is just as little mere hypothesis as the divine love itself. Absolutely nothing outside God determines God to the work of creation; He determines Himself purely and solely. Not His plenitude of life or Nature, not His omnipotence, but His love, which is the power above His omnipotence, determines Him. He is therefore absolutely free in creation. His spontaneous love, in union with absolute intelligence, derives from itself the idea of the world, and determines itself to creative activity. The Nature of God as such could not create. The power of God as such would effect no relative self-dependence of the world, nay, as such, would not include the possibility of

another object than God, which, when really cut off from God's existence, would continue as an independent causality. Intelligence as such would merely give us a form, a plan, no actuality, and apart from love a mere limited teleology, and therefore no motive for setting omnipotence to work in order to the actual existence of another than God. Love, on the other hand, immanent in the divine intelligence and power, carries within itself its own absolute logic or rationality. It is the causal principle of a real existence other than God, and, indeed, of a multitude of such existences, desiring as it does a multiplication of the life of love, while including, on the other hand, the principle of union. It secures distinction by making the world an end, and yet establishes no dualism either in the world itself, or between the world and God. The end in view is a rich life of love, and this constitutes the motive for creation. Grant to love the position due to it in respect to creation, and the dispute vanishes between those who say, "God created the world for Himself, for His own glory, that He might be confessed and glorified by rational spirits," and those who regard the glorification or happiness of the creature as its end. In love both are blended together. God makes Himself a means in order to the world's good. He desires it for its own sake, as a kingdom and theatre of love; but what owes its being and happiness to love is made in order *to love*, because only by exercising love can it be perfect. The world, therefore, beloved of God, by necessity of love makes itself in turn a means and sacrifice for another, and responds to the love wherewith it is loved. In this way a blessed cycle of the life of love ensues. To the divine love belongs the bliss of possessing all things. In its unenvying charity it stoops to the humble, especially to everything destined for love, capable therefore of being sought for its own sake, and bound because of the love it receives to become itself a subject of love. But, again, to man's likeness to God belongs the power of reciprocal love. Love in its ascending order is thus foreshadowed, and the cycle of love is made complete. Through being an object of love, *i.e.* through self-communication of and participation in God, the world comes to be a subject of love, to the end that in God and the world one and the same Love may exist.

3. In this way we already obtain a glimpse into the *relation* of *multiplicity* to *unity* in the idea of the world.

An antinomy here meets us. If multiplication of the life of love in the universe is a good thing, nay, the final cause of a world outside God, then an absolutely unlimited number of living beings seems requisite, a consequence of which would be an infinite host of worlds, successive or simultaneous. But, on the other hand, the interests of reason require a unity of the many, and it is part of the world's excellence for its various members through mutual want and supply to form a perfect organism, so that the notion is inadmissible of the world consisting of many totalities absolutely out of relation to each other. The solution of the antinomy is as follows. An absolutely unlimited number of personalities, destined for the true spirit-life, is unthinkable; for then must even the same individuals have had power to repeat themselves, in order that the very number might be infinitely great. But this would be no infinite enrichment of the life of love, but without use and aim. The number, therefore, is not to be considered absolutely unlimited; it is limited by the end in view. Only such spiritual personalities are created as are able by reciprocity of giving and receiving to subserve the life of love, every one having something distinctive. Thus the end of God's creative love and wisdom cannot be a poor infinity of countless individuals, but only that the *complement* of possible individualities considered as capable of special excellence may be filled up. But while multiplicity is thus obtained in the world, *i.e.* a limited one, unity amid this multiplicity, despite its power of growth, is secured. As certainly as the end is a definite one, does it require a definite complement. A perfect organism must neither be burdened by a too-much nor suffer from a too-little, but is an unbroken although progressive cycle, in which everything has its place, and each exists for each. To the universe as the subject of love it pertains that its members are all destined for each other, love being only able to manifest itself in this way. Consequently love, as it is the causal principle of the origin of the world, so is it by essential nature the bond of unity in the living world. The particular members, which are themselves in turn relative totalities, can of course only be different

by one having something which the other lacks. But wherein one has no productiveness, it may still have receptiveness in respect to others. Thus these defects are no hindrance to the unity of the spirit of love, which may govern in every member, nay, by mutual intercourse convert even defects into an instrument of living, reciprocal communion, in which each member may regard all as its own.[1] Thus, through the idea of the organism—despite its progressive nature—whose soul is love, and which the world is meant to exhibit, it comes to pass that the world is a limited, not excessive multiplicity, and at the same time a unity. But that the world may be an ethical organism, God destines it to be an image of Himself, as well of His perfections as of His triune character, and this in such a manner that, through His existence in it, through His self-communication, it may be a perfect image of Him, a *likeness* of God realized in cosmical form.[2] If the world-idea has a share in representing the Trinity, as the above-quoted numerous analogies (§ 30, 3) may indicate, still more is this capable of proof with respect to self-conscious spiritual and ethical beings. And in this is implied withal a participation of the world in all perfections, physical, spiritual, and ethical. But these various endowments can by no means be implanted in the world forthwith in perfectly realized unity in the way in which they are united in God. The world's perfection and unity will exist at first as a *rudiment*, that by means of freedom it may grow to that ethical organism which, while different from God, is also united with Him. These rudiments will differ in different members, accordingly as one or the other divine perfection forms for the individual as such the dominant or representative one. But still all in a certain sense are accessible to all.[3] Further, these various endowments will, in

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 23. [2] Gen. i. 26.

[3] Origen derives diversity from freedom, from differences of moral conduct. But this would involve the possibility of one and the same thing repeating itself an infinite number of times. He then tries to check unlimited diversity by limiting the divine knowledge; but, on the other hand, according to the Leibnitzian *principium indiscernibilium*, what is not different in itself must be taken as identical. Thomas v. Aq. says better: *Sapientia Dei* is *causa distinctionis rerum propter perfectionem universi, ita et inæqualitatis.* Only he takes these differences not in a qualitative, but merely in a quantitative sense, the lower stages as *defectus* in Being, which is for him synonymous with evil. God is for him absolute Being. Here, therefore, is an unsuppressed strain of

the first instance, be external to each other, but so constituted that, by virtue of the idea of organism pervading them all, they form relative worlds, *e.g.* the world of nature, of art, of philosophy, of morality, which again are connected by secret inner bonds, nay, together form one system, the organism of the entire progressive world, which, like a reflected orb of splendour, is the living mirror of the one divine Sun.

Observation 1.—Is it consonant with the idea of love for the imperfect, which the world still is in comparison with God, to spring from the perfect? As the world can only be comprehended from the standpoint of the perfect, and the existence of more than one absolute is inconceivable, either there can be no world at all or only one not absolute, *i.e.* one destitute of self-existence (*Aseität*). But such a world may still be receptive of all other divine perfections, nay, on the ground of God's self-existence represent self-existence (§ 33); and if at first it is necessarily imperfect, in order that scope may be left for the free play of self-determination, even this, again, is neither evil nor a contradiction, but part of the world's excellence.

Observation 2.—What has been said suggests the thought of God not having created the world at once *uno actu*. Nay, the rise of relative worlds may still be going on, at least as respects the shaping of new world-orbs.

4. The question respecting the *eternity* or *temporal character* of creation and the age of the world is not dealt with in Holy Writ. Just as little has it been expressly formulated in the doctrine of the Church. It is therefore to be investigated on purely dogmatic lines. The supposition of an eternal creation *a parte ante*, or the non-commencement of the world, has usually been disclaimed in the Church. In the early Church, Origen and some of his disciples are almost the only exceptions. Yet even Thomas v. Aq. says that God is an eternally *sufficiens causa mundi;* and the *sufficiens causa* must apparently have always carried with it its *effectus*, provided as here nothing external hinders.[1] Quenstedt says emphatically, that

Pantheism or Emanationism, the basis of which is the conception of God in His essence as bare existence, not as primarily moral. Cf. Landerer, Thomas v. Aq. in Herzog's *Encycl.*: "God's will in his view is nothing but self-active *intellectus*, which, again, is itself existence."

[1] Summa I. 9, 46, Art. 2. Hence in conclusion he merely reckons it *credibile*, not *scibile* or *demonstrabile*, that the world had a beginning.

in the supposition of God having created eternally no wrong idea of God is implied. God was always able to create if He willed, but He did not always will.[1] On the other hand, the non-commencement of the world has been maintained in various forms in modern theology.[2] The eternity of the world is usually rejected on the ground that it endangers the dependence of the world on God, and that the world is thus brought too near God. And as matter of fact, every one must allow that if the world is eternal like God, this leads to dualism, or a confounding of God and the world. But, on the other hand, it is to be remembered that the dependence of the world on God is not bound up with its longer or shorter duration, but with the fact of its determination by God. An unlimited duration of the world is accepted at once by every one with reference to the future, nay, this is even called the eternity of the world; but its absolute dependence on God is not thereby called in question. It is unpractised reasoning which, for the purpose of keeping God and the world apart, and the latter in absolute dependence on God, seeks a point of support in the notion of *time* lying midway between God's existence and that of the world. But this point of support we must be able to dispense with, because we are unable to posit time *before* the world. There is no time without something contained in it. If, therefore, time existed apart from the world, God must exist in time. Nor does the causal relation require a temporal, but merely a logical pre-existence of the cause to the effect. Time, indeed, is no mere subjective notion. It is the standard for measuring the succession of the individual in its reciprocal relations. This standard is borrowed, at least now, from the relation of the central body of our solar system to our planet. But what is to be the standard for the world as a unity? There was no time apart from the world. We may say with Augustine: Mundus non in tempore sed cum tempore factus est. Were we to say that God created in time, in a definite moment of time, this would be equivalent to supposing an eternal, independent

[1] Quenstedt, *L.C.* p. 420, Observ. 2.

[2] So Schleiermacher, Martensen, and others. Rothe supposes at least a non-commencement of the matter disposed by God, from which again in further course the world issued.

time side by side with God or before God, so that by such creation in time, time itself would be directly excepted from dependence on God, since God would be eternally encompassed by it, nay, dependent on it.[1] Accordingly, we are bound to maintain that no actual time can be posited before the world, and that, therefore, it cannot be said that there was a time when the world was not,—a proposition, of course, not to be interpreted as if it meant that the world is eternal in the same sense as God. On the contrary, little as our time existed before the world, and certainly as God is to be conceived primarily in His pure eternity in the simultaneity of all the moments of His absolute life, not in their succession, and certainly further, as there is in Him no temporal, but absolutely existent life, so certainly His eternal world-idea includes the necessity of gradual progress, succession, and therefore possible time, and along with the idea of the creaturely also the idea of time as the standard for measuring the successive movements of the creaturely. When, therefore, the world comes into actual existence, actual time comes into existence. The actual world is preceded by merely possible time; of course not in a temporal sense, else must time have existed before time, but in a logical sense. From the point of view of actual time, merely possible time can only be *mentally represented* under the image of the past, and the same is true of the eternal world-idea and God's eternity in relation to the world's actual existence. But the truth embodied in this image, to be mentally *conceived*, is the logical relation which keeps God and the world apart in the most positive manner—namely, that midway between God's being and that of the world lies in a logical respect the merely possible world and time, *i.e.* the world and time conceived as non-existent, or that the world

[1] As Rohmer conceives time and space in the light of eternal primal powers encompassing God. Quite different, nay, the opposite of this, is the view of Weisse (*Philos. Dogmatik*, § 493–498), who posits time eternally in God, and supposes that infinite time, like infinite space, is a power of the divine life. They do not form a power above God, but are eternally vanquished by his *æviternitas* and perfection, so that, as they exist in God, they have nothing in common with our time and space (see § 19, 3). This is an hypothesis, applicable in reference to modern Christological Kenotism, not to be rejected in the abstract, provided only it holds by the view that in the divine Essence everything is simultaneous, although internally to be so distinguished that it may be revealed in temporal association.

by its very idea only comes to exist through a state of non-existence, and the concrete world-idea only through the conception of its non-existence as a second to God (§. 33, 3).

Nevertheless it must not be overlooked that so far the bearing of the controversy has only been investigated under one aspect. For although the world is not eternal like God, God alone possessing self-existence, still a question may be raised as to its duration, its age, *a parte ante*, and here again an antinomy presents itself.

No one denies that the world-idea in God is eternal, not first projected in time. Ought not, then, this idea, which is no mere idle play of the divine fancy, but destined to real existence, to have begun to be realized forthwith? The reason of any delay could only lie either in an act of arbitrary caprice unworthy of God, nay, impossible, the world being a good thing and the desire for it an exercise of eternal love, or in a restriction which must have lain in God, there being nothing external to Him. Accordingly, the idea of God naturally suggests that no postponement, no inaction of creative love, can be presupposed to the commencement of its operation. Nor can it be requisite for the keenest discrimination between God and the world, that the world-idea conceived by God should not proceed forthwith to the realization which it craves, but only that God's eternal self-consciousness be clearly discriminated from the decree to create the world, or from the idea of the world as one destined to realization through the operation of His love (§ 33, 5).

But while from the standpoint of the idea of God in the abstract an endless duration of the world *a parte ante* commends itself to us, of course on the understanding that it always has its metaphysical beginning in God, a difficulty again presents itself on the teleological side. The absolutely limitless is the imperfect. Excessive or diffusive infinity is incompatible with a teleological conception, which requires a rounded completeness and permits no *progressus in infinitum* forwards or backwards, nor an infinite multitude of time-divisions. Or, more concretely: If the temporal world has existed for endless ages, then, since the world is still one and exists for a single end, we must suppose its parts and the stages of its growth to be infinite in number in order to fill

up this time both forwards and backwards. Keeping here only to the latter part of the proposition, we should arrive at an endless series of *media*, or germs of no *media* at all. But this would do away with a teleological disposition and limitation almost as effectually as we saw above would be done by an excessive multiplicity (par. 3). We must therefore undoubtedly hold of *this* temporal visible disposition of things known to us and usually called the world, that its age is not unlimited, but limited, measured in extent. But this can only be made to agree with the former view, not indeed by assuming[1] an endless series of worlds like the one we know, coming into existence and again vanishing away; but, the unity of the world remaining intact, by supposing a multiplicity of creative cycles, relatively world-ages, which, as concerns time and temporal relations, need by no means be all constituted alike, and therefore, as concerns their relation to becoming and passing away, need not be homogeneous with our world. The world known to us is subject to temporal relations through the succession of its moments, whereby some belong to the past, while others, which is necessary to the existence of this temporal world, are still future. In our world teleology appears in the form of temporal succession, of the separate existence of means and ends. But this cannot be essential and necessary for the world in the abstract. On the contrary, only when perfection is arrived at does true life begin in the simultaneous presence of its elements, which, as they logically condition each other, exist perpetually in combination. Then will time no longer be distinguished by the separate existence of its parts, then will life flow direct from the depths and fulness of eternity. Then the world becomes an organism of love, in which the end and its means of accomplishment are realized not in succession, but simultaneously. Time will merge in eternity, in the celestial life, as even already it is permitted to speculative anticipation to begin to contemplate things *sub specie æternitatis*,[2] and to faith to take its stand above time in the consciousness of eternity, in ζωὴ αἰώνιος, and to participate internally in God's

[1] As Buddhism does to the destruction of all teleology; but even Origen attempts the same in his own way.

[2] Eccles. iii. 11.

freedom from temporal existence. Just, therefore, as we have no right to say that this law of succession and this progress from imperfect to perfect must continue for ever, because on the contrary a state is conceivable, nay, is the object of Christian hope, where time in the old sense will exist no longer,[1] and because the spirit craves to drink the water of eternal life, so have we also no right to say that this world, tangible to sense and subject to temporality, cannot have been preceded by a world standing in the light of eternity, a world of pure spirits (although spirits not yet subject to laws of historical progress) which are withdrawn in the first instance from all relation of succession, and exist in the simultaneity of all their constituent elements, and in this character surround the throne of God, a kingdom of which it cannot be said that a time was when it was not, not merely because no time was ere it was, but also because for it there was no time, no succession or becoming. This world can only be brought under the standpoint of time by reference to the succeeding world. From this point of view it appears a preceding one, already belonging to the past. Thus, midway between the eternal world of the end, in which temporal existence merges, and the world of the beginning standing in the light of eternity, may lie, like an island in a broad ocean, the present world bound to temporal existence. Several Scripture passages seem to allude to such a celestial world pertaining to God's throne. Here come in the ζῶα (living beings) around God's throne in Ezekiel and Revelation, the representatives of creaturely life,[2] the seven spirits of God, the Cherubim and Seraphim. This celestial world seems to be contemplated in Scripture as a kingdom of beings serving God in perfect unselfishness, absolutely devoted to His will, in whom God's glory is mirrored and revealed. Certainly this eternal world,—prior to our historical period,—of which the world of succession and historical development is merely an appendage, when compared morally with the present one, is a lower stage of being, because the potentiality of freedom does not yet emerge independently in it. But still in this

[1] Rev. x. 6, xx. 11 : χρόνος οὐκέτι ἔσται.

[2] Rev. iv. 6 ff., v. 8, xi. 14, vi. 1-7, vii. 11, xiv. 3, xv. 7, 19 ff. ; cf. Ezek. i.

world of celestial spirits, in virtue of sympathy for our world, there may be a reflection of historical development and succession, so that by means of successive creations it acquires a relation to time and historical development.[1] Even a definitive moral decision may arise for it through its relation to the temporal world, which it summons in turn to co-operation and decision in behoof of God's newly emerging purposes; and previously this world of radiant spirits may sustain such relations after the manner of a pure, lofty nature. There is just as little any religious interest involved in supposing, on the one hand, God's intelligence, which conceives the world-idea to be eternally active, and the purpose of creation ever-existent, while His creative volition is still idle, as on the other in representing His intelligence which conceives the world as first at rest and then active. On the contrary, in this way arbitrary caprice or mutation would be imported into God's inner Essence, or even an obstruction, hostile to God, assumed in God. On the other hand, the interest of religion requires the firm discrimination of God from His creation, of His eternity from theirs, the latter being derived, not original. And this is secured by the dogmatic formula, perfectly in unison with church doctrine to the effect, that the world is that form of being which, although destined to wear God's likeness, still only comes into actual existence, both as a whole and as regards its several cycles or parts, through the divine conception of its non-existence, nay, through its non-existence. In this formula the truth, meant to be indicated in the theory of a creation in time, is preserved in adequate expression. Herewith is connected the antithesis of *rest or non-activity and activity*. It is inapplicable to God, not merely because His love is to be conceived as eternally operative, but also because God does not pass, after creative action, into inactive repose. The Sabbath of God is not to be contemplated in the light of idle reposing, but of a desisting from work which is withal full of activity.[2] It might seem, indeed, that for conservation, in distinction from creation, a less expenditure of energy may suffice, and therefore a comparative repose. But

[1] 1 Pet. i. 12.

[2] Gen. ii. 1, cf. with John v. 17; see above, § 32, conclusion.

we shall see presently why this cannot be held. But certain as it is that God is eternally active, *ens actuosissimum*, we still know that He need not on this account be ever doing the same thing. Commencement of existence is only possible in the world through the fact that what He willed eternally indeed in His world-idea, but did not will as eternally in respect of real effect, He now wills in time. Above time in Himself, He places Himself, after the appearance of a temporal world, in a positive relation to it and to time. Just so, passing out of existence is only possible in the world through the fact that God endowed the perishable with but a limited energy of existence, or that what He willed to effect in the fulness of time He ceases to effect, so that no doubt a comparative repose ensues.

5. CREATION OUT OF NOTHING, AND THE RELATION OF FORM AND MATTER IN CREATION. — The maxim, Out of nothing nothing comes, is not in contradiction with the doctrine of creation out of nothing. For the meaning of this doctrine is not that the world, whether regarded in relation to its matter or form, is without adequate originating cause, and that here the law of causality must be given up, but that in God alone is to be found the adequate, although miraculous and creative, cause of the world's existence, and that, therefore, the law of causality applies to the world in the fullest degree. Our position is, that it belongs to God's creative power, in harmony with the absolute Fulness of His Essence, to create both form and *substance*. To His miraculous power alone is the latter function reserved. It is the divine element in the strict sense in the work of creation; for the moulding of given substances, material and spiritual, lies within the power of the creature also. If we may not ascribe absoluteness to the world, thus identifying it with God, the origination even of matter must be acknowledged to take place by means of the divine causality; for a third existence, an eternal matter, whether apart from God or side by side with God, is out of the question. Rigid Materialism, denying spirit and God, must perforce regard the construction of the world as a purely mechanical process, but comes into collision, as regards matter, with the law of causality, by which still it must of necessity be absolutely governed in everything, being compelled to

assume, respecting matter, that it is without ground and cause. Respecting God, we may and must assume, that even in Him the law of causality finds its application, seeing that He is to be contemplated as self-originating. Consequently, in Him the cause runs back into itself, this being the idea of absoluteness. But of matter it cannot be imagined that it originates itself, and the idea of absoluteness is utterly incompatible with the nature of matter, with its isolation, divisibility, mutability, passivity. And the same must hold good in case an eternal matter is assumed, moulded indeed by the conscious or unconscious Absolute, but not having therein its originating cause. We should then obtain two Absolutes, whereas it pertains to the nature of the Absolute not to be a generic conception capable of existing in plurality. A *Dualism*, such as would follow from the notion of an eternal matter alongside God, is fatal to the unity of reason, whether matter be conceived as obdurate and unyielding, or plastic and of such a nature as to yield to the persuasion of the world-forming God (*Demiurge*), and submit to be disposed in the form of a κόσμος. The idea of Absoluteness is not purely apprehended, unless it include absolute self-origination,[1] which can pertain to but one—God. Accordingly, we must abide by the position, that even matter is to be derived from God's Omnipotence, although we do not comprehend the How of its realization.

And just as little as an eternal matter can be presupposed to God's creative activity, does the *form* of the world precede creation. That it is to be referred to God is conceded by all who acknowledge a rational plan, a teleology, in the world, even if it be the imaginary form of an eternal matter. But may we not suppose that the world-idea is the primary form of the world, preceding as it does the actual reality, and therefore even matter? But the idea, as of matter, so of form, is rather involved *in* the world-idea, and while we can conceive

[1] Cf. §§ 20, 21. It is a mere subterfuge and abdication of thought, when Ed. v. Hartmann all at once forbids inquiry into efficient and final causes on one point, and breaks out into rapturous praise of the "idealess bliss" of thinking no longer: "The true test of metaphysical talent is the ability to stand dumbfounded before the problem of causeless existence as before a Medusa's head." A problem is for the thinking power to solve, not to stand dumbfounded before.

matter without a definite form, we cannot conceive it absolutely formless, as little as we can conceive an actual form apart from matter. If, nevertheless, we choose to call the world-idea its primary form, this is no antithesis to matter, but to the actuality of the form and matter, which is merely postulated in the world-idea. Therefore the world-idea, or the ideal world in itself, is not a world in positive reality, although it is not Nothing. It lacks not merely matter, but the realization of the form outside God. Its only existence is as a world-picture in the divine Intelligence. We might then attempt to obtain a means of transition from the world-idea to the actuality of matter, on which, too, the realization of the form depends, by conceding indeed that matter like form is to be referred to God's creative causality, while supposing that the latter borrows the matter from the divine Essence, the divine Nature, as without doubt it borrows the form from the divine Intelligence. God may be supposed in His boundless fulness to form divisions or manifold concentrations of His essence, whether from a necessity of reproducing or reduplicating Himself, or that by His own volition He converts Himself into matter, which then becomes the object of His plastic activity. The first has been accepted in various forms by several theosophists, often in such adhesion to church formulæ that by the Nothing from which the world was made, they understood invisible, not yet actually separated potencies, the yet undivided, undetermined Essence of God.[1] In favour of this view, appeal is made to the consideration that, by deriving the material of the world from God's Essence, we better avoid the semblance of making something come from nothing. Moreover, it is alleged that by this transformation of a portion of His Essence, the divine Personality may remain untouched, supposing it to be the free power presiding over His Nature. This theory, of course, need not perforce have pantheistic consequences, and God's eternal Immutability need not be interfered with, provided the matter of creation was not part of God's proper Essence. But then it would be requisite to assume so loose a relation of the divine Essence to the divine Nature as would be inconsistent with the divine Immutability. If we glance at

[1] Cf. above, § 20, 1.

the matter surrounding us, it is impossible to imagine that it ever existed in God in the form in which it now presents itself to us. On the contrary, it must have undergone a transforming or depotentiating process, which could not be without a disturbing effect upon the idea of God Himself, unless we suppose that the "Nature" of God had no connection with His Essence, in which case we only exchange one difficulty for another, while importing a sort of dualism into God Himself. For the purpose, therefore, of preserving God's Immutability, it were better to have recourse to the idea of a self-reduplication of God, and say: God has a twofold mode of existence, at least, in relation to His Nature, one eternal and one mutable, the latter by His power of volition.[1] But thereby nothing would be gained. Such a real self-reduplication would still be nothing but a production out of nothing, quite as marvellous as such production, while inferior to it in so far as this self-reduplication, if it is to explain the present constitution of matter, could not be a simple reduplication, but must necessarily be connected with a process of transformation or depotentiation. Thus we must maintain our position, that in order to God's creative action in the first instance, all that is given is Nothing, which cannot even be called a potentiality of being, inasmuch as it does not originate (*setzt*) but is only negatived by origination (*Setzung*). But the unsuccessful attempts to derive matter from God's Nature, and the impossibility of maintaining the notion of an eternal matter outside God (which is a *contradictio in adjecto*, because without self-origination it is not eternal, and with self-origination it would not be matter), can only confirm us in the belief that there is no escaping from the idea of creation out of nothing, unless we would deny the idea of creation altogether, and contradict the accepted idea of God. But everything creative is big with mystery. Already in us dwells the

[1] Of this turn of thought we are reminded by Schelling's cosmogony in his *Philosophy of Revelation*, when above the potencies, out of which our world grows, he pictures God's absolute mighty personality eternally controlling its potencies. The dissolution of its unity, its subversion (*universio*), is for him the condition of a world external to God. But he leaves it uncertain whether the potencies are substantive realities or attributes. The latter may certainly exist in a twofold, nay, manifold manner, but only *in* substances whose diversity is not explained by self-reduplication.

wondrous faculty of giving birth to ideal creations of imagination or thought, an image, so to speak an echo, of creative power. But in God, inasmuch as He is the fount of all existence and life, dwells the further power, in unison with His love which ever tends towards reality, to impart to His ideal creations substantive existence, and make them stand forth in independent being. This substantive, in distinction from merely ideal, existence, not identical with God, projected into existence outside Him, is the essential element in the idea of what is created, whether it be substantive matter, with all the boundless vicissitude of forms and modes of existence to which it is subject, or whether the products of creative energy be spiritual creatures. For there are spiritual substances as well. As to matter, this Proteus still teems with mysteries for human science, and it is no business of theology to determine whether materialistic or idealistic Atomists, whether the champions of a mechanical or dynamical world-theory are right, nor on its own account does it need a decision on the point, but confidently remits fuller investigation to the physical sciences, save that it recognises and marks as impossible certain derivations of its origin and certain definitions of the relations between matter and spirit, because in contradiction with the essence of God and spirit.

Observation 1.—Less demur has been made to the supposition of man's spiritual essence springing out of God, than to the derivation of *matter* out of God's Essence. This view may be favoured by Gen. ii. 7; Acts xvii. 28: τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν. Just so, for example, our own hymnology, not merely the mystic, is full of phrases tending in this direction. Nor, in fact, if we are right in speaking of divine self-communication, can it be denied that divine powers, a divine spirit, is communicated to the creature by God's love (2 Pet. i. 4). Only in opposition to Emanationism, even of a more refined type, not merely instead of the involuntary issuing forth of the spiritual creature from God, must we maintain that this is not an action of God's nature alone, but of His will, but also instead of a mere volition of God's self-communication, a new will must be posited which in turn forms centres of manifold individuality, to which the communication can be made. Then, in order to avoid the above-mentioned difficulties, opposing themselves to the derivation of our matter from God's Essence, it might suggest itself to interpolate the

created spirit-world, and the use or abuse of its freedom as the mediating cause of the origin of matter. But this would imply that matter in its essence is spirit,[1] and would thus correspond with the idealistic theory of matter, respecting which, as observed, theology refrains from expressing a judgment, with the reservation, that the specific distinction between matter and spirit, nature and spirit, remain intact, which *e.g.* even Leibnitz strives to maintain. Upon other difficulties of this theory, which is widely spread in certain theosophic circles, *e.g.* that the free spirit-world must thus have been a co-creator of nature, it is not necessary here to enter more fully.[2]

Observation 2.—By the primary form of the world in God, not seldom has the Son been understood, and certainly even God Himself may be called the primary type or form of the world, especially in His inner self-objectivization, or as the Son; for God creates the world through the Logos, as well as after His type or image (Col. i. 13 ff.; John i. 3 ff.). But still God as Logos is more correctly spoken of as the primary form or *archetype for* the future real world, not the archetypical world itself. Whereas God in Himself is not potentiality, but absolutely real, the world-idea is merely the conception of the world destined to be realized, which only becomes what it is to be in its realized state through the divine life, which fashions the comparatively formless matter, and breathes into it soul and spirit.

6. Again, after a world and world-system are reached, we must still be careful to maintain the distinction of the *idea of creation* from that of *conservation*, and not allow the former to vanish in the latter. This proposition is important, when we have regard to the different stages of concrete beings. By universal admission, the human race has not existed always, even as its dwelling-place has not existed always. On the present earth the lower structures existed first, then the higher followed in systematic gradation, each higher one finding already in existence what it presupposes and needs, especially does man find Nature. If, therefore, with the first act, by which Nature arose, we let the idea of creation drop, retaining merely that of conservation, this would be the same

[1] Origen derives ψυχή from ψύχος. The fallen spirits, he said, froze into souls. In a similar sense, to Napoleon's question to Goethe: What is matter? Schelling wishes the answer given: It is *esprit gelé*.

[2] As to the above, compare the interesting, and in theological circles hitherto unnoticed, investigations respecting matter by Harms, *Allg. Encycl. der Physik*, Bd. 1, Einleit. pp. 299–413.

as saying that man is a *mere* product of the Nature existing before him, is to be explained by the conservation of its productive energy, and is a *mere* product of brute beings, or still lower physical forms,—a frivolous materialistic theory. Rational beings are specifically distinct from Nature, which therefore is not a sufficient cause of spirit. The lower cannot be sufficient cause for the higher, but is the necessary medium for preserving the unity of the world, although the lower furnishes no means for explaining the higher. In order to explain the origin of man, a creative power must be supposed, not yet introduced into Nature, and not exhausted in it, but towering above it. Proceeding even on empirical grounds, we must renounce the attempt to derive absolutely from one another all that follows one upon another, or is mediated one by another. To Nature, spirit is a miracle, a miracle being that which is inexplicable from the given world-system as such, although not on this account destitute of adequate cause. With this the unity of the world very well consists, unity not requiring uniformity of being throughout creation. In the unity of the world there is room not merely for Nature, but spirit. We have even a more immediate consciousness of the necessity of spirit than of Nature. In the next place, if we would comprise in one the two grand aspects of the world—nature and spirit—the second of which cannot be derived from the first by itself, we need to seek a higher whole, in which the later stages, without springing from the earlier, are seen to be something eternally involved in this whole as an essential element, nay, in which both are included in internal relationship to each other and for each other, but yet in fitting sequence. This whole is not the temporary world-system, but the divine idea of the world which, as perpetually active, becomes also, through God's creative will, the real world-cause. This eternal idea of the world, which is also the cause governing its emergence in actual reality, includes in itself the intimate coherence of all the parts of the cosmos, so that in the formation of the lower stages, which already have a reference to the higher, of which they are the necessary instrumental means, the formation of the higher really begins; for the accomplishment of the end begins with the formation of that which is destined to be its instrument and organ.

Since, therefore, the eternal world-idea, despite the plurality of creative acts, remains perpetually the same, even the appearance in the given world-system of a new creative manifestation, is no reason at all for alleging a dislocation of the world-system, or a change in God and His world-idea. On the contrary, it would imply an inconceivable change in the world-idea and in God, if the actual introduction of the end by a new divine act were wanting, while the former stages were in existence as the actual instrumental means in preparation for this end. How can Nature lay claim to be the entire world, and to admit into itself nothing that is not formed by its productive power, by it as the sufficient cause? This, in case the first existence beside God were matter, would mean that the world is nothing but matter. But so little is Nature the end of the world, that in the divine world-idea (as similarly in God's inner essence itself) it is rather conceived as a medium and organ or basis, and not even in God Himself can Nature be conceived as its own end.

Observation 1.—The importance for the idea of miracle of what has been established is obvious of itself. Creation, in so far as it is inexplicable from itself, from an already existing order of nature, is in reality a miracle, nay the *primary miracle*, but a miracle comprehensible in the necessity of the "that," though not self-evident in its "how," and springing from the rational laws of divine love,—hence a miracle only apprehended by a mind not dominated by the finite, *i.e.* only apprehended by faith, which may and ought to grow into *knowledge* of God.

Observation 2.—In the interest of the eternal immutability of the divine action, and with a view to the ostensible exaltation of divine omnipotence, Augustine supposes that God does not carry out His creative work in separate acts, but in one only, in which everything is implicitly established (cf. Aug. Dorner, *Augustinus, s. theol. System*, p. 35 ff., 71 ff.). But a successive creation would only be inconsistent with omnipotence, in case succession were imposed on God by something external to Him, not in case His volition itself wills it. Just as little is the true notion of God's unchangeableness infringed by the supposition of a succession in His causal action. God accompanies time, as with His knowledge (§ 27), so with His action. He need not, to maintain His unchangeableness, produce eternally the same effect, and does not, unless we suppose that there is no historical

progress in the world. Here also in Augustine the influence of Neo-Platonism upon his idea of God makes itself felt.—Quite recently, chiefly in consequence of the new movement in natural science due to Darwin, opposition has arisen against the supposition of a plurality of creative acts on the part of God, in the interest of the world's unity,[1] the notion being, that this requires everything occurring in the world, since its beginning, to be referred to its own forces as its sufficient cause. "The germs or causes of everything to come are already implanted and present in the universe from the beginning, although at first in a latent form, and only passing into reality after perhaps a long process. Thus, *e.g.*, man is already potentially created in Nature." If the meaning be, that Nature as Nature is already potential man, and the animal world a sufficient reason to explain the origin of man, then man is rated as a mere animal being, and the specific distinction between Nature and spirit, between physical and moral, is denied (see *infra*). But if the meaning be, that in Nature animal potentialities are indeed created and present in a latent form, but at the same time, and in distinction from them, the germs of future spirits, perhaps in this case the maintenance of the specific distinction between Nature and spirit may be possible. But, to say nothing of the fact that we should thus enter upon the unknown land of latent, slumbering forces or *qualitates occultæ*, the chief question remains, How is the emergence of the spiritual potentialities into reality to be brought about? Were it said: "Nature, which existed before man, brings spirit, which was only latent in it, forth into reality, apart from any action of God," we should again arrive at Naturalism, and that in a deistical form; and the result would be the same, if after the creation of the first man all creative activity of God, every new intervention of God, were excluded. In this case all would be seminally created in Adam. All would be absolutely the product of the human nature created in Adam, or of humanity left to itself. Hence even Schmid, in his excellent work, has here left scope for new acts of God occurring in time. He supposes that the germs of everything brought forth in the world's history, existing from the beginning, and coeval with the world's creation, are present in the first instance, merely in a latent, imprisoned form, and in due time are liberated or "set free." But still every time a divine act is required, summoning the potentialities into actual existence, and thereby first leading the creative will to its destined goal; and in this what we desire is acknowledged, namely, the resolution of

[1] K. Schmid, *Die Darwinschen Theorien*, 1876.

creative action into a series of acts, only that on the first theory a superfluous pre-existence of the higher in the lower would be postulated (*e.g.* of Christ in Adam), which only in appearance contributes more to the unity of the world than the view advocated above, according to which the real connection of specifically distinct orders lies in the receptiveness of the lower for the higher. For the specific distinction of the physical and spiritual remaining, this distinction must have asserted itself, even in relation to the germs of the spiritual alongside and in the physical, and the commencement of the real union of the two will still be dependent on the existence of living receptiveness in the lower for the higher. So that even thus the real but still sufficient safeguard for the unity of the world lies in the last resort only in the divine world-idea, which stands security for the union of the physical and spiritual.

SECOND POINT: CONSERVATION AND CONCURSUS.

§ 35. *Transition.*

Conservation with Co-operation and Providence, as well as Government of world, is to be distinguished from Creation.

Co-operation, Providence, and Government are teleological in character, and have regard to final, Creation and Conservation primarily to efficient, causes. The divine co-operation (Concursus) is the intermediate idea common to the two groups, although belonging primarily to the first. Creation itself presupposes nothing but the creative cause, while the other ideas have to do, not merely with divine, but also with finite causality, which owes it existence to the divine. The Concursus (of God) stands in relation to the reality of the world which manifests itself already in living activity. The world's existence comes about apart from the co-operation of finite causality. It is otherwise with conservation. If we take away the activity of the creature from the idea of conservation, it can no longer be distinguished from that of creation. Instead of conservation only a *creatio continua* is left. The latter view expresses a noble truth, provided it imply not that God every moment makes a new beginning, which would

mean that He institutes[1] nothing living, organized, continuous, and therefore no real world, provided the intention simply be not to allow the fresh, unique character of the idea of creation to disappear in that of conservation, but even in it to keep full in view the divine fount of life, without excluding the spontaneous activity of the creature. No doubt the *energy* in the act of self-conservation is every moment to be referred to the divine causality, which is conservative, not merely creative, only in so far as the causality originated co-operates in the preservation of its energy.. The doctrine of conservation is thus essentially the doctrine of the divine *concursus*, and is of decisive importance in opposition to Acosmism and Deism.

§ 36.

Little as the idea of creation should be resolved into that of conservation (§ 34, 6), just as little should the converse be done. Still, a false independence of the two ideas in regard to each other is also to be avoided. Both errors are avoided in the statement that a just idea of the divine activity in regard to the existence of the world, as a living world, is only formed by combining both views. If the creation-idea, as such, merely implies that God calls another real entity from non-existence into existence, the idea of conservation affirms that, for the purpose of giving the world a permanent character, God constitutes (*setzt*) it an abiding force, itself in turn a cause, and in its higher stages even a causality in its own reproduction. Conservation, therefore, is the continuance of the divine creative will, but in such a way as to embrace what is instituted (*das Gesetzte*) in its vitality, nay, employ its secondary causality as the means of its reproduction, by which course it becomes a creaturely image of the divine

[1] [The Translator would remark that the word *setzen* (to set, place), so frequently occurring in Dorner, cannot always be rendered by the same word in English. *Institute, constitute, originate, establish*, are the most common renderings. *Posit*, if it were allowable, would be the best equivalent.]

self-origination (self-existence), although merely on the basis of God's ever-present, sustaining omnipotence.

1. Ecclesiastical Doctrine has not treated this idea at length, although the Catechism distinguishes preservation from creation. In connection with the Flood, the O. T. depicts preservation in contrast with creation in specially vivid colours, and speaks of God's breath preserving the world.[1] In the N. T. the divine Principle manifested in the Son is also conceived as the Preserver.[2] But in a teleological relation also, the Word made Flesh is the world's Preserver. The sinful world is preserved for Christ's sake and on His account.[3] He is the immoveably fixed, living centre, alone able to stand security to divine wisdom and love for the world's excellence. The efficiency of secondary causes is already involved in the idea of creation, which is only completed in the institution of such causes. In its very nature it looks forward to the idea of conservation. "What our God has created, that will He also preserve." On this account, in Gen. i. each order of living plants is so made as to have its seed in itself. This has also a meaning in the spiritual sphere.[4] Paul calls himself a co-worker with God, a father who begot the Christians in Corinth, a mother who bore them.[5]

2. The world is not absolutely or originally self-constituting life (*sich selbst setzendes Leben*). In its existence it is and remains an effect, not constituting itself, and never attaining to the power of absolutely constituting itself. The opposite notion of the world as regards its substance preserving itself as a whole apart from God, and being an absolutely self-sustaining dynamico-mechanical organism, would be deistic in character, even supposing the rights of the divine government to be reserved.[6] God alone has self-existence in the absolute sense. The world can only reflect God's eternal life-process

[1] Ps. civ. 29, cxlvii.; Job xxxviii. ff.

[2] John i. 4: "In Him was life;" Col. i. 17: "By Him all things consist;" Heb. i. 3: "He sustains all things by the word of His power;" Acts xvii. 25–28.

[3] Col. i. 13 ff. [4] John vii. 38; Matt. xxviii. 19 f.

[5] 1 Cor. iv. 14 ff.; Gal. iv. 19; Rom. x. 14, 17; Eph. iv. 11.

[6] Even Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, ed. 2, I. 215–222, § 54, despite his opposition to the common notion of preservation, admits that God might at any moment destroy the entire mass of living creatures, as regards both the material and physical

in creaturely form, and in the way of creaturely derivation one from another, on the basis of God's continuous preserving volition. Were it absolutely self-constituting life, it would be God, no longer the world. On the other hand, were it *merely* constituted, it would not be an image of God, because not self-constituting, but finished once for all. On the contrary, we see at once that it is designed to form such an image, especially if we look at the living portion of the world, for whose sake the rest exists. Here, however, the apparently simple idea of conservation presents a difficulty. If the finite is constituted, it is constituted as a force able in its degree to maintain and manifest itself as causality. Nothing would be constituted, if the constituted were not constituted as a causal force. But how is it consistent with this, that God is also without intermission the cause of this causation? Does not finite causality, if really such, exclude divine? And conversely, must not the finite remain inherent in the divine and be a mere illusion, if in conservation also the divine cause be treated as real? And this difficulty becomes still more acute in the case of the living creature, to which of necessity a power of self-constitution must be ascribed. For the question then arises: How can continuous divine causality consist with this? It seems altogether superfluous. If one is treated as real, the other seems to become mere illusion. Were it said, the continuance or self-constitution of finite things is mediated for the individual only through the general world-idea conducive thereto, and the co-ordination of the many is the work of God the Preserver, there is no doubt truth in this, and we are reminded of the fact that the proper object of conservation is not the individual as such, but the world. But the main question would only be pushed farther back; for the question arises, Does the world conserve or maintain itself as a whole without further assistance from God's conserving energy? Is it, as the theories of a world-soul suppose, self-sufficient as a unity once constituted? Are we to agree with those who discern the very glory of God's creative power in the fact of His having created something that no longer needs His help

aspect (p. 221), and only ascribes absolute, self-determining indestructibility to what he calls "spirit," only, however, in virtue of the divine element appropriated by it, which has drawn the material into indissoluble unity with itself.

in the way that a machine still needs its master? Or must we assent to those who in the interest of religion elect to decline ascribing to nature power of its own, or even self-constitution?

3. The latter view we cannot accept, because this would be to revoke the idea of creation, and transform the creative relation of cause and effect into the category of accident and substance, or even of identity; for if the ostensibly created is without real force of its own, then the divine cause has really effected nothing. A real creature only exists, provided it exists as really distinct from the cause. Consequently, in the interest of the creation-idea itself, it is important for the divine act of constitution to give rise to something having separate existence, and not remaining inherent in the divine conception and volition, which are merely at first a determination (*Bestimmtheit*) in God Himself. And thus must creative activity itself produce that which is destined to permanent existence and able to become the object of conservation. But yet, on the other hand, God must be participant in conservation; for were the world so cut off from God as no longer to need His continuous influence, and to possess absolutely in its state of separation from God the ground of its continued existence, then at least as a whole it would possess absoluteness like God, although originally existing through God. And if such independence of God, no longer standing in need of Him, were part of its complete character as created, it were a second God, and place for religion there were none. But it is no part of the world's perfection to be God, its glory is community of life with God. Had God so constituted it as to surrender Himself entirely to its power, He would have fallen away from Himself. Two Absolutes being inconceivable, self-existence cannot belong to the world in the sense that it no longer needs God in order to its existence, and therefore in a state of separation from God finds in itself simply and solely the power of continuance or perpetual self-determination. Self-existence in this sense, be it said for the last time, belongs only to God. The following, then, is our conclusion: Neither must continuous *divine* activity be excluded, nor the agency of the created in its own conservation. Were the latter wanting, the unity of the world would be in peril; for if the separate parts of the world do not act as

causes, they do not influence each other, they are disconnected, and each and all are only willed by God in an atomistic way, without connection with the rest. In this case no organism, no cosmos is willed. And not less, conversely, would the world be no world, if it carried its basis of life within itself, or drew its power of self-conservation solely from itself.

4. But in what way can the two elements, both of which are equally necessary in thought, be reconciled? Only thus, that in the creative will itself what pertains to conservation is already involved, namely, that what is created is created a secondary causal power, and that the creative will is already directed to conservation; and this in such a manner as to employ the action of secondary causes for the ends of its conserving will, and consequently to embody it as an efficient factor in the latter. Since God wills the world not merely for an existence moment by moment, which would have to commence afresh every moment, but for a continuance in identity with itself, He also wills its causality in perpetual living connection with Himself; or, in other words, wills the divine Concursus, consisting in this, that every moment God wills the world to be self-reproductive, and confers upon its several structures a power of self-conservation. His will remains the constantly renewed, perennial, living ground of the world's possibility, so that the world would cease to exist and act, were His will to withdraw itself from its existence and capacity for being a secondary cause. The divine causality, thus conceived, is the higher unity, comprehending under it creation and conservation as two elements, neither of which can be imagined without the other. *Conservatio ingreditur ipsum decretum creationis.*

5. We saw (§ 34, 6) that even during the course of the world's existence a place must be left for creative causality, and that therefore the idea of conservation is not alone dominant during the world's history. But how does this newly-occurring phenomenon of creation chime in with conservation, which requires the co-operation of secondary causalities with God? The possibility of the entry of new elements into the world's course was formerly based upon the pregnant, divine world-idea, which, so far from being altered by what is new, is preserved intact by its very means. The point before us now is

to guard not merely the conservation of the world-idea, but of the actual world, from disturbance by really new elements. This is done by means of two propositions. FIRST, by distinguishing productive from medial causality (*causa medians*). In the world, as once established, there must be the capacity for all that succeeds, even for the phenomena of new creative acts. This is implied in the unity of the world. But productive capacity is one thing, receptive another; *e.g.* Nature has productive capacity for the conservation of its species, but only receptive for the origin of the human race. Were even the latter wanting—vital receptivity—then what is new would be no part of the world-organism. But if in the already existent there is at least receptiveness for the new, the world-order remains undisturbed despite the new. Nay, only in this case would contradiction arise in the world with its vital receptiveness—if the latter condition were left without satisfaction. SECONDLY, the new element can only enter into the world for the purpose of becoming thenceforth the object of conservation. With these two precautions there is no fear of danger to the idea of conservation from newly-occurring phenomena. The earlier is rather corroborated by the later under a new aspect, that of receptiveness, while the new is incorporated with the circle of conservation which enlarges itself in harmony with the eternal world-idea. The *motive*, on the ground of which the one creative will is pleased apparently to resolve itself as it were into several acts, is nothing but respect for the rights of secondary causes. For this is the divine law, that only through the spontaneous agency of the potencies already established are new receptivities evolved;[1] and similarly, the new phenomena, emerging in the world-order set on foot, are of such a kind as to presuppose the spontaneous activity of the established world, *e.g.* Christianity presupposes the operation of conscience. The new awaits or finds its point of connection in the results evolved by the productivity of the already settled order, which latter is receptiveness awakened on the side directed to the totality of the world-idea. Thus is the world able to remain one, firmly cohering in all its members and ideas, despite the differences, not merely of degree, which it carries in its bosom.

[1] Cf. H. Ritter's minor treatises, *Paradoxa*, 1867, p. 97 ff.

6. Although there are in nature causalities, which are such not merely in appearance, still the perfect idea of secondary causality is not reached except in a state of freedom, in "free causes." For the several beings belonging to the kingdom of nature, which are to be called causes, *e.g.* animal beings, are merely peculiar combinations of forces into a unity, and the manner in which the forces are combined along with their tendency determines of itself the movements of such beings. The unity itself is no new causality which is master of itself. Only in a state of freedom, within the domain of nature, is a being independent of physical forces constituted by God, a being who, while he ever has his basis in the fact of his constitution by God's creative and conserving will, has also power over his own reproduction, nay self-forming power, power not simply determined from without. It is a mistake to suppose a lower degree of activity on the part of God, a comparative repose or self-limitation of His power, in the case of free agents. On the contrary, creative causality is far more productive in establishing the free than the unfree, whose causal power remains partially inherent as it were in the divine. Creative causality is perpetually at work in conserving even the free, and that as the determining force; for at no moment can freedom be the author of its own existence, but simply make a good use of itself as constituted, or the opposite. Its power relates not to the fact, but to the character of its existence. In nature is causal force, but determined, and indeed not determined by itself. Even there the determining force is again a cause behind a cause. When, on the other hand, freedom is given to man, he is a self-determining cause, on him is conferred causality in its second power. He can be a cause not merely as he is determined by God, but the cause of his own causal action, cause of himself, *i.e.* as a good or evil causal power. Nevertheless, since he is not the author of the existence of his own freedom, and does not possess it apart from God, even then self-existence is not his, but, metaphysically or ontologically considered, God is the abiding cause of man's being a cause able to determine the character of his existence, *i.e.* to determine whether he will be a good or evil causal power.

THIRD POINT: DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

§ 37.

Creation and Conservation have to be defined in a teleological respect, and thus lead to the conception of *Providence*. But Providence is partly regulative of what exists, partly creative.

1. ECCLESIASTICAL AND BIBLICAL DOCTRINE.—What we possess, we are compelled to refer to God's wise and good Providence, by which all absolute chance (*e.g.* in origin, birth and death, in the course of the world) is precluded, as well as the blind, aimless necessity of fate, which in its ultimate ground would be chance.[1] We are thus able to believe in the possibility of the hearing of prayer.[2] The Reformed Confessions give more prominence to this point.[3]

As concerns *Biblical* teaching, *πρόνοια* occurs only in the apocryphal Book of Wisdom; but God's Providence is taught in a variety of ways.[4] Physical and spiritual are alike embraced by it, but in a teleological respect, in view of the eternal world-plan and absolute purpose—the supreme good of God's kingdom in Christ, God does not repent.[5] God's world-plan is certain of fulfilment, despite every hindrance. Whoever will not serve it of good-will, must serve it as a passive instrument and against his will.[6] But this accomplishment of the world-plan is effected not by sheer might, but gradually, in harmony with the laws of wisdom,[7] and in such a way as to employ the agency of second causes.

[1] *Cat. Maj.* 492, 23. 408, 24; *Apol.* 85, 14; *Form. Conc.* 580, 677.

[2] *Apol.* 91, 46.

[3] *Cat. Pal.*: *Dei Providentia est omnipotens et ubique præsens Dei vis quæ cœlum et terram tamquam manu sustinet et gubernat.* Hence Providence is the union of conservation and government. Cf. *Helv.* I. cap. 6, *Belg.* 13. *Gall.* 8: *Pro sua voluntate ordinat et disponit, quidquid in mundo evenit.* But He is not *autor peccati.* His conduct is just, He turns evil into good.

[4] Wisd. xiv. 3, xvii. 2 ff. Cf. Acts xiv. 17, xvii. 25–28; Matt. vi. 25–32; Rom. viii. 28; Luke xii. 24; Phil. i. 6, ii. 13.

[5] Rom. viii. 28, xi. 29, 36; Col. i. 13 f.; Phil. ii. 10; Rev. v. 13.

[6] Rom. ix.–xi. Cf. Wisd. xii. and xvi.–xix.

[7] Gal. iv. 4; Acts xvi. 6, 7; 2 Cor. xii. 9.

Providence also extends to the most minute and to individuals, of which the most significant instances are the baptismal injunction and the justification of individuals.[1] Each elect one receives a new name.[2] But it relates to individuals in the sense that in them is willed the living realization of God's kingdom, or each one is willed as a member of that kingdom.[3]

2. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION.—RELATION OF PROVIDENCE TO THE FORMER IDEAS.—Creation and Conservation, as such, are exhibitions of power. But power is the minister of God's love and wisdom. It works with a teleological reference. And in this way, creation and conservation being contemplated under the idea of purpose, that which is created and conserved is brought under divine *Providence*. *Government*, likewise teleological in nature, is not a distinct department alongside Providence, but an aspect of the same. Government presupposes what is governed, and therefore includes nothing creative. But Providence in its governing capacity is that divine activity, which keeps both the spontaneous activity of the established system, and the new combinations entering it, in harmony with the aim of the divine world-idea.[4] But this idea, which forms the contents of Providence, is not realized at *one* stroke, by *one* creative act; but spontaneous activity and maturity of receptiveness on the part of the established system of things must precede the elements of the world-idea, which cannot be established immediately, although they belong none the less to the entire plan of world-reality (§ 34). Now this divine activity which, when the fulness of time is come, causes the new to issue forth, while at the same time of set purpose making sure of the coherence of the new with the old, is likewise a department of Providence, not merely in its rectoral, but its creative capacity. Through this reference to purpose the world is a whole pregnant with meaning. The contents of Providence or the *aim of the world*[5] are the glorification of God, but in the last resort of God in His

[1] Matt. x. 30, xviii. 10, xxviii. 19 ff.; Mark xvi.

[2] Rev. ii. 17, xvii. 8; John x. 3.

[3] Eph. ii. 15–22.

[4] Otherwise Rothe, *ut supra*, p. 219, who assigns even creative acts to government.

[5] See above, § 32, 2.

character of love, so that the glorification of the world, which is destined to be made happy in love and wisdom, is included as well. The aim of the world is not simply external, and does not merely hover above it, but includes the idea of its proper nature, such as is eternally conceived by God, and is native to the world, inasmuch as that aim only becomes reality through the productive or at least receptive vitality of its nature. The world is destined to be an *image of the triune God.* Accordingly, the triune form of life is already incorporated therein, in so far as it is life and organism, and still more in a spiritual and moral respect, although only in such a manner that it realizes its conception in a gradual process of development through a series of creative, firmly-concatenated acts of God (§ 36, 5). On the other hand, the *process of development* is *not the only possible form in which life can exist.* Where development is, defect still is; but life is not dependent on defect of life. Therefore we need not fear that life may possibly become extinct or its pulse of movement fail, when all the elements belonging to the ultimate aim are brought into simultaneous existence. So little is this the case, that, on the contrary, true, godlike life in its entire range and compass only begins when every moment is the destined goal and consummated presence of the supreme good.

3. Mode of Operation of Divine Providence.—Generally speaking, it operates as the All-ruling divine will conducting the world, with its conceptions which ever transcend the reality, to its destined goal.

It embraces everything, even free causes, each in its own way. It includes the agency of *secondary causes* in harmony with their nature in such a way as to keep secure, along with the absolute aim, the distinction between the necessary and free causes, by whose means the aim is to be worked out. Where this is denied, religion shrivels into passive resignation and abandonment of all effort. There finite and divine causality, when not identified, are treated as mutually exclusive. Where one acts, the other does not. Absolute Determinism, and to some extent the Mystics, would have everything referred directly to God's Providence, to the exclusion of the spontaneous activity of the world. The Mohammedan refuses medicine, because everything happens as God predes-

tinated. But if everything outside God is impersonal and without causality, then has Providence no real object, and government nothing to govern. And, especially, to wish to exclude human freedom in the interest of God's all-comprehending Providence, would be to look on God as a monarch able only to effect His purposes by means of unfree, impersonal forces. But it is a higher order of government, nay true government, to be able to control free forces, and bend them to one's own purpose.

On the other hand, wide as is the field that God's Providence leaves to the action of free causes, it nevertheless utterly excludes absolute *chance*, as well as blind might or *caprice* not standing at the beck and control of God's wise love. As respects *chance* especially, divine Providence, clothed with Almighty power, so comprehends everything of this kind in its range, that nothing exists without both final and efficient cause. Absolute chance there cannot be; for, God's vision including all possibilities, nothing can occur unobserved and unexpected by Him, but God is great and wonderful in counsel.[1] Nothing within the compass of the possible can actually take place without God's permissive, not to say against His absolutely disposing, will; and He permits nothing actually to take place that would interfere with His world-plan. We may, indeed, speak of a *comparative* chance. When in a particular department an effect follows, whose sufficient cause is to be found not in that department but in an external cause, relatively, *i.e.* with reference to the department in question, this effect may be said to be by chance; but absolute chance even here there is none, both departments being held in relation to each other by a higher hand or unity, else they would be unable to influence each other. The idea of absolute chance is therefore a matter of imperfect observation.

But we must linger awhile on the subject of human *freedom* in relation to Providence. Freedom is the possibility of arbitrariness, and so far there is in it the principle of chance, and that real, though still not absolute. For in its *existence* and aim freedom is conditioned by God. Regarded neither in an efficient nor final relation is its existence

[1] Job xv. 8; Ps. xxxiii.; Isa. xxviii. 29, xl. 13; Jer. xxxii. 18 ff.; Prov. viii. 14; Rom. xi. 33; 1 Cor. ii. 7.

accidental. For as the possibility of decision between opposites, between a twofold possibility, has freedom been willed by God in His ethical character as an essential means in order to the morally good or ethically necessary. Consequently, every moment is God master of the existence of such freedom, whose possibility resides perpetually in Him alone, —a consideration sufficient of itself to prove that even when perverted to evil it cannot overthrow God's world-plan. But the ethical character of the divine aim requires that it should not be carried out by force or compulsion, for thereby it would nullify itself. Thus, while on the one hand freedom is necessarily, and the comparative contingency implied in it rationally, ordained by God, on the other it is included in the sweep of the divine world-aim. To this is to be added, that the free, which is created in order to the good, only realizes its idea by means of the latter, while through evil it falls into bondage, and as arbitrary caprice runs to waste. Moreover, this forms a limitation to freedom, so that it can never be a principle of absolute chance. If freedom of choice as the *possibility* of chance has necessity in reason, still its rationality is not that of the final aim, but merely of the instrumental means. As formal freedom it is a necessary medium or point of transition. Accordingly the possibility of chance is not the highest good in itself, nor is it so eternally. On account of all these limits, which prove freedom not to be absolute, it is impossible for it, as arbitrary caprice, ever to build up a firmly-compacted hostile kingdom of arbitrariness. In contradiction with God's absolute final aim, freedom is in contradiction with itself, and reduces itself, though not the divine world-aim, to impotence and ruin.

4. But we must examine still more minutely the RELATION OF PROVIDENCE TO EVIL. The possibility of evil is necessary, although God can never convert this possibility into reality, or incorporate it with the world-aim otherwise than as a *conditio sine qua non*. Consequently, even evil, "moral chance," does not lie outside the pale of God's all-comprehensive Providence. It arises out of freedom in its arbitrary aspect, the capacity for which is every moment from God. Still less can an independent, eternally-enduring power belong to evil. Arbitrariness is only permitted a place in the world

of the instrumental means by which the absolute final aim is accomplished, and, passing by the considerations just advanced, finds its limitation in nature outside us, in its own distinctive character and essence, in the rational beings outside it, even in their caprice as well as in its own essence, in the native, essential connection between the morally necessary and the free. But, finally, in its wisdom and might, Providence finds in itself the means for conducting the world-aim to its blessed end, partly in its *judicial* character (*i.e.* by upholding in conscience—the counterpoise to caprice—through law and penalty the rights of the morally necessary and its absolute authority against the arrogant, turbulent pretentiousness of evil), and partly in its character of love impoverishing itself, and thus winning moral victories over free spirits. In its boundless compass God's wise love possesses means whereby it is able, notwithstanding the wide diffusion of evil, without force and compulsion to save even the fallen and guilt-laden from perdition. Without losing itself, love is able to surrender itself to the uncertainty of caprice, even of contumely, and yet remain assured of its inner victorious power to make even the world's passage through a state of sin a means of glorifying itself, and triumphantly realizing its aim in a kingdom of free spirits. It is a triumph of divine art (τέχνη Θεοῦ), that in His character of love God surrenders Himself in His Word, in the Sacraments, in Christ Himself, to the domain of caprice and contingency, exposes Himself in all this to misunderstanding and contumely, and yet does it in such a way that through this very self-impoverishment love reveals its purity and unselfishness, and also its divine invincibility, and by renouncing the use of mere power and judicial methods exhibits the victorious, heart-subduing omnipotence of love over free existence. And whoever may be lost through despising God's revelation of love, the organism and aim of the world can suffer no hurt. At the command of God's omnipotent wisdom are means for filling up the gaps,[1] and God's prescient wisdom in its eternal counsel has already provided for this. While, therefore, God every moment sustains evil in existence, and without Him it could not exist at all, still a righteous and gracious Providence, the guardian

[1] Luke xix. 24-26.

of the world-aim, is not merely confident of victory in spite of evil, but even converts the actual existence of evil into a means for accomplishing its aim in the most signal, most thoroughgoing negation of evil.

5. RELATION OF THE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE TO THE DIVINE WORLD-PLAN AND FREE CAUSALITIES.—That the divine plan of the world or counsel excludes not secondary, especially free, causes, we have seen. But now the question may be asked, Are the contents of this world-plan a mere general purpose, which seeks to leave a place for free actions, without being thereby thrown into disorder, whereas definite free actions and definite individuals are not included therein? Or, are definite, particular individuals, such as are to exist, with their actions included therein, and their free actions, although not willed or approved, yet at least eternally known and permitted? Here, again, we come to a question previously touched on and left open (§ 26). As concerns, in the first place, the point of eternal *permission*, we must certainly hold that the divine world-plan, so far as it relates to the actions of definite individuals and their circumstances on the whole, does not originate exclusively in God, as it were *uno actu*, in all its elements, but in order to the formation of the concrete world-plan, such as it will actually become, the foreseen use of freedom *in concreto* must be taken into account as a woof, so to speak, adopted into the conceptions drawn by God purely from Himself. We have before found ourselves unable to abide by an abstract simplicity of the divine essence, nor can we, with the old divines of the seventeenth century, regard the divine counsel as a simple divine conception. It is rather a mediated one, composed of diverse elements, a portion of which springs not from God but from the variable factor of human freedom, by which, however, the divine conduct conditions itself, and consequently His counsel as well, although its ultimate aim is not determined thereby. *Firm*, indeed, and *immoveable* stands the *world-aim*, that holy Love shall gain a kingdom in which to rule, that the universe established by omnipotence shall become a moral Cosmos, which, however, does not imply that all rational beings will reach the goal of holiness and blessedness. The latter issue is no postulate of divine love, because as just

it must desire free decision, and justice is the *conditio sine qua non* of the communication of love. But certainly the will of divine love is to grant to all free beings the possibility of attaining the life of love; and thus the divine counsel also includes the means for accomplishing the divine aim of the world. But still neither of these includes definite persons. The question, therefore, still is: Can the divine counsel remain indefinite, and have as its real object merely the race, the species in general?[1] We must rather suppose, as a third element in the divine counsel, concrete persons and the position they take therein, even as Holy Scripture in various ways designates persons as its objects.[2] But the persons are free. Their conduct, like their position in the world-whole, cannot therefore be decided by mere predestination, just as little as man apart from God can be called the master of his own fate. Thus the necessity recurs for laying down the doctrine, that the definite assignment of a place in the world-plan to individuals is conditioned by the *intuitus* of free causes, or that in the definitive formation of the world-plan, comprehensive of concrete personalities, God conditions Himself by regard to the use of creaturely freedom.[3] But if the formation of the concrete world-plan, *i.e.* the plan comprehending definite persons, was from eternity definitive in nature, and not simply rendered more definite by the knowledge of the use of freedom revealing itself only in time, we are compelled to maintain a foreknowledge even of the free, and therewith encounter one of the most difficult of dogmatic questions.

We have previously been unable to conceal from ourselves that the supposition of a divine foreknowledge of free actions, and therefore also of the definite persons who will attain the goal of perfection and blessedness, has its difficulties. The greatest of these is the following. It seems as if, supposing such eternal foreknowledge to exist, the free cause must have had a real effect before its actual existence, namely this, to render itself perceptible to divine knowledge, since this divine

[1] As supposed by Schleiermacher and v. Hofmann on different grounds.

[2] Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14, xxiv. 22, 24, 31; Mark xiii. 20, 22, 27; Luke xviii. 7; Rom. viii. 33; Eph. i. 4, cf. ii. 19–21.

[3] As, for example, John Gerhard says: *Intuitus fidei ingreditur decretum electionis.*

foreknowledge could only spring from God alone, on the supposition of God being the exclusive cause of the free. Hence Martensen, Rothe, and others, fear that the notion of an eternal foreknowledge of future free existence would rather transform the free into the necessary. For this reason, they suppose that the *ultimate aim*, the *realization* of a *kingdom of love*, indeed, stands immoveably fixed; but as concerns the persons, who can only be incorporated into this kingdom by means of free agency beyond the reach of foresight, the divine world-plan is still indefinite, and its still empty framework is only gradually filled up through the free agency of individuals, the divine knowledge being thus supplemented step by step in time. But before deciding in favour of *denying* the *divine foreknowledge* of the free, let us ask ourselves whether this will not involve its own, perhaps even greater, difficulties. And first, we must weigh well the fact, that God's perfected kingdom embraces none but free personalities. If, then, divine foreknowledge of the free is to be absolutely denied, whereas the entire accomplishment of the divine counsel is still conditioned by freedom, there will be no certainty of even *one* individual being led by his spontaneous decision to the desired end. But where in this case is the fixed world-aim, which yet those teachers rightly desire to be unconditionally maintained? How can its working out and realization be unconditionally certain for God, if absolutely of all who form the real contents of the world-aim, it is uncertain whether they will attain it? God would then have created the world at a mere guess. Seeing, therefore, that these divines hold the realization of the purpose to be absolutely certain, they seem to betray that they unconsciously assume a sort of foreknowledge of the free, or in the background put necessity in the place of freedom. To this is to be added, that Holy Scripture does not favour the notion of an indefinite world-plan, particular persons and nothing else being, on the contrary, made the object of divine Preparation, Providence, and Election. A *religious interest* is involved in the *world-plan*—not a colourless scheme, but concrete—showing no sign of weakness, but remaining eternally certain for God. We are then able to repose confidence in it, and God is seen to have created, not in a tentative way, but in pros-

pect of the certain accomplishment of His world-plan without injury to freedom. This view is specially countenanced by *prophecy*, as by Holy Scripture generally.[1] On the other side, the impossibility of divine foreknowledge of the free, even if we are unable to conceive to ourselves its manner, is not adequately proved. Even human science supplies an approximately correct fore-calculation of circumstances and events depending on freedom. Nay, the calculation of probabilities, which is constantly growing in importance, and statistics, moral statistics included, are based on nothing else than the possibility of a comparative prevision of free events. Certainly, foreknowledge of the free were an impossibility, if *volition* must necessarily coincide with divine *knowledge*, a notion resting on the mistaken conception of God's simplicity formerly abandoned. But this Schleiermacher-like, freedom-denying assumption, Rothe himself disclaims. We thus hold that God's world-plan is not one that omits definite individuals from the highest grace, and includes, as it were, merely things in general, or His own acts, seeing that even the latter are partly conditioned by the free. The incorporation of definite human individuals into the world-plan is brought about by means of His intuitive knowledge. These individuals will form the organism, and this organism is a fact certain of accomplishment. But, of course, it cannot be said with our old Theologians, that the divine world-plan is a simple divine conception, deduced simply and solely from God. If freedom is to be retained, the world-plan can only be one of a mediated nature, made up of diverse elements, of which the portion not originating with God, though determined by Him, is still foreseen by God for the purpose of being incorporated permissively into the divine world-plan. For the rest, the importance of this controversy was previously (§ 27, 5) reduced to its true measure in God's all-comprehensive knowledge of the possible and present, as well as the security of the world-aim, and the certainty of its accomplishment, being acknowledged on both sides. Further, the supposition of the divine foreknowledge must not be held to imply that it exercises a limiting influence on the divine procedure, that,

[1] Isa. xliii. 9; Ps. cxxxix. 16; Job xiv. 5; Matt. xi. 21; 1 John iii. 20; Heb. iv. 13.

for example, through foreknowing that the offer of salvation will be in vain in a particular case, God will refrain from making the offer. No one can be judged by the way in which he would have acted, if he is not actually brought into circumstances to act rightly.

6. Theology distinguishes *providentia universalis*, embracing also nature, from *specialis*, referring to the kingdom of rational beings, and *specialissima*, referring only to believers. This distinction would be erroneous, if the meaning were that Providence is less observable in one province than in another. The activity put forth by God is not indeed a merely uniform one, which may only have assumed a different appearance, or had a different result, through diversity in the world, but one taking a different form according to the end in view. While this is so done that in everything He wills the whole—the entire world-plan, He also assigns to the individual, which He wills with reference to the whole, a diverse position in the latter, and influences it accordingly. He wills Nature as a means for the sake of spirit. As to spirit, He wills it to come to the knowledge of His truth, into communion with Himself; and His activity extends to each according to the kind and degree of its receptiveness and maturity. To religion, for example, is assigned a central, to the world of industry a circumferential, importance. How far the possibility of change in God's action, a conditioning of Himself by the act of the free creation, is here implied, how also a participation in the time-life of the world without detriment to God's moral unchangeableness, was formerly investigated.

Concluding Observation.—In the ideas treated of, from that of creation onwards, the divine activity defines itself with greater and greater precision. First of all, it is seen establishing real existence in general; next, establishing with the purpose of continuing the existence established, and therefore willing and imparting power in order to continuance by self-reproduction; finally, working out wise and holy aims. Thus, the three ideas, Creation, Conservation, Providence, correspond in their ascending gradation with the categories of existence, life, and spirituality, especially ethical existence; and as the antithesis of the physical and spiritual is thus already prefigured, so is also their reciprocal connection

SECOND MAIN DIVISION.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CREATURE.

FIRST HEAD: THE DOCTRINE OF THE WORLD AS NATURE.

SECOND HEAD: THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

APPENDIX: THE DOCTRINE OF ANGELS.

FIRST HEAD.

THE WORLD AS NATURE.

§ 38.

THE world is created good and perfect, not in the same sense as God, but in the sense that as Nature it is fitted and destined, and continues to be a means in reference to the world-aim, which finds its realization through spirit.

1. Holy Scripture says that God beheld the world He had made, and pronounced it good (Gen. i. 31). This is said *before* the Fall. A later passage (Gen. vi. 6) may seem to imply a change in God's judgment of the world, a repentance of God on account of sin. And no doubt, if the existence of the world were simply in unlimited contradiction to God's moral nature, sin is an absolute evil, and a state of nothingness preferable. But such a subversion of the world-plan to its deepest foundations did not ensue, even as the result of sin; for God remained master of Himself, of His righteousness, and wisdom, and omnipotence (§ 37); and that the world in itself, certainly not in its sinful character, but through God's connection with it not absolutely broken off, was even after the Fall still good through its receptiveness for Him,—of this its preservation, its continuance, is the pledge. But certainly it cannot be preserved on account of what it is, but of what it is to be, even chastisement and punishment being a means of preserving the world, a guarding of the normal against the abnormal. But with punishment is linked promise, and with the Flood, the emblem of peace.[1] According to more definite Christian teaching, the world still possesses goodness so far as it is receptive for Christ, and so far it is not yet cast off. Even after sin, the Logos remains in the world as the innermost

[1] Gen. iii. 14–19, ix. 13 ff.

principle of life and consciousness, as the world's hidden centre, which is one day to issue forth for salvation.

2. As we have not here to do with cosmological questions, we have only to speak of the relation of nature to God and to man. That God does not influence nature in a mechanical way, that it is not a mere phantom, a mere transition-stage in the divine volition and life, is evident from what has gone before. It has a pulse of life in itself, its several structures are centres of force or springs of life. Even with respect to its essence, it cannot be absolutely alien to God, but something in it must resemble Him. It bears His seal, even the life that is in it already reflecting the triune life-law. It has not in it merely the essence of the established, commanded; but whatever proceeds from God's creating mouth must carry in itself establishing, productive force. But Nature makes no reply to the Word, through which it arose. It is not dead, but speechless and blind. Only in man does awakened nature open its eyes to recognise its Maker, to reply to His voice. Nevertheless, even Nature is not precluded from a share in typically representing the elements of the divine essence,—life, harmony, and beauty, nay, even God's goodness, —and in this respect is good. No doubt it seems as if *physical evil*, the conflict of the animal-world within itself, death, and corruptibleness, were inconsistent with this view. It cannot, indeed, be said that enjoyment is the aim of Nature, else what is without sensation would be aimless; but still the sufferings of living creatures through each other or men, and their destruction, seem to conflict with the goodness of Nature. When the Wolffian philosophy says that the world is the best among possible worlds, this is no solution but a confession of the enigma.[1] Others say: "Through man's sin everything is subverted in Nature. It was his to hold the reins; they fell from his hand, and now disorder and strife reign in the world." But why does Nature suffer for man's fault? Moreover, Palæontology indicates the presence of death and decay in nature, before man's appearance. Nor, finally, does the hope of a future state, when the groaning creation shall participate in man's redemption, solve the riddle, because this Palin-

[1] Which again may even merge into the dualistic proposition of modern Pessimism: "The world is worse than none at all."

genesis does not affect the suffering individuals, to whom we are unable to ascribe immortality. The right answer, therefore, is: Immortal the individual nature-beings cannot be, because they have no absolute value in themselves, but only a limited aim, harmony, and so on. So far, therefore, from a wrong being done them (§ 23) when they perish, when death with all its accompaniments befalls them, or from this being opposed to God's goodness, which reveals itself in them to a limited degree, the idea of justice, which assigns measure and end to everything according to its worth, and must be the inner law of goodness, requires that creatures of the natural order should not be treated as if they were of infinite worth, but that as limited they come to an end, and be given over to corruptibleness. But this, so far from excluding, confirms the hope of a future participation even of Nature in the incorruptibility of the children of God. For such an independent form of existence in relation to reason as Nature had *in the first instance* (for the very reason that it was *before* the rational creation), or as it still has in general, and by which corruption exercises its undisputed sway over it, it will then have no longer. Nature will rather be the magnified body of humanity, of rational beings in general, and thus, through this tightly-knit bond, participate in their incorruptibleness. Spirit is destined to be the redeemer even of nature. This final result does not require Nature to have been incorruptible in the beginning as well. If Nature was before man, its initial condition was not that state of close association with spirit which will find place at the end; but, on the contrary, its first form of existence was its limited, isolated stage, with which termination and death were bound up. But such a separate existence, were it permanent, would be against the notion of spirit, as well as against nature's own receptiveness for spirit, described by Paul as its inner sighing after perfection.[1] So far, then, as sin retards this perfection, it may certainly be said that Nature is detained by sin in a state of corruption against its will, as well as, that it has been placed in a long-enduring state of corruptibleness, which apart from sin was unnecessary, if the assimilation of Nature by spirit could have been accomplished forthwith.

[1] Rom. viii. 17.

3. But again, Nature is good by reason of its teleological relation to man, and that even at present. "The ground is cursed for thy sake,"[1] which does not mean that it suffers through man, that thorns and thistles are abnormal and later created organisms, but expresses its teleological relation to man. Nature is good, because it was prepared for man before the Fall, but also prepared for him as he is after the Fall. It restrains or punishes him now, acts as a spur to his indolence, rewards his industry, but need not, in order to do this, ever have been different. Its flexibility and plasticity are helps to this end. From the beginning it was made for man, and for government by him, but he must first, as it were, conquer this supremacy for himself. Provided his development is normal, and he is not wanting in spiritual energy, Nature can never offer him insuperable resistance, or refuse him what he needs. If his state is abnormal, one of spiritual feebleness, even then it is good, because of the very resistance and restraint it offers. Teleologically regarded, therefore, it was good, and is *still* so, and this is the chief point in reference to it. Now this purposeful relation of nature to spirit forms an inner bond of connection between *the two.* Nature has first of all the power of influencing spirit, of furnishing it with an abundance of incentives for developing the consciousness of self, of the world, and of God. It serves in a special sense to stimulate and fructify the speculative spirit, to which everything after its manner may be an object. But no less is it susceptible also to the influence of spirit, or so co-ordinate with the practical spirit that in it the latter may embody itself, make it its organ, through it, so to speak, enlarge its own organism, and turn it into a weapon for acquiring the mastery of the world. Spirit is able to make nature a symbol, nay a mirror and expressive image of the spiritual. Nature also is capable of intelligibly bodying forth the infinite. It forms no obstacle to the revelation of infinite truth. The corruptible may become a "parable" of the incorruptible. Nay, spiritually infinite truth may become "event, matter of fact," through self-embodiment in the finite. Nature especially shows this in man, through whose bodily organization the perfect teleological relation of nature to spirit is partly initiated, partly completed.

[1] Gen. iii.

SECOND HEAD.

MAN.

§ 39.

MAN is the goal and crown of the Nature known to us. All its stages are presupposed conditions and means in reference to him. He is its living synthesis and realized unity of aim. Therefore is he lord of the world. On one hand, accordingly, man is also a *natural being*, and under this aspect only its culmination, the highest natural being, subject to every law of finite nature—limited, dependent, full of need, reproducing himself indeed, but with only a limited measure of vital energy, and therefore, like all beings of the earth, subject to death. But, on the other hand, he is also the culmination of nature in such a sense that he already reaches forward to a specifically higher domain, and through the higher side of his nature is not necessarily subject to death.

1. The narrative of creation makes creation take place in ascending gradation, but makes it cease in man as in its destined goal from the beginning, *i.e.* in the sense that everything preceding was a preparation for him.[1] On emerging into existence he finds a house, a home such as he needs, and subjects standing ready, when their master appears. But far more significant still is the manner of his creation. While he is dust taken from dust, he is not, like what preceded, a mere product of the earth impregnated with life by the Spirit of God brooding over it. At the ground of man's creation lies a new distinct divine conception presented in the form of a self-consultation on the part of God, and the carrying out of this supreme work is by inspiration of divine breath.[2]

2. In Nature the divine work of creation does not perfectly

[1] Gen. i., ii. 7, 19. [2] Gen. i. 26, ii. 7.

come up to its idea. God indeed is revealed in it as the creative principle of life, but as it contains no aims of boundless compass, through Nature alone no revelation would be given of God Himself as spirit and the supreme good. In Nature, it is true, is found sensation, but even in its higher stages it does not behold itself, to say nothing of the divine. In order, therefore, that knowledge of and desire for the divine may be possible in the creature, God's creative love makes the "creature of dignified presence," the crown of creation in the sense, that without this crown the tree of the world would be a fragment without perfection of aim. Theodore of Mopsuestia early acknowledges that "God prepared man to be the bond of the universe, in him reduced diversity to unity, to the end that in him the whole world may be, so to speak, knit together, and he may be the real and effectual pledge to the universe of its harmony and friendship." Just so, according to the eighth Psalm, everything has its unity as comprehended under man's governance. Modern philosophy, especially the natural philosophy of Schelling's school, has begun to indicate how, even in a corporeal respect, the various systems of life—the nervous, ganglionic, muscular, etc.—which in nature appear apart in different classes of beings, are united in man, and how each one of these systems thus attains its proper perfection, and is an appropriate means for realizing the unity of aim in the entire organism. A similar idea is involved in the ancient doctrine of man being a *microcosm*. But—and this is far more important—with this concentration of various systems of life corresponds a further concentration of another kind. The consciousness of man is a mirror of the universe, he is the consciousness of Nature, in him Nature contemplates and comprehends itself, seeing that while he is spirit he is also part of Nature. Just so his will has a universal reference to Nature, and may extend itself to everything. As the culmination and flower of Nature, he is therefore competent for its governance, understands its forces and laws, and is able to control nature through Nature. He is king of creation.

3. We have thus to consider man first as a *natural being*, although the highest. He is a natural being by reason of his origin and corporeity, his process of life and death. He is

limited as to time, in no respect complete from the first. He is limited as to space by everything exercising an influence upon him and placing him in relative dependence on itself. These physical limits man finds not merely outside himself in other beings; he finds them in himself, in his body, and through his body it comes to pass that other limited forces are able to get the better of him. It might now be supposed that this physical character of his is nothing but an imperfection. But nature outside him, like his body, is no dividing boundary, no isolating wall, but the world in all its rich fulness exists *for* man, while the body on every side is open to the world and endowed with senses, through which as through manifold doors the whole world stands in relations of intimate intercourse with him, to the end that he may perceive and observe it, in himself give it spiritual existence, and thus idealize it. In the world of *language*, created by him, he reproduces the impressions of the world and forms an ideal world homogeneous with himself.[1] In the next place, the body is given him as an organ and means for influencing the world and bodying forth his conceptions. Thus, although the body is in the first instance a limit, it is also a bond of connection, a *vinculum* in a twofold sense. In its limiting capacity it serves by its separateness to distinguish man from everything else, to exclude confusion; but the restrictive element in the limit at first formed by the body may be abolished, what is left of the body being that it is not a mere divisive boundary, but a prerequisite of communion, namely a principle of distinction. Through the body no doubt the spirit is essentially qualified as limited and receptive, nay accessible to suffering; but through conquest of the body in its limiting capacity, through its permeation by soul, and through the encompassing of the surrounding world by the very means of the bodily organs, the spirit is able to give its eternal essence tangible evidence of an inner illimitableness won by its own effort. In the body the spirit finds, so to speak, its fulcrum, by the aid of which it is able to set itself free for its own life. The process of this self-emancipation is its history. Corporeity is thus a condition of its historical development, and in so far as we are compelled to regard the gradual nature of its develop-

[1] Cf. William v. Humboldt respecting the origin of languages.

ment as a good thing, because by the mere simultaneous presence of its elements from the first no room would be left for its power of self-formation, whereas in a course of gradual development it can reproduce its idea, and realize itself element by element, we affirm it to be a part of man's excellence, of his original perfection, that he is also a natural being.

4. But to nature corruptibleness and death essentially belong. Man on his corporeal side belonging to Nature, so far death is for him a physical necessity. Were this, however, the whole truth, it would be out of harmony with Holy Scripture, which says, "Death is the wages of sin."[1] Moreover, the interconnection of spirit and body in a teleological respect forms an apparent contradiction to this physical necessity. Nature does not merely demand the body back from man when it has fulfilled its destiny and contributed its help towards enabling the spirit by the very means of the body to emancipate itself and build up its own inner world. Not merely where it has become superfluous is it dismissed by the spirit to rest, but it is reluctantly divorced from the spirit, so that Nature, which should be governed by spirit, evinces its superiority to man in the region lying nearest him. And even the fact of the body usually becoming a burden and a less docile instrument to the more advanced in life, seems to indicate an original incongruity between soul and body, which throws doubt on their mutual relationship in a teleological aspect. Man thus does not present the appearance of a being in whom one centre dominates all the rest; but instead of the image of a perfect circle, we are forced to adopt that of an ellipse having two relatively independent foci. But this very thought brings the solution of the enigma within view. At first the body could only be loosely connected with the spirit. The true unity of the two is only the issue of an ethical process. Therefore man *potuit mori*, nay *non potuit non mori*, unless by reason of the growth of spiritual energy this necessity of death was precluded. Were perfection of energy not wanting to the spirit, certainly Nature could oppose to it no insuperable resistance without giving rise to an insoluble paradox. But Nature cannot be required to furnish an immortal part. Only spirit can be the deliverer of Nature from the yoke of corruptibleness.

[1] Rom. v. 12, vi. 23.

And thus we arrive at the position, that although the body by itself must of necessity die, in association with spirit, in virtue of its susceptibleness to the influence of spirit, it is not absolutely subject to this necessity. The actual entrance of death must have its reason in this, that the spirit does not possess or does not exercise the energy by which it would be able to maintain the union with the body and carry through their teleological interconnection. That the corporeal nature is susceptible to the influence of spirit, is shown by signs the most diversified. Its organism may be inspired and sustained in incalculable measure by the energy of the spirit. We thus see that sin, and the disharmony introduced by it, play a part in this matter. Apart from an abnormal course of development, the possibility of death might have remained in permanent abeyance. Only through interruption of the normal order of development is the death of human beings, such as now actually occurs, comprehensible in its necessity. Only thus does the purely physical necessity of death acquire an established position.

5. Man is designed to be the lord of Nature, first, by acquiring mastery over it through knowledge, knowledge of its forces and laws being the condition of rendering it in reality his servant. But the meaning of this lordship is, that he rules in Nature as the disposing and regulating power, exhibits in it his higher nature, and imprints on it his stamp and seal. This suggests an inner world, a world of conceptions and aims, the carrying out of which in the world is merely the realization of his supreme authority.

§ 40.—*Man as Spirit.*

Man is specifically distinct from Nature, because in virtue of possessing knowledge, will, and feeling, he is spirit, and thus able to make not merely the world, but himself and God his object.

1. *As spirit*, man is his own author in respect of actual existence, although upon the basis or foundation laid by God. Self-consciousness is especially the spirit's own action, and that without intermission. In *feeling* he has existence

within himself, in *will* he exists in a state of movement from self outwards, in *knowledge* in movement from without inwards. In feeling, to be carefully distinguished from sensation, is given immediate apperception of his own life, whereas in self-consciousness this apperception is mediated by the act of thought.

2. Like the other spiritual faculties so called, *Feeling* is receptive of infinite as of finite truth. Moreover, feeling is not merely the primitive life-form of spirit, before as yet sense and impulse, consciousness and will, have separately issued forth from the unsevered unity of spirit; but no less do knowledge and will always run out into feeling as into their resting-place, even as feelings accompany and qualify all spiritual functions.

3. On the side of *Will* man is not merely a cause in general, but a free cause. Freedom manifests itself first as choice between one finite and another, as *liberum arbitrium specificationis*. But directly an infinite good, especially morality, enters the field of consciousness, a choice of infinite importance is presented—the choice between good and evil, in comparison with which the former distinctions, between which choice lay, dwindle into insignificance, choice between them shrinking into mere by-play. In respect of moral good, it is requisite that it be willed freely,—constrained neither by determination from without, nor yet from within by a constitution not due to freedom; for otherwise in the matter of good and evil, man were no real cause, but God alone would be the agent in the proper sense, which would amount to moral Acosmism. In the second place, it is requisite that goodness be willed because it is goodness and not its opposite, for only thus is it really willed as such, or as what it is. The first step in this process is a *distinction* in knowledge, which in the next place has to assert itself through the will in the form of *excision* of the possible not-good, in the form of *decision* for the good. That this discriminative decision may be possible, both goodness and its opposite, as at least possible in itself, must stand for an instant clearly before the vision, and in this sense the possibility of evil, like the law of gradual progress, is involved in the world's excellence, in the possibility of the realization of moral good (§ 37). But the non-existence as yet of the desired unity of will with goodness is a very

different thing from evil, which is a falling away from normal progress, a starting aside from the straight path. Gradual advance is the necessary condition of spontaneous exertion in building up our moral being, and without the possibility of evil goodness would be an innate quality, exercising such power over us that its realization through our will would rather take the form of a physical although conscious process. By which of the two paths the development of mankind has proceeded, by simple progress in good or by actual emergence of evil, is matter of history. The necessity of the latter never has been or can be proved. The attempts at proof lead to Manichæism or to the resolving of evil into illusion. The possibility of a sinless development of man, in absolute harmony with his idea, must always be held fast,[1] and at the same time the possibility of his passing through all the stages of life without fault and yet being true man. Evil can never be part of man's nature. When it exists, it is removeable, conquerable, because eternally excluded from the idea of man.

4. The COGNITIVE ASPECT, or consciousness of self, of the world, and of God. Remitting all details to psychology, let us here dwell simply on the two last points. As self-consciousness ripens, it becomes aware of its absolute dependence on God, apprehending itself in its basis which stands in a passive relation to God. Man feels himself under the control and at the disposal of an absolutely higher power, and this God-consciousness is the basis of freedom in opposition to the world. It has different degrees, accordingly as God is recognised merely as power, and in the light of physical, or also in the light of moral, categories. God-consciousness is not identical with conscience, and still less to be derived from it.[2] We know and are acquainted with God first as absolute power. But through moral, in distinction from religious consciousness, the latter itself receives accessions. The deeper we penetrate into the nature of good and evil, and the more we perceive that the former brings us inner harmony and happiness, the purer and richer becomes the idea of God, which, as formerly shown, stands in most intimate association with the good.

[1] Even Schleiermacher maintains the same.

[2] As Schenkel supposes.

Thus the religious element is enriched by the interweaving of the moral, in such a way, indeed, that the clearer man's moral self-consciousness becomes, the more his moral character also is referred back to God in His moral capacity, nay, is primarily deduced from Him. Thus in conscience God's voice is heard, despite the fact that it is the voice of man's own true nature as well. Conversely, the idea of God assures to the contents of conscience the character of unconditional validity, and corroborates the sense of unconditional obligation. Objectively regarded, the awakening of moral consciousness in conscience is a divine origination. God implants the moral, existing in Him and conceived and willed by Him as the good, in man's knowledge. God's knowledge is originative of knowledge. But this origination on the part of God is carried into effect through man's own spiritual energy, without which the moral could be no part of *his* knowledge. This spiritual energy begins with the individual element. Moral knowledge, implanted and self-developing, may precede the evolution of God-consciousness, and in the first instance be merely a knowledge of man's own moral nature or of the moral relations of life. But only with God-consciousness, and that of a moral kind, do the clearness and energy of moral self-consciousness become complete. From the very time of man's origination, God-consciousness is struggling as it were to break through, and is occupied in the formation of a rational consciousness of self and the world.

5. GENERIC CONSCIOUSNESS.—Humanity is willed by God as a unity indeed, but a unity in diversity, *i.e.* as an organism. In self-consciousness man knows himself to be an individual, beside whom stands the plurality of individuals forming the genus. This plurality, too, is based on the development of each individual. Nature, being without spirit, can furnish no substitute for this. As spirit man needs to be stimulated by corresponding spiritual instruments, and therefore by beings of his own class, different from him and yet receptive to him as he is to them. To plurality belongs variety, and by this means the one humanity is divided into species. The principles of variety are the roots of races, nations, tribes, families, individuals. Variety is expressed not merely in corporeal but in spiritual differences, and in the present temporal life humanity

has no existence other than in these forms of life. But despite their numbers and variety, men are one in themselves, and through knowing this have a generic consciousness. Every one is different from the rest, and destined to remain so. But distinction is here the essential condition of *communion* in receiving and giving; for only he can give and receive in a living sense who is himself something. And communion, the more it becomes reality, gets the better of limitations, and converts diversity into a bond of union in love. Love is the completion of generic consciousness. But it is the completion of the individual as well; for the latter is not merely this particular finite being. To his complete nature belong both organic division and particularity, and the powers of the universal, that universal will which the race wills, and without this the particular will is Egoism. But the particular will takes up the universal, and then from the more imperfect stages of individuality and subjectivity *personality* arises.[1] Generic consciousness is the principle of all social life, and in virtue of it man strives with all his strength after communion; but this holds good in the highest degree of the spiritual departments of life. *As spirit, man is designed to exist for spirit.* He is only able perfectly to obtain and exercise his knowledge, his moral nature, in a life of communion. Nay, supposing man wills his own true nature in all these departments, he wills therewith the true nature of humanity in general, and must as matter of course devote himself to the task of communicating to it as well as of receiving from it. In no province belonging to the perfection of creation can anything of a lofty character dawn on the spirit, without generic consciousness being *stimulated* in the most powerful way.[2] Hence religion is of necessity creative of communion. In everything of a lofty character impressing us, the impulse to communicate awakens; and here *language* has its immense significance,—this gift distinguishing man as a social being. Communication through language has withal supreme significance for his own development. Only when that which slumbered or stirred within us has found clear expression in words are we complete masters of the thing itself. It then has objective

[1] Cf. above, § 31*a*.

[2] Schleiermacher, *Der Christl. Glaube*, § 6, 60.

existence for us in definite form. And again, the one who makes the communication obtains *security* through the others, to whom he reveals himself, that the object moving him is no plaything of chance or mere idiosyncrasy, but something substantial. And it is only this knowledge of self in others, and being known by others, which perfects in us the conviction that the words spoken and acts done proceeded from the nature of the rational genus, the conviction being thus elevated beyond the value of the thing itself. Thus subjectivity is raised out of itself, and becomes aware of its intrinsic objectivity. Personality is the minister of the genus, the genus of personality. Only in the generic organism does the latter find its true and secure position.

§ 41. *Continuation.—The Divine Image.*

Man's collective organization has its unity in the fact of his being destined for community of life with God or for religion. With religion the portrayal of God in the personal creature is realized, in order that man may be *God's image*. This is to be viewed partly as original endowment, partly as destination.

1. *Biblical Doctrine.*—דְּמוּת and צֶלֶם[1] refer not merely to corporeal resemblance.[2] As God is not contemplated in the record under a corporeal aspect, the word must also have a spiritual import, although the dignity of man's form and his powers for ruling over nature and the animal world reflect something of the divine majesty, which did not disappear even on the entrance of sin.[3] In the same way his spiritual powers and capacities bear the imprint of the divine likeness. Still, capacities are not God's actual image, but merely its possibility. The higher import of the word "image" points to the future.[4] In reference to what he possesses already, he is created "in" the divine image as his model; but in reference to the chief matter—his destination—he has in God a norm and ideal.

[1] Gen. i. 26. [2] Gen. v. 3. [3] Jas. iii. 9; 1 Cor. xi. 7.
[4] As also in Gen. i. 26, 27, the difference between בְּ and כְּ seems to indicate.

According to the N. T., the Son of God is the original image of God,[1] and to Him men are to be conformed spiritually and physically.[2] Consequently it is through Christ that we are to attain likeness to God. That this design was realized in Adam, or that Adam is an image of God in the same sense as Christ, is nowhere said. The direct opposite is evident from the fact that not Adam before the Fall, but Christ, is proposed as our pattern.[3] With this the O. T. record harmonizes in ascribing to the first pair innocence and purity indeed, but not moral indefectibility, perfection, and holiness. On the contrary, even deficiency in knowledge of the distinction of good and evil is ascribed to them. Consequently, the divine image according to Holy Scripture is partly original *endowment*, partly *destination*.

2. ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE.—The ancient Church very accurately distinguished between εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις, and the Greek Church does the same in its Confession. The latter phrase expresses man's destination, which is not to be regarded as carried out at the moment of creation. The Roman Church supposes in Adam a *donum superadditum justitiæ originalis* standing in external connection with man's nature, but that this nature itself is found in *liberum arbitrium*, which continues after the Fall, although in an enfeebled state. Luther and the Evangelical Church[4] disclaim the notion that *justitia* can be called a *donum superadditum*, as also that *liberum arbitrium*, considered as formal power of choice, is the *imago divina*. On the contrary, holiness and righteousness are counted part of the idea and true nature of man, part of *justitia originalis*. And because his being destined for *sanctitas et justitia* is part of the idea of man affirmed in his likeness to God, it is held that, as fallen, man has lost the divine likeness. But, united as the Evangelical Church is in this theory of man, according to which mere *liberum arbitrium* as formal power of choice or neutrality of freedom is not sufficient to define his nature, divines, and in the same way

[1] Col. i. 15. [2] Phil. iii. 21; Eph. iv. 23 f.; Col. iii. 9, 10; 1 John iii. 2.

[3] Rom. v. 12-20; 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff., where moreover χοϊκός, ψυχικός affirm neither sinfulness nor even the want of all point of connection for πνεῦμα, but simply that Adam was not yet πνευματικός.

[4] *Apolog.* 52, 53; *Heidelb. Cat.* qu. vi. 7; *Helv. post.* vii. 9.

the Confessions to some extent, differ upon the question whether Adam had or had not perfect actual righteousness and holiness by creation. The first is held in the Belgic Confession, and the *Formula Concordiæ* approximates thereto.[1] On the other hand, the *Apology* cautiously, and with well-considered reserve, only says, that the *justitia originalis* of man "*habitura erat* hæc dona: notitiam Dei certiorem, fiduciam Dei . . . aut certe rectitudinem (*right inclination*) et vim ista efficiendi." Later Lutheran theology adhered to the first view, partly in an anti-Pelagian interest, partly for the purpose of cutting away all ground for supposing that the admission of imperfection in man, as he came from God's hand, would make God responsible for evil. This question forms a criterion as to whether the religious element is recognised in its affinity with the moral; or, again, whether the two are separated or confounded.

3. Dogmatic Investigation of the Doctrine of the Divine Image.—The most important point in the idea of this image is the correlation of all man's capacities with consciousness of God; but at the same time, the *idea* of likeness to God as man's destination is to be distinguished from the *realization* of this idea through the act of creation.

As relates to the first point, namely, man's destination, the idea of man, as it is conceived in God's world-plan, and therefore willed by God's creative volition, is not exhausted in the fact of his being a teleologically co-ordinated unity of nature and soul. The soul has not merely Nature for its contents, but is susceptible also of the infinite, the divine. Nay, the idea of man also includes within it his perpetual, actual, life-relation to God, more precisely—the satisfaction of his receptiveness for God and the divine, although empirically this may only be the fruit of a series of divine acts, in which the ideal man or the ideal of man gradually establishes itself in his knowledge and volition through progressive creative realization and through appropriation on the part of man. Mere natural beings have no such ideal, no proper historical development, because no freedom. But man is a being

[1] *Belg.* 14: *Atque in omnibus plane perfectum*, which however the edition of 1612 has *not*. *F. C.*, p. 640, speaks indeed of a *concreata justicia orig.*, but also adds: ad *quam homo in veritate, sanctitate et justicia creatus fuerat.*

summoned to freedom and historical development. Hence in his case the idea and the actuality of the idea exist apart, the latter being the fruit of free acts and coming gradually into existence. In relation to God, man's free acts are not productive in character, but are acts of reception, which may be discontinued, but without which further creative communication or realization of the idea cannot proceed.[1] The freedom of man, even of empirical man, is in essential connection[2] with the morally necessary, the divine; and by this fact, not by mere *liberum arbitrium*, is he potentially, *i.e.* by his very destination, the image of the ethical God. Accordingly, from the first, destination is to be distinguished from realization.

The Catholic Church, on this point halting behind the Greek, which in the most positive way maintains this distinction, falls into a double error, that of a magical and of a Pelagianizing tendency. In order that divine grace may not send man forth empty-handed from its presence, ethical perfection is assigned him as a *donum*, as if this did not require to be worked out by means of freedom. On the other hand, the Roman Church, being anxious to preserve man's freedom even after the Fall, discovers his indefeasible nature precisely in *liberum arbitrium*, which is regarded for the most part as empty of itself, as the neutrality of freedom, while grace and holiness themselves are said to be a divine *donum superadditum*. The *liberum arbitrium* referred to has no essential relation to the contents of goodness, a view which must lead to the Scotist dogma, that man's rational capacity stands merely in a casual relation to goodness, *i.e.* can only receive as good what the positive legislation accepted as divine declares such, but is never able to recognise the intrinsic excellence of goodness, because this would imply that we were able to recognise it as rational in itself. The reason of this blending of magical and Pelagian tendencies lies in the mutual exclusiveness of the divine and human according to Catholic teaching, which exclusiveness is again repeated in its theory of grace. So far as grace operates, it excludes the activity of man, snatches him, so to speak, from himself for the purpose of bringing him into communion with the good; and grace, instead of being quickening and creative in its influence, puts

[1] Matt. xiii. 12. [2] § 40, 3.

itself in negativing substitution in man's place. And so far as human freedom operates, it is supposed to exclude divine activity. In both respects no unity of the divine and human life—that fundamental Christian idea—is obtained, but at most an alternation between the two.

But even Protestant theology has in the course of its history shown an affinity with both errors. On the one side the older dominant Lutheran theology [1] says: "The first man possessed original righteousness not merely in a seminal but developed form. The first human pair had an inspiration of love, to which were added a high measure of illumination respecting divine and natural things, and a natural immortality." But the attitude here assumed is in opposition to the possibility left open in the *Apology*, nor does it agree with the narrative in Genesis, which denies to man at first knowledge of good and evil, whence it follows that his love was still unconscious, and as a necessary consequence did not bear an ethical character in the strict sense. Just so the N. T.[2] forbids the supposition of the idea of man having been realized at the first moment. Else even the Fall would have been an impossibility, whereas according to the narrative at least probation was necessary, which of itself implies progress. An inspiration of love is certainly just as possible in the beginning as in the age of Redemption; but from this it does not follow that man has nothing to do in order to the formation of his moral character, or that love "cannot properly be willed, but only given." There is a third case, a willing by man of the divine gift of love along with the possibility of not willing it. Only by prescinding the latter evil possibility, can conscious love and the positive willing of goodness as such be established. But on the other side many speak as if freedom had to acquire its moral worth for man solely from its own resources, and apart from everything previously given it. If the aberration just instanced leans to a species of moral magic, this second view shares in the error of a false independence of man in relation to God, since he is supposed to be absolutely his own creator, so to speak, in a moral respect. In opposition to this the right ground is taken by

[1] With it Philippi substantially agrees, *Glaubenslehre*, II. 350 f.

[2] 1 Cor. xv. 45.

those who remind us that the soul is never a mere *tabula rasa*, that there is in it a world of the unconscious. If in our knowledge there is already inherent no innate relation to what is rational and good,—a relation that is an original dowry of our nature and not our own work,—then knowledge of truth and goodness as such is absolutely out of the question, and we remain in the circle of subjective or arbitrary opinions, if not banished to the sphere of external, positive enactments. The same conclusion is reached on the side of will. If formal freedom has no intrinsic, essential relation to goodness and truth, if it finds itself just as much in contradiction as in harmony with goodness, then the good and divine stands in an attitude to man so external, that it can never become really his, nay, in that case formal freedom can only decide in favour of the good from caprice, *i.e.* in an unethical way. We affirm, therefore, that the idea of man on the side of knowledge and volition includes an *essential* relation to the rational and good, and for this very reason to God in himself. In order to the possibility of the moral, a pre-moral is necessary. But certain as it is that man's freedom is in essential connection with the morally necessary ideal, man being thus potentially the image of the ethical God, and certain as it is that this image is not to be discovered in mere formal, empty power of choice, since, on the contrary, the free can only be created in order to the morally necessary, yet the same ethical character requires that the means by which the morally necessary and the essential elements of man's nature are to become *reality* in his will, shall not act in a magical way, or simply through exclusively divine, creative activity; and it is therefore an inevitable logical necessity for Protestantism to decide for the second of the alternatives left open in the *Apology*.

The *actual constitution* of the first man must not be so conceived as to imply that he was spared all labour and the conquest of the world, intellectual and real, just as little as he was spared spontaneous moral effort. In the same way in reference to natural immortality only a *posse non mori* can be affirmed of him, namely, provided his spiritual energy was of such quality and so increased that the necessity of death, inherent in the body alone, remained in abeyance (§ 39, 4).

For the rest, it is of no dogmatic importance how high the prerogatives of the first man are placed, provided only two limits are observed,—1. That God is not made the author of evil; 2. That man is not precluded from a course of ethical development by a too-much or too-little. Both are observed by regarding the *first man* as created with a pure, innocent nature, with a natural bias to good or a natural love for God. Beside this, there was present in him, along with consciousness of self and the world, a natural bias to self and the world. These qualities cannot be in antagonism to each other. As they came from the Creator's hand, they existed in immediate, good, though still not perfect and indissoluble, unity. On the other hand, this unity needed to be ratified by the will, by a good use of freedom. Actual living relation to God, because depending upon the use made of freedom, cannot be perfect in the beginning, but must be the outcome of several divine acts. Even after the *Fall* the divine image remains still man's destination, although its fulfilment has been interrupted, nay, deflected into a by-path, by the Fall. But *in* this image as a destination is included the religious relation as the cardinal point, seeing that it is from it that the force proceeds by which the several aspects of man's nature are to be brought to unity and completion. Self-consciousness and world-consciousness can only find their completion in God-consciousness, self and the world only subsisting in their true reality in connection with God. On the other hand, self-consciousness and world-consciousness are the essential means for realizing God-consciousness. It is often, indeed, supposed that the two former are a limit to God-consciousness, or that were the latter stronger the former would be weaker. But without self-consciousness the subject would lose God-consciousness, and without world-consciousness he would sink into the condition of a brute. Rather the same Ego, that is conscious of itself and the world, may at the same moment be conscious of God and of dependence on Him, which very dependence is itself a characteristic of the Ego and of the world. Conversely, when we know God as He is, in Him we know also a willing and conceiving of the world and ourselves, so that in Him we may apprehend ourselves and know ourselves, as the apostle says, as known of Him. And thus the postulate

is well founded, that the soul animating all the conscious moments of human life is consciousness of God.

§ 42.—*The Essential Immortality of the Soul.*

Destined for religion, man is destined for immortality.

1. Against the doctrine, that death is the consequence of sin,[1] objections are raised.[2] Death, it is said, is not an absolute evil; else it would be abolished by redemption; it is a universal law of nature. We have seen (§ 39) that while man is a natural being, and thus mortal in himself, it is also part of the law of his nature to possess unlimited susceptibility to the influence of spirit, and that nature is conditioned by the law of spirit. That death is among the necessities of spirit, and is not rather an indication of passivity, of feebleness on its part, cannot be shown. Thus it is man's moral deficiency, through which the possibility of death becomes a reality. But redemption, when completed, completes also dominion over nature. Accordingly, Christianity promises conquest over death, and exhibits this conquest prototypically in the resurrection of Christ. Although, no doubt, after the appearance of sin, death may be a comparative good like every act of judgment before the final judgment, death is no good, considered apart from the fact of sin, but an evil that casts doubt on the mutual teleological relationship of soul and body, on the absolute unity of the personality. This reciprocal relation is only secure in case the death of the body does not render doubtful the existence of the soul, but on the contrary itself meets its overthrow, the sides of man's nature separated by death being thus enabled to present themselves in complete union in the consummation of the individual person.

2. This leads to the question of the IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. Wonder has been expressed that in the O. T. this doctrine is kept so much in the background, or is altogether

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 21, 55 ff.; Rom. v. 12, viii. 10; Gen. iii.

[2] Cf. Man in Pelt's *Mitarbeiten*, 1838, 2; on the other side, Reich, *Die Auferstehung des Herrn als Heilsthatsache*, 1845; Krabbe, *Die Lehre von Sünde und Tod*, 1836.

wanting.[1] The cause is found partly in the theocracy which is content to fix its gaze on the present life, partly in the *Messianic idea*, which indeed promises a glorious future in the present, but in such a form that the idea of a perfect *kingdom* overpowers that of personality. But that the spirit found no satisfaction in the historic theocracy, the Messianic idea shows; while the latter, we might suppose, in order to the glorious future of the kingdom of blessedness, needs the immortality of the righteous composing it, even as in later days, before Christ's advent, faith in the resurrection of the just to the Messianic kingdom assumed this shape. This explanation therefore, while containing an element of truth, is not sufficient. The reason why the doctrine of immortality is kept in the background must lie deeper. Examined more closely, the doctrine is not altogether wanting. But immortality is conceived as a mere unending form of life, emptied of everything making it worth living, as continuance in a shadowy form of existence, in Sheol. And before Christ's advent, this could not be otherwise. The rich fulness of the divine life being still wanting to man before Christ's coming, while still the economy of the O. T. partly satisfied, partly awakened higher needs than the heathen world in general knows, all that is left to the righteous, when earthly satisfaction fails, is a form of life, unending indeed, but still awful from its vague emptiness, and this is the essential part in the idea of Sheol. In all this, then, we still confess the *poverty* of pre-Christian days. In contrast with this condition, Christ is celebrated in the N. T. and the earliest Fathers in a special sense as introducing the fulness of the new, eternal life, and holding in His hand the keys of death and hell, a power including jurisdiction over the path to Hades.

Ecclesiastical Doctrine, with Holy Scripture, maintains man's immortality in the shape of a restoration of the individual even to corporeal existence through the *resurrection*, and that in a glorified pneumatic form.

3. As to the DOGMATIC PROOF of immortality, we have first of all to examine the evidences adduced on its behalf. The

[1] Among other nations especially has the idea of immortality assumed various forms. Cf. Spiess, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre vom Zustand nach dem Tod*, 1877.

Wolffian philosophy employed the metaphysical argument, that the soul is immortal, because indissoluble by reason of its simplicity. But even the simple might die out of itself, and the soul is not abstractly simple in itself, but a unity of many powers. Further, we ought not to overlook the high worth and spiritual relations of man; for with what right can creatures of limited worth lay claim to immortality, or what would the immortality of atoms signify? Hence, more consideration is due to the proof from the illimitableness of human capacities, from the perfectibility of man. "The institution of these capacities would be aimless, unless they attained what they are meant to do, which is not the case in this earthly life." But the argument is often stated as if aims of infinite worth were not realized in the present life, whereas life would not be lived in vain, if the consciousness of eternity shone forth, or the flame of holy love was felt, but once. The aim lies not only at the close. An immortality, emptying the present life of all meaning for the purpose of establishing the necessity of a future life, is worthless. Rationalism laid special stress on the doctrine of immortality, but committed the fault of remitting us to a *progressus in infinitum*, a progress without definite aim, whereas objects which are ends in themselves are found even in the present life.—Another argument starts from the world-idea, for which every individual is of value. No doubt, for the world-whole every single personality, with all it possesses, is indispensable. Were but one lacking, a gap would be left in the whole. But this can only be maintained, provided the individuals possess spiritual import, or so far as they attain to personality in the strict sense.—The *juridical* argument demands immortality in the interest of equality between worth and wellbeing, absent on earth. But neither have the ungodly real prosperity on earth; nor do the good demand of God's justice reward for their virtue.—Finally, the reason borrowed from love, which longs after *reunion*, cannot be accepted as convincing. The craving for immortality on this ground is no doubt widely spread in modern days, but it is marked by much sickly sentimentality. Those who in this earthly life, when they are together, forswear love, speak often of reunion, as if they had saved their love for the future life.

The mutual relations of individuals in the future cannot be judged by subjective wishes, but by the objective principle of God's kingdom. The supreme blessing hoped for by our forefathers from immortality, was rather the immediate presence of God and Christ. The more concrete form of reunion was secondary to the kingdom of Christ, to His triumphant Church, and the desires of natural love were subordinated to contentment with whatever order the kingdom of God may bring with it, the restoration of former relations occupying but a secondary place. Again and again must it be asserted that nothing but the divine import of life makes life worth living. Christianity alone securing this import of life, it is at once evident that outside its pale no certainty of immortality was possible, but merely vague hope and presentiment.

4. The POSITIVE dogma to be held is, that the human soul is not like mere natural beings perishable, but by its very idea imperishable. Finite life may die either through succumbing to external hostile forces, or through living out its powers. But no force of nature reaches to the spirit. Nature may at present demand from man his body, but not his spirit, which is the aim and goal of nature. Nor can the soul be the author of its own death; for the attempt at annihilation would be again an act of self-exertion, and thus again an act of self-affirmation. And, finally, the soul could only die out of itself, on the supposition of its being merely nature; but the human spirit is not an object of mere finite worth, but capable of possessing, and destined to possess, eternal worth in itself, and with respect to the whole, — not, indeed, on the ground of its being a microcosm, a peculiar synthesis of the universe, but on the ground of every human soul being destined for communion with God. Finite life may die by living out its powers; but in the heart of man as spirit eternity is planted,[1] and united with God, whose will is to communicate life, he possesses unending life. The fount of the divine Spirit is unfathomable and inexhaustible. Seeing therefore that in man, as long as he is man, there is receptiveness for this life—divine, truly immortal, superior to time and temporal laws—we are warranted in holding, that the soul could only perish if either man could ever cease to be

[1] Eccles. iii. 11.

man, or God could cease in His communicableness to sustain relations, not merely negative, to receptiveness for him such as his love desires. Accordingly, everything depends on the communication of the divine life to man being assured. This is only secured to Christians through Christ. Here, therefore, it is sufficient to have recognised the possibility of the soul's immortality and its destination for this. The doctrine of actual immortality falls to the second part of Dogmatics, to which also belongs the restoration or consummation of the personality in a corporeal respect, of which, likewise, apart from Christianity, there is no certain knowledge.

§ 43.—*A first Human Pair and their Perpetuation.*

The Biblical theory of *one* human pair, in whom the human species was constituted by creative act, answers to the requirements of reason, as well as to our consciousness of God and of the genus. The conservation of the species is effected in accordance with the universal law of living creatures through secondary causalities, individuals of the species, or reproduction. Nevertheless, the origination of new human individuals can be viewed as a conserving of the species only under one aspect, each one of the three theories—Creationism, Pre-existentianism, Traducianism—representing an element belonging to a complete account of the origination of human beings. But the plurality, characterizing our species, is the requisite condition of the community which is the theatre of God's world-ruling love, and also its organ.

Lotze, *Mikrokosmus*, III. 87–123. Fichte, *Anthropologie.* Alex. v. Humboldt, *Kosmos*, vol. ii. Hugh Miller, *Footprints of the Creator.* Agassiz, *Essay on Classification.* Mivarts, *Man and Ape; Evolution and its Consequences; Lessons of Nature*, 1876. Dawson, *Nature and the Bible.* Reusch, *Bibel u. Natur.* M'Cosh, *Christianity and Positivism*, and his *Report at the Ev. Alliance*, 1873, *and the Pan-Presbyterian Council*, Edin. 1878. De Quatrefages, *Théories transformistes et évolutionistes.*

Zöckler, Essay in the *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, vol. vi., 1861, "On the Question of Species in its Theological Bearing, with special reference to the Theories of Agassiz and Darwin," pp. 659–714; vol. vii., 1862, pp. 166–169. The same, *Die einheitliche Abstammung des Menschen-geschlechts*, vol. viii., pp. 51–91; cf. his Essay, vol. ix., pp. 688–759, "On the Theistic Idea of Creation." The same, *Theologie u. Naturwissenschaft*, vol. ii., 1879, pp. 737–755 (in this work modern literature on the subject is very fully quoted). F. Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, ed. ii. 1877; *Die Entstehung der Welt u. die Naturgesetze*, 1876. Ebrard, *Die Anfänge des Menschengeschlechts*, 1876; and his *Apologetik*. Schultz, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 1865. R. Schmid, *Die Darwinschen Theorien u. ihre Stellung zur Philosophie, Religion u. Moral*, 1876.

1. The *Biblical* doctrine of the origin of the human race from a *first human pair*[1] created by God has been combated in two ways. First (and this was long the usual form of contention on the part of its opponents), the variety of human races was regarded as too great for them to be comprehended under unity of species (or genus). Reliance was placed not only upon difference in bodily organization, but also upon difference in spiritual characteristics, especially upon the assertion that there are tribes showing no trace of religion.[2] The further the examination into the differences advanced, the greater became the number of human *species* which it was supposed necessary to assume, whether recourse was had for their explanation to the supposition of different, ascending acts of creation, or to their collateral origination in different places.[3] In any case, it was thought, the descent of all men from an original unity had to be given up and regarded as incompatible with the actual condition of things.—But not only did this view encounter opposition from philosophers, historians, and philologists, who described the application of the idea of different

[1] Gen. i. and ii.; Acts xvii. 26–28; cf. Rom. v. 12 ff.

[2] On the authority of accounts of travels, which certainly were greatly modified by subsequent inquirers, Schelling accepted the notion of tribes destitute of religion. Others explained the facts on which this notion is based by depravation, and attribute them to a process of degeneracy. So especially Dawson.

[3] British students reckoned as many as 150 human species; see Zöckler, *Theol. u. Naturwissenschaft*, II. 771. To the class of those who assumed different, ascending acts of creation belongs Peyrerius with his *Præadamitæ;* in the same way Schelling.

species to man as inadmissible, and referred to the strong historical traces of a genealogical interconnection of humanity, but the physical sciences themselves, since the diffusion of modern evolution-doctrines, have taken quite an opposite direction. The idea of a single, causal, genealogical interconnection has for some time been so powerful, that physical research is busily engaged in the effort to resolve all specific differences of all living beings into mere varieties, and from one or some few primitive forms to derive everything organic in a genealogical line from plants to man, whether higher and higher structures are supposed to have arisen by transmutation in a purely mechanical process,[1] or an inner evolution-principle is conceived to be at work.[2] Evolutionists of the latter school are better able to leave room for a teleological conception of the world and for divine influence than the champions of an exclusively mechanical theory, inasmuch as in the beginnings of creation they are able to suppose spiritual potentialities implanted, which issue forth at the right time, and are from the first specifically distinct from the merely physical.[3] The more thoughtful, however, confess the countless gaps opposed by experience to a rigidly applied doctrine of the genealogical derivation of life in its diverse forms. In the same way they confess that to such questions as, How did the first cell arise? How did organisms arise on our planet at all? science has still to give an answer, since neither from history nor experiment do we learn anything as to the origin of living

[1] So the stricter school of Darwin, who, however, to natural selection, the result of the struggle for existence, which preserved the more perfect and rejected the imperfect, subsequently added other organizing principles not of a merely mechanical nature, like fitness and "sexual selection æsthetically influenced by colours." In the animal world, from which man is derived, Darwin discovers already rudiments of morality and religion, but refuses to derive the rudiments of the organic and living from the inorganic, and therefore at least still leaves a place for the first beginning of God's creative activity. In the interest of a single evolution-doctrine for mankind he also assumes, in opposition to polygenistic theories, not merely one centre of creation for the earliest men (Africa), but has also nothing to object to the descent from one pair of the earliest representatives of the human race, assumed by Lyell, Huxley, Wallace, and others. Zöckler, p. 774.

[2] So especially those influenced by Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*.

[3] See above, p. 43, respecting R. Schmid, *Die Darwinschen Theorien*. Similarly J. B. Baltzer, and Kuhl; Frohschammer, Snell, K. Ch. Planck, C. G. Carus, Fr. de Rougemont. The earth is not seldom represented as an animated being, a kind of world-soul. Zöckler, pp. 704–710.

structures.[1] But if it is out of the question to eliminate creative energy working teleologically in order to the origination of life, if, on the contrary, this energy is manifestly an indispensable condition, unless we are to assume causeless phenomena, and thus to violate the law of causality, so also the withdrawal of God from the world which is to be conserved is an untenable notion. Else, after creation a self-dependent form of being resembling God's (divine self-existence) must have been conferred on the world. But that the idea of divine conservation leaves room for new creative manifestations of God, has been shown above.

2. The hypotheses which, in the supposed interest of the world's unity and its absolute interconnection, seek by deriving the human race from the animal world to dispense with a new creative act of God, whether they admit a single first human pair or not, are based on a denial of the essential distinction between rational beings and nature, and degrade it to a mere vanishing quantity. For if man is a mere product of nature, then so long as the law of causality holds good he can only be a natural being, respecting which there can be no question of intensively infinite worth, morality, and religion. Physical foreshadowings of the moral especially are not to be denied in Nature. But any notion of that which alone makes the moral moral, of the absoluteness of duty and the worth of goodness, in opposition to everything merely physical, nature has not, but only reason. And it is just the same with religion. Therefore, only at the price of denying man's rational character can the nature of man be derived from nature alone. For his origination a new creative act of God is essential, not one disturbing the world's unity, but in a teleological respect its finish and crown; whereas the mechanical, atheistic evolution-theory dissolves into an endless, fortuitous plurality,—a parody on the name of Monism which it so fondly assumes. And of the latter charge even its admission of a single first human pair cannot acquit it, so long as for the sake of the world's unity it maintains man's essential identity with nature, and leaves no room for absolute teleology,—that highest and firmest bond of the world's unity,—but at most and reluctantly one of a limited, evanescent nature. But even the supposition that mankind consists not simply of different races, but of

[1] So J. R. Meyer, Huxley, and others; see Zöckler, p. 729.

different *species* (derive these, as we may, from creation or otherwise),[1] and that therefore different progenitors must be assumed for them, is untenable. That which is characteristic of man is to be sought pre-eminently in reason. But reason has no plural. There can be no different "species" of reason. Chalybæus says rightly:[2] "The supposition of different human *species* (instead of *races* with essentially the same destination for rational ends) would be a transformation of men into a physical order." It is thus evident that both the theories mentioned in opposition to the Biblical view have their roots in the same error—the denial of the rational essence of human nature. If one theory obscures, nay, subverts man's characteristic nature by a one-sided assertion of the continuity of the world, whose final issue is the obliteration of distinctions, the essential identification of all things, whether in materialistic or pantheistic fashion, the other in turn denies man's rational character by a one-sided assertion of the discontinuity of mankind supposed to be severed into different species. The truth lies in the position that mankind is a unity in itself, while the kingdom of man is essentially different from the kingdom of nature.[3]

3. This being conceded, and the derivation of man from nature renounced, as well as the notion that he is a being merely physical in kind and parting into different species, it is thereby also allowed that, in order to his origination, a new act different from the creation of nature as such is requisite, for which indeed receptiveness must be presupposed in nature, but without its productive force being capable of being a substitute for this act. But in this case the Biblical doctrine decisively commends itself, of the human race, which did not exist always, being first created by God in a single[4] pair; for several pairs would be several creative beginnings, a

[1] Quatrefages maintains that as yet not a single case of transmutation of one species into another has been scientifically established. Zöckler, p. 736 f. But of course what constitutes *species* and variety is not to be defined everywhere in the same sense as between man and mere natural beings.

[2] *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 327 ff.

[3] Even Alex. v. Humboldt, for the reasons given, supposes one human species, although he is unwilling to assert the derivation of all from one original pair.

[4] The singleness of the first pair, admitted even by Darwinians, is maintained by numerous other authorities. Thus by Lyell, Huxley, Wallace, and others; cf. Zöckler, II. 774.

superfluous miracle, after one pair with a destination for reproduction had been created. One pair being created, the human species is created, and all that is then needed in *one* respect is conservation. The same consequence follows from our *generic consciousness.* Springing from one pair, mankind forms one family and one interdependent unity more completely than if it sprang from several independent creative beginnings. Certain as it is that the spiritual aspect in man is the chief matter, still the fraternal tie is far stronger when by reason of common descent men have one history. Mere spiritual unity without actual consanguinity has less binding force than both together. In any other case they would have no single course of historical development; nay, even their type must be diverse in character; otherwise no reason can be given why, instead of the type also of the others beginning to be realized with the first pair, a new creative commencement, absolutely unconnected with the first pair, was requisite. As matter of fact, the science of history, as well as comparative philology, takes as its starting-point the thought of the single genealogical connection of our race, and in doing so follows a genuine human instinct, which even now is not without its reward; for the history of nations and religions finds among different nations kindred traditions. Linguistic research is also constantly adding to the genealogical stem of languages.

4. *Respecting the origination of separate individuals* within the genus created there are three theories, Pre-existentianism, Traducianism, Creationism. No one of these alone suffices.

Pre-existentianism makes human souls to have been created eternally or since the beginning of the world. After a period of disembodied existence they are put into human bodies by way of punishment for sin, or by way of discipline. But this would not correspond with our generic consciousness, or with the perfect inter-relationship of the race. The body would be regarded as a mere external appendage of the spirit. And why need the souls be supposed to have waited so long for their body, whether the latter be a punishment or means of improvement? But if the souls are first created upon generation, this passes over into Creationism. Instead, therefore, of indulging in mythical dreams about conditions and acts of a pre-existent state, Traducianism commends itself to us, in

so far as it seeks to plant us on the firm ground of reality and analogy with all living beings. It supposes that with generation new souls develope themselves from Adam's soul like shoots (*traduces*) from a tree. Through generation, Rudolph Wagner is of opinion, a division of the soul-substance takes place, whereas others prefer the figure of one combustible matter or light kindled by another. But this is only in real keeping with Materialism. Hence even Augustine, although his doctrine of original sin must have gravitated in this direction, carefully guarded himself from lending countenance to Traducianism. The theory is also incompatible with the idea of free personality. In it we retain only the continuity of the species, reach no firm, deep discrimination of personal individuals, mankind being for the most part regarded as an identical mass. According to *Creationism*, the generation of the body is the occasion to God, in harmony with the principle of *Concursus*, for the creation of the soul. Received from Him on the fortieth day, the soul unites itself with the body. In this case we should have the body pre-existing before the soul, and the race would in no sense co-operate in originating new souls. Here, too, body and soul would be external to each other, as in Pre-existentianism, and the mutual interconnection of men would be merely in a corporeal respect. This and the operation of the race are only secured by God's activity being regarded as one that acts through the power of the race and of individuals. *If* Creationism still acknowledges a sin of the race, its principle must lie altogether in the body.

5. Each one of these theories represents *one* aspect of the *whole* truth,—Traducianism generic consciousness, Pre-existentianism self-consciousness or the interest of the personality as a separate eternal divine thought (as Holy Scripture does in its doctrine of election[1]), Creationism God-consciousness. Nothing but the union of these three elements is sufficient. But the union must not be so conceived as if there were a mechanical division of the process between God, the genus, and the element of personality. We must hold first: the entire individual, so far as he contains no new element, nothing not already constituted in previous stages, is as to his entire nature a product of the genus present and operative in the parents, as well as a product of God's conserving power. Secondly: so

[1] As Schöberlein justly insists.

far as the individual contains new elements, we have to go back from parental causality and conservation to a creative act of God, but one which, while really constituting new elements, is at the same time a conserving of the eternal world-idea, a continuance or carrying forward of the eternal idea of our race as an organism of many members. Thirdly: in this divine world-thought the particular individuals, as regards their idea, are constituted separate essential members. This idea of theirs in God (and this is the truth in the Pre-existence-theory), may be viewed as striving from the first after realization through its appropriate media, *i.e.* in their succession and order in time. Just so, in the eternal idea of these particular individuals lies their affinity with the generic idea, as well as their realization through the medium of the representatives of the genus—the parents; as on the other hand it lies in the idea of the race not simply to require identical repetitions of individuals, but to be receptive of new individualities destined for freedom, and therefore receptive of divine activity introducing new members into the circle of humanity. The eternal idea not merely of the genus in general, but also of particular personalities, is not Nothing, not blank thought, but has already initial reality in the eternal, creative principle—the Logos and initial temporal reality in the first human pair.

Observation.—Some would ascribe to man an original power of self-determination; but God would then be made a passive womb, whence individuals are born spontaneously. No individual, before he exists, can contribute to his own existence. He himself comes into being through the interaction of the divine agency and that of the genus, but in such a way that both are determined by the eternal, divine idea of the individual as a free personal being. To explain the origination of impersonal creatures, the combined supposition of God's conserving agency and of the genus is sufficient. But man is above nature, not a mere continuation of the life of the genus. By his very idea he must be eternally conceived by God as a relative totality, of course in union with the whole. This is also borne out by the Mosaic cosmogony, which for man's origination lays down a new beginning, a distinct prior conception of him, and a distinct act carrying the conception into effect.[1]

[1] Gen. i. 26, 27, ii. 7.

APPENDIX.

ANGELOLOGY.

§ 44.

THE Doctrine of Angels as pure, celestial (unfallen) spirits, attested by Holy Writ and accepted by the Church, lacks complete dogmatic verification; but it involves no contradiction in itself or to other doctrines.

1. *Biblical and Ecclesiastical Doctrine.* — Here come in from the O. T. the מַחֲנִים in Jacob's history, the sons of God in Job's, the angels in Daniel's and Isaiah's,[1] whereas the מַלְאַךְ יְהוָה (§ 28, 1) is not everywhere regarded under a personal aspect, but in a portion of the passages denotes Jehovah in His revealed character. According to the N. T., the angels are created beings forming one portion of the spirit-kingdom, and living members of it in virtue of love and sympathy;[2] they are immortal, and without reproduction and sexual distinction;[3] they are wrapt in contemplation, in adoration of the divine counsels and celebration of God's praise.[4] As concerns their occupation, they are called in general ministering spirits of God,[5] and at the decisive epochs of God's kingdom their ministry comes out with special prominence, as at Christ's birth, resurrection, ascension, and second coming. Their numbers are depicted as immense,[6] and, according to Paul especially, they are ranged in different orders.[7] But however high they stand, Christ stands above them. Nor are they to be made objects of worship;[8] on the

[1] Gen. xxxii. 2; Job i.; Dan. vii. 10; Isa. vi.; Ps. lxviii. 18.
[2] Luke xv. 10; Matt. xviii. 10; Rev. xxii. 9.
[3] Luke xx. 36; Matt. xxii. 30.
[4] 1 Pet. i. 12; Eph. iii. 10.
[5] Heb. i. 14; Matt. xviii. 10, xxii. 30; Luke xvi. 22.
[6] Matt. xxvi. 53; Heb. xii. 22.
[7] 1 Thess. iv. 16; Gal. iii. 19; Eph. iii. 10; Col. i. 16–20.
[8] Heb. i.; Rev. xxii. 9; Col. ii. 18; cf. Col. i. 16; Heb. ii. 7, 9.

contrary, they themselves worship the Son of God.[1] It forms an important modification of the O. T. doctrine of angels, that in the N. T. they are gathered around Christ as around a centre.[2] It is no supposition of the N. T. that angels are merely departed men, as Swedenborgians hold.[3] Nor from the fact of their being called ministering spirits, sent forth for man's good, does it follow that they are at all a lower class of beings than men.[4] For the rest, Christ speaks of them as He could not have done on the supposition of His knowing that they have no existence. When Schleiermacher, while not alleging any accommodation in this matter on the part of Christ, thinks that Christ made use of the doctrine of angels, as any one may ingenuously, without sin, share in harmless popular notions, and that the knowledge of angels did not pertain to Christ's official knowledge, it is to be observed in reply, that Christ does not handle the doctrine in a mere traditional or proverbial way, but modifies it, and assigns to the angels a peculiar attitude in relation to His person.[5]

Ecclesiastical doctrine maintains the Biblical doctrine of angels, although the Reformation at the same time made protest against its abuse to purposes of religious worship, and against the interposition of angelic mediation.[6]

2. As concerns the objections to the Biblical doctrine of angels, it is to be conceded that many points in it remain obscure, *e.g.* the time of their creation, their relation to corporeity and development.[7] Their relation to the world, too, is not more precisely defined. According to several passages, they have also a relation to nature,[8] a fact especially dwelt on by v. Hofmann among moderns; according to other passages, to the spiritual domain, whether to the kingdom of God in general or as guardian-spirits to indi-

[1] Heb. i. 4, 13; Phil. ii. 6.
[2] John i. 52; Col. i. 20.
[3] Heb. i. 14, xii. 22, 23.
[4] Matt. xx. 26–28.
[5] Matt. xxvi. 53.
[6] *Apology*, 224; *Art. Smalk.* 311; *Cat.* 383.
[7] Other obscurities lie in the passages Rev. iv. 5 (of the seven Spirits of God, a passage often made use of by Emanationism), v. 6, 11 (the ζῶα); Ezek. i. 5; Isa. vi. 3 (the Seraphim).
[8] John v. 4 (but the words found here are probably spurious); and especially in Revelation, *e.g.* chaps. vii. and ix.

viduals.[1] Some think that the doctrine had its origin among the Persians. It is true that in the last centuries before Christ we find in the O. T. Apocrypha, *e.g.* the Book of Tobit, an extravagant angelology, nay even angel-worship, *e.g.* among the Essenes; but long before the contact with Parseeism, the notion of angels is found in the first book of Moses. Nor is Sabeanism to be thought of, despite the phrase "Lord of hosts." To the Hebrews the stars are not angels. Schleiermacher attempts to deduce the doctrine psychologically from the felt need of assuming in the universe more of spirit than the earth exhibits. But to the popular mind in pre-Christian days the stars did not assume the vastness they do to us, and such a comprehensive view of the universe as the scene of the revelation of spirit is not pre-Christian. And by the heathen the stars were even regarded as living beings.—The moral explanation of the origin of the doctrine suggested by C. Daub is ingenious:[2] "Seeing himself involved in the antithesis of good and evil, man sketches for himself archetypes of his ethical character under both aspects, and thus out of ethical necessity arises the idea of the angel as the glorious ideal of good (and the idea of the devil as the terrible extreme, to which man must of necessity attain in a course of evil)." But, on the contrary, the Hebrews are bold enough to make God their ideal, as is shown by the doctrine of the divine image,[3] the doctrine of angels having rather grown out of the idea of God. They are a kind of revelation, God's host, His spirit-kingdom, wherein His glory is displayed. These explanations of the origin of the doctrine, supposing them to be established, would not prove its falsehood. Before it can be described as impossible, it must be shown to be in *contradiction* with the *idea of God* or the *creature*. This would be done, supposing the angels had to be conceived with the Cabbala as *emanationist* in character; but this is not taught in Holy Scripture. They would be in contradiction with the idea of the *living creature*, supposing they were merely determined beings, without any power of self-determination and exertion. But even this is no part of

[1] Matt. xviii. 10; Heb. i. 14; Ps. xci. 11, xxxiv. 8.
[2] Followed by Binder in the *Studien der württemb. Geistlichkeit*, IX. 2, 1836.
[3] Lev. xi. 44: "Ye shall be holy, for I am holy."

their idea. They may possess the power, like nature itself, of self-reproduction. It might with more reason be said, that they are represented as endowed with *innate perfection, wisdom,* and *holiness,* and this would conflict with creaturely ethical existence. But no such doctrine is taught. That they stand in need of probation, is not denied; that they increase in knowledge, and therefore in wisdom and happiness, the New Testament seems to teach, and Christ's exaltation ministers to their perfection.[1] But *the* form of gradual progress belonging to us, *this* external relativity of different elements to each other, need not be theirs. And even if originally they formed a *pure world,* not bound like us to space and time, but standing *in the light of eternity,* still through the creation of man—this temporal being—and through their knowledge of man's development and destination even temporality may be reflected in them, so that by means of man, or rather of their sympathy with man, they may even come to share in historical development.[2]

3. But if no contradiction is established in the idea of angels, can they be shown to be a necessary class of beings? Thomas Aquinas and Raymond of Sabunde derive them from the idea of a complete world, exhibiting without a break all possible forms of life. But the possibility must not be merely subjective. It must be shown that the world-idea contains a place for them, which they alone in a distinctive sense are able to fill up; but this is not done. *Others* have thought: "The angels serve to fill up the vast interval between God and the creature," as if the distinction between God and man were a merely quantitative one. And with this erroneous conception is connected the opposite one, that God is removed to a distance from the world by His lofty dignity. This may be implied in a physical or forensic conception of God, from which would next follow a doctrine of angelic mediators and intercessors, which the Reformation rightly condemned.—Weisse understands by the angels the ideal world, whose

[1] Col. i. 20; Eph. iii. 10; 1 Pet. i. 12.

[2] Schelling, *Philos. der Offenb.* II. 279 f., represents them as volitionless potencies of an impersonal nature, forming the good ideal possibility of every one, and even after the Fall maintaining the bond of connection between God and man. He seems to view them as goodness working unconsciously in man, which the German language often calls "his good angel."

unity is the Logos; but in this case they are either mere unreal ideas, or, if real, men are mere shadowy repetitions of angels.

§ 45. *Continuation.*

As the Doctrine of Angels involves no contradiction in itself, so, on the other hand, manifold importance is not to be denied to it, partly in the character of a doctrinal boundary, partly because of the wide outlooks which it opens up to the Christian spirit on more than one side.

1. The doctrine of angels forms a *safeguard* against a mistaken *this-worldliness* in regard to our race and its history, in the same way that the doctrine of immortality does in regard to the individual and his life. Humanity is only one part of the entire sum of rational beings.[1] There is a two-fold preponderance of world-consciousness over God-consciousness. In the first place, we are often inclined to make the universe shrink into the earth, to describe everything lying beyond the earth as insignificant, trifling, mistaken other-worldliness. Of this, in the second place, the plausible opposite is that, while enlarging our view to contemplate the mathematical immensity of the mechanical structure of the universe, we fall on this account into a disparagement of spirit in contrast with mere vastness, and for example deem it mathematically absurd and impossible for our earth, this atom in the great All, to be the theatre of divine revelations, such as Christianity describes. Against both errors, the former over-valuation of the earth, and the spirit-power living upon it, as against the latter timid under-valuation of the significance of spirit, in contrast with mere vastness, the doctrine of angels forms a safeguard.—As concerns *over-valuation*, while the doctrine by itself is no security for the energy and purity of God-consciousness, it opens to the spirit an immense vista, forces it out of the limits of our planet, enlarges consciousness

[1] Schelling, *Philos. der Offenb.* II. 292. Nothing but the consciousness of being a universal being, in whose weal and woe interest is taken even outside this world, elevates man above the earth, above nature, which is itself better understood as to its *limits* by having another world outside itself.

of the world in a spiritual sense by requiring a higher, infinitely rich world of spirits to be taken into consideration, and through the holy character of these spirits secures to God-consciousness a powerful point of support for the religious apprehension of the universe. The *boundary* imposed by the doctrine on the human species is a limitation for a mere earthly mind, but for one made free by love an expansion. Not from spirit, not from love, but only from Egoism can the fear spring of the absolute worth of our race suffering from other beings participating therein. In reality it can only be a gain, an enhancement of the dignity of the human race, to suppose that outside our earth there is a spirit-world which exists for us as we exist for it.[1] The unity of the universe of course must not be infringed by it. But how can unity be supposed to be infringed by the existence of spirit in other parts of the universe? On the contrary, it were strange if the earth were the sole end of the world. On the contrary, according to the N. T., the angel-world and perfected humanity form one unity. Of the former also, the Son of God is the centre. Its religion is one and the same with that of Christendom.[2] Akin to this over-valuation of the earth and man is the common question, whether angels or men are the higher order of beings. Christ, it is said, took hold not of angels but humanity; He is Lord of angels; therefore in His person humanity is raised to the head even of the angelic order of beings. But this whole question resembles the dispute of the disciples, which among them was greatest,[3] and the answer will be given by our asking, In what does man's essence lie? Manifestly, primarily in the spirit, not in this earthly frame, which angels, it is true, have not. As relates to the spirit or reason, of which but one kind can exist, and whose true reality consists in wisdom, love, and holiness, men and angels are of the same nature. Though men begin at a lower stage, they shall still when perfected be ἰσάγγελοι;[4] as on the other side, at least in virtue of sympathy for men, angels have a course of historical progress, and are only welded into perfect unity through Christ.—While the former limitation of the view to this earth springs from the pride and arrogance of the human heart, the doctrine of angels

[1] Luke xv. 10.
[2] Phil. ii. 8 ff.; Col. i. 20.
[3] Matt. xviii.; John xiii. 13 ff.
[4] Luke xx. 36.

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is a no less important safeguard against the *despairing doubt* of the infinite significance of spirit in the world-All, springing from over-valuation of material masses; for the doctrine requires other world-regions in manifold gradation to be conceived as filled by rational beings, to the end that everywhere spirit may be seen to be the end of nature. On the other hand, by the doctrine of the sympathy of higher spirits with our history, it is intimated that in the spirit-kingdom nothing is isolated; that, on the contrary, what transpires on this earthly ball—a mere drop in a bucket—has significance for the entire universe of spirits.

2. Moreover, manifold significance in a positive respect cannot be denied to the doctrine of angels. Natural science does not permit our earth, and therefore our race, to be regarded as instituted eternally *a parte ante*. But just as little, we found (§ 34, 4), is the thought conceivable of God only having begun to create and surround Himself with spiritual beings a number of years ago, which would be the case if this earth with its inhabitants were the first. Prior to it, therefore, we must assume cycles of creation, each one of which is relatively independent, but which, on the other hand, are designed to interlock organically one with another.[1] The Biblical doctrine of angels, then, shows how it is possible to conceive this earthly world as non-existent ages ago, and yet God's work of creation as not beginning with it. This consideration suggests to us the doctrine of angels in the light of a necessary postulate.—In the same way the beginnings of our race seem to require the doctrine. The nature of man, in order to its development, absolutely needs stimulus from without, and indeed each aspect of his nature needs a cor-

[1] This has been expressed with great poetic beauty by Baltzer in his poem, *Die Weltschöpfung*:—

In the bright eternal ages,
Ere the dawn of worlds was toned,
Ere the spaces, ere the æons,
Lord of Hosts our God was throned.

He first made the angelic army,
And the bases of the earth,
And the waving seas of æther,
When He gave the world its birth.

At the world's first blessed dawning
Lay the silent spirit-land,
Stilly sleeping like a fledgeling,
All unconscious in God's hand.

Then to loudest praise untiring
God awaked the choir sublime,
As the first-fruits of creation,
At the gateway of dark Time.

REV. A. CAVE.

responding one, the spiritual aspect a spiritual. This stimulus he must find in a created spirit external to him. Now, seeing that in the beginning of the human race this cannot be supplied by man, the commencement of human development suggests that our race is not a self-enclosed, self-sufficing totality, but that there is a point where the circle of our race awaits the interlocking of the circle of another race, a race whose nature indeed we are unable to explain, but to which the Biblical doctrine of angels all the more corresponds, as angels are in many ways adapted to be the channel of divine communications to the world. Withal this is quite in keeping with the character of the pre-Christian period, where the mediatorial ministry of creatures has a far more prominent place[1] than in the New Covenant, which in Christ brings about direct connection with God. Angels, even if not bodiless, are beings free of space, not burdened with matter, not restricted to one sphere, but "the universe is open to them without limit—*omnis spiritus ales.*"[2]—Further, this doctrine brings vividly before us the wealth of spirit in the most diversified forms. Even for the doctrine of God and man it is important, as through it the possibility of a sinless development is demonstrated, and thus the identification of finitude and sin prevented. The angels are represented by Christ as a pattern of joyous fulfilment of God's will.[3]—The doctrine also enhances the dignity of Christ, who is the Head of the angels, as well as the glory and majesty of the Church, which embraces them.[4] Finally, amid the conflicts of the present age this doctrine forms a pledge to the Christian consciousness, that the triumphant Church is no empty ideal, no eternal other-world, but a present reality, and that believers have already the rights of citizens in their kingdom.[5] They belong to two worlds. We are born into a heavenly kingdom, not first formed by men, but in existence already. The kingdom of heaven comes to men.

[1] Gal. iii. 19; Acts vii. 53, cf. John i. 51. [2] Rothe after Tertullian.
[3] Matt. vi. 10. [4] Eph. i. 10; Phil. ii. 10; Col. i. 16-20.
[5] Heb. xii. 22; Eph. i. 21-23.

THIRD MAIN DIVISION.

THE UNITY[1] OF GOD AND MAN.

FIRST OR THETIC DIVISION.

FIRST HEAD: THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
SECOND HEAD: THE DOCTRINE OF REVELATION.
THIRD HEAD: THE DOCTRINE OF THE GODMANHOOD.

[1] [*Einheit, oneness,* a word, however, which the translator is free to confess that he shrinks from using in this connection.]

FIRST HEAD.

RELIGION.

§ 46.

GOD in His character of love is self-communicative, man spiritually receptive thereto. The coalescence of that act of communication and this act of reception, realized in actual life, is *religion*. God as a person being an indivisible spiritual totality, religion has its primary actuality not in any one of the spiritual faculties, but in the totality of man or the mind.

Bockshammer, *Offenbarung, u. Theologie*, 1822. Schleiermacher, *Reden über die Religion; Christlicher Glaube, Einleitung*. On Schleiermacher's idea of religion: Elwert, *Vom Wesen der Religion, Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1835, 3. Kern, *Das Leben in Gott.*, ibid. 1830, 2. Olshausen, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, 3. Stock, *Die intellectuelle Auffassung der Religion, Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1839, 4. Reiff, *Verhältniss von Philosophie u. Religion*, ibid. 1839, 4. Schweizer, *Die Dignität des Religionstifters, Stud. u. Krit.* 1834, 3. Ibid., *Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche*, I. 1863, p. 88 ff. Romang, *System der natürlichen Religionslehre*, 1841. Rothe, *Ethik*, 1 edit. I. § 144 ff., pp. 256–276; § 107, p. 227. 2d edit. § 115, pp. 462–482. Carlblom, *Das Gefühl in seiner Bedeutung für den Glauben im Gegensatz gegen den Intellectualismus innerhalb der kirchlichen Theologie unserer Zeit*, 1857. Erdmann, *Ueber Glauben u. Wissen*, 1837. Göschel, *Aphorismen über Nichtwissen u. absolutes Wissen*, 1829. Pfleiderer, *ut supra*. Biedermann, *ut supra*, pp. 22–109. Köstlin, *Der Glaube, sein Wesen, Grund u. Gegenstand, seine Bedeutung für Erkennen, Leben u. Kirche*, 1859.

1. The result of the First Main Division (§§ 15–37) was to show that God's will is to communicate Himself, to communicate life and spirit from Himself; of the Second, to show

that in man God made a creature destined to receive His perfect self-communication. At present, we have to exhibit that act of self-communication and this act of reception in their concrete combination, or so blended that, despite the distinction between God and man, established in the first two main divisions, the unity of the two shall now come into view; and this is done by means of religion. Religion is first of all to be examined, as a general concept, on the basis of the results already gained, with respect to its subjective aspect and objective ground, as well as with respect to the laws of its progress up to its consummation, and then to be considered with respect to its actual realization. But the present section will, in the first place, by psychological examination, prepare the way in both a negative and positive respect, for an understanding of the nature of religion. We here touch upon the question, much discussed since Schleiermacher's days, respecting the seat of religion, which, however, for us is merely preliminary; for this question does not concern the essentials of the investigation, because in fixing the place where something resides, very little is learned of the thing itself. To this is to be added, that there is no spiritual faculty which, both as to contents and form, might not be other than religious in character,[1] even as the capacity of the super-sensuous itself is not religion, while its exercise may even be irreligious. Supposing what has been advanced to hold good, that man's collective faculties have a relation to religion, religion can occupy no particular place among our spiritual faculties.—That religion pertains to the complete idea of human nature, follows from the idea of God and man. Individuals or communities being found without any religion proves nothing to the contrary. We must not judge man by empirical man, but judge empirical man by his idea. All the radii of spirit converge to religion, so that a normal man can be no other than religious. Where religion is absent, there is either immaturity, barbarism, at least defect in culture of the rational nature, or self-mutilation. Even *Atheists* demonstrate man's essential destination for religion; for no one can exist without religion, without substituting for it deification either of self or the world, and therefore perverted religion. Without an

[1] With this Rothe agrees, ed. 2, p. 117, note 2.

Absolute, reason cannot subsist. But the true Absolute is the supreme good—God; and therefore reason can do no other than require a course of conduct in harmony with the idea of God, *i.e.* religion. True theory leads to practice.

2. The nature of religion cannot be defined by any one of the spiritual faculties. Hence it is not a mere knowing, willing, or feeling. That it cannot be defined as mere knowledge or will, Schleiermacher has shown[1] in classical style; first, in reference to the contents, and then to the form of both. It is admitted that neither the bulk of the contents of knowledge, even if relating to divine things, makes religious, as a general rule, nor the contents of the will, or its aim and result, everything depending on the disposition. But just as little does the *form* of knowledge or will make religious. For the former depends on clearness and completeness of thought, which would lead us back to the contents. But if knowledge were found in the *feeling* of conviction, and knowledge connected with such feeling were called religious, feeling would rather be made the characteristic element of religion. On the other side, were the form of the will—disposition—made to constitute religion, we should again fall back upon feeling, every movement of will springing from an agitation of feeling. Purity or excellence of disposition is known by the character of the pleasure or aversion in the feeling that gave impulse to the will. In fact, it must be granted that there is even a knowledge of God Himself, which may be destitute of religion, namely, when personal participation is wanting, as in bare Orthodoxy or Intellectualism. And in the same way, it is not every exercise of will, *e.g.* in favour of the divine law, that is religious. There is a mechanical, merely legal, exercise of will, which remains nothing but outward show so long as personal participation is wanting. Such participation being no doubt expressed in *feeling*, Schleiermacher has given vogue to the tendency to find religion mainly, although not exclusively, in feeling. But, supposing *feeling as a third* element, alongside knowledge and will, to be conceived as the faculty of existence-within-self in spiritual affection and self-perception, it can be shown that even this would be no definition of religion. If, as Schleiermacher supposes, the nature of a thing

[1] *Christl. Glaube*, p. 3.

is defined by that which, according as it rises and falls, is the measure of its perfection, then must the strongest intensity of feeling, as concerns the *form*, be also the highest degree of religion. But if the perfection of everything is to be measured by its idea, or by its correspondence with its idea, while feeling alone is supposed to constitute the idea of religion, we must hold that feeling by itself is not adapted to form such a standard. The strength of feeling depending very much on individual mental temperament, this forms no security for the purity or healthiness of religious feeling. Purity cannot be judged by feeling alone, because there are impure feelings as well. We are compelled to make the transition to an objective standard, to which religion, if it is to be perfect, must conform in the last resort to the idea of God, which has to do with *knowledge*. Were there no objective standard for feeling, it would be autonomous, and thus would be good, whatever its character.[1] In feeling, as subjective excitement alone, we have not the idea of God. This we have, in some sort, in knowledge, although this knowledge need by no means be conceptual and scientific. Consequently the nature of pure religion cannot be defined without referring to knowledge as its standard, to which feeling must correspond. With respect to the *contents* of feeling, in religious feeling the reference to a definite idea of God will likewise exert an influence, and upon its accurate or confused character, in short, upon its completeness, will the nature of religion depend. A religion, for example, acquainted merely with God's physical attributes, will stand lower than one that has heard of His holiness, or still more of His love. Not merely will and intelligence, but feeling also, may in the abstract be the scene, as for the highest, so also for the most perverse, phenomena.

Observation. — In taking a general view of these three attempts to define religion as knowing, or willing, or feeling, another common peculiarity occurs to us. If in religion nothing but pure subjective feeling is to be taken into account, it is a pure relation to self. The object would then in turn be the subject, and religion would be a consciousness of one's own divinity, with which a pantheistic theory would very well consort. And just the same in the other two cases. The

[1] Cf. Martensen, *De autonomia conscientiæ sui humanæ*, 1837.

logical outcome of the theory, which finds religion in the will, is the position that God is the perfect world-order to be realized by means of the will, and therefore a problem and product of the future (Fichte). Just so, if religion is knowledge, or, viewed in its culmination, "absolute knowledge," relation to God as another being likewise comes to an end. Absolute knowledge is thought thinking itself, aware of nothing outside itself. Each one of these theories, logically carried out, leads to one of the chief possible forms of idealistic Pantheism. The reason of this is, that these three—thinking, willing, feeling—are spontaneous activities of the subject, in which it is granted the subject in different ways to constitute itself. Now if these functions are left to stand for what they are, secondary determinations of the spirit as the primary whole, itself a constituted, given quantity, it is then possible to say, that on the basis of constitution by another, of absolute dependence, they have the power of constituting themselves, each one in its sphere. But if any one of them, severed from the whole, is made to stand for the whole, and put as the highest power in the place of the whole, be it even under the name of religion, then their secondary position is denied, and there remains merely a self-constitution not based on the fact of constitution by another; and the fact of absolute constitution by another being taken away, by that very circumstance the fundamental prerequisite of religion is abolished. When, on the other hand, these functions are understood as the particular powers which they are, there remain the possibility and necessity of regarding them as limited by each other, and constituted by a higher freedom, which in turn cannot be constituted by them or by itself, but must be constituted by God.

3. Nor for the same reason can we describe religion by a combination of any two of those three fundamental functions, and define it as a unity of knowledge and will, or of knowledge and feeling, or of feeling and will. The first would be the once current Wolffian definition of religion, as a *modus Deum cognoscendi et colendi.* But a knowledge of God, and a willing of His will, is still not religion, without personal participation in and communion with God. Nay, without such participation, even true knowledge of God is out of the question. Just so, the will only acquires a religious character by the inherence in it, as impulse and inclination, of feeling directed to God. The more speculative Mystics describe religion as knowledge

and feeling, the practical as a unity of will and feeling. To the former, religion is the bliss of knowing God; to the latter, the bliss of loving God. But then knowledge and will would be divorced from each other, whereas, in order to religion, they must be inseparably united. For neither can there be a direction of the will to God, unless there is a knowledge of the aim and import of the effort, which is itself only religious as a desire to be under God's governance; nor is religious knowledge possible without religious impulse and will, for the will must give the spirit the direction Godward, or keep it in that condition, if actual religion is to be the result. And religion itself is a course of spiritual action, no pure passivity. There is in it the highest energy of spirit, even if the only effect of the energy be to restore the most intense receptiveness for God.

4. The only course open, therefore, is to claim for religion all these three functions, not one merely, or two, as its constituent elements. What we have hitherto found apagogically, that all the three fundamental powers of spirit combine as coefficients in forming religion, is confirmed by Holy Scripture, and may be verified on positive grounds. The entire spirit with all its energy is claimed for religion, when it is said: We are to love God with the whole heart, and soul, and mind, and strength.[1] The matter in question in religion is not a receiving of this or that gift of God, but the reception of God, communion with the entire, *i.e.* personal God, His favour and grace. Hence religion does not become reality in its subjective aspect, unless man as a whole, in his God-reflecting totality, enters into living relation with God. Unless religion dimly or clearly recognises God as its object, it cannot even know with what it has to do in the act of feeling and willing. But the object can only be given in a spiritual way, and to consciousness, through the medium of knowledge, which no doubt, as will be seen later, must be based on an anticipatory act of God to and in man. Just so, without movement towards God, without exercise of will, actual religion is impossible.[2] A mere involuntary, so to speak nature-prompted

[1] Matt. xxii. 37 ff.; Mark xii. 28–31; 1 John iv. 8.

[2] In saying this we acknowledge the element of truth in the efforts of those who, in opposition to the absolute sense of dependence, discover or wish to establish the

sense, *e.g.* of omnipotence, of absolute dependence on God, would not be religion. There is even such a thing as an irreligious feeling of absolute dependence.[1]—Again, without internalizing feeling, the object—God—is left either an object for will merely, an Ought, or an externally-remaining object for knowledge. The former would be Practicalism, the latter Intellectualism, but neither is religion. Feeling is the place where what holds good for will or knowledge is transformed into subjective, personal life.

5. But if, as shown, these three functions must co-operate to constitute religion, the question arises further, Is their simultaneous co-operation possible? And if so, is religion limited to moments when they co-operate in a state of equipoise, or may it have existence in the comparatively independent action of these functions? They are all receptive to God-consciousness, all claimed for it, as they all need it in order to their completion. They all co-operate in constituting religion, and their isolation or inactivity is precluded by its means. But seeing that the preponderance of one function, *e.g.* of will, or feeling as mere self-perception, has for its obverse the suppression of the others for the moment in question, the most favourable attitude of the spirit for realizing religion must be a condition that is neither absorbed in knowledge, nor in mere self-feeling or willing, but where the spirit in the concentrated unity of its powers is turned in its receptiveness actively and as a totality towards God, who is also a totality. If there is such a thing as a simultaneous co-operation of these powers, their simultaneous existence, which

nature of religion in freedom, in the endeavour to rise superior to the limits of the finite. But they are wrong in their unwillingness to presuppose at the basis of this impulse to rise above the finite a drawing of the living God, who, in the absolute feeling of dependence, reveals Himself to the spirit as infinite power, and does this to the inner consciousness, in order that the will may affirm this dependence. But if the starting-point is not, in accordance with the actual state of things, God's objective act or testimony to Himself, but merely man's freedom and activity of knowledge and will, then the idea of God becomes a mere subjective product, and the entire subsequent religious process cannot then escape a one-sided subjective character. The security against this error must be found in the consideration that the instinct of freedom to rise above the finite must spring from God, while God cannot be conceived deistically over against the established world, but "in Him we live, move, and have our being."

[1] Jas. ii. 19.

in God is absolute, may occur in a reflected way in man, and fill certain moments of time. There could be no interchange between the opposite actions of emergence out of self and recurrence into self, unless there were given as points of transition moments of equipoise between knowledge and will, in which, while man exists also within himself, he need by no means be under the necessity during this spiritual existence in and with himself of being conscious only of *self*. Knowledge and will are not extinguished in feeling, but continue to act as potencies therein. Otherwise, it would be inconceivable how moments of preponderance on the side of knowledge or will can again follow. We must add the consideration, that those so-called fundamental powers are not to be regarded as *parts* of the soul, but in each one the entire soul exists, though in a different character. If, therefore, all that is necessary is a heightened energy of spirit, an actual co-operation—joint-working—of the factors involved in every form of the spirit's existence, we have in this case that concentrated unity of spirit, without one-sided preponderance of one of the three factors, which we seek. This primitive totality recurring also at every stage, we call *mind*.[1] The word mind or *heart* deserves the preference above the expression "feeling," because "feeling" leans too much to a subjective conception of religion. Moreover, by mind or heart the totality of the energizing spirit is better expressed. On the other hand, in the expression "mind," subjective participation is completely assured, while the co-operation of the other factors is also assumed.

But while religion is primarily a characteristic of spirit in its original unity or entireness, the question occurs, Are merely those moments of combined, collective activity of the mind to be put to the account of religion, or also conditions of life, when the spirit exercises one of its separate functions, *e.g.* knowledge or will? Primarily of course the life of religion is generated in the collective faculties of the heart, in moments of undivided, harmoniously co-operating power and energy, since religion cannot originate in a single faculty as such. But to limit religion to moments of undivided existence would be to exclude it from a vast number of conscious moments,

[1] Even Schleiermacher, *Christl. Glaube*, I. p. 8, approves the phrase of Steffens: Immediate presence of the entire undivided existence.

whereas it lays claim to all. And then would arise the double mischief, that many moments of time would necessarily be irreligious, and that religion would be unable to operate as a principle, and by permeating all powers with soul, to assimilate them to itself, which is the only way in which these powers can attain their harmony and consummation. We hold, therefore, that *the spirit of religion* is able to continue in the functions during their comparatively independent action, even as we speak of a *spirit* of prayer outside the moments of worship proper (§ 48, 3), and that this, so far from harming religion, is the means, since moments of undivided concentration constantly recur, of working out for it an ever higher and richer unity. There must be a religious knowing, willing, and feeling; all these single functions are susceptible to and in need of religion, even as the corresponding faculties co-operate in constituting the idea of religion. Those are creative moments in religion, when feeling is not absorbed in consciousness of a single condition of delight or aversion, and will and knowledge are not surrendered to a single object, but when the soul is all within itself, but for the purpose of raising itself in the concentrated unity of its powers to God. Other states in part prepare for, in part live upon, these.—If religion, then, is a matter of the mind or heart, we have therewith indicated the sphere it requires; but as other phenomena may possibly occur in the same territory, religion is not yet adequately defined. Not all moments of the undivided spiritual existence must perforce be religious; for certain as it is that it is only religion through which all the powers can attain perfect development and unity, still to the development of man, and also of religion, a certain unity must be presupposed, which yet is not itself actual religion.

§ 47.—*The Nature of Religion.*

Religion is the living, reciprocal relationship of God to man and man to God. Thus, on God's part it is His self-manifestation, first of His majesty and power, secondly of His will; on man's part, primarily the consciousness of absolute dependence on God and surrender to Him.

Seeing that on God's part it is the communicative relation of God to man, on the basis of absolute dependence and humility, man is in religion filled with divine life in knowledge, freedom, and blessedness.

1. Religion is a vital relation of two parties, God and man, and therefore cannot subsist where only one member of the antithesis is active. Were it only the individual subject, there might arise an ideal perception of self, perhaps in distinguishing the ideal from the empirical Ego; but unless at least a germ of the distinction between the human Ego and another real being is also involved, there would be no question of a religious relation, but merely of a moral relation to oneself. But dependence on oneself is merely freedom. Were only the divine factor active, there could be no question of absolute dependence, or of communication; for that which is absolutely dependent would be wanting. It is no accident that the religion of the Old and New Testament is designated by the term *covenant*, with which the word *religio* is perhaps connected; for in a covenant a communion of two parties is implied, which is regarded on both sides as a fixed, so to speak binding, vital relation.

2. Let us consider the objective and subjective aspect of this relation in general as such. Man alone cannot generate or create religion. Many indeed believe this, and, busying themselves with fanciful pictures of their own making, call it natural religion, or give the name of religion to moral conduct, to submission to a law, or finally, to certain higher moods in which the soul, so to speak, vibrates with feeling. But intercourse with the pictures of one's own fancy and the moods of feeling resulting therefrom, is merely a kind of intercourse with oneself and not religion; and the same is true of the submission of the will to laws prescribed by the moral consciousness or conscience. Religion presupposes something divine and a perception of the divine as *a priori* to it; but its aim and effort is communion with the living God. Its concern is with the right settling of the relation, already existing in fact, between God and man, with His immediate grace and favour, then with knowledge of His greatness and a walk well-pleasing in His sight, in a word, with perpetually renewed *communion with*

God. But then originally man is constituted only by God. Originally we can only have the idea of God through God and God's action. To this extent religion is no pure act of man, but only becomes reality on the ground of the divine agency. God's activity in implanting the germs of reason, and with them the ability to apprehend Him and become conscious of Him, must perforce remain the fundamental element. And not merely does God preserve the world, and with it man's ability to grasp the idea of God, but through Him also the idea of God puts forth life and energy. Every moment we only know God through God, and through His living, manifold manifestation is religion preserved in continued existence where it exists. Thus, what remains of causal power to the subject in the matter of religion is keeping oneself, feeling, knowing, willing, in dependence on God on the ground of an enduring vital union with God.[1]

But, on the other hand, the subjective aspect is just as essential to the nature of religion. Subjective religion or piety is a living relationship to God, therefore not Quietism. With the extinction of the living activity of the subject, religion would be extinguished. It is also part of the idea of manifestation on God's part, that it effects what it intends—activity on man's part. As a consequence, religion cannot, so to speak, be put on man from without, nor cannot it be inborn. It is a living activity on the part of the already existing. It cannot therefore be established by external revelation alone. Just as little does it exist where one party only is passively affected by communion, without a *focus* of personal, subjective religion. But this activity on the part of the subject is of such a nature that it is not conscious of itself as something primary, but points back of itself to a primary act on God's part.[2]

3. This living *relationship* between God and man is, on man's side, above all the *consciousness of absolute dependence on God*, but a dependence which, if religion is to become a fact, must be acknowledged and *affirmed.* This absolute

[1] Of course in this the factor of freedom is involved. But in making this freedom stand for religion so as to co-ordinate it with dependence, many forget that even the existence of freedom depends perpetually on God.

[2] This is also implied when Schleiermacher discovers the ground of the sense of absolute dependence in a "being touched" by God.

dependence, forming no antagonism to human freedom, is involved in the fundamental relation between God and the world. God is the only Life sufficient of and for itself, and absolutely determining all outside Him; the creature is dependent in its very being, *i.e.* absolutely. The dependence of man on the forces of nature is specifically distinct from this absolute dependence, having a partial sense of freedom in relation to the world's companionship and limitation. Nay, this sense of freedom in relation to Nature is raised to a climax by the consciousness that Nature is absolutely dependent with us on a higher power. "If God be for me, who can be against me?" Wherever, therefore, even in heathenism, real religion exists, there has been established, along with a sense of superiority to Nature and the visible, and therefore freedom in relation to it, a feeling or perception of absolute dependence through experiencing an impression of God's immediate, boundless power, although the embodiment of this feeling in idea or conception may be imperfect, *e.g.* polytheistic, and therefore in contradiction with the fundamental feeling. Freedom, however, comes into view in the matter of religion in another way than in relation to Nature, namely in relation to God, and this without forming a contradiction to the divine power, by which freedom is established and persists. We cannot, with Schleiermacher, give the name of religion to the bare feeling of absolute dependence. Seeing that there is even such a thing as a reluctant feeling of dependence (§ 46, 4), the affirmation, the *willing* of such absolute dependence and of its consciousness is requisite in order to subjective religion, and this is *humility*, the groundwork, nay, the earliest form of existence of all piety. But we have further seen (§ 46), that not only feeling and will, but knowledge also is a prerequisite to the existence of religion as well as to its growth. The perception of absolute dependence is in man a conscious vital state, and a clear or obscure consciousness of the absolute divine causality or *power*. By virtue of humility we feel and know that apart from God we are unable to live, that in Him lies the prime source and goal of our life, while at the same time we are able to will this dependence on Him, cherish the sense of it, and preserve it fresh. And since God may manifest Himself to feeling not merely as Power but also as Holiness

and Justice, and finally as Love, and impart a corresponding impression of Himself to the heart, an ever purer and richer intuition and knowledge of God may grow up.

Observation 1.—But although, in harmony with what has been advanced, religion is no involuntary, merely natural growth, and consequently in its very root is ethical in nature, this does not give us the right to make conscience its beginning. The first element in it is rather absolute dependence, and that independent of the will, involuntarily existing and self-manifesting. Only then does the second element come into play, viz. that man, if he is to be religious, act in harmony with his true character, *i.e.* with this fact of dependence. Certainly therefore freedom also in relation to God, not merely absolute dependence, belongs to religion. To assume the two were a contradiction, supposing our freedom had to be regarded as absolute. But the two harmonize, if in the same divine will, on which we are absolutely dependent in our *being*, is included the willing of our freedom, the willing of the exercise of our powers, by means of which the *character of our being* is at least partially determined. Freedom, therefore, in relation to God in the use of our powers, does not cancel the fact that, as we are absolutely constituted by God without assistance from us, so in our being we are ever absolutely dependent on Him. And this dependence, extending to being, suffers no limitation from our freedom. Consequently it is a mistake to suppose that absolute freedom might just as well be found in religion as absolute dependence.[1]

Observation 2.—Hase would distinguish God and man thus: the latter is God becoming, God is man perfect. On such a definition, while no place would be left of course for absolute dependence, none also would be left for God's absolute and creative freedom. The right distinction of the two must go back to the idea of God's self-existence and sole self-sufficiency, which *cannot* be the goal or problem of man.

4. Religion is the highest stage of self-consciousness, nay, the highest form of the life of spirit generally.[2] There are not wanting, indeed, those who say that absolute unity is only attained when the spirit no longer has God objectively over against itself, that religion is still entangled in Dualism, holding fast as it does to the distinction between God and

[1] This is acknowledged even by Lipsius, *ut supra*, §§ 29, 38, 2d ed. 1879.

[2] Cf. Schleiermacher, *Christl. Glaube*, I. § 5.

man, and that consequently it is only in absolute knowledge, or the sense of absolute freedom, by which this Dualism is overcome, that the highest unity is attained.[1] But duality is not Dualism, but the prerequisite of living unity. On the contrary, by these very theories a dualism would be imported into man; for if thought can only arrive at perfection by means of an absolute knowledge, by which the religious and moral would be absorbed or precluded, this means that the *speculative spirit* is in *essential contradiction* with the world of the will and the heart,—a supposition involving *tacit dualism*. And the same would follow, supposing a sense of absolute freedom were imagined as the goal. Whereas every *kind of Pantheism* either supposes the world to be absorbed by God, or God by the world, and consequently regards the two as hostile, mutually exclusive quantities, it is the prerogative of religion to attain, nay to enjoy, the highest unity, a unity blending and ratifying all antitheses, because we are conscious of ourselves, along with the world and all its spheres, as absolutely dependent on God and wholly hidden in Him.

5. CONTENTS OF RELIGION.—Religion becomes reality by the communication on God's part of divine life. By favour of God's love the communication is self-communication, but always upon the ground of absolute dependence on Him and by means of man's assent to the same, which draws down on itself divine powers. The form of this communication is determined by the divine nature and its constituent elements. It includes first, *knowledge of the truth*, even if in the first instance it be in the form of presentiment or spiritual intuition, of course of such a kind that the knowledge communicated becomes also matter of feeling and will. Feeling alone, occupied merely with self and brooding upon self, may easily become one-sided and selfish. But true knowledge of God takes delight in the object which the spirit permits to dominate in it. Besides, the knowledge of God is its own end, a good in itself; and for God to be known is God's glory, as it is man's happiness. But religious is different from dialectic and discursive knowledge of God. The former needs no learning or high intellectual culture. It is no matter of the cultured as such, but of the simple believing heart, which in

[1] Or even only in atheistical "Monism" so called.

a way of its own becomes conscious of a present God. And even when religious knowledge becomes perfect, the distinction of subject and object will not disappear. While true knowledge of God only arises through a being and self-knowledge on the part of God in us,—a being and self-knowledge which originate knowledge and make His thoughts our thoughts,—all our true knowledge of God has for its medium the consciousness that we are thought, willed, loved by God. And thus neither does God know Himself as us, although as His work we are enfolded in His self-knowledge, nor do we know ourselves as God, although He is included in our knowledge, but we know Him as determining and imparting, ourselves as willed by Him and receiving from Him. But only because God is truth is there anything true in itself, and therefore real knowledge.—But no less is the good man made partaker in the divine *freedom*, not merely in the negative sense of deliverance from finite cravings or independence of the world, like the freedom of apathy or wantonness, which leaves the soul poor and desolate, but in the sense of positive strength, with which the good man feels himself endued, power to overcome the world,[1] nay, to convert it to his service as an organ and instrument of expression. This sense of strength, this princely spirit, Christianity confers in proclaiming, "All is yours," victory in the midst of conflict and apparent defeat.[2] Having given up his isolated attitude, even that of will, in God's presence by devotion to God, who on His part responds to this devotion by communicating His mind and spirit, the good man desires whatever befalls, and there takes place, befalls, what he desires.—In the free life of love and knowledge, which religion imparts, man is also partaker in *blessedness*. The difference between prosperity and blessedness is that the latter word has reference to ideal, infinite reality, the former not. He is blessed who has part in the supreme good. It is implied in the idea that every faculty is in unimpeded operation, energetically and harmoniously. Seeing, then, that in religion every faculty reaches its designed perfection, and God Himself becomes the spirit's supreme good, how can blessedness be wanting? When to this is added the consideration that in religion the good man does not appear

[1] 1 John v. 4, 5. [2] John xvi. 33; 1 Cor. iii. 22.

before God as an isolated individual, but that by the God, who is on his side, all are willed as in process of becoming partakers in the knowledge, freedom, and blessedness of God, not merely is personal self-consciousness satisfied, but also the larger consciousness, or that of the whole human race. In the contemplation and enjoyment of God, as well as in the loving companionship of God's Church—as the family of the great Father, endued with capacity to know Him as they are known of Him—the spirit keeps a Sabbath as buoyant with life as it is calm and blessed.

§ 48.—*Faith.*

Faith, considered as a matter of the heart, is the fundamental activity of religion, uniting in itself activity and receptivity. Both are manifested in the essential function of faith—prayer. But during this temporal life faith is in process of development, *i.e.* in a state of progressive increase.

1. On the basis of the O. T., Christianity has in the word *faith*, πίστις, a sacred term for the normal attitude of man in religion. It aptly describes that attitude of the heart to God, through which by divine condescension religion becomes a reality; for in πίστις, according to its Biblical meaning, living receptiveness and spontaneous action are indissolubly united. No doubt the first element in religion is the experience of God's quickening and determining influence. But the result is no mere passive state. God wills no mere passivity; His action is stimulative of action. Supposing the will to spontaneously follow the drawing to God,[1] self-determination and determination from without are blended in willingness to be determined by God. And now that it is determined by and filled with God's power, the will has what it longed after; it is raised above the visible and above itself by attachment to the invisible,[2] which is just as easy of demonstration as it is of access.—But no less does πίστις involve the element of religious *knowledge*. Often indeed the word faith is used in the sense of *opinion*, of a formally imperfect, *i.e.* indefinite,

[1] ὑπακοὴ πίστεως, Rom. i. 5. [2] Heb. xi. 1.

uncertain knowledge, scarcely amounting to a state of conviction. And as to substantive import, by faith is often meant an *incomplete* knowledge, confined to generalities or having mere historical details for its matter. But instead of this, religious faith rather implies *firm certainty*, nay, the supreme certainty of that in which alone everything else finds its demonstration; for by faith the spirit apprehends the presence of God, and that as the basis of communion between God and man. As to substantive import, therefore, faith implies already an initial or seminal knowledge of a totality, a whole, linked as it is with a present God.[1] There is in it a delight, as in all God's communications, so in the knowledge of God; and whatever of such fundamental knowledge it possesses subjectively, this the thinking faculty can and ought objectively to elaborate and exhibit in the life.[2]—Finally, to faith personal participation of the heart is essential.[3] But seeing that in this way on the subjective side, through knowledge, through exercise of will and trust, and through personal participation, faith is the link of connection binding the entire man in heart to God, it is out of the question to say that that which constitutes its essence *can ever cease.* The passage[4] which seems to imply the contrary refers only to the cessation of the form of knowledge distinguishing faith from sight, into which in this respect as into something higher it is raised. The essential point in faith is the attitude of the heart, the soul being recalled from all one-sided exercise of its faculties to a state of equipoise, in order with the whole heart, the whole soul, and the whole strength to be united to God.

2. PRAYER is religion's most distinctive mode of expression, nay, we may say of existence; for it is the direct visible embodiment of the life actuating the soul. Directly the chords of the soul tremble under the divine touch, the existence of the inner emotion makes itself known inwardly in prayer, outwardly in bearing, tone, and word. Prayer is the soul's vital breath. The soul that no longer prays has ceased to collect itself for life's highest function. What of life is lived without prayer is a burdened existence, dissipated in petty

[1] 1 John ii. 27, 20: "Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and know all things;" Col. ii. 3.

[2] § 46, p. 113.

[3] Rom. x. 10: καρδίᾳ γὰρ πιστεύεται.

[4] 1 Cor. xiii. 12, 13.

temporalities and a multifarious crowd of acts and feelings, without any consciousness of the Whence and Whither worthy of man. The relation prayer sustains to *faith* is that it is its direct practical exercise, whether in petition or in thanksgiving and praise. Prayer is faith conversing with God. But as in faith we found two seemingly opposite aspects, so, as one or the other preponderates, the prayer-life has two corresponding functions. As the physical life is sustained in existence by the interchange of the inspiration and expiration of the vital air, the influx and efflux of the blood in the heart, so the spiritual life preserves its existence by the mutual play of believing, *asking*, or *receiving*, by which man becomes endued with divine powers of life, and, on the other hand, of adoring worship that surrenders itself in self-sacrifice to God in devotion, or in thanksgiving that finds its blissful repose in God's high praise. But as, further, in the physical life the process is not suspended when outbreathing succeeds to in-breathing, but this very act becomes in turn the occasion of the opposite function, so in the spiritual region there is the play of ceaseless transition from asking to having, from having to giving and sacrificing, from giving back to asking and obtaining, and in this interchange of receiving and presenting, of asking and sacrificing, the progress of the creaturely life of religion goes on.

3. But since, finally, the *stages of faith* differ according to the degree of development of the separate faculties, on whose normal cultivation (§ 46, 5) the strength, perfection, and permanence of religion depend, faith also supplies the impulse to continuous effort in cultivating these separate faculties according to their respective natures. This, of course, can only be done by man exchanging the state in which these functions exist in undivided unity for one of them alone, knowing or doing or feeling. But the spirit need not on this account let itself be thrust out of the domain of religion (p. 113); but even in these separate functions the life of faith and prayer may continue, as it were an accompanying undertone, this being called in Christian phraseology the *spirit of prayer*. But these separate functions must ever merge again into the state of unity, into religious moments in the strict sense, when man is collected in faith and prayer before God. The

two poles of receiving and giving, petition and thanksgiving, form in the normal personality of man the living and yet fixed axis, around which as around a primary point the entire life of the secondary functions revolves.

By no means can *sin* be primarily regarded as the reason why the life of religion or faith has to pass through *a series of stages.* Rather, man's ethical destination requires ethical self-determination on his part, and to this a law of succession, entrance upon a course of progressive development, is requisite. A *spontaneous,* innate feeling—implanted in consciousness by God—of absolute dependence is certainly to be postulated as the *ground of possibility* for religion; but the will has itself first to will this dependence and the sense of it, and thus by affirming or reproducing to make God's act its own (§ 47). This being done, God is able to impart to the self-surrendering spirit more than the bare knowledge of His absolute causality, namely, the knowledge of His will—just and holy, wise and loving—and therewith of the world's aim, nay, to vouchsafe to it not merely the knowledge but the communication of Himself. This *twofold surrender* of God to man, and of man to God, is *ethical* in nature, and postulates therefore progressive development.—But just as little as sin is the cause of that law of gradual succession, is this law of gradual succession the cause of sin. To the previous stage the one to be attained subsequently is of course wanting, and so far the former is *defective.* But considered in itself or absolutely, every stage may be what *it ought* to be. The idea or ideal of man comprises also his normal development, and therefore the *stages* of realization as willed of God. It would therefore be nothing else than perverse to discover an *evil* in this law of gradual succession. It is good, because only by its means is it possible for man in his onward progress to take part in his self-development, and be in God a free, independent personality, in the spirit of Paul Gerhard's saying: "What is slow in coming is held the faster, and what is long delayed tastes all the sweeter." But the doctrine that the gradual nature of the realization of religion is a good thing is opposed both to the theory of a golden era of the world in the sense that man, as he came from God's hand, was absolutely perfect, his only duty being to preserve what was

established (§ 42), and to the error of a Pelagianism, which in the interest of the natural goodness of man renounces the idea that progress in the communion of God with man is necessary to his gradual self-realization. That which is able to impart higher dignity to man, cannot become his without participation on his part. All spiritual blessings as real possessions are only, as the early Greek proverb says, the purchase of toil. On the other hand, *one* act cannot give actual perfection. Man is infinite in nature by reason of infinite receptiveness, or by reason of receptiveness for the infinite, which is communicated to him according to the degree of maturity he attains in the receptiveness which it is his to cultivate and improve. The *animal* has its limits which it cannot overstep. Man is endowed with capacity for infinite progress, and this law holds good within the Christian life as well. To the righteousness of faith must be added righteousness of life. Regeneration through faith does not make everything complete forthwith. Even of faith it is said: From faith to faith.[1]

§ 49.—*Communion in Religion.*

In its origin, growth, and continuance, religion has in itself an essential relation to communion. The religious community, although one in virtue of its idea, assumes a multiple form under the limits of space and time. Each one of these separate communities, so far as it is not of an evanescent, imperfect kind, points to a single historical founder, the author of the distinctive character stamped on it. But the plurality of religious communities should not interfere with their destination to merge into one community, which, if it is to be all-comprehensive, must start from one founder, who must perforce embody in himself the absolutely universal principle.

Schleiermacher, *Der christl. Glaube*, I. § 6, 10, pp. 32 ff., 56 ff.

1. If anywhere, one might suppose, in the province of

[1] Rom. i. 17; Eph. i. 4, ii. 10, iv. 15.

religion human communion is non-essential, fortuitous; for the impulse to communion, so powerful in the secular field—the necessity of supplying mutual deficiencies—seems here to have no place, no one being able to be religious, any more than moral, for another. Nay, even supposing the conception of the propensity to communion to be more definitely moral in character, the need of religious communion for the good man seems to be precluded by the fact that religion has to do with God, not, as in the region of morality, with man. God and God alone is able always to satisfy the religious need. But certain as it is that religion is a personal transaction between God and man, and little as the religious community can be a substitute for communion with God Himself, God Himself and His action on the contrary pertaining to the reality of religion, still *even God Himself is not rightly known* and honoured, unless in Him we recognise the Creator and Father of a vast spiritual kingdom. I am not at liberty to suppose that God is related only to me, and that His action is exhausted in this line of dealing. This would be Egoism, not religion, seeing that God would be conceived as a particularistic Being. In religion I must needs possess Him as He is, and will myself as He would possess me, *i.e.* regard myself in His sight as a *member of a whole*, not as an isolated being. I must regard Him as one who acts for the good of others, who desires by His acts to do me good, as He desires what He does to me to be of service to others. But a state of isolation has at its foundation the presumptuous desire to be the whole absolutely, without being again comprehended as a ministering and susceptible instrument in a higher whole. To this theological basis of the religious community is to be added the *anthropological* one, which is of importance in respect to the lower stages. We saw formerly (§ 41), that the individual personality only reaches completion through true consciousness of the race, or through love. The intrinsic connection of all spiritual spheres with the ethical is the reason why, as we saw, consciousness of the race always receives an impetus when something of high import emerges in any spiritual region. Now this holds good of religion in an eminent degree. The spirit of religion stimulates to interchange in imparting and receiving in the most powerful way,

because here it is true life itself that is in question. Manifold variety of gifts and powers, since they are all intended to be actuated by religion, results in no isolating independence or separation, but renders interchange living and fruitful. Constituted of God a member of an organism, man only answers to his reality when he makes the interests of the race his own, and is, so to speak, permeated by the spirit of the Universal. Again, the divine idea of the race is not satisfied when its members are merely related *among themselves*. This interconnection must also be realized in the most vivid way in their *consciousness* and *volition*. The union of the two is *the common spirit*. Only by means of a common spirit does the organism of humanity attain its true reality.

2. In its origin and continued existence religion is formative of communion. Generic consciousness must in all its stadia be united with God-consciousness. In basis and aim, religion is the most universal of all principles. For this reason every one really possessed by the spirit of religion strives after communion, to establish it where it does not exist, to join and so at least participate in reproducing or conserving it where it exists. This follows, not only from what has just been laid down, but also from the law of human development (§ 41). Religion needs *stimulus* and organs adapted to its nature, a distinction thus arising between those who communicate and those who receive. To this is to be added diversity of gifts and generations. Whatever wealth of religious acquisition one supplies, is meant to be an invitation to the other equally to enjoy and imitate. At any rate, nothing but what is impure and obstructive to the free circulation of the divine life can prevent the individual believer from being social in religious character. *Separatism* is a form of religious disease. Healthy religion, however, has to guard against the opposite error of a mistaken culture of the generic consciousness, namely, against a *passion for communicating* out of proportion to the inner reality and vital energy of personal religion. But alongside these two faults of too-little and too-much on the side of the *communicative* generic consciousness, are two faults on the side of *reception*. First, mere *passive* reception from others, in which case religion is rather a simple matter of memory and authority. The social spirit of religion in its

true form, instead of suppressing individuality, includes it in its most energetic exercise. The other fault is *exclusive reserve* or obtuseness, destitute of desire to enter the circle of the religious ideas of others, and to borrow from them, and for this reason refusing communion with them. This, especially when joined with a magisterial disposition and spirit of self-sufficiency, is a self-injurious withdrawal from works and talents bestowed by God on others for our good. Of such separatism not merely individuals but communities may render themselves guilty; but the more this narrowness and self-exaltation gain ground among them, however great or however small their numbers, the more they degenerate into *sects*.

3. The realized communion of those who worship God in common is called in Christian phraseology the *Church*. And as men collectively are no less one race in God's view than God is one, as they are destined by His will to form one organism, one kingdom of God, the life of religion being its centre, it follows that the Church by its very idea must be one. One God, one World, one Church! Therewith *plurality* seems to be precluded, and we might be inclined to derive its existence altogether from sin, by which the universal cementing principle has been suppressed, and limits induced instead. No doubt sin does convert distinctions into antinomies and separatist forms of opposition. But in itself distinction is not schism. Even without sin a stricter concentration into one group in harmony with elective affinity is possible, the obverse of which is diminished intensity of direct communion with others, separation although not severance. In connection with natural peculiarities of individual character, expressing themselves in different types of families and nations, a great variety in the modes of combining the different elements, which religious development has to assimilate, may ensue without sin; and in the process those more nearly allied by affinity and sympathy will enter into closer association with each other. But exclusiveness with respect to any portion would imply sin; and the numerous religious communities would always, unless sin prevented, be ready to show religious hospitality one to another. Accordingly, this plurality, if it is to remain innocent, must in turn allow itself to be regarded as the unity of the Church in process of

realization, as stages with an inner impulse urging it on to complete unity.

4. But whether the course of development be sinful or not, each one of the religious communities, if it is not to remain at a mere subordinate stage and be evanescent in character, must have a *historical starting-point* or *founder*. Supposing it impossible to adhere to the notion of each person being religious in isolation,—otherwise the individuals tending to one centre, to God, would be to each other like *radii* that never touch, would be connected with God and yet disconnected with each other,—the question is, how a religious community, and that permanent and stable, is to be formed. Those of merely *receptive* character cannot be the founders of religious communion, but can only be attracted, stimulated by those whose predominant characteristic is communicativeness, and by them united together in the participation of their religious faith. Again, those endowed with *capacity to communicate* cannot beget a common religious spirit by conventional agreement or mere choice. This would only be conceivable if religion were a matter of artificial contrivance. But it is merely granted them through higher qualifications, —to be referred to God,—and the authority which these give, to exert an attractive, uniting influence on their own circle, whether small or great, by bodying forth their religious life; and in union around such centres or names, and in imitating and perpetuating the religious life bodied forth by them, those previously lying disconnected side by side, like dead embers, become conscious of their unity and possessed by a common spirit, religious communion being the result. In this historically cognizable centre they have found a bond of religious community and the possibility of a sense of unity. But for every definite religious communion, *unity* of founder is requisite. A *plurality* of founders would be directly fatal to communion, and out of harmony with the design of their special qualifications. Supposing these founders all to have the same primary religious impulse and faith, the existence of many would at least imply a superfluous endowment. For what is given to one is in him given for the good of all; and what might seem at first to be gained in rapid diffusion by plurality of founders, would soon prove to be a loss, as in the variety

of founders the respective circles would have difficulty in apprehending their unity, and be liable to error. The plurality would enfeeble the energy of the common spirit, the sense of unity. But supposing the many founders were altogether different one from another, which, after what has been said, is more probable, every one being a separate individuality, no religious community founded by them in common would possess the required unity. Such a community could only be drawn together in a more concentrated form, provided among the many leaders one were to arise uniting the diversities in himself as in a higher unity. But then he would simply be the true founder. Thus, a common religious spirit can only be awakened in a vast circle by the pre-eminence of one individual, to whom the circle feels itself attracted in spirit, he being the representative of its innermost and best nature and in possession of the good, for which an ardent need has been awakened. By his expressing and communicating this good, all have in him the common historic centre, through which they know *themselves* one, in which they find their common religious principles embodied objectively and in a form cognizable by all. Since, then, around men of special religious endowments, attracted and spiritually dominated by them, a Church grows up, having as the principle of its common spirit the new truth the founder had to impart, religion in its gradual course of realization among mankind may assume the form of a *plurality* of religious communities representing different aspects of the idea of God, but all having their historic founders,—a universal law of life clearly demonstrated by history, for even in the Christian era we have an echo of it in the founders of particular churches. But each one of the many founders, and each one of the many communities, so long as they do not yet embody the actual universal principle, only represent a section limited in space and time, and even though they are sufficient in their place, can only be regarded in a higher relation as points of transition. For the Church of God must of necessity not merely be absolutely one, but—if the realization of religion is to be perfect—be known and stand forth as one. If consequently a religious community, after the higher form has appeared and the time of its own separate existence thus expired, does

not merge into the higher community, *i.e.* disappear in it as a separate body, it must at least be evident that such religion contains unsound elements. Every religious founder, embodying, indeed, the spirit of a definite circle but not of the truly universal, will be able to satisfy the individuals of his own circle, but not all alike, nor at all times. Historical progress has the effect of allowing the spirits of the multitude to permeate each other by mutual contact. But where, in spite of this want of ability to give satisfaction on the part of the particular religious founder, individuals continue to adhere to him, whereas a higher stage is within their reach, a false dependence begins at once to threaten their own individuality, since a restricted alien individuality seeks to supplant their own, in contradiction with the receptiveness of man, which exists with a view to the really universal principle, in which the possibility of healing lies. For these reasons, without doubt, particular separate religious communities have their time, and as such must needs come to an end. Even in the ancient world, humanity demanded that mankind should regard themselves as a unity. So in Chrysippus. But this cannot be effected through philosophy, all not having philosophical gifts, but only by means of humanity knowing itself one religiously, before God as well as through God, and through possession of religious blessings outweighing all distinctions.

5. If even religious communities, subject to limitations of time and space, do not come into existence without a historical starting-point, far less *can the highest form of the realized unity of entire real humanity, recognising itself as God's Church, come into existence without a historical starting-point, by which mediately or immediately all are possessed in order in it to know themselves one.* What must be the character of such a starting-point, how it must not merely be free from all separatist extremes, but include in it for every true personality the innermost and best of all reality, nay, embody the very idea of religion, in order that in it all may have a real centre of a real communion,—all this can only be discussed later on. In the organism of humanity it will fill a similar position to the one filled in the system of corporeal life by *the head,* which, although all the members are also ends and not merely means, while it is itself in turn a member,

yet bears the hegemony over the entire body, doing good to each member after its manner, and keeping it in harmony with the whole.

Observation.—In the present section we have considered the nature of religion in general, and in doing so have been occupied in a psychological field; but even here it is evident how essential is the dependence of religion on divine action. Since it is this which fructifies the religious capacity, gives a start to, and assists its development, the more definite idea of religion is only the fruit of a closer consideration of this divine action or *revelation.*

SECOND HEAD

REVELATION.

FIRST SUBDIVISION.

NATURE AND NECESSITY OF REVELATION.

§ 50.

There is no Religion but through Revelation.

LITERATURE.—Bockshammer, *Offenbarung u. Theologie*, 1822. V. Drey, *Apologetik* (*Philosophie der Offenbarung*), 1838, I. 119 ff. Schelling, *Philosophie der Offenbarung*, 2 vols. Nitzsch, *System*, 6th ed. § 22 ff. Auberlen, *Offenbarung*, 1861. Löwe, *Die Offenbarung*, 1842. Krauss, *Die Lehre von der Offenbarung*, 1868. Weisse, *Philosoph. Dogmatik*, 1855, I. p. 76 ff. Biedermann, *Christl. Dogmatik*, §§ 30–38. Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*, Art. 2, pp. 55–121, 1862.

1. If religion, where it exists, is not a mere subjective result, if we only come to know God through God, not simply through a movement on the part of man, who cannot command God, but, so to speak, through a movement on the part of God coming out of the depths of His secrecy (§ 46), this involves already the idea of Revelation, by which that of religion receives more precise definition. The word "Revelation" is certainly used in very different senses. In the broadest sense, every activity is a manifestation of an inner power. The Apostle Paul calls the structure of the world a revelation of God.[1] The idea of the world, eternally existent in God, is by the Word of God spoken forth into reality, revealed. The term gains in appropriateness in proportion as in revelation a new and profounder spiritual truth emerges; and since the concern of religion is above all with such an emergence of

[1] Rom. i. 20.

God out of Himself, with such a movement of God towards man, and such a meeting with him as makes God known and reveals Him to man, which is more than mere instruction about God, we may say that every truly religious moment which is neither occupied by one of the one-sided functions of the spirit, nor yet mere reminiscence of former religious moments, partakes in the idea of Revelation, because in such a moment an influence of the living God is implied. In every true act of worship, veils so to speak are removed between God and man; God reveals Himself to the good man, the latter becomes conscious of God. Thus, all real religion subsists by the imparting of divine revelation and the reception of the same. But in this broad sense nothing more definite is expressed by the term revelation than is involved in what has been already said, where God's action in originating religion was under consideration. The conception needs to be more precisely marked off from other fields; for even in art and science, for example, when a new, grand idea dawns for the first time on the spirit, one may speak of Revelation, such ideas being *given* to man. For were his will supposed to have produced them, in order to be capable of being objects of will, they must have been in existence already, at least for thought; for nothing can be willed without being an object of thought. Such ideas, therefore, cannot originally be products of will. Mere exhibition of subjective energy does not suffice to explain them, as the most distinguished and original minds are the first to confess.

2. Here, then, we expressly claim the word for the religious domain. By this we imply that *religious* Revelation is subjective and central in nature, and is related to man's entire nature or the heart, while pointing to the objective, absolute centre—God—and revealing the latter. Often, indeed, Revelation is applied to the mere communication of higher truths, as in the old Supranaturalism. But revelation, being related to man's entire nature, is meant to impart to him a share in the divine life in general, not merely in the divine knowledge.—The idea of revelation at once limits itself still more narrowly, when we consider that it is not every divine activity in producing a religious moment that deserves to be called Revelation in the full sense, but that here an analogy obtains with the ideas of creation and conservation. Divine activity, if it

is to be called Revelation, must impart something analogous to the product of creation, something new, not previously existent in the spirit. So far, therefore, as the divine activity has already operated in the spirit, and is not absolutely new in it, we are referred back to a first moment distinguished above all others by this feature, that by it the spirit was elevated to a new stage; and to this creative moment in the life of the individual is therefore pre-eminently due the name of Revelation.[1] The succeeding moments stand in the same relation to this first one as the preserving, cultivating, and manufacturing operations of man's subordinate labour. But finally, a still narrower limitation is suggested by the consideration, that if Revelation denotes not merely the introduction of something new to the individual, whereas perhaps it was living long ago in other individuals, but its introduction by God's action to the race as a whole for the first time; then certainly the idea of Revelation belongs in the fullest sense to that divine activity which first made over to mankind what is new in the sphere of religion, even if at first in the person of one individual. If through Revelation something new has been instituted, even in but one place, among mankind, by this very fact, although in the first instance the Revelation was imparted to but one individual—the founder (§ 49)—something is instituted for the good of mankind; and this new thing becomes at once the object of conservation, although it is so transmitted to others as to be new to them, nor is divine activity wanting in the process.

§ 51.—*Notes of Revelation.*

A Revelation destined for mankind has four fundamental notes:—1. Originality or Novelty; 2. Continuity in itself and with the world-whole, or Permanence and Universality; 3. Positivity; 4. Gradual Development.

1. *The first pair—Novelty or Originality and Continuity.*—The first two predicates seem mutually exclusive, and yet unless they co-exist, the idea of revelation is not rightly

[1] This is the application of the word in Gal. i. 16; Matt. xvi. 17, xi. 27.

conceived. It is specially to be observed, that Originality or Novelty on one side, and Continuity on the other, express more precisely the truth meant to be expressed on one side by *Supranaturalism* in the notions of supernaturalness and immediateness, on the other by Rationalism in those of naturalness and mediateness.

That Revelation must needs bear the character of *Originality* is implied in what has been just advanced (§ 50, 2). The word is meant to denote an antithesis to what has been already previously established, that the latter is insufficient to explain what is established by revelation. If every individual in the circle of mankind implies an original creative cause (§ 43, 4), if every act of genuine worship implies an operation of a present God, how much more for a new stage of development in religion must we go back to such an original act of God! The controversy between *Rationalism* and *Supranaturalism*, as is well known, circles round the ideas of the natural and supernatural, the mediate and immediate, as its crucial points. But these ideas are involved in great ambiguity. For if the *supranaturalistic idea of immediateness* is to be strictly taken, all mediation is denied, even that of a later through a former revelation, which would imply an abrupt relation of things; and still more, all human action in matters of Revelation is abolished, even vital receptiveness, and nothing but pure passivity is left. And then if Revelation is supposed still to exert an elevating influence, it can only take place in a magical way. But in this case the act of Revelation stands altogether isolated, and all *continuity* is broken up. And in so far as historical progress is only possible through the vital interaction of diverse forces, even of natural with divine, *progress* also is abolished. Then would the absolutely immediate be also the absolutely supernatural, and on the supposition of such an absolute miracle another more remarkable miracle would be, why Revelation assumes the form of *gradual progress*, when in the presence of such complete passivity on man's part there was nothing to prevent God introducing the completed Revelation into the course of history at the very beginning. But we must go farther. How is Revelation possible at all on the supposition of mere *passivity* on man's part? How is it to be recognised as Revelation

without a vital point of connection in man, whereas Revelation, like everything objective, can only exist for the spirit through the medium of its perceiving and thinking powers, and a certainty of the truth of revelation can only be his by his rational nature having a vital destination for the truth? From all this it follows that by absolute Supranaturalism revelation and religion itself, as well as all certainty of the divinity of revelation, would be swept away. All this certainly Supranaturalism does not intend; but on this very account the words Immediateness and Supernaturalness do not aptly describe its true meaning.

To this extent, therefore, its antithesis—*Rationalism*—had a right to protest. But in doing so, it would hear only of *mediate* or *natural* revelation. Nor indeed does it advance beyond this point, but equally abolishes the notion of revelation and religion. Although it does not expressly say what is suggested, that *nature* alone is the revealer,—as the naturalistic form of the opposition to Supranaturalism holds,—still its meaning implies that no effect can transpire in the domain of religion and revelation, the adequate cause of which does not lie exclusively in the already existing and realized world-order. If the former theory, by its notion of God's sole operation, breaks up all continuity, here we have nothing but *continuity* and, in substance, identity. The emphasizing of such identity abolishes all novelty, all real advance in revelation, and therefore again historical progress. There is nothing left but the eternal monotony of the already existing, the self-unfolding. For really new contents, for new potentialities not already implanted in previous stages, for divine acts, no place remains. Rationalism, in repudiating God's living and continuously creative government, professes indeed to enhance the dignity and independence of human nature, while reducing the human spirit to impoverishment and destitution.

Schleiermacher has the merit of having led theology by an inner path beyond the antithesis of Supranaturalism and Rationalism, by combining the elements of truth in both in a higher unity, which is now the fundamental postulate of modern theology. According to him, Revelation is both, supernatural or immediate as well as natural and mediate. More precisely: it is new or original, because not explicable from

the concatenation of finite causes and effects alone, but on the other hand it is eternally involved in the divine world-idea in process of realization, and in so far not new; and its entrance into actual history is effected by means of the real world, at least by means of its preliminary receptiveness. Accordingly, the aspect of revelation, in which it is not a product of the hitherto existing world-system, is its originality or novelty, while the other aspect is its permanence and continuity, its unity with itself and with the world-system, both the actual system and that of the eternal world-idea; and because it has reference to the *world*-system, its design is universal. Even the *new* element in the field of revelation, *e.g.* Christianity, has been conceived and willed from the beginning, just as it is comprehended in the realization of revelation and carried into effect by means of its early stages, at least of its preliminary receptiveness. In this sense it is the old, nay the oldest element, pertaining to the very foundations of the world. As no revelation infringes upon continuity, it proves that it is not something isolated. Rather is revelation in each one of its elements involved in the world-idea. Thus is Revelation, while dealing out different matter at different stages, not merely at one with itself, but also in harmony with history backwards as well as forwards. Thus also in the world-organization, rightly viewed, does the apparent antinomy in Scripture between the originality or novelty and the continuity of revelation resolve itself.[1]

2. The second pair is *Positivity* and *Gradual Development.* In the last century *positivity* was among the notions most scouted. It was looked on as antithetic to the intrinsically true, as the statutory, law-made, arbitrary, only gaining currency by force or external authority. To the positive the natural was opposed. Natural religion, natural law, and the like, were the topics discussed. For us natural religion has no meaning, though we concede the fact of a religious philosophy, which yet is not religion. If, as shown, religion is in no sense the

[1] Novelty, 2 Cor. v. 17; 1 Tim. iii. 16. Stages in the O. T., Gen. xii.; Ex. vi.; 1 Kings xix. Continuity, cf. Gen. i. 26 f. with Ex. xix., Gen. xii. with Ex. vi. (connection with the patriarchal religion); the Law and the primitive conscience, Deut. xxx. 14. In the N. T. the Baptist and Christ, Gal. iii. 24; John v. 38.

fruit of mere subjective action, requiring the mutual vital relation between God and man which constitutes religion, requiring also God's action to which the initiative belongs, then have we in the fact of God's action *originating* something the commencement of the positive. Mere capacity for religion is an insignificant matter in comparison with that which will be the issue of historical facts or God's acts of institution. And out of the historically evolved revelation and the new system of ideas given by it grows a new order of life in worship, morals, doctrine, a sacred tradition, a corporation, in which the new principle may display its power. This tradition may no doubt acquire for its adherents a position of authority, which may also result in a merely legal position. But there it must on no account remain. On the contrary, Revelation demands to be received into the heart, not merely into the understanding and memory, and in the truly divine lies an emancipating force. The divine import of revelation corresponds to the true nature of man. Accordingly, not merely does Mosaism claim to be positive, the N. T. also requires ὑπακοὴ πίστεως and is mediated by law and conscience, but for that very reason as a universal human obligation.[1]

The law of *gradual development* follows from the preceding. Religion and revelation cannot be completed at once, revelation gives not everything at one time. Gradual progress carries with it advance to new stages. But looked at in this light, development seems to come into collision with positivity. The former represents Revelation as in ceaseless flow until the stage of consummation is reached. Positivity asks that Revelation be accepted, received with unfaltering confidence, whereas development and progress interfere with such confidence, introducing movement and change into the fixed and positive. This gives rise to two faults, accordingly as we adhere to one or other of the two. Judaism is ruled by a mistaken conservatism, which passes into literalism and mechanism. Then the soul of religion, which cannot exist without progress and movement, takes its flight, and professed fidelity to the past retains only what is material. Others, again, attach themselves only to movement, speak of eternal advance, perfecti-

[1] Positivity, Ex. xix.; Matt. v. 17, xxiv. 35; Rom. i. 5. Gradual development, Gal. iv. 4; Heb. i. 1; John i. 17; Gal. iii. 24; 1 Cor. xv. 45.

bility even in Christianity, and in a state of restless disquiet are incapable of collected surrender to the already existing, which is the requisite condition of further communications. Unique and sublime in this respect is the attitude of the *Hebrew religion.* In it the antinomy is perfectly reconciled. By the faithful use of previous gifts there is evolved receptiveness for new communications, which are never wanting (Matt. xiii. 12). The higher preserves the acquisitions of the former stage, *e.g.* Prophecy the Law, while the lower presses on to the higher and bids it welcome. Receptiveness, when grown to maturity, withdraws its cause from the external forms and traditions, which the earlier principle created for itself, and longs after something better. But this longing is nothing but the spirit turning to the innermost, as it were prophetic, essence of the previous stages. Thereupon, the form of positivity, after doing its part, loses its power, and is no longer able to stand in the way of advance. Rather it serves as the intense, eager antithesis to further development, and prevents the latter leaving behind anything of value in the former stages, which it does not preserve within itself. No doubt, where complete experience of the former stages in the true sense is wanting, in one case impatience and precipitancy, in another sluggishness will beget a sinful antithesis between positivity and development; but unceasing progress in revelation can be as little hindered by sin as by an earlier form of Revelation.

Observation.—The notes of Revelation specified relate partly to its form, partly to its contents. Both will be more closely investigated in the two following subdivisions.

SECOND SUBDIVISION.

FORM OF REVELATION.

§ 52.

Revelation as regards its form is of necessity partly external, partly internal, one co-operating with the other. External Revelation or Manifestation, intervening in the system of

nature, is called *Miracle* in the strict sense; internal Revelation, related to the spirit, is *Inspiration*. God's collective activity in revelation, directed to the end of completely satisfying man's receptivity and need, is exhausted or precluded neither by the original creation nor by the conservation of the world, but joins on to the world of conservation, both physical and human.[1]

Observation.—Cf. respecting Manifestation and Inspiration, Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik* in the article on Revelation.

1. Revelation is necessarily internal and external, neither without the other. That it must perforce be internal is scarcely matter of doubt, religion having reference to an inner act of God on the spirit, an act of communion, so that Revelation in any case only reaches its proper end, when it is internally imparted and made over to the spirit. And as with the final aim, which Revelation has in view at every stage, so is it with its starting-point. The initial point is formed by God's universal Revelation in man's heart, in his understanding and conscience.[2] This Revelation is the essential point of connection for appropriating every further revelation, external or internal. Therein, to use the language of the Fathers, is carried into effect the participation of all rational creatures in the eternal λόγος, and with this primary revelation, without which man as man would not be really constituted, nothing subsequent must be incompatible, God being in harmony with Himself. This revelation, therefore, is a negative criterion for everything subsequent, which is only possible on the ground of this as its essential foundation, even as, on the other hand, the revelation itself must be conceived as somehow tending and moving towards this subsequent stage. But this primary revelation is not religion in its actuality, but merely its possibility. In religion all depends, not on *that* act of God by means of which man is involuntarily conscious of a unique, *i.e.* absolute dependence on a higher power, but upon actual communion between God and man, based upon reciprocal acts of spontaneous mutual surrender.[3] For this reason, in order that he may possess religion, man

[1] § 47, 2, 48, 3. [2] John i. 4. [3] § 47, 50.

needs not merely a conscious sense of his state of dependence, but the further distinct intimation that God is willing to enter and does enter into converse with him. Thus, through the co-operation of the two factors, God and man, a religious history grows up among mankind.

2. The question now is, whether *external* Revelation also is necessary for religion and its further development in the character of reciprocal communion, either as an instrument or integral constituent of God's gifts in revelation. Might not a purely internal influence of God upon the spirit suffice, especially considering that an external revelation could not even be known as regards its purport, unless it became internal? Now the necessity for Revelation making an entry in some form into the external world might be deduced from what is requisite in order to religious communion. The members of a religious circle can only know themselves one, and thus be animated by a common religious spirit, by that which unites them—the contents of revelation acquired—assuming for them all an objectively cognizable form in a personal medium,[1] a historic and therefore objectively and externally cognizable founder. Knowing themselves one with Him, they know themselves one with all who are partakers of the same faith.[2] But in this case the revelation proper by which the actuating religious consciousness of the founder himself was founded, would be presupposed, and, by the transmission of what he possesses, would be already made an object of conservation. But such a revelation implies a beginning or the act of originating the new religious consciousness. Thus the question again recurs: In order even to this act, does Revelation in its forward movement necessarily summon to its service what is external? It cannot be said that the creative moments of religion are only acts of internal revelation. The reply is: For these very creative moments external revelation, harmonizing with internal, is essential. This follows in general from the fact of all human development needing at every stage stimulus from without, and that by corresponding

[1] § 49, 4.

[2] Cf. C. L. Nitzsch, *De Revelatione.* In the same way Ritschl (*Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, vol. ii.) founds revelation upon communion as the purpose of the world.

instruments, which again are only adapted to the purpose in view by their being embodiments, symbolical or real, of that to which they lead and which they offer for appropriation. Even receptivity, not merely productive energy, if it is to be vital, needs stimulus and culture, while only vital receptivity has real power of appropriation. The world outside us has from the first been so ordered of God, and so providentially directed, as to possess capacity for expressing spirit and the spiritual, nay, for embodying symbolically truth of infinite import or subserving its realization.[1] To this the following considerations, of equal importance for human consciousness and will, are to be added. Purely internal spiritual operations, even if they are really divine, are of necessity definite determinations of ourselves; for only through a definite affection, nay activity on our part, do they fall within our province. But under this aspect they cannot be known as divine with sufficient certainty and freedom from doubt, because they are not definitely enough distinguished from our own subjectivity. In the eyes of the spirit itself, especially in later moments when to the first state of elevation the task of sedulous culture and preservation succeeds, they may come under *suspicion* of springing from a *mere subjective source*. On the other hand, supposing God's revelation to bear testimony to that which it is internally perceived to be by means of phenomena, in harmonious accord therewith, in nature independently of man, then consciousness obtains security against such doubt and certainty of a subjective-objective kind. The founder of religion or bearer of Revelation, who along with the internal receives at the same time an external revelation in harmonious accord therewith, by this means acquires the certainty of having come into immediate contact with the eternal source, in which the ideal and the real world have their supreme unity; and this consciousness of the blending rays of revelation elevates him to internal certainty and gives him confidence to promulgate the purport of the revelation in the external world, assured of this, that he is the representative of divine truth which possesses power to win the mastery in

[1] § 38. Cf. *e.g.* Rom. i. 20 f., x. 17. Still religion does not come into existence by the co-operation of spirit and nature, apart from the operation of the living God in it and in spirit.

the world.[1] The sense of the positive accordance of Nature with the new truth brought by Revelation, whether the accordance be immediate or the result of the energy of this new truth, renders the new trustworthy, and distinguishes it as objective truth from mere subjective notions.[2] One might seek to evade this argument by supposing that Revelation imparts doctrines, eternal truths, which attest themselves to the spirit by their intrinsic force. But even then, not merely would the external element, harmoniously according with the truth to be revealed, retain a stimulating and auxiliary influence, but what is still more important, religion is concerned not simply with teaching eternal truths, but with a vital relation between God and man, and the consciousness thereof. To this is to be added, that as concerns the side of the *will*, revelation, in employing what is external in its service, and presenting itself to man, so to speak, in the garb of objectivity, by this means provides for the possibility of such a spontaneous appropriation of it as is demanded by the law of human development. For by the fact of its being deposited in an objective medium, and appearing and offering itself to him in this form, it is possible for him spontaneously to take up his own attitude to it, either that of cordial acceptance or refusal. On the other hand, were Revelation to operate in the spirit and take possession of it by altogether direct means, apart

[1] If it is objected to what is said above (Biedermann, pp. 76, 77), that in any case internal must precede external revelation as a basis for the possibility of apprehending the external, while by means of the internal *everything* becomes indirectly a revelation of God, no doubt a consciousness of God is to be presupposed as receptiveness for understanding the divine manifestation (see *supra*), while on this account, by means of the *movement*, providentially directed and ordered, in the circle of nature the indefinite consciousness of God may receive enrichment. The teleological co-ordination of nature and spirit may have for its effect that occurrences in nature are the medium of that which was the divine intention in their concrete co-ordination. Moreover, the external may be a ratification of the internal.

[2] Even Schleiermacher points out (I. 71) how difficult it is to mark off the idea of the specifically revealed from what is brought to light by elevation of spirit in a natural way. This difficulty Rothe rightly emphasizes (p. 72), by the remark that the inspired makes itself cognizable with certainty in its distinction from all analogous phenomena by the circumstance that it stands in an express relation, both causal and teleological, to an objective divine manifestation; and p. 66: a divine influence not mediated by something external, pointing conclusively to God, would be magical in nature.

from a neutral medium in which it clothes its contents and presents them for appropriation, then the freedom of this appropriation would be prejudiced, the spirit would be preoccupied in anticipation of its own choice, and treated in the same way as inanimate nature.

3. Relation of Revelation to the Unity of the World and to Divine Conservation.—By God's intervention in the world for the purpose of internal and external revelation, the world's continuity is not interfered with. We saw above (§§ 34, 36), that in the world not yet completed room is left for the action of God originating a new element. The world is by no means to be so viewed as if God could only intervene in it from without. He possesses an existence, as in Himself, so in the world, and His immanence in the world as its abiding cause, always at work, but not always producing the same phenomena, belongs to the world's own living constitution. But God works in harmony with His world-idea, in which is eternally involved what is new in a temporal aspect, but which, as we saw, is by no means so realized temporally, that the creative causality exhausted itself in the first act, and that the productive causality of everything that follows must needs have been involved in the already existent system of nature. This system preserves its rights, provided only that receptiveness, and therefore need, for the new element form the middle term between the former stage and the new, which is still wanting. It may even be said that with the former the origination of the later new element began. Just as little, after what was said before respecting God's unchangeableness, can the entrance of the divine action into temporality disturb us. On the contrary, were God only free from time, and raised above it in such a sense that it formed a limit which He could not cross, He would not be really free. Rather, here also is the view we have laid down decisive: God possesses not only a transcendent existence in Himself, but a transitive one, an immanence in the world, each implying the other. Thus He not merely lives an eternal life of love in Himself, but, springing from this, a temporal becoming of His self-communication takes place in accordance with the laws of His wisdom. And thus His life of love in the world is subject of course to historical progress. He establishes a firmly con-

catenated system of acts, which becomes reality in time, and in these acts He Himself is not far off from what they effect. And this real self-communication of God to the world, in virtue of which the world embodies the divine in tangible reality, involves no confusion of the divine and human, neither loss on the part of the divine, the world only being partaker of the divine through God's will and immediately-present existence, not as it were by robbing God,—nor loss on the part of the world, seeing that, on the contrary, through communion with God its own idea is realized, and in addition the divine communication is mediated and made permanent through its willingness of reception. Even where man himself becomes the organ of revelation, there is never any question of co-ordinate equality between the appropriator and appropriated.

Observation.—The immanent Trinity and the doctrine of creation require God to have in the world another object than Himself, not merely Himself (§§ 33, 34). Perfect revelation, because self-communication, requires God in this other—the world—also to have Himself. Both requirements meet in the statement that creation originates another object, distinguished from God by His self-existence. Through the perfecting of revelation, or self-communication to this permanent second existence, distinction gives place to unity, but to a unity not abolishing, but carrying within itself, preserving, the distinction, being the result of God's unitive action as well as of man's appropriative receptiveness or volition. And as in such revelation God's triune life has reality in the world, so by this means the world gains likeness to God and participates in life in God.

FIRST POINT: MIRACLE.

A.—*Biblical Doctrine.*

§ 53.

The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments bring miraculous events in nature into formal conjunction with the field of revelation, partly in respect of their active concurrence with internal revelation at every stage,

partly in respect, after the appearance of a new revelation, of subserving its preservation, confirmation, or diffusion in the world. The miracles of Scripture have their centre in the revelation of God in Christ.

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1. Among external miracles we must distinguish between external divine manifestations, to which Theophanies also belong, and miraculous works done by the instrumentality of man (ἔργα). The N. T. has three designations for miracles, τέρας, δύναμις -μεις, and σημεῖον.[1] They correspond to the words, פֶּלֶא, Ex. xv. 11, Dan. xii. 6; גְּבוּרָה or בְּרִיאָה, Num. xvi. 30 (cf. 2 Cor. v. 17; Col. iii. 10; Gal. vi. 15; Eph. ii. 10, 15, iv. 25), and אוֹת, Ex. iv. 8 ff. These three names exhibit the three different aspects of the miraculous idea. Τέρας designates the negative aspect. It is an event awakening wonder, because not agreeing with the ordinary course of things, and bringing to a standstill inquiry into the natural connection of cause and effect, the impression being produced of having been touched by a higher unknown power. Δύναμις indicates the positive aspect of such an event. It is to be regarded as an exhibition of power in the higher sense. Supposing this to be an act of man, it reveals energy and freedom of will, although in unity with the divine will. In such a miracle of course God's finger is to be seen, Ex. viii. 15; they are performed πνεύματι θεοῦ, Luke iv. 18, Matt. xii. 28, or δακτύλῳ θεοῦ, Luke xi. 20. But the miracle-workers are represented not simply as spectators and joint-witnesses of

[1] τέρας, John iv. 48; Matt. xxiv. 24; Acts ii. 19, 22, 43. δύναμις, δυνάμεις, Matt. vii. 22, xi. 20 ff.; Rom. xv. 19. σημεῖον, Acts ii. 22, 43; Rom. xv. 19, etc.

the divine action, but as actual workers; they have ἐξουσία, Matt. ix. 8, cf. ver. 6, x. 8, xxi. 24; Mark vi. 7; Luke iv. 36, ix. 1, x. 19. The divine power made over to man is called πνεῦμα; and thus the miraculous gift, while springing from God, is still man's own, 1 Cor. xii. 4, 28. In σημεῖον, finally, is expressed the relation of the miracle to something else, or to the fact that it is not simply an end in itself. It is partly typical, *e.g.* bodily healing of that of the spirit, Matt. xi. 15; partly its design is to indicate the connection of the miracle-worker with God, John v. 20, x. 25, or the founding of God's kingdom, Luke xi. 20; or lastly, it is a prophecy of the time of consummation, John xiv. 12.

2. Diversity and Affinity of Miracles.—All miracles, recounted in the O. and N. T., have this in common, that they are done in the interest of religion or of God's kingdom, and thus mediately or immediately stand in relation to the aim of revelation, Christ. The miracles of the apostles and primitive Christianity are done in Christ's name, in faith in Him, by virtue of fellowship with Him, Acts iii. 6; Matt. xvii. 20 ff.; Luke x. 9, 19, 20; Gal. iii. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 28. It is especially the power of His resurrection (Eph. i. 19, 20) that is brought into connection with miracles. As concerns the O. T., no miraculous acts by men are found in the patriarchal age, but only Theophanies or angelic appearances.—In the case of Abraham, the matter in hand is his separation from the heathen world surrounding him and from its seductive false worships, and the secure laying of the foundations of a pure Monotheism. This is especially shown in Gen. xxii. What indeed is required by God Almighty is unconditional obedience, the sacrifice even of the most ardent wishes; but withal Abraham is to be shown that God is not a God desiring human sacrifice, that His will is not to destroy but to preserve and enrich life. Similar is the meaning of the revelation to Moses, Ex. iii. 2 ff. It is accompanied by an outward sign, the bush burning, yet not consumed. This was the physical symbol of the divine holiness, which would destroy impurity, while not inflicting death. In the Theophany to Elijah likewise (1 Kings xix.), the prophet receives an impression of God's objective essence through corresponding physical symbols, of God's Omnipotence, Justice, and Holiness, and finally

in the still small voice of His Goodness.—Miraculous works through men begin first with the founding of the theocracy, in which men have to co-operate, standing as they do in intimate connection with this design. In the case of Moses they subserve the founding of a monotheistic, common religious system in the midst of an idolatrous world, in the case of Elijah and Elisha chiefly its preservation. They are distinguished from illusive and spectacular miracles, from magical arts, by their ethical aim as well as by their divine source. In days of terrible temptations from heathenism, and in presence of the overwhelming influence exercised by the forces of nature upon a consciousness of God disordered by sin, they oppose the consciousness of Jehovah as the Lord of Nature in an effectual way to the deification of Nature, and preserve it from being swallowed up in the spirit of nature, maintaining confidence in Jehovah and in His supremacy, 1 Sam. xii. 16–18; Deut. xiii. 1–3; 1 Kings xiii. 3–6; 2 Kings xx. 8–11. The words in 1 Pet. i. 11, to the effect that the Spirit of Christ dwelt in the prophets, may be explained as meaning that the prophets, while serving the theocracy, by means of miracles in God's strength prepared the way for and foreshadowed Christ's advent and work. Thus, summing up the teaching of Holy Scripture as a whole, we may say that at the centre of the miracles related in Holy Scripture stand, according to it, Christ and His kingdom, even as He Himself is the personal manifestation of a higher life. Nature and spirit, which otherwise lie separate and apart, are to be brought into unity under the leadership of spirit, which was the problem and promise from the very beginning, Gen. i. 27 ff.

3. Religious Worth of Miracles, especially Christ's, according to Holy Scripture.—On one side the Lord rebukes the overvaluing of miracles, unwillingness to believe without them. "Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed." He bestows praise when He is believed in for the sake of His entire manifestation, when His word is believed apart from miracles.[1] Miracles alone, without religious susceptibility, do not produce the faith to which Jesus commits Himself.[2] On the contrary, faith is frequently required before and for miracles, and where it and the religious sense are

[1] John iv. 48, xx. 29, cf. x. 38, xiv. 10. [2] John ii. 24.

wanting, He refuses them.[1] True saving faith is not the effect of miracles alone. "If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God."[2] "If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."[3] Cut off from His person, His purpose and word, they could only minister to the carnal mind, like lying wonders. But such passages, limiting so carefully the value of miracles, prove withal in the strongest way that Christ's miracles were not invented by His followers, else they would not have so disparaged mere faith in miracles. They can only have related them, because they believed them. But this leads to the other side of the question. Little as external miracles alone are regarded as the foundation of faith, important efficacy is still ascribed to them, Matt. xii. 28. They may awaken reflection, so that what at first is *τέρας* may be recognised as *δύναμις*, a demonstration of power of a divine kind, and in conjunction with His holiness and work, a demonstration of the founding of God's kingdom as a kingdom of higher spiritual power; or as a sign. They are a foreshadowing of Christ's saving spiritual power; and the demonstration of power in the field of sense, may and ought to awaken or confirm trust in His power in a spiritual respect. He is able and willing to heal the whole man.[4] Accordingly, Christ is able to say, If ye believe not my words (without my works), believe (me) for the works' sake.[5] Similarly Paul.[6] Nay, in a certain sense faith in Christ Himself is faith in miracle, faith that He is a personal revelation, as also that He possesses the power of *ζωοποιεῖν*,[7] and therefore miraculous power; and thus according to the N. T. there is no Christian faith that is not faith in miracle.

[1] Matt. xvi. 1 ff.; Mark viii. 11, 12, vi. 5; Luke xvi. 31; John vi. 30-33; Luke iv. 23-27.

[2] John vii. 17.

[3] John viii. 31, 32.

[4] John v. 20 ff., cf. xiv. 7, 23; Matt. xi. 5.

[5] John x. 37 ff., xv. 25; Matt. xi. 20.

[6] 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13.

[7] Cf. A. Dorner, *ut supra*, pp. 70-80.

B.—*Different Theories of the Idea of Miracles.*

§ 54.

The idea of miracle in the older orthodoxy frequently discovered the essence of miracle in contrariety to nature, and in this very circumstance the proof of the truth of revelation. This idea of absolute miracle was modified by others, especially since the last century, but also so diluted that it sank at last into the subjective religious contemplation of purely natural occurrences, or was entirely denied.

Observation.—By Schleiermacher, and especially by Rothe, the ground has been prepared for such a treatment of the idea of miracle as satisfies the claims both of faith and science.

1. The Miracle-idea of the Older Theology.—For Augustine everything in a certain sense is a miracle, because God's work.[1] He will not allow independence to the world. His notion of creation continually threatens that of conservation, because, according to his doctrine of God's immutability, a distinction in the divine acts is out of the question, all being established once for all. According to him, creative activity has a systematic order within itself. It is what it is according to God's eternal, immoveable counsel. But the obverse of this follows as well. So far as a world is still acknowledged to be actual and active, he is obliged, instead of deducing all movements transpiring in it from an intervention of the unchangeable God, to deduce them from its own inherent constitution which it had from the very creation, but which it reveals in time. But this implies that all occurrences in it are simply products of its nature established from the first. And consequently he was obliged really to call everything natural. For him no miracle is altogether *contra naturam*, but merely *contra naturam, quæ nobis est nota.* Latent seeds of things are implanted by God in the universe, and these emerge in due time, or may be developed, shaped, commingled by the power of creatures, men or angels, and thus the events

[1] Cf. A. Dorner, *ut supra*, pp. 70–80.

arise which seem to us miraculous.[1] On the other hand, theology since Augustine has fancied itself compelled to define miracle as an occurrence contrary to nature, and at least for the moment setting aside the operation of its laws. So Thomas Aquinas is of opinion that miracles occur *præter naturam, supra et contra naturam,* and C. V. Löscher, the last considerable defender of old Lutheran orthodoxy, says: *solus Deus potest tum supra naturæ vires tum contra naturæ leges agere,* both ideas belonging to the notion of miracle. Buddeus (*Instit. Th. Dogmat.* Liber ii. 2, cap. i.) would have miracle considered as a *suspensio legum naturæ,* to which was next added the miracle of their *restitutio.* Augustine's theory certainly is not satisfactory. If everything is a miracle—a view implying a measure of truth—and there is no advancing to a distinction between laws of nature and miracle, two consequences follow: first, there is no system of nature, no natural law, and, there is no miracle, but merely a complex of the creatively willed κόσμος, in which all occurrences are instituted or already involved, only that we know this κόσμος imperfectly, and therefore call the uncommon miraculous. From this it is obvious that no idea of miracle is possible, unless a law of nature is also acknowledged. Within the limits of the world there can only be a question of miracle, provided the idea of conservation retain its rights alongside that of creation, and in conjunction therewith the idea of a fixed system or law of nature. Nor, again, is the old so-called orthodox notion of miracle[2] satisfactory, for in it creation and conservation come into conflict. If, while miracle is admitted in the existing world, it is regarded as the exclusive effect of God's creative activity, nay, as an abrogating of the laws of nature (which yet are God's will and originate in His wisdom) by another will of God sustaining a merely negative relation to the former one, then the threads of God's conserving activity and the world's continuity are broken. A suspension, even for a moment, of secondary causes, would be their destruction and

[1] Similarly Gregory the Great: *quotidiana Dei miracula ex assiduitate viluerunt.*

[2] Which, for the rest, is temperately handled by J. Gerhard and Höpfner, the former of whom says: *per miracula non possunt probari oracula;* the latter, miracles are merely *præter et supra naturæ ordinem.*

would afterwards require a new creation. It is indeed quite in order to say that one force may counteract, neutralize another, the higher the lower, *i.e.* in their effects; but it is only in appearance that a force can be reduced to inactivity, a notion that would imply the supposition of dead forces. In reality, the forces of nature must be conceived as in perpetual operation, even if their energy is exerted in restriction, not in production. But it is perfectly consistent with the continuous action of these forces, nay, required by the system of the world, for the weaker to bend to the stronger forces. No one has the right of unlimited operation, all being encompassed by a higher system of law and higher order in which the mechanical forces are subordinated to and designed to obey the chemical, these the vital or organic, the organic the animal, and these the spirit. Moreover, receptiveness on the part of the lower forces for the higher must be admitted, and so far also co-operation, although under restraint in an abnormal state. It has indeed been supposed, *e.g.* even by Strauss, that a miracle which is *contra naturam*, harmonizes with God-consciousness, God therein revealing Himself to it as Lord of Nature, not bound to Nature, and only contradicts world-consciousness. Dieringer requires continuous miracles, God thereby evincing that He not merely created but also sustains the world. But God wills no activity in the world in contradiction to true world-consciousness, *i.e.* the divine world-idea. It is not the world's fault if we do not recognise that at no point are we able in a deistic way to remain content with secondary causalities. The world gives no countenance to the notion that we might be able to do this apart from miracles, certain as it is on the other hand that not everything outside us is adapted, and that equally in the case of all, to be the medium of God-consciousness, or of a particular stage in the same. Profounder reflection, equally with living religious sentiment, is compelled to recognise God even in the course of things according to ordinary law, not merely in miracle, and cannot look upon God's government in that course as of a lower order. Even supposing that the positive exhibition of power in miracles possibly awakens a consciousness of divine power with special vividness, the system of government by law should awaken still more a consciousness of the continuity and wisdom of the

divine dealings, and it is a dishonouring of the idea of God to suppose that the real order of the world is in any place interrupted or "dislocated" by an act of God. If room can only be made for the new by reducing to nullity what was previously established by God, the miracle is either a correction of a previous mistake, and thus an alteration of the world-plan, or the new itself is a mistake, does not fit into the world-order, is not prepared for in it, and accordingly can find no effectual place in it. On these grounds, not merely scientific world-consciousness but even a religious apprehension of the world can do no other than take umbrage at a notion of miracles, which seems unwilling to leave us a sense of God's living presence and energy perpetually at work, and gains a place for miracles at the price of bequeathing an alternation between a deistic apprehension of things in the world's ordinary course, and the supposition of a rare miraculous activity on God's part that shatters in pieces the world's continuity. No wonder that such an absolutely supernatural notion of miracle was variously modified and departed from until Deism and Rationalism denied miracle altogether.

2. Modifications of the absolute idea of miracle were attempted by means of peculiar theories of nature, then of man, finally of the divine mode of governing the world.

Here comes in first the preformation-theory of Bonnet and others, who suppose miracles to be already implanted in Nature. The miraculous germs always exist alongside other germs in a sort of sheath, like hidden springs in a machine, and emerge into the light when their time comes. But were miracles simply the work of Nature, the miracle-worker would be a mere spectator, or merely have a knowledge of what nature may effect; a miracle-worker he would not be. If miracles are merely products of ordinary Nature, they are not miracles; while, if they are something special, not originating in Nature, it would still have to be shown how they blend into unity with the world-whole. They must then be referred to God as the guarantee of the world's unity, as is done by Bonnet. In this case the theory is no advance as respects knowledge.[1]—Akin to this is the view early advanced by

[1] Bonnet agrees with Euler, Haller, and others. Similar is the teaching of Schmid's acute work upon Darwinism (*ut supra*), which also reminds us of

Paracelsus and Jerome Cardan. They suppose a twofold world, existing one in the other; beside or behind the visible is an inner, ideal world, which breaks through in particular sacred spots. Here, also, Nature itself would be the miracle-worker. There would be but one miracle, that of primitive creation. If within the world's history a place were still meant to be left for the notion of miracle, at least a power must be postulated, by means of which the inner world previously concealed or held back may be set free. Here, too, would remain the problem, how the phenomenal and the inner ideal world can form one unity.[1] If they are really so different as to render it impossible to deduce the higher ideal from the causality of the phenomenal and real, and necessary to fall back upon God's creative causality, it can be no longer of importance or advantage to suppose the inner world to be already actually established along with our order of nature. To the divine activity itself it would make no difference when the higher world made its entry; on the other hand, it must be fatal to the unity of the world for a world of an altogether different constitution to be concealed in it, before receptivity for it or the need of it had been developed.

Others regard miracle as the work of a specially powerful *will*. Appeal is made to the innumerable powers slumbering in man generally, usually concealed but at times breaking forth; or recourse is had to peculiarities of *physical* individuality, especially to magnetic powers. But the advocates of this theory have in view but one species of scriptural miracles—those of healing, and even for these the appeal to a

Augustine's *semina occulta*. He supposes the potency or germs of that which emerges in miracle to be in creation from the beginning: "but these germs are bound, until the time comes for them to be set free." But there is no means of forming an idea as to the form which these germs are supposed to assume, in so far as they are anything different from receptivity. On this view, however, the miracle-idea would not be denied, in so far as creation is regarded as miraculous; and still less, supposing the "setting free" of those germs were not the mere work of nature, but of a divine operation.

[1] Lotze also, for whom the material world is merely the manifestation of a super-sensuous one, and who behind the mechanism of the phenomenal world assumes a world of living forces not exhausted in mechanical activity, may here be mentioned. He, however, binds this inner and the phenomenal world together in a stricter unity, while placing the former in an intimate and most actively self-variable relation to God, thus preserving the notion of miracle.

special physical organization is inadequate. For how is it possible to ascribe the same physical organization to all the disciples of Christ, of whom miracles are reported? Granting, finally, that magnetism reached farther than has been proved, still taken alone, apart from connection with religion, it remains a mere natural curiosity. When Weisse[1] calls the miraculous power of Christ one aspect of His official qualifications, His "genius" on the basis of His organic endowments, or the depository of His specifically religious talent, this would either be intrinsic to His body, but then immaterial to religion, or it was in actual connection with His religious power, and this would suggest a different doctrine, namely, that His miraculous power has its ground in a peculiar connection with God.

Finally, it has been attempted to substitute the so-called *teleological* notion of miracle for the current one, and to deduce miracle not from a positively and directly intervening operation on God's part, but simply from His conserving and governing agency. Although, it is said, in miracle no new powers, instituted or stimulated by God's creative action, are at work, but merely the general order of nature, yet, if the manifold physical and spiritual powers in actual existence so blend together as to produce a startling result, this proves a controlling and combining divine intelligence. This, then, would be a miracle of wisdom in God's government of the world that subsists and acts by its own laws, not of His productive agency. But the divine wisdom cannot be considered as limited to particular points of Providence. The miracles of Providence, if only clear knowledge be not wanting, are not to be viewed as something isolated, but as the most widespread of all. It is doubtless true that what has been long prepared in the world's history by natural causes bursts forth at last, as Klopstock says, in the thunder-track of decisive crisis. But it is mere human short-sightedness, when miracles of divine wisdom are only acknowledged at last in a single point.

Others, again, transform miracle into a mere *subjective mode of apprehending* things. This is done when it is said that everything is a miracle or nothing, that miracles must be just as capable of adequate explanation by means of the existing forces of nature as all other phenomena. It is evident that this,

[1] *Leben Jesu*, I. 334 ff.

although under a veiling name, is a denial of miracle, and simply affirms that there is nothing but physical fact.

3. Schleiermacher forms a turning-point. It is indeed often asserted [1] that Schleiermacher denies miracle altogether, chiefly because, in his Life of Christ, he explains away many miracles on critical grounds. But historico-critical inquiry into the credibility of particular miraculous narratives must be carefully distinguished from the dogmatic question, whether miracles are possible, and especially whether Christ possessed miraculous power. Appeal is eagerly made to the decisive passage,[2] where it is said: "There is no need in the interest of religion so to conceive a fact as by its dependence on God to do away entirely with the fact of its being conditioned by the order of nature." But what he wishes to maintain here is not its production by the actually existent order of nature, but its "being conditioned" by it. And conditionality obtains not merely on the supposition of miracle originating in the productive power of the actually existent order of nature, but also on the supposition of its joining on to a receptiveness in the existing world. And as concerns his Determinism, Calvin too was a Determinist. But who will assert on this account that he denies miracle? With Determinism a plurality of creative acts on the part of God, even within the world of conservation, is quite consistent. It cannot be denied that Schleiermacher regards Christ in contrast with all other men as a miracle. This is evinced by the energy with which he maintains His absolute sinlessness; but his teaching expressly implies that Christ is not explicable by means of the given generic circle of humanity and its resources, but that in order to explain the origin of this personality we must go back to the primordial divine fount itself. The opposite view compels recourse to the makeshift that in his theory of religion he unconsciously fell into self-contradiction. But those who speak in this way do not reflect how gross a blunder they impute to a theologian of Schleiermacher's stature. It is more to the point

[1] So by Frank, *System der christl. Gewissheit*, II. p. 216, and in the same way usually by modern miracle-denying theologians. Rothe also is of opinion that the abolition of the notion of miracle follows in Schleiermacher's case, especially from his Determinism.

[2] *Der christl. Glaube*, I. § 47.

to direct somewhat more attention to Schleiermacher's general strain of thought. It would then appear that Schleiermacher's starting-point is the idea of the world's unity in God's eternal counsel, in which the endlessly various elements of the counsel harmoniously combine, while he distinguishes therefrom the historical realization of this world-idea. For this very reason he treats the actual order of nature not as one eternally finished and uniform, but one into which new elements may find entrance, nay, in which they may be naturalized, in harmony with the eternal world-idea which comprises both within itself eternally. The order of nature once established is by no means for him the sufficient cause of all succeeding formations. From the domain of the inorganic he distinguishes the organic and vital, from this the animal, and from the animal and psychical the spiritual, without intending to deduce the higher from the lower, however harmoniously it may blend with the same. The deistic view, according to which the world, so far as it includes development and progress, must have shaped itself apart from God Himself, he repudiates, because based upon a dead conception of God. What gives the impression of his holding a different opinion is the certainly too negative attitude assumed by his idea of God to time and temporal development. In this it is maintained that God on His part stands in eternally the same relation to the world, wills eternally the same things, and nothing but the world's diversity at different times, especially the amount of its receptiveness, is ever the cause of something different, new, and inexplicable by its productivity emerging into actual existence. But even then he does not give up the view that this new element is God's act, not the work of Nature, although he conceives the world as willed by God in an eternally uniform manner. In reference to Christ, along with what has been quoted, he no doubt says also: "He is implanted in Nature eternally." But thereby he neither teaches that He actually existed eternally, nor that the realization of His eternal idea is only instituted by means of the (actual) order of nature, but only that He was conditioned thereby. It is therefore no desire to place the divine activity in the background in comparison with the efficiency of the order of nature surrounding us, which influences him in these expositions.

His desire is to reconcile not the once active, but the eternal living efficiency of God with the unity of the world, both with the unity of its idea and with the unity of the actual complex of the world, which, while subject to the law of development, is receptive for and capable of admitting within itself the realization of the world-idea. That Schleiermacher's intention is not to reject miracle altogether, but only such miracle as breaks up the order of nature, nay the world-idea, appears in the clearest manner from another passage treating of miraculous acts:[1] "Although," he says, "no miracle by itself can originate faith, yet perhaps the connection between miracle and the origination of a new region of faith is to be regarded as so exceptional, that in this case only we concede a miracle. Where a new point of development in the spiritual life exists, and that primarily in self-consciousness, there new manifestations, mediated by the spiritual power showing itself, are as it were expected." "If therefore Christ," he continues, "is acknowledged as Redeemer, and consequently as the beginning of the supreme development of human nature in the domain of self-consciousness, it is *a natural presupposition*, that He who exercises so peculiar an influence upon the rest of human nature, by virtue of the coherence of the universe will also manifest a peculiar power over the material side of human nature, and be in a position to exert a peculiar influence even upon external nature. That is, from one who is the supreme revelation of God, it is natural to expect miracles." We are warranted in saying, that after the later Supranaturalism had more and more diluted the notion of miracle, while Rationalism utterly denied it, Schleiermacher, by a more living conception of God, paved the way for again securely establishing the notion on scientific grounds. For him, miracle is neither explicable from Nature alone, nor entirely alien to it; but by means of the idea of the divine counsel, in itself one and eternal, which includes not merely what is creatively realized from the beginning, but also what is new in respect to the system of nature at a given time, and on the other hand, by means of the category of the receptiveness of this system of nature for ever advancing influence up to the point of consummation, he has so firmly established the interconnection of

[1] § 14, Appendix.

miracle on one side and the world that is still in process of development on the other, that the idea of miracle is able to maintain its independence. Still more conclusively has Rothe demonstrated the necessity of miracle to a living conception of God.[1] Side by side with Rothe, the treatises of Jul. Müller and J. Köstlin deserve special notice.

C.—*Dogmatic Investigation.*

§ 55.

Miracles are sensuously cognizable events, not comprehensible on the ground of the causality of Nature and the given system of Nature as such, but essentially on the ground of God's free action alone. Such facts find their possibility in the constitution of Nature and God's living relation to it, their necessity in the aim of revelation, which they subserve.

Observation.—The definition of miracle given is applicable also to the primary miracle of creation, and on this very account fitted to remind of God's free and yet positive, intimate relation to Nature, which, while lying at the base of its existence, is not abolished by the transition to conservation. That the rights pertaining to the idea of conservation and secondary causalities (§ 36), as well as to the unity of the world, need not suffer on account of miracles, it is the object of the following discussion to show.

1. It has been already conceded above, that natural law is not abolished within the limits of the world by miracle, but presupposed by it; for if God produced everything that exists and happens immediately and exclusively, secondary causalities and their connection would be denied; we should simply have divine action, no world, and therefore no natural law.[2] Certainly it must then be said that God's action has produced nothing.[3] Thus the notion of miracle, although maintaining

[1] In the above exposition it is not meant to be denied that Schleiermacher is fettered in the pure working out of the idea of miracle by deficiency in clearly distinguishing between God and the world, between Physics and Ethics, and especially by his doctrine of God's unchangeableness (see above, § 20, 3).

[2] This view the Arabian philosophers have tried to work out with most consistency; cf. H. Ritter, *Geschichte der christl. Philos.* vol. iii. p. 734 ff.

[3] See above, pp. 153, 47.

the idea of free creative causality, is in no wise hostile in the abstract to that of natural law. All the more hostile, in the opinion of many, is natural law to miracle, and nothing is more common than to hold up before faith in miracle inviolable natural law "as a sort of Medusa's head." But cautious thinking should be restrained from too confident language of this kind, by the consideration that talk about the absolute incompatibility of miracle and natural law is in wonderful harmony with the opposite extreme—absolute Supernaturalism, which likewise sets up an Either—Or, "natural law *or* miracle," while supposing natural law to be abolished, or at least brought to an end and suspended in favour of miracle. Certainly it is as clear as day that a deistic and naturalistic theory of the world precludes miracle *a priori*. But this theory must deny much else that gives dignity to man, as formerly shown; and here we leave it out of account. Pantheism also must *a priori* renounce the possibility of miracles, and that because for it everything must be alike divine. The most it can say is: "Everything is miraculous," a coin whose obverse we have already found to be: "Nothing is miraculous," because the distinction between miracle and natural law is not reached so long as the distinction between God and the world is unacknowledged. The Pantheism of development might indeed endeavour to adorn the new element, produced by divine self-evolution, with the name of miracle. But since it is unable to conceive God as absolute, free personality, this new element would remain the mere work of His eternal nature, and be no free act.[1] The foundation of this mode of thinking being cut away by the doctrine of God, we need not allow ourselves to be disturbed by objections having deistic and naturalistic or pantheistic modes of thought as their presupposition. On *God's* side the possibility of miracle is certified to us both by the absolute dependence of Nature on God and by His intimate relation to it as the per-

[1] Rothe, *ut supra*, p. 85 ff. (*Theol. Ethik*, I. 110 ff.), expresses himself strikingly respecting the essential connection of miracle with the theistic idea of God, in behalf of which he quotes Zeller, *Theol. Jahrb.* I. 2, p. 285, who, from faith in a transcendence of God, infers that He also manifests His energy in the world (therefore also immanently).—But no less from a miracle-working immanence of God in the world may we infer His transcendence,—not a local one, but a sublime majesty exercising command over itself and Nature.

petual living ground of its possibility. It is otherwise with the objections raised against miracle on the ground of the *idea of the world.* They might perhaps, indeed, be met by the simple statement that they lie under the necessity of reverting to one of the modes of thought just mentioned and refuted in the doctrine of God, even as in fact they are accustomed to draw their strength from one or other of these. But considering the importance of the matter, we should not grudge labour. Rather, if we are in earnest in acknowledging the actual world as it is, and a law of Nature existing in it, we must take into view as distinctly as possible the objections that may be drawn from its constituent elements.

2. Nature is a reality, endlessly diversified and endowed with powers of self-conservation and self-reproduction. If now it were implied in the idea of Nature that it is the sole reality, if its reality were made questionable by the position that it is not everything, the objection to miracle would have a force amounting to this: "Miracle is impossible, because by its admission another reality than that of Nature would have to be supposed." But that the reality of Nature makes no such claim is evinced by the reality of spirit, which, with its boundless ethical and religious import, cannot be a product of Nature, while at the same time it is no potency hostile to nature, but anticipated by it.[1] But we must go farther, and lay down that not merely is it empty assertion, refuted even by experience, that Nature is the sole reality, but *Nature is also in itself no finished, eternally uniform, and settled quantity.*[2] Not everything in Nature can be derived exclusively from the efficiency of natural forces. Very many and considerable phenomena in it must be traced back to the intervention of free forces, which gradually modify the face of the earth and control Nature by understanding and directing its forces. Nature is plastic to an incalculable degree. Moreover, it has itself a history, and not only a past, when it was otherwise, but a future not to be calculated by us. It is true that the newly discovered law of the equivalence of forces or

[1] See § 23, Transition from Nature to Spirit; and § 40, on the Divine Image.

[2] We are rightly reminded of this by Rothe, p. 93 f., in opposition to an *exaggerated* notion of the complete elaboration of the organism in our material world.

the conservation of force has been to some extent so employed as to imply that the Nature known to us is absolutely sufficient of itself for producing out of its own resources everything belonging to its complex, and barred against all new forces, of which it stands in no need. But even empirical science, Palæontology for example, shows that our earth itself did not always exist. On the contrary, there was a time when no organism and *life* existed upon it, but mechanical, chemical, electrical forces were the only governing powers. That *these* have produced life upon our earth is to the present moment mere assertion. It is only possible to make creation conclude with the world of mechanism, on the supposition that the vegetative and animal forces are conceived to be inherent as *qualitates occultæ* in the mechanical from the beginning. But in this case (unless in opposition to the idea of matter self-existence is ascribed to it; whereas it is referred to creative causality) we should pass over essentially to Augustine's doctrine, according to which everything is supposed to be created at once. If this hypothesis also desired to include a right estimate of the worth of the superior creatures, it would come into collision with its own fundamental tendency, which is, with the assistance of billions of years, to derive all living structures from the simplest, lowest forms. Moreover, *spiritual* beings, not derivable from Nature, are part of the world's actuality, and they form the strongest experimental proof that Nature and the system of Nature were not really eternally uniform, finished from the beginning and self-sufficing; for there can be no doubt that men did not always exist on the earth. And as little as the emergence of humanity without a new creative act is to be comprehended on the ground of the bare force of Nature, so little are the new rational beings, continually added to our species, to be comprehended on the ground of a conservation of the force of our species. Rather are they an enhancement of this force by divine action (§ 43). On all these grounds it is worse than a Chinese theory, at variance with the truth of history and an oblivion and degradation of the significance of spirit, to suppose that Nature is a mere complex of mechanical forces, abiding eternally the same, and finished from the beginning in such a manner that in these and their exercise everything further was already

instituted, and that nothing beside these can claim admittance within its circle.

But as the controversy always turns chiefly upon the relation of miracle to "natural law," we must turn our attention directly to this point, as is done by the more eminent labourers in this field.[1] *J. Müller* acknowledges a real law of Nature inherent in the world. This is inviolable in reference to everything falling within its sphere. But there is a higher and a lower order of forces, and in reference to what belongs to the former natural law is not a law. Accordingly it cannot involve the exclusion of forces of a higher order, or regard their operation as an intrusion. Since now forces of a higher order occur in miracle, the latter is no dissolution or suspension of the order as a whole; for the forces of the higher and lower orders together form one whole, both are included in the one world-idea, and each operates after its degree and kind. Both too are cognizable, our thought is able to reach the forces of the higher order. Both are transparent on one side, obscure on the other. Nature is transparent and manifest on the side of law, obscure as to the significance of the natural in the vast teleological world-system. Miracle, on the other hand, is obscure on the side on which it forms one whole with the lower order and links itself with natural law, but transparent on its teleological side and its connection with God.—The not quite satisfactory point in this theory lies in this, that it treats the higher and lower orders as two separate totalities or worlds, and fails to place miracle, either in its basis or constituent elements, in such clear relation to the world of natural law as to make it evident, how the latter readily makes room for it and is able to admit it within itself. But the miracle of which we speak, is a sensuous event within the bounds of Nature, and must, if it is to become reality, assume elements of Nature as its manifestation, so to speak as its garb. It by no means invades the higher order, like a "Supernature" invading Nature, for the purpose of putting itself in its place.[2] On the other hand, Rothe, who

[1] So J. Müller, Lotze, and Köstlin; in the same way Rothe.

[2] Rothe, *ut supra*, p. 89 f. "The product of God's miraculous operation is again itself Nature, perfectly homogeneous with the latter, enters into Nature, becomes forthwith an organic ingredient of the same and subject to its law,

(with Schleiermacher) makes miracles, on the side on which they are effects, incorporate themselves in the existing world-system, denies as concerns their genesis all creaturely second-causes in the case of miracles in the most eminent sense, calling them absolute miracles. He does not shrink from the expression, that in them God "plays the magician."[1] This would be incompatible with the personal creature only, not with impersonal Nature. In the case of such miracles, no conflict can arise with Nature. Conflict is only possible where there is contact, but here no contact takes place. In the production of such miracles the creature does not concur at all, nor consequently the law of Nature. But, on the other hand, Rothe makes these creative acts of God (*e.g.* in producing the gradual series of beings) "conditioned," or condition themselves by the already existent,[2] although the *causative* power is not in them, but in God's creative causality alone. But in this again a contact with already existent Nature and its law seems to be conceded, and it would still be necessary to show that this contact of creative causes need not imply conflict with natural law. In this respect the following suggestion of his is important: In order that the self-enclosed character of the laws of Nature may not exclude the intervention of God with His absolute causality, but that Nature may be and really remain absolutely dependent on Him, although not a limit to Him, God must needs impart to the laws of Nature the same breadth and elasticity, so to speak the same power of giving way, which is everywhere the condition of the undisturbed working of a piece of mechanism, even of the organic.—In this respect *Lotze* has effected a better harmony with natural law.[3] From natural laws he goes back to *Nature*, which for him is no immoveable finished whole. On the contrary, in it he distinguishes the inner force or inner essence and the phenomenon, which is the effect of the inner force or essence, although the effect incorporates itself in the

although God, by virtue of His absolute causality, without its assistance generates in it separate new elements (but perfectly homogeneous with it)." As examples, he adduces the miracle at Cana, the multiplication of loaves, but especially Christ's person itself.

[1] P. 99. [2] P. 97.

[3] *Mikrokosmus*, II. 50 ff. 1858. Similarly Köstlin, *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* 1864, p. 259 ff.

system of Nature and its laws, and only by doing this becomes a datum obvious to sense. Natural laws are mere abstractions from the functions of the forces, no forces by themselves.[1] The forces ever operate in accordance with their nature and constitution, and to this we must go back. But this nature of theirs is not eternally the same. The world is a living organism. Supposing a disturbance anywhere to occur, all the parts are sympathetically affected, and labour to supply healing and compensation. They feel in general the influence of the world's condition at the moment, and modify their operation accordingly, in harmony with the spirit of the world's progress and the kind of operation which it demands. They operate in combination with new quantitative modifications, for the same quantity of force need not unchangeably inhere in the element. The *inner* condition of things being changed, the result of the law is changed; but the law itself retains its efficiency, the modification of force experienced entering with perfect plasticity into the system of Nature. Now this inner modificability of forces leaves an open space, on which "the power that commands in the name of the spirit of the world is able to exercise its influence;" for the individual element stands in relation not merely with other individual elements, but with the unity of the infinite, supreme world-cause. A self-enclosed hard circle of mechanical necessity would not be directly accessible to a miracle-working command. But God's power need not change or reverse the laws. He can accomplish the desired result by changing the inner condition of things or forces. That supreme unity—the power commanding in the name of the spirit of the world—can produce miraculous effects by influencing the forces. The inner nature of the forces is under the control not of mechanical necessity but of the supreme power, such as directs and conducts them to the desired goal. This mode of representation commends itself on the ground that it does not make God perform His miracles within the sensuous, law-regulated world from without, but by directing and modifying the forces from within, by which means the new, divinely caused element

[1] Köstlin, *ut supra*. The operative element in Nature is substances and forces, not laws. These are mere formulæ for the operation of the (then existing) forces.

combines more closely with the already existing system of Nature and its laws. This conduces to the world's unity demanded by the "spirit"—the teleological idea of the supreme personal world-cause. Nevertheless, if the distinctions in the living beings, called forth by God, are not merely quantitative and therefore evanescent in character, it will not suffice to limit the modificability of substances merely to the "quantity" of their force. Rather, the modificability of the lower substances, by whose existence the creative causal activity conditions itself within the course of the world, must also be defined as receptiveness of the lower for the higher.[1] Moreover, not merely is there good ground for supposing a direct, modifying, or creative intervention of God for the purpose of realizing the entire world-idea, not simply for remedying any disturbance that has occurred, but, moreover, the providential direction of the movements of the forces, instead of being effected by Nature alone, may originate in direct divine action.

3. The possibility of miracle in general we have seen, in respect of God and Nature. But we have to distinguish different kinds of miracles, all of which stand in relation, although in different ways, to the world as revelation. One class consists of events in Nature, which cannot be comprehended on the basis of the causality of Nature alone, but only of the divine operation within Nature, whether of a creative kind, or one providentially controlling natural elements and causes for the ends of revelation. In the same list we may place the sending of heavenly messengers, in which case God indeed employs creaturely causes, but such as are remote from the circle of the earthly causal system. It was previously shown[2] how important, nay necessary, external manifestations of God, such as must be referred directly to His causality and revealing will, are for the bearers, and therefore for the establishing of revelation itself. In point of fact even Nature, by means of sensuously obvious, miraculous data within it, may in some respects render essential service to spirit and its develop-

[1] This seems also to be Köstlin's view, when he says: The divine power presiding over all things may intervene in the operation and reciprocal action of the forces. In this way these forces produce the miraculous. The tendencies, which the substance would have had, left to themselves, are thus counteracted, reversed, by God's power.

[2] § 52.

ment. Let us observe more closely how Nature may at the same time be made serviceable for the ends of revelation. Little as spirit can be described as originally a mere blank table, on which sensuous experience has to write, it is certain that it only becomes what it is meant to be by means of correspondent stimulus from without. Thus in its ordered course Nature serves to awaken the consciousness of God in its physical definitions, such as power, measure, order, beauty, and finite teleology. Higher spiritual definitions of the idea of God certainly cannot be revealed by Nature as such. On the contrary, its self-contained system and regularity of rotation may lead, if religious development remains bound to this, to errors that confound God and the world, as the history of religion but too abundantly shows, so that it might seem that for higher spiritual communications we must remain wholly shut up to internal operations of God's Spirit. But the law of human nature, according to which the latter needs appropriate means of stimulus from without, holds good also in reference to the spiritual sphere, and in the same way the need of bearers of revelation holds good, as was shown in § 52. Nay, this need is directly corroborated in an eminent degree by the dangers, just mentioned, of religious errors, to which mankind is exposed in bare intercourse with Nature. Now, by means of miracle, the spirit may be rescued from the sole predominance of Nature, and become conscious of a higher power holding sway over Nature. If this, taken alone, is rather a mere negative importance of miracle, being fitted to show man that behind or above the usual course of nature there are other higher powers superior to it, it is further to be taken into consideration that Nature is also capable of *symbolizing* and embodying the ideal and ethical in objective realization in the world. Nature is designed for spirit, and in virtue of the secret bond subsisting between the two, the elements, such as light, fire, lightning, storm, wind, have capacity for symbolizing the spiritual, and thus, operating in the right place, for becoming the stimulating earthly foil for the conception of the ideal truth, which revelation desires to communicate. Here come in the natural events at the fundamental revelation of the divine holiness to Moses and at the giving of the Law to the people,[1]

[1] Ex. iii. 19, xix.

as well as in the case of Elijah,[1] the significant, exact appropriateness of which to the spiritual truth revealed deserves special notice.[2] Where an event, if only of an unusual kind, within the visible world is of such a nature as of itself to necessitate a symbolical interpretation, because coincident with a peculiar attitude of the heart, or with a spiritual revelation of God, there its effect may be to cause man to receive either an effectual stimulus to the living apprehension of the truth to be revealed, or on the other hand a ratification of the same, and there Nature through its teleological correlation with the work of revelation is made co-operative in the latter, and is for the recipient of the spiritual truth, externally symbolized by the independent natural phenomena, a disclosure of the objective, divine revealing will. God is made known therewith to the bearer of the revelation as the supreme unity of Nature and spirit. There is still another way in which Nature may render service to revelation as an accompanying and ratifying seal. Its life is in such intimate connection with that of the spirit, for whose sake it exists, that notable phenomena in the inner spiritual field, God's revealing acts in that field, as it were sympathetically find an echo in Nature by virtue of the secret original bond subsisting between it and spirit, of which we have a significant example in God's inner voice in conscience, whose stroke not merely affects the spirit, but is felt in physical and corporeal respects, just as the N. T. describes spiritual redemption as the commencement of corporeal (Rom. viii. 17 ff.), and connects with it a presentiment of the latter. That sympathy of feeling between Nature and the great and greatest events in the spiritual field, of which the highest is the field of revelation, is openly exhibited in the case of Christ's birth, death, resurrection, as well as in the birth of the Christian Church at Pentecost.

It is true that the highest form of revelation would only be attained where Nature is not the minister of revelation, either taken alone, or by its teleological correlation with

[1] 1 Kings xix. 10 ff.

[2] But elements of Nature may also be employed by the spirit, *e.g.* the creaturely spirit of the messengers of God, by His authority, *e.g.* by word and discourse, to convey spiritual truth to man from without.

the spirit and its needs, or by its appropriation for the moment by the revealing will, or by its movements in sympathy with events in the spiritual region, but where man himself, the most perfect representative of inspiration in Nature, is made the revealing organ. But still we ought not lightly to estimate, especially in reference to earlier stages, the service rendered, as shown, in manifold ways by Nature, with a view to make revelation withal a manifestation. The coincidence of the correspondent external revelation with the internal is for the bearer of the revelation of boundless importance. For if it were for him a purely internal transaction, his assurance of its inner truthfulness and objective divinity might indeed at the moment of revelation be free from all doubt; but in order that the spirit in regard to subsequent times, and in face of contrariety in the actual world with the contents of the revelation, may retain its joyous certainty, along with the internal revelation a security for its divine objectivity is at the same time imparted to the spirit, by the fact that external objectivity, independent of the spirit's subjectivity, is presented to it in union with this internal revelation, confirms and attests the same, and by its conformity, independently of the spirit, with revelation points to the same Being as its author, who is also the author of Nature.

4. But there is still a *second class* of miracles to be discussed, as well as their possibility and value for the ends of revelation. These are such as are not produced by God Himself directly (like the primary miracle of creation, the creation of human souls or the internal, as Luther calls them, "right lofty" miracles, or like His self-manifestations in teleological miracles), but those performed through the instrumentality of men. An attempt may be made to refer them all to the first class, and thus to God directly, while only permitting to the human organs a miraculous prescience of what God intends to do, or prayer for His miraculous working. But this is insufficient; for in the N. T. especially the miraculous gift is spoken of as a charisma. These miraculous deeds of men have been regarded, especially by Biblical Supernaturalism, as attesting the divine mission of the bearers of revelation and their teaching. In the present day they are to many a hindrance to faith. They are the most numerous in the N. T.

in particular, and yet they seem the most dispensable, when revelation has been once established by miracles of the first class. In them also pre-eminently we meet with what is apparently contrary to Nature, whereas so many miracles in the O. T. may be called merely teleological, the divine government of the world causing events, such as the course of Nature is able to effect, with full and obvious intention to coincide with the designs of revelation and God's kingdom. The blind by birth receive sight, the dead are raised, Christ stills the waves of the sea, and the like. Now this should not indeed determine us a second time to take up the cause of the *contra naturam*, it being impossible to infer contrariety to Nature generally from the premiss, that, if miracle had not occurred, the course of Nature would have had a different result. Else, every influence exerted by human freedom on the course of Nature would have for its result a miracle contrary to Nature.[1] Nevertheless, this second class needs special confirmation from reason, while it is at the same time to be conceded that in every particular miraculous fact narrated the right of historical criticism must be reserved. Now the N. T. miracles may in great measure be brought into a certain analogy with what occurs elsewhere. Thus, a portion of the miracles of healing, to which on this account some show a desire to limit the number of credible miracles, are certainly to some extent of such a kind that the miracle is transferred from the miracle-worker to the faith of the recipient. At the same time it is admitted that miracles are so closely interwoven with the history of Christ, and according to every narrative form so important a part of His labours, that even upon the surface (unless the historical credibility of the original records is to be denied altogether, which again would give rise to new enigmas) the reference of the miracles to poetic invention, whether unintentional or intentional, is an impossibility; on

[1] It is otherwise in the case where miracle is directed against an abnormal state of Nature, against disorders in it. This case Steinmeyer seems to have in view, *ut supra*, p. 14. In this case miracle represents true Nature. But it will not do, with C. Malan, Hirtzel, and others, to regard miracle *in general* as *true* Nature, and in this sense to deny its supernaturalness, while only leaving to our system of Nature the predicate of the sub-natural (*sousnaturel*), *i.e.* the unnatural. All goodness and stability in natural law would then be swept away, whereas we saw previously that the correct notion of miracle presupposes natural law.

the contrary, historical fact must lie at their basis. The sole rational supposition is: As those numerous narratives are trustworthy, which warn against the overvaluing of miracles, so also must the miracles, which they narrate, be narrated *bona fide;* nay, the warning against overvaluing, which no one calls in question, itself implies withal a historical character, and this is also presupposed.—Then may not the miracles of the N. T., which are mostly miracles of healing, be perhaps approximately explained in a natural way by the suggestion of a co-operation of surviving healthy forces of a psychical nature, to which in any case the miracle joins on, or of the issuing forth of extraordinary healing forces in the human organism, which are aroused by psychical influences? In others, as in the case of the stater in the mouth of the fish, the great draught of fishes,[1] the healing of the nobleman's son, reference may perhaps be made by way of explanation to a higher knowledge in Christ. But such explanations of miracle would either merely push the difficulty farther back or contradict the narratives, which would evidently have the events regarded as miraculous manifestations of power on the part of Christ or of His disciples through Him. But these approximate attempts at explanation by analogies are put out of court especially by the raising of the dead, the multiplication of the loaves, the miracle at Cana. Such miraculous acts resist all effort to refer them to Nature or mere human powers, and when they are just as well attested as the rest, and to some extent more so, it is a perilous enterprise to let the one class stand, while regarding the other as poetical invention. On the contrary, the N. T. requires us to view the miracles of healing in connection with the power necessarily demanded for the other miracles.

We linger upon the N. T. miracles, because the O. T. ones do not hold good for Christians by their own authority and for their own sake, but only through connection with the ends of God's kingdom, and thus with the N. T., where alone God's kingdom attains its consummation and secure establishment. It should first of all be pointed out, that in case miracles of the second class are to be regarded as actually performed by men, namely by virtue of divine

[1] Luke vi.; John xxi. 4, 48.

endowment, which, like all charismata, joins on to the person of the miracle-worker, then the connection between their miraculous deeds and the world of conservation, or their coherence with the latter, is far more transparent than if we everywhere go back exclusively to the divine causality. This also is the meaning of the N. T.[1] Even in the case of Christ, according to the N. T., it is not God or the divine nature that does the miracles, but this ἐξουσία is given Him as man,[2] given as a power of His own, with which as with the other powers He has to exercise authority. Man is not a mere channel for divine actions or a mere spectator, but his power of will receives this enhancement or freedom. But if miracles of this second class are to be regarded as works of man's will, the miraculous *force*—that πνευματικόν[3]—exists in the will before its proceeding to action in the character of a superior, higher force amid the other world-forces, but one which precisely like them has attained real cosmical existence. In this way the miraculous works, as expressions of such really existing forces, form part of the world of conservation, whereas the original communication of the miraculous force (δύναμις) is an act of God to men, modifying the existing forces, an act effecting a change within the limits of humanity, apart from which the result would have been different. We may then endeavour to regard this divine act, by which the ability to work miracles is implanted, as a divine quickening of existent but slumbering capacities, or as a "liberation of previously imprisoned forces" by God, or again (a view which the representations of the N. T. favour) as a communication of the divine living Spirit to men. In any of these cases the miracle proper of the second class retains its position.

5. For ourselves the *first* point of importance must be, to acknowledge that neither in the constitution of Nature nor the human will is there anything opposed to the idea of such miracles, which are to be regarded as outbursts or self-manifestations of a higher, divine Spirit in human organs employed by God, and no less in the *second* place to acknowledge the inner teleological connection of such miracles with religion and revelation. By the very fact of being referred to charismata, miraculous works are withdrawn from

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 28; Mark xvi. 17; Matt. x. 1. [2] Matt. ix. 6. [3] 1 Cor. xii. 1.

singularity and isolation. The charisma points back to the fulness of new spiritual communication on God's part to mankind, having in it nothing of a magical or capricious character, but conditioned by moral motives as well as finding in Nature a side that meets it with friendly welcome.

As relates first of all to the *receptiveness of Nature*, Nature is everywhere in a state of movement and development, and accordingly, as we saw above (p. 163), no self-contained whole of itself. Just so it is not its own end, but designed to have spirit as its master, to whose influences it is part of its original perfection to possess unlimited receptiveness. In serving spirit, it does not serve an alien law or misleading caprice. The fear, that if miraculous power is made over to spirit itself, the door may be opened to magical influence, vanishes before the consideration that the miracle-worker can only possess his power in union with God and His will ("through faith"), while, removed from this circle, he becomes powerless and must necessarily see his power die away. In its true being, union with God being interposed, the spirit does not go astray; for, however high its power rises, it carries also the law of a divine order within itself, a higher order, needing perhaps to be worked out through conflict, but still harmonizing perfectly with the world-whole. A presentiment of the fact that Nature is no finished whole, but that new phases of development await it through the advancing development of spirit, is not disclaimed by physical research itself. The most enlightened inquirers in this field are the most careful to avoid assertions by which insuperable limits might be imposed once for all upon the activity and receptiveness of Nature. There resides in it an incalculable degree of elasticity, not merely in the sense that on fitting occasion given, rare, or hitherto secretly existing, forces issue from it, as the most important discoveries show, but also in the sense that unsuspected, new receptivities emerge in it, by the satisfaction of which its horizon is both ideally and actually widened. Thus, to miracle belongs the significance of pointing to an inner essence of Nature, "to the inner spirit of the world" (nay, this spirit there strives after realization), to a higher future of the world. In miraculous acts, a higher spiritual force, united with God, influences Nature and matures in it as it were solitary early flowers,

just as sometimes in mid-winter we find on the earth and in the air messengers of spring awakened by special force in the sun's warming rays. But the receptiveness, to which the activity of Nature is to be limited in miracle, is of course to be regarded as living in character, and therein lies the possibility of unison between what has been called the higher and lower orders. Here only do we decisively break with such theories as see in miracle merely a suspension of the world-system and a contrariety to Nature. The lower and higher orders must in turn be regarded as an organized unity; and we must reject all attempts not merely to reduce the higher to the lower, but just as much to allow the lower to vanish in a higher, without preserving its separate existence, as a mistaken mystic natural philosophy would do, or as they are compelled to assume, for whom Nature resolves itself into acts of divine volition. On the contrary, the notion of miracle, as shown, points back by its own nature to a natural order, and would have its own distinctive character found in the very fact of deviation from this order, which is therefore acknowledged in its own place. This being so, the lower and higher orders can only combine to form the world-unity by the circumstance that in the lower is a side which as it were offers itself to or even longs after[1] the higher order; and miracle joining on to this side, the lower is directly affirmed and corroborated under this aspect. It is quite consistent therewith, that miracle is worked out through conflict, whose office it is to do away with the abnormal. This is not in contrariety to true Nature. On the contrary, the miracles of healing, for example, stand in complete unison with the world of conservation, and as it were in covenant-relationship with healthy Nature. If it is only through miracle that Nature becomes what it is designed to be, an apt instrument of spirit, it possesses therein its true dignity; for the consummation of Nature cannot lie in its mere separate existence, in its isolation from spirit, but in its unity with spirit. It cannot be the author of its own consummation, but spirit is given it to be its perfecter and deliverer, even as God is the perfecter and deliverer of spirit.[2] And thus, indeed, the miracles of the N. T. may be regarded as prophetic foreshadowings

[1] Cf. Rom. viii. 19-21. [2] Rom. viii. 11 ff.

of the future condition of Nature, even as the miracles of the O. T. are momentary, prophetic outbursts of powers, which can only have their proper place in the region of completed revelation. Sickness, corruption, and death in corporeal life, to which the scriptural miracles mostly refer, as well as every instance of the predominance of Nature over spirit, belong not to true Nature, or to the perfection of spirit or of the world. On the contrary, the spirit's authority and freedom as to Nature are thereby partially abolished. Nature in this case is at least in a condition not positively harmonizing with the teleological relation between the two (§ 39, 4). So far, accordingly, as in miracle that freedom of the spirit is revealed by which Nature is to be emancipated, miracle has high significance and much to attract. Hence the delight in miracles belonging to every unsophisticated nature. It belongs to prose to understand miracle, to poetry to love it, and indeed to that true poetry which, instead of creating idle pictures of the imagination, takes pleasure in realizing to itself the actual ideal, the higher, more perfect, and therefore poetic, stage of spirit-freedom, of unison with Nature. But while in miracle we see the prophecy of a higher condition of things,—the spirit's state of freedom in its unison with Nature,—the meaning cannot be that miracles, such as appear in the N. T. on occasion of time and circumstances or need, will in the final consummation of things be daily matters; but the chief point is, that in the final consummation of things abnormities and restraints and powerlessness of spirit will give place to the continuous government or animation of Nature by the spirit that has become united with God. What at present we call miracle, will, carried out on a vast scale, only serve to conduct the world to a state of existence in conformity with its original, eternal idea.

But as relates to the *receptiveness* of the *human will* for powers, expressing themselves in Nature in miracles, no doubt as long as the human will remains subject to abnormal or capricious action, the order of Nature stands opposed to it in the character of a barrier withstanding disorder and checking caprice. But when the spirit possesses in union with God the principle of true freedom, this freedom, because one with God's will, will by no means through miracle prove

fatal to the order of Nature, but in its working we may see the morning-glow of a true order of things free from everything abnormal. What makes miracle miracle indeed, the human will cannot accomplish of itself, but through divine power it may be enabled thereto. As created after the divine image, man is intended to partake in the divine freedom and dominion; but this he has not so long as Nature is able to offer successful resistance to his designs. For as long as this is the case, Nature not merely shares the dominion with him, but holds him partially in its dominion and in subjection to itself. Accordingly Steffens (*Religionsphilosophie*, I. 479) says rightly: "Christ could not be bound by any condition of nature, His entire significance consisting in this, that He proclaimed to us the unconditional freedom of spirit." — But are not *diabolical miracles* inconsistent with this derivation of miracles from will united with God?[1] These need not perplex us; for whatever they are, they are not miracles in the full sense of the word. They are no doubt represented as signs of the last days, but not as beginnings of a higher condition of things. Nor are they δυνάμεις in the sense of a higher freedom of the creaturely will through union with God; but they are and are called lying wonders,[2] not only because they subserve lies, but also because they merely assume the semblance of real miracles, of higher freedom of spirit. They are τέρατα, awaken astonishment, but are effects, the possibility of which must lie in the creature as such, whether they are to be regarded as purely blind works,[3] or, as John Gerhard, Trench, Hengstenberg, Rothe, suppose, originate in a profound contrariety to Nature, by which man surrenders himself to spirit-opposing, alien powers, either physical or diabolical. In any case they originate not in enhanced freedom and energy of spirit, but in a debasement of the same. Nor are they creative in nature, for only to God belong creatively quickening powers, but are merely negative. At the same time they are cognizable by believers[4] in their true

[1] 2 Thess. ii. 9; Matt. xxiv. 24; Rev. xiii. 13, xvi. 14; cf. Acts xiii. 8 (Elymas); Ex. vii. 11, 22 (the Egyptian sorcerers).

[2] 2 Thess. ii. 9. ψεύδους is also to be applied to δυνάμει and σημείοις; cf. ver. 11.

[3] As held by Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xv. 19, and also by Chrysostom and Thomas v. Aq. *Summa*, P. I. Qu. 114, Art. 4.

[4] Matt. xxiv. 24.

character, especially when regard is had to their relation to religion.

§ 56.—*Conclusion.—Teleology and Cognizableness of Miracle.*

Little as the miraculous acts performed by men are exhausted in ends lying outside themselves, since as moral acts they rather carry their end within themselves, they still certainly dovetail in a teleological relation into the history of revelation as cognizable and beneficent facts.

1. That the man who is spiritually elevated by internal divine communication will also be set free from Nature, is readily understood, and that not merely in a negative sense, but in the sense of enhanced power over Nature. Thus it may be quite natural for him to produce effects with his powers, which for others and for Nature outside him are miraculous. But what peculiar significance has such spontaneous manifestation of higher power for the purposes of revelation? Is miracle the visible exhibition of revelation as such? Certainly the new element must needs exhibit itself, and only thus can it effectually dovetail into the world. But such spontaneous exhibition may, nay must, also be carried into effect by words and moral action in the usual way; by both means may its spiritual import be expressed. What, then, is the office of miraculous acts? The aspect exhibited in miracle is the energy of the new spiritual truth which revelation would communicate. Nature is made a witness on behalf of the bearer of the revelation by means of what he does to it, and so long as no body of spiritual testimony as yet exists, and the spiritual world is not as yet transformed, miracle represents that essential aspect of the truth. Only what is marked by energy has a claim to confidence; truth without force were no truth. Therefore, while the truth has not as yet attained objective reality in the kingdom of spirit, it displays its energy in Nature, in the supremacy of spirit over Nature; from which it is evident that subsequently such demonstrations of new spiritual power may be dispensed with, at least for the secure establishing of revelation. But the way in which the truth especially displays its claim to confidence in such exercise of

energy is by suggesting to the thoughtful observer the association of the bearer of the revelation with God Himself. In God the Creator alone is primarily found the unity of Nature and spirit in an absolutely perfect manner. In the worker of miracles is typically displayed this unity of Nature and spirit, which has its foundation in God, who also originates this union in the human will in the form of power over the natural. Thus, the communication of miraculous power is verified on teleological grounds.

2. The revelation of such higher spiritual freedom, the application of miraculous power in a particular case, stands perpetually under ethical laws, because it is the human will that has to perform the miracles. For this reason they must all have ethical significance in themselves, and cannot be *mere* means in order to something else, *e.g.* merely suggest the divine origin of revelation. If miracles, instead of being required by definite moral circumstances, *e.g.* suffering and need, instead of being the natural, moral exercise of existing spiritual power, did nothing more than exhibit the power of spirit over Nature, or if their purpose lay altogether outside the action itself, they would be merely epideiktic in character. Mere show-miracles are not found in Scripture; Christ expressly repudiates them. Thus, miraculous powers stand in the catalogue of the gifts, with which, in accordance with ethical law, profit has to be made; and miraculous acts accordingly, like other acts, have to be judged by a moral standard. But it is quite consistent therewith, that in them, when they are understood as to their cause, something divine becomes apparent, namely, the vital bond between God and the spirit, which, in harmony with the fundamental relation between God and Nature, displays its supremacy in them. Such phenomena acquire all the more significance, when, as in the days of systems of natural religion, the spirit of mankind generally is held captive by the powers of Nature and disposed to deify them, is without moral energy, nay, without faith in the spiritual world and its transcendent importance. For just as in miracle the native supremacy of spirit over Nature is revealed in requiring ethical actions, so also through it God-consciousness is more definitely distinguished from world-consciousness. In miracle is exhibited a higher might springing from God, which, pointing back

to God, bears witness to God's freedom in relation to Nature.[1] And seeing that no epoch is free from the danger of confounding God-consciousness and world-consciousness, well-attested miracles have significance for later times as well. Moreover, by means of facts, recognized as miracles, the true theory of the world is securely established on the purely historical side, and that theory is precluded which endures no miracle, because the only God it knows is one identical or intertwined with Nature. Rothe rightly says, that for one who deems miracles impossible, the consciousness of a living, personal God is out of the question. An independence of the world, that excludes miracles, must end in the world's deification.

3. But the denial of miracle, *e.g.* by Hume, and especially Renan, bases itself on the question as to their *cognizableness.* "Their real cause is confessedly invisible. The possibility always remains, that they are the effects of natural causes. But if they are incognizable, they are without reason and aim." But those who speak thus do not know how, on the other hand, to insist with sufficient emphasis on the strangeness of and want of analogy for miracle. But this implies the admission that miracle is very definitely distinguished from everything not miraculous. And granting that miracles were incognizable, they might still be possible, although not on teleological grounds, yet as the natural expression of a will peculiarly invigorated by the spirit of revelation, though for the rest subject to ethical laws. The teleological relation is not the causal basis of miracles, the miraculous powers depending on a communication of spirit. J. Müller rightly says: "Miracles, like raising the dead, changing water into wine, proclaim themselves without further ado as miracles, the explanation of which by physical forces is renounced by cautious physical science." It is true that miracle can merely of itself suggest an invisible higher power, but by this very means it serves to emancipate the spirit from Nature, to extend its horizon and lead it to something higher. Now *what* this higher power is, miracle cannot say of itself. This must be learned from the mouth of the miracle-worker, and his testimony must gain credibility from his character. Supposing

[1] This holds good most directly of miracles of the first class, but indirectly also of the others.

both elements to be present, the trustworthy testimony of the miracle-worker respecting what he does serves to guide to the right understanding or cognition of its cause. From this it follows, that miracle is not meant to be considered apart, but that it dovetails spontaneously into a vaster system. Miracle by itself, as a human act, has not the power and is not meant to demonstrate the truth of a revelation, but is the spontaneous manifestation of a revelation already made, and can therefore only be understood in association with the person of the religious founder. But it can be understood. For, in the first place, the miracle-worker is conscious to himself of doing the miracle, not in the power of his finite will, but in union with God, to which union he will then bear witness. In the second place, the astonishment excited by his act will co-operate with his testimony and the impression of his entire person in producing faith in his higher mission, because in the τέρας a σημεῖον is recognised, a symbolical fact, the effect of which is to produce a comprehension of the δύναμις from which the miracle flowed, and which leads in this way up to the divine influence operating in the miracle-worker, as well as to faith in his power. In the next place, personal participation being gained in the spiritual revelation brought by the miracle-worker, the astonishment comes to an end, because now the miracle no longer appears strange, but adequately grounded in the power of the miracle-worker and his mission, and to this extent natural. Therewith it is also seen to pertain to the field of conservation. Thus, in miracle, as analogously in human life generally, a movement in a circle is observable. As, for example, the word of the gospel must have been apprehended and have exerted somehow an attractive influence, in order that its internal presence might become a fact in the spirit by means of the external, while on the other hand the same word is first rightly understood and known to be truth when the Christian standpoint is reached, so is it in the case of miracle. As a σημεῖον exciting a feeling of wonder, miracle leads to Christianity, and on the other hand can only be perfectly understood from the standpoint of Christianity, *i.e.* so understood as to appear a manifestation of natural power (δύναμις), regarded from the point of view of Christianity and the miracle-worker. But this circle involves no contradiction, but is in harmony

with the universal law of human progress. The movement begins with a stimulus from without, in order to reach its goal within; but the vehicle or medium having done its work, the opposite movement begins from within outwards. The light of the internal revelation that has been assimilated now sheds light on the external, so that the latter loses its strangeness.

SECOND POINT: DOCTRINE OF THE FORM OF INTERNAL REVELATION IN ORDER TO THE FOUNDING OF RELIGION, OR INSPIRATION.

§ 57.

Revelation imparted to the spirit is, as regards its form, Inspiration.

Luther's *Werke*, ed. Walch, viii. 2140, 2161, xiv. 172. Joh. Gerhard, *Loc. de Inspiratione*, T. ii. Quenstedt, *Systema Theol.* I. 55 ff. Calov, *Syst.* I. 484 ff. Heidegger, *Corp. Theol.* II. 34. *Exercitationes Biblicæ*, 1700 (in opposition to Spinoza, Capellus, R. Simon). G. Calixtus, *Responsio ad Theologos Moguntinos de Infallibilitate Rom. Pontificis*, Thes. 72–77. HISTORICAL: Sonntag, *Doctrina Inspirationis ejusque Ratio Historica*, Heidelberg, 1810. Rudelbach, *Luth. Zeitschr.* 1840 (History of Dogma). DOGMATIC: Schleiermacher, *Christl. Glaube*, §§ 28, 132. Twesten, *Vorlesungen*, 3d ed. vol. i. p. 282 ff. Gaussen, *La Théopneustie*, 2d ed. 1842. Hengstenberg, *Christology of O. T.* (concluding treatise on Prophecy). Philippi, *Kirchl. Glaubenslehre*, I. 184, 1854. Schweizer, *Christl. Glaubenslehre*, I. §§ 43–50, p. 138 ff. Von der Goltz, *ut supra*, p. 84 ff. Beck, *Einleitung in das System christl. Lehre*, 2d ed. 1876, §§ 82–101; *System der christl. Lehre*, p. 240 ff. Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, vol. i.; *Einleit.* p. 26 f., II. 1, p. 13. Tholuck, *Ueber die Inspirationslehre, Deutsche Zeitschrift* of J. Müller, 1850, n. 16 ff., and his article "Inspiration" in Herzog's *Real-Encycl.* VI. Auberlen, *Divine Revelation.* Jacobi, *Die Kirchliche Lehre von der Tradition u. H. Schrift*, 1847. Holtzmann, *Kanon u. Tradition*, 1859. Krauss, *Die Lehre von der Offenbarung*, 1868. Köstlin, *Der Glaube*, 1859. Delitzsch, *Chr. Apologetik*, 1869, p. 393 ff. Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*, pp. 112, 121 ff. Fréd. de Rougemont, *Christ et ses Témoins.* E. de Pressensé, *Revue théologique*, Supplement, Nov. 1862, and *Bulletin théol.* Févr. 1869.

A.—*Biblical Doctrine.*

1. The language used in the O. and N. T. respecting divine inbreathing or inspiration is far more comprehensive in meaning than the phraseology which refers the word chiefly to holy writings. No doubt 2 Tim. iii. 16 justifies the latter usage, whether we translate: God-breathed, or, which is more probable, God-inspired, an inference from which is that a holy writing breathes of God's Spirit. For the founding of the O. T. religion and theocracy, for its firm establishment and higher development, inspiration is everywhere presupposed. Abraham, like Moses, is called a prophet. Nay, all theocratic offices are based on inspiration or participation in the Holy Spirit. A sacred afflatus is ascribed, along with prophets, to artists, poets, judges, kings.[1] But it is in an altogether special sense that the Spirit imparts higher knowledge[2] and the universal outpouring of the Spirit. That all shall be taught of God, is the prophetic hope.[3] Christianity regards itself as the fulfilment of this hope.[4] With the baptism of the Spirit all men are to be made partakers of adoption.[5] The Spirit is the source of all charismata in the Church.[6] Accordingly, notwithstanding the universal outpouring of the Spirit upon believers, a difference of kind, as well as of degree, in the communication of the Spirit retains its place.[7]

2. As concerns the relation of the objective influence of the Spirit to the inspired bearers of revelation, we often find in the O. T. in the case of the prophets states of transport or ecstasy. This does not imply indeed a loss of self-consciousness, but simply the retirement into the background of world-consciousness, whereas self-consciousness and in it God-consciousness continue. But still, according to the N. T.,[8] it is a higher stage when the man who is ἐν πνεύματι stands also in νοῦς, and therefore when self-possession remains united with inspiration. Where this is wanting, the cause may be

[1] Ex. xxxi. 3 ff., xxxv. 31; Judg. xi. 29, xiv. 6, xv. 14, etc.
[2] Isa. xi. 2, li. 13. [3] Joel iii. 1; Ezek. xxxvi. 26; Isa. xi. 9, xl. 3, lxi. 13.
[4] Acts ii. [5] Matt. xxviii. 19 f.; Rom. viii. 15. [6] 1 Cor. xii.
[7] Matt. x. 19; Luke xxi. 15, cf. xii. 11, 12; in John: xiv. 16, 17, 26, xv. 26, xvi. 7–14; in Paul: 1 Cor. ii. 13, vii. 40.
[8] 1 Cor. xiv. 15 ff.

twofold. First, when the Holy Spirit possesses the man merely for a moment, and does not take up His permanent abode in him, it may happen that the man is only able to sojourn in the element of the divine by means of a momentary break with everyday consciousness. But again, the contents of revelation may contribute to the repression of ordinary world-consciousness; for visions relate not merely to the fundamental facts of salvation, such as bear upon the relation between God and the soul (as in Gal. i. 12; 2 Cor. xii. 1 ff.), but, *e.g.*, even in the N. T., in Peter's case and in the Apocalypse,[1] to states of the world not yet present. In this case the world-consciousness, with its present contents, must give place to its fulfilment by the contents of the vision, and therewith the spirit be transported beyond the realities of the present. But seeing that even then the consciousness of God and of self is not extinguished, but on the contrary intensified, there is no ground for the notion that the inspired men of the O. and N. T. existed in a purely passive state. We read also of a searching on the part of the prophets;[2] and even when Christ[3] promises His disciples that not they shall speak, but the Holy Spirit in them, this must be taken along with the context which says, that this Spirit shall give them a mouth and wisdom. Nor is it specified as an effect of inspiration that its recipients possess all knowledge at once, or are elevated morally and intellectually above all possibility of mistake and error.[4] But with the consciousness that personally they are not yet perfect (*οὐ τετελείωμαι*), there is connected in the prophets and apostles the firm consciousness that they are bearers of God's word, of a divine message, to which divine authority belongs. Accordingly they claim authority for these contents, which they are well able to distinguish[5] from products of their own thought.[6]

[1] Acts x.; Rev. i. 10.
[2] 1 Pet. i. 10, 11, cf. Rom. x. 20.
[3] Luke xxi. 15; Matt. x. 19.
[4] Gal. ii. 12; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; Phil. iii. 12.
[5] 1 Cor. vii. 6, 10, 12.
[6] Gal. i. 8, iii. 2; 1 Cor. ii. 4 ff.; 2 Cor. v. 20; 1 Thess. ii. 13; 2 Cor. xiii. 10; 1 Pet. i. 12, 25.

B.—*History of the Doctrine of Inspiration.*

§ 58.

Theories of Inspiration moved partly in extremes, partly in unsatisfactory compromises, until modern theology made more comprehensive investigation into its premisses, and laid a secure basis for its demonstration.

1. The supranaturalistic defenders of inspiration usually fell into the same mistake as rationalistic opponents of the same, in so far as they omitted the distinction, without which this entire doctrine cannot be set in a clear light. Inspiration in the original sense, referring to persons, is one thing; inspiration in a secondary, mediate sense, referring to sacred writings, another. Supernaturalism treated the inspiration of Holy Scripture as the fundamental dogma, on which alone everything else was to depend for stability. It treated Holy Scripture as the revelation itself, instead of as the memorial of the originally revealed, ideal and actual, truth; the consequence being that Holy Scripture was transformed into God's exclusive work, the human element was explained away, and the original living power thrust away behind the writing contained in letters. Faith ever draws its strength and decisive certainty from the original, eternally living power, to which Scripture is designed to lead. But when Scripture was regarded as the goal, and attestation was sought elsewhere than in the experience of faith through the presence of the truth in the spirit, then the Reformation-standpoint was abandoned, its so-called material principle violated, and it became easy for Rationalism to expose the contradictions in which the inquirers had thus involved themselves (see above, §§ 7, 7*b*).

2. The Chief Forms of the Inspiration-Theory.—The theory of pre-Christian Alexandrianism, especially of Philo, which supposed the human side to be suppressed by Inspiration, passed over into the Church in various forms. When the divine light rises, Philo thinks, the human sets; ecstasy, passivity is essential to inspiration, and in harmony partly

with the divine majesty, partly with the design of guarding against all disorders through the influence of human consciousness. However, morbid, fanatical phenomena, *e.g.* of Montanism, terrified many church teachers, who consequently postulated the continuance of human consciousness even for the state of inspiration. So especially Chrysostom. But it is especially worthy of note, how that extreme supernaturalistic view led over in a certain degree to its opposite. After a variety of meanings had been established in Holy Scripture by describing it as consisting of divine dictates of infinitely rich import, one had a bridge by which to pass over to a supposed higher sense, when the literal sense seemed difficult or inconceivable; and this being once acknowledged, an unconscious, rationalizing mode of thought in respect of the contents became an incentive to keep the extreme, supernatural theory of Inspiration at a high point. So to some extent in Origen's case, in modern days in Swedenborg's. In opposition to this, the Reformation indeed stood by the literal mode of exposition and the single sense of Holy Scripture. But whereas the Confessions of the Reformation laid down no definite theory of Inspiration, Luther, and to some extent Calvin, even favouring laxer views, both Evangelical Creeds during their scholastic period went to the farthest extreme of the pre-Christian theory above mentioned. While the state of ecstasy was not accepted, the spiritual activity of the authors was none the less to be conceived as utterly suppressed. Spiritual passivity was conceived by Calov, Quenstedt, Buxtorf, in so absolute a form, that nothing was left to the sacred authors but mechanical activity in apprehending the words containing the matter, and in writing. Such overstraining of the divinity of the Holy Scriptures has for its obverse the denial of the Inspiration of the *persons*, of the holy men themselves, to whom all productive power of their own was refused, and whose own knowledge of the contents they wrote down was regarded as a matter of indifference, if not actually dangerous to the pure divinity of the contents. But as we saw the absolutely supernatural notion of miracle resulting in a collision between divine activity and conservation, so here also the effect was to degrade to passivity secondary causalities which yet cannot be dispensed with, if

Revelation is supposed to be given for the purpose of being assimilated and conserved by living acceptance. At the same time, by such moments of inspiration the continuity of life in the sacred authors, who yet were the possessors of faith and religious knowledge, would be severed, without the fruits of God's Spirit in their person exerting any influence upon their writings.

This, as well as the many critical and exegetical difficulties, to which such notions gave birth, was the reason why the absolutely supernatural idea of inspiration, which we may call the Docetic, was modified after the beginning of the last century. This was done, after George Calixtus's example,[1] by the divine activity being limited to giving assistance to the human for the purpose of imparting to the latter what it had not of itself, or at least of guarding the products of human thought from error; or, finally, after the sacred authors had finished their work by purely human strength, of impressing upon it the seal of the divine ratification. But even here the relation of the divine agency to human activity is conceived in a purely external way. God and man in this case remain in mere juxtaposition.

But then the one-sided subjective mode of apprehension advanced still further in Rationalism, which, developing the element slumbering in the last-named theory, finds in inspiration nothing but a purely human exaltation by native internal strength.[2] Certain as it is that Rationalism was right, when it protested against the suppression of the human aspect, it was itself destitute of a right idea of God and religion, nay, of the felt need of a living God and of intercourse with Him. When it says, that by such intimate association with the creaturely spirit wrong and dishonour would be done to the divine majesty, this seems to imply that it would be too great an honour for man. But, on the other hand, Rationalism does not find it in keeping with man's dignity to stand in need of such divine communications. And man is supposed

[1] Calixtus's doctrine was held by Grotius, Baxter, Le Clerc, Clarke, Doddridge, Pfaff, Baumgarten, cf. Tholuck, *ut supra*.

[2] Accordingly Wegscheider, *Institutio*, § 42, says: Everywhere faith in revelation may be traced back to myths and undeveloped notions. A barbarous age regards all unusual spiritual emotions as divine operations.

by it to stand higher, when he developes himself purely out of himself apart from God. Nature also, it is said, can subsist and develope itself without special divine assistance. But apart from this contradiction, in which the twofold possible form of forsaking the living God[1] is seen to be involved, we have seen above that the idea of God, instead of condemning, requires the belief that He stands in an inner living relation to the world. And just so it is a mean view, to suppose of man that he loses in dignity by God's standing in an actively efficient relation to his development and progress, in a more intimate relation than He does to Nature. The latter may develope itself with no other divine activity than that of conservation. But man has higher needs and duties, susceptibility for communion with God and His acts. But in the desire for such a mode of development as Nature possesses, Pelagianism, which professes to hold such lofty views of man's dignity, betrays its low conception of his essence and dignity. It overlooks his call to historical progress and advancing divine communion.

3. The conflict between these theories may teach us, that the only satisfactory theory of inspiration is one that supposes actual divine illumination, and therefore truth without mixture of error, to be imparted by Inspiration, but which, so far from needing to suppress human consciousness, employs human intelligence as an instrument, even as the existence of revelation can only be designed for spirit, while human intelligence is created for God.

C.—*Dogmatic Doctrine of Inspiration.*

§ 59.

In the most general sense, Inspiration is the form in which man obtains part in the spiritual purport of revelation under all its aspects. It is a spiritual miracle, and, because applying to the entire spirit, may apply also to will, enhancing its energy and purity, as well as to

[1] Jer. xvii. 9.

feeling; but its more specific signification is as spiritual suggestion or illumination respecting the truth, with a view to founding abiding religious communion. Notwithstanding, of itself it is not the highest form of Revelation.

1. In the case of Inspiration as of Revelation, we must take as a starting-point a broader signification, in order in the next place by contracting to give the notion greater intensity of meaning. Inspiration refers to the spiritual side of man, and so far implies God's primordial causality. Even the granting of participation in the divine breath may be called Inspiration.[1] To this point every subsequent divine communication joins on. But in the stricter sense, the word is in place where, for the first time in his life, a man is given higher insight into the divine world; and most in place, where, for the first time in the history of the race, higher religious intuition is imparted by divine communication, and thus a new and higher stage of development is reached. All this, it is true, does not touch the sense in which the word Inspiration or suggestion is most commonly taken, namely, the Inspiration of sacred writings. But it is this very Inspiration which is left unexplained, nay rendered incomprehensible,[2] by the Supernaturalism which dissolves the connection between the divine activity in the composition of such writings and Inspiration in the original sense, according to which not books but men are inspired.[3] But the connection of the inspiration of persons with the ends of revelation is self-evident. It is with Inspiration as with miracles. The appearance of abruptness, of a breach of continuity, vanishes when the latter are referred to a preceding enhancement of freedom by God. In the same way the abruptness, which we are compelled to assume, in case Inspiration had to be referred merely to the moment of written composition, vanishes, when we take as our starting-point, as Holy Scripture does, the influence of the Holy Spirit on the persons, upon which, when the persons are filled with the Spirit, the composition of writings full of inspiration fol-

[1] Gen. ii. 7. [2] § 59.

[3] 1 Cor. vii. 40; Luke xxi. 15; Matt. x. 20; John xiv. 26.

lows as a natural effect belonging to the region of conservation.

2. But have we then to conceive the distinction between inspired men and others as a specific difference, or one merely of degree? Let us not here understand the word specific as implying that there are several species of divine Pneuma. There is but one Spirit of God, although He has revealed Himself πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως.[1] Wherever a believer rejoices in divine communion, there is participation in the Spirit of God. Inspiration confers no specifically higher dignity in comparison with other believers.[2] But although, intrinsically considered, a certain homogeneity of all partakers in divine communion with inspired men is evident, and in this respect no specific distinction is demonstrable, yet we cannot rest here. On the basis of this essential equality arises an inequality, nay, a uniqueness of character in the bearers of Revelation.

We do not give the name of inspired men in the stricter sense to those who, in one way or another, are made partakers of internal revelation in the Spirit of God merely by the mediation of others. On the other hand, they who receive a revelation through a primordial act on God's part and first of all, stand in a unique position, and as it were in the character of spiritual progenitors,—above all, the men who by revelation mark a new stage in religion—an Abraham, Moses, Elijah, and the prophets, as well as the first-fruits of redeemed humanity restored to God and conscious of the fact, such as the apostles. For only then is Revelation really given to humanity, and therefore made historical fact, when a pure, unerring knowledge of it is imparted to those to whom it is first made, and on whose pure announcement its continuance depends. Consequently, those standing at the head must occupy a unique position, in so far as Revelation, that its design may not be frustrated, gives a pledge in their peculiar equipment that the genuine purport of revelation is able through their means to perpetuate itself in an unerring form. But here arises a not inconsiderable difficulty, with which the theology of the present day is wrestling, after having begun to shake itself free both of the absolutely supernatural and

[1] Heb. i. 1. [2] Matt. xi. 11.

rationalistic notion of Inspiration. On one side it is one of the advanced principles of modern philosophy, not to disengage inspiration from the persons of the holy men, not to regard it as something abrupt, breaking in upon the continuity of their life, but fitting into the same. But, on the other hand, the participants in Inspiration, as concerns their persons, can by no means be regarded as perfectly pure or perfect in knowledge; and considering the association between will and knowledge, when they themselves are forced to confess that they have still to struggle with sin, it seems as if the purity and freedom from error of what is communicated to them must be endangered. This circumstance is the reason why some have been induced to class even the bearers of Revelation with other fallible believers; whereas others, that they may not involve the normative authority of the former in utter uncertainty, prefer to return to the old, untenable idea of Inspiration.[1] But the only effect of reverting to the former stage of thought would be that the process of criticism, which destroyed it in the eighteenth century, must begin afresh. Nor are there wanting those who show a disposition to carry on the work with vigour.[2] Let us first examine the objection.

3. Of course even inspired men are not to be considered as exempted from the laws of human development. Neither do they know everything, nor is their knowledge, which is rooted in faith, that of sight. It has still something symbolic about it.[3] As men they might err and be deceived in purely empirical, finite things, just as also they were not free from sin. But it is by no means implied in the unity of human personality, that sin and error must needs have diffused their disordering influence through its entire being. As relates to the outer world, this stands primarily in a position of relative independence in relation to spirit, so that an error in the contents of such empirical knowledge need not imply error in spiritual concerns, but in relation to spiritual knowledge is a matter of

[1] So Gaussen, Agenor de Gasparin, and Philippi, who make, not indeed the literal words, but the language to be inspired.

[2] So Schleiermacher, Schmid, Twesten, Nitzsch, Lücke, Rothe, Tholuck, Sack, Beck, v. Hofmann, Baumgarten, Auberlen, Köstlin, and others.

[3] 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

indifference. In just the same way also in the case of inspired men, the inner man and its consciousness stands in a position of comparative independence in relation to their outer man. By affirming that every moment the entire man must be determined by that which is present to one side of his being, whether it be truth or error and sin, we should make progress, and redemption itself, impossible. If sin, wherever it actually exists, is to possess the power of at once falsifying and leavening with its own spirit all communications and revelation as well, then no effectual communication of new life or illumination is possible, but man, like a merely natural being, must remain as he is. If man, in need of redemption, is incapable of being made actually partaker at a single point of infallible truth, capacity of redemption is denied him, and Manichæism carries the day. Just because man is still in process of development, he is not yet identical with himself, not a perfect unity. By the relatively distinct existence, nay the severance, of the different sides of his being alone are progress and historical development possible.[1] True, absolute unity with himself lies still in the future; but in order to the attainment of this, a pure, infallible point must be given somewhere in man, governing the entire process. The new principle must first strike root in one spot, in man's innermost being, and that in a self-conscious form, so that the Ego has the assurance within itself of standing in the element of truth. Sin itself cannot make this impossible. Man's innermost being must still possess receptiveness for apprehending the divine truth to be communicated in its purity and clearness, and this reception of the communication will then become the lever of an altogether new development advancing on its victorious path in all directions, although in a gradual way. That innermost being, filled with the new truth, because not existing in the bearers of revelation as mere blind force or feeling, but in a conscious form, may therefore be called a power of abiding, pure, unsullied life and knowledge, a δός μοι, ποῦ στῶ, from which influence may be exerted upon the error and sin of the world.[2] It is therefore incorrect to suppose it impossible for any one, on account of sin, to obtain by divine illumination pure knowledge of the

[1] Heb. iv. 12 ff. [2] Cf. herewith 1 John ii. 6, 9, 20, 27.

truth, to apprehend and communicate God's Word as God's Word, and consequently to possess and impart infallible truth, *i.e.* in the spiritual domain. This cannot be denied even in reference to believers generally. How much less with respect to the bearers of the perfected revelation! They will be able to apprehend and communicate it in a pure form, although in various degrees according to their spiritual individuality and measure of attainment. And whereas concerning error there can never be any certainty, our spirit being designed for the truth, they will be able to possess a certainty of their having the truth, and of what among their multitude of ideas is without mixture of error. Tendencies to erroneous conceptions may possibly continue to operate, with which they have still to contend. But their higher knowledge and illumination must needs give an impression of truth and certainty, such as is denied to what is erroneous. Accordingly, nothing impossible is required, but only conscientiousness and love of truth, in order to guard them against placing the erroneous and ambiguous element, which has still to be overcome in them, on the same level with the truth, whose appointed witnesses they are conscious of being, and of which a divine certainty animates them. And thus, in an altogether natural way, namely, regarded from the standpoint of their higher personal equipment, it is possible for them to be preserved from error in their teaching and preaching, so that they give forth as God's Word nothing but infallible truth, while themselves not on this account absolutely free from error in their personal capacity.

To this is to be added, that Inspiration cannot be absolutely measured by the level of morality or depth of religion attained by the man who enjoys it. The inspired word is not a mere reflex of religious states of heart, so that inspired knowledge would not extend beyond the moral and religious attainments of the holy men. To the inspired man, objective divine truth and insight into it are vouchsafed by God. And here again it is evident how essential it is to define religion not merely as feeling, but also as knowledge. In opposition to Schleiermacher's conception of religion, we have been compelled to lay stress upon objective truth, because by the relation which it sustains to this has religion to judge of its own

purity. And it is a rule without exception, that where the course of development is to be of a kind laying claim to the conscious will, a degree of knowledge or a general guiding conception must keep well in advance of the actual state of being, in order that the latter may be shaped in harmony with the knowledge or conception. Therefore must the knowledge of the bearers of Revelation not merely be far in advance of the spiritual state of the world outside them, but also of their own moral and religious being. How far in advance it is possible for such illumination to keep, cannot be laid down in any general formula or definite limitation. In this matter the issue turns essentially on the nature of the individuality, which is selected and equipped with an eye to the ends of revelation; and this leads to a third point.

The *charismatic endowment* of the bearers of revelation has still to be considered. On the basis of natural capacity, of course in dependence on human fidelity, a special charismatic equipment may arise through the Spirit of God, in virtue of which man in the realm of divine light obtains, as it were, an eagle-glance, like an Isaiah, John, or Paul, by means of which the depths of the divine mysteries can disclose themselves to him in a peculiar way, not for his sake merely, but for the good of the *Church*. This does not involve the assertion of absolute freedom from error in things which do not concern the eternally abiding essence of revelation and religion, but only asserts a contingent character in historical or empirical matters. They remain men as to growth even in knowledge, and consequently as to perpetually abiding imperfection in knowledge. But it may be acknowledged, that, without assuming a miracle of a magical order, their communication may be a real communication of God's Word, and their teaching, even if not as yet absolutely perfect, still free from error. If the possibility of this has been demonstrated dogmatically, so, on the other hand, it can be demonstrated *in concreto* by exegetical science, that the reality in the case of the men accepted as inspired is not in contradiction thereto.

4. LIMITATION OF FREEDOM FROM ERROR IN INSPIRED MEN.—We are compelled to agree with approved evangelical teachers [1]

[1] Like Sack, *Apologetik*, p. 437; Tholuck, *ut supra*, and *Th. Real-Encycl.* vi. 692 ff.; Köstlin, *Der Glaube*, p. 289 ff.; Lange, *Philos. Dogm.* p. 552; Beck,

in insisting that freedom of error applies to the external and human only so far as it stands in essential connection with spiritual truth. Inspiration in purely historical, chronological, and topographical matters could only take place internally in the form of vision. But visions could not exhibit things in their empirical reality, since these, by their very nature, must be apprehended by means of external experience. Were mere vision enough, the empirical reality would be meaningless, and this would border on the Docetic. What, therefore, inspired men learned as to such things in an empirical way, and only could thus learn, was not imparted to them by Inspiration. To this is to be added, that were the Spirit of God to impart just as immediate, original illumination respecting the contingent and purely empirical as respecting spiritual and divine things, the essential and non-essential would be mingled together to the detriment of religion and the burdening of such faith as is endowed with a fine sense of truth. But no doubt there are historical matters which stand in essential connection with the meaning and spirit of revelation, nay, are its expression and visible embodiment; and in this case, without doubt, Inspiration does not apply merely to non-historic eternal truths. There are eternal things destined to become historic, and historic which, although taking place *but* once, have undying significance. Where this is the case in the region of Revelation, there of necessity error, even in historical matters, will be excluded. But there is also a multitude of such matters, not having such connection with revelation itself. The possibility of what is erroneous or inaccurate in non-spiritual things is even part of the complete historic character of religion, because holy men only could and only needed to be raised as to physical, geographical, and similar matters above those con-

System der christl. Lehre, opposes a mechanical separation of contents and form, but says, p. 242: Inspiration extends "merely to the mysteries of the divine kingdom, to spiritual truth; to the external and human only so far as it stands in essential connection with the former; herein it elevates its organs to a knowledge far surpassing all human wisdom and into the full light of truth, but it does not instruct them and preserve them from mistakes altogether immaterial to this *spiritual* truth, and falling within the province of common inquiry and knowledge, such as chronological, topographical, purely world-historical circumstances." Cf. Tholuck, *ut supra*, p. 699.

ceptions of their days, from which no danger to the pure knowledge of the divine was to be feared, on the supposition of their entire exemption from the circumstances of their historical situation being admissible. Such inaccuracies must even be of service to the purpose of revelation. They form an important ferment, preventing man from resting in literalities, teaching him to distinguish the pith and substance of revelation from the secondary, and impelling him to hold by the former. The fact of the bearers of revelation not being raised by absolute miracle above all possibility of error only need awaken anxiety, if the truth of revelation depended in the last resort upon the mere authority of its human organs, if therefore the only possible kind of certainty respecting the truth were faith in the universal and absolute freedom from error of its organs. But the Introductory Part has rather shown,[1] that the direct way to falsify the truth would be to attempt to derive it from the divine form of the mode of tradition, from the inspiration of the bearers of revelation. *Fides historica* is not sufficient; *fides divina* cannot need to be supplemented by it.[2] Thus, by means of the still remaining imperfection of the human instruments, the divine economy has brought it about, that we are unable to rest in men, and that longing after God Himself is unable to find its full satisfaction in them, that real security must be sought in the contents which are independent of the inspired organs of revelation, and which have power to impart certainty respecting themselves. And this security is not imperilled by the supposition, that in matters respecting which certainty, so far from being necessary, is of no religious moment, holy men might err. It is enough for them to apprehend and transmit without adulteration the unerring spiritual truth, of which they are constituted witnesses, leaving it to the inherent force of this truth to bear witness concerning itself.[3]

5. Within the limits specified, then, a real union of the

[1] §§ 7, 7*b*. [2] Gal. i. 8.

[3] With the above principles, maintained by Luther, many modern Reformed theologians also agree; so Sack, Ebrard, Lange, E. de Pressensé, Godet; also the noteworthy work of F. W. Farrar, *The Life of Christ*, 20th ed. i. 398, ii. 181, 484.

divine and human takes place. How are we more precisely to define this union? A modern view in reference to the O. T. is this: To one nation—Israel, perpetuated in Christianity, God gave from the time of its forefathers a substantially pneumatic basis, so that its deliberation upon itself or its self-consciousness, such as is apparent in the elect spirits of the nation, is nothing else than the reflection of the union of the divine and human life, established in the beginning and unfolding itself in the history of Israel, a reflection which, because faithful, is itself again divine-human. This view is unable duly to discriminate between the Old and New Testament, forestalls the Incarnation, and has in it a one-sided physical character. Akin to it is another view: Inspiration is indeed, in the first instance, a communication to individuals, not to a nation, although for a nation, yea for mankind; but it is a communication not to their persons, but to their nature. But with this the spiritual purport of revelation is inconsistent. This leads to a transformation of the spiritual into a physical process, unless by nature is meant a divinely-wrought spiritual state, which would be out of keeping with the O. T., because of the merely momentary character of its spiritual effects. Finally, in so far as the nature, not the person, is to be the recipient of the illumination, this view threatens to revert to the old theory which ignores the person. The only right point of view is, to conceive the divine and the human personality as co-operative in Inspiration, and this in harmony with the fundamental law, by which the human side is receptive to and capable of assimilating the divine. At the same time, of course human receptiveness is not to be conceived as an empty vessel, in which the divine contents are merely deposited, man meanwhile remaining passive. But man is receptive, even as he is filled, in respect of his consciousness of self, of the world, and of God. For this reason man's individuality and historical situation can least of all be regarded as immaterial. This specific character of the human spirit may therefore on one hand be considered as the plastic material upon which the Spirit of God comes[1] in order to bring light and life to man. On the other hand, in the human spirit there exists already a longing for

[1] Analogously with Gen. i. 2.

the blessing to be imparted, and the Spirit of God conditions Himself in His working by this specific character of the man, for the purpose of making him a living bearer and organ of the divine Word destined to come to mankind. By the insight thus vouchsafed to the inspired man into divine things, order, light, truth, are brought into the chaos of human consciousness; and even what the inspired one knew before he now knows differently in its inner significance and order, so far as is requisite at the time, but at any rate knows in the sense that the real purport of every revelation is actually made over and becomes a pure, communicable, human possession. Thus, what takes place is not a mechanical division between the divine and human, but a reconciliation of the two with each other, a union, so far as this is required by the end of revelation. This mode of conception[1] shows with special vividness, both how that material of natural self-consciousness, which is incidental and non-essential in reference to revelation, neither is nor can be appropriated by the Spirit of God, and also no less, that this need awaken no anxiety in regard to the work of the divine Spirit in man, but that everything which is touched and illumined by the Holy Spirit may be at once divine and human. Moreover, different *degrees* of inspiration are at the same time naturally implied, in proportion to the extent to which, in accordance with each stage of revelation, appropriation on the part of human consciousness takes place.

THIRD SUBDIVISION.

CONTENTS OF REVELATION.

§ 60.

The content of Revelation is in general God Himself, its end the effecting of a living, reciprocal communion both of God with individuals, and of individuals with each other. Religion being essentially creative of communion, the content of revelation is necessarily directed to the creation of a religious community (§ 49).

[1] With it Von Rougemont is for the most part in agreement.

1. Many, with too intellectual a tendency, regard instruction as the only purpose of Revelation, the end in view being either the contents, the truth (which is then usually described as a body of supra-rational propositions, "mysteries"), or certainty. If the former sum up revelation in the repletion of the intelligence with higher truth, the latter sum it up in proof, and both classes honour in Revelation the means by which certain propositions, known or unknown, are proved. Both, in a one-sided way, put knowledge first.—Others just as one-sidedly fix their attention in Revelation on the satisfaction of the interests of the practical reason. Revelation is supposed by its positive character to confirm, or by practical commands savingly to regulate, the voice of conscience. But morality is not religion.—Others, finally, only expect Revelation to impart happiness. But unless knowledge and will are also assumed and claimed by it, this would be eudæmonistic.

2. For us it is a result of the idea of religion,[1] that just as no aspect of the spirit can be absent from religion, so knowledge, will, feeling, must be taken into account by Revelation. Knowledge, then, as the product of Revelation, we call *illumination.* Its content is God as regards the different elements of His idea; therefore God as regards His omnipotence, God as the principle of measure, order, beauty, holiness and right, of wisdom and love. But to illumination in the full sense belongs not merely the revelation of a body of truth, but also the imparting of *certainty* concerning the same. God's objective testimony must become light in man himself, testifying concerning itself, and rendering its truth evident.—In conformity with the importance of the will also for the origin and exercise of religion, Revelation must possess power by its contents to inspire and intensify the will; and under this aspect it is *quickening.* Nowhere and never is the illumination imparted by revelation void of effect. It would have the knowledge communicated reduced to practice. — But since, finally, its aim is the elevation of the entire person, the entire spiritual consciousness of self or life is enhanced in freedom and *blessedness.* Thus by means of these three—divine illumination, quickening, elevation—man becomes more and more a partaker of the blessings of religion, of the divine life in wisdom,

[1] §§ 46-48.

holiness, and freedom, as also in the sense of the enhanced value of life or blessedness.

3. But this, again, cannot be limited to the narrow circle of the individual person. A revelation not having a universal design would be incompatible with God's Essence. In revealing Himself to an individual, God has in view the race,[1] and with this universal divine purpose the generic consciousness agrees. Thus it is only in the form of the community that God's final purpose in His revelation is accomplished. Still its primitive form of existence is that of a revelation to the individual. In the community the purely divine, relatively creative causality of God passes over into conserving causality, makes use of secondary causalities with a view to the origination of a collective life informed by *one* spirit, and that one member may exist for another, one race of organs of revelation for another. Revelation thereby becomes a living common possession appertaining to the being of the world while constantly reproducing itself—tradition in the good sense of the word.

4. Little as we are able to describe *a priori* the method of the progress of revelation in its details (on account of the possible influence of sin), still we may go so far as to say that the first stage of religion, which must be consciousness of God's omnipotence and consciousness of involuntary, absolute dependence which has to grow into humility, is incapable of receiving a complete revelation all at once, but can only do it through the medium of an intermediate stage, whether its continuance be short or long. Even apart from the question of a sinful development, there must intervene the consciousness of a divinely-imposed moral and religious vocation, in order that there may be scope for man's own exertion and the personal appropriation of that which God has designed for man. The illumination already belonging to the knowledge of divine omnipotence must also become illumination respecting the divine *will*. This will includes on one side moral duties for man; on the other side it is the will to perfect the revelation; and both must be made known to man in order that he may continue in the normal course to the end. Therewith is established, even apart from sin, the necessity of the revelation of *law*, as well as of divine *promise*

[1] Gen. xii. 3, xviii. 18, xxii. 18; Isa. xlix. 6.

(prophecy). Law has not its origin in sin, as little as sin has its origin in law. An "ought" must precede volition and being, in order to the commencement of a moral and religious process. But neither can the promise of divine action be absent, that the law, which appeals to man's freedom and awakens his consciousness of freedom, may not in the effort to fulfil the law isolate itself from God, and abandon the ground of lowly faith. And not merely will a promise be given to the effect, that God will be with those who sincerely obey His will, but God will also impart glimpses of insight into the purpose to consummate religion and revelation, that man may both be cognizant of his own still remaining imperfection and that of the general condition of the community, and by the deepening of aspiration after consummation be prepared for the latter. Only in the third and last place will the consummation of revelation itself take place, the effect of which is that the divine element, which at the second stage took up its abode in knowledge and aspiration, now fills and inspires feeling and will with its active presence.[1]

§ 61.

Revelation with reference to Possible Sin.

If, as the reality shows, the development of man has taken a sinful course, revelation is only made the more necessary. It is not made impossible, but simply modified as to its contents, to the extent that before it can be perfective it must first of all be remedial. Since the corruption of religion, in accordance with its nature and in virtue of the unity of spirit, will, on the appearance of sin, assume a threefold form, the task to be accomplished is threefold,—the remedying of error, the remedying of the consciousness of guilt (or atonement), finally, the remedying of sin itself, or purification of the heart and sanctification of the will. But error, guilt, and sin can only be over-

[1] Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff.; §§ 37, 41.

come in love by the opposing positive forces of wisdom, blessedness, and freedom. Accordingly, redemption or remedial grace leads on to perfective grace, which, even apart from sin, was the goal from the first.

Observation.—These three primal functions of divine revelation in relation to sin shape themselves, within the circle of Christianity, into the three offices of Christ.

1. Development through a state of sin, indeed, does not exclude all progress, which must have taken place even apart from sin, *e.g.* a development of world-, self-, and race-consciousness by human effort, even including a certain degree of God-consciousness. But when sin has entered, revelation cannot advance to completion in a direct path simply by the further development of powers already in active existence, for this would be a development of sin. What is needed is a reversal (*στρέφεσθαι*[1]), a conversion of the entire tendency from the abnormal to the normal path. First of all, the contradiction must be removed in which man has involved himself with his idea as well as with God. Supposing, moreover, that the abnormal state not merely affects particular elements of particular persons in our race, but that its subversive influences permeate the entire personality, nay the entire life of humanity, then these powers of evil must first of all be broken by the redemptive energies with which revelation must needs be endowed. These redemptive energies will have their fountain-head in divine love (as *χάρις*[2]). This love, as the supreme point in the idea of God, that by which God possesses absolutely free power over Himself, must needs be able to impart truth corrective of all error. In it lies the power to atone or cancel inner unhappiness,—in it, finally, the power to inspire and fill the will with itself, *i.e.* with responsive love.

2. If then, apart from sin, the law of progress in revelation is that step by step it holds in abeyance the possibility of sin and summons forth higher energies (*gratia sanitatis*), after the entrance of sin the divine working is that of *gratia medicinalis*. In the latter case, before the concluding revelation, a still more abundant preparation for or introduction to remedial action will take place. The aim will be to

[1] Matt. xviii. 3. [2] John i. 17, iii. 16.

establish securely consciousness of God, in order thereby to obtain a right point of departure for the religious progress of humanity. In the next place, for the purpose of preparing the way for remedial measures as well as for consummation, revelation will introduce what is apparently opposed thereto. *First of all,* it will curb evil by ordinances, by external positivity of right and laws,[1] that human life may not be utterly dissolved in a state of anarchy, but continue and be faithful to its destiny in spite of sin, as well as that in the continuance of a moral order of life susceptibility for higher things may be evolved.[2] This law includes, *secondly,* institutions which provide for the objective manifestation of already existing evil,[3] that it may be compelled to publish and clearly reveal its inner nature before the eyes of all. *Thirdly,* revelation combines both elements to the extent that it employs the growing power of knowledge of the law as well as of God in His character of holiness and the growing power of sin as a means for promoting growth in self-knowledge, *i.e.* the knowledge of sin and the need of salvation, and thus implants susceptibility for salvation.[4] This susceptibility, *fourthly,* receives its most powerful aliment and stimulus from fore-announcements of the revelation of salvation and consummation. All these divine acts, even after humanity has fallen away from God, maintain a bond of connection with Him at least on the divine side. But in any case, the goal of the preparation, whatever may be the nature of the details, can be nothing but the evolution of pure susceptibility for the redemptive and perfective revelation, or of the believing child-like spirit[5] which in its own way comprehends knowledge, will, and feeling.

[1] Gal. iii. 24. [2] Gal. iii. 23, 24; 2 Thess. ii. 7; Rom. xiii. 1-3.
[3] Rom. vii. 11, v. 20; 1 Cor. xv. 56. [4] Rom. iii. 20.
[5] Matt. xviii. 3; John iii. 5.

THIRD HEAD.

THE DIVINE INCARNATION, OR THE GODMANHOOD.

§ 62.

The form and contents of Revelation only attain their consummation in the divine Incarnation, and in such a way that the consummation of divine revelation in itself becomes also the consummation of religion, and therewith of humanity. This perfective process is carried into effect first of all in One who, as absolute God-man, is both the Revealer in the absolute sense and the Man embodying God's perfect image, while at the same time bringing about the consummation of the world.

Observation.—The intention in what follows is not to put a logical or physical necessity for the divine Incarnation in the place of spontaneous divine love, but rather to seek to understand the intrinsic wisdom of the divine thoughts and counsels, and their coherence with each other and with the nature of God in His character of love, neither caprice nor chance having any place in those thoughts. Just as little can the knowledge of the ethical necessity of the incarnation desire to usurp the place of the historic knowledge of the God-man coming through the evangelical announcement of the faith in Him which follows in consequence. The knowledge of Christianity in its eternal verifiableness or divine reasonableness (σοφία[1]) grows naturally, not from pure thought as from vacancy, but from the living faith in which the historic truth has come to be internally appropriated. In faith is reflected the bond of union between the ideal, eternal, and the historically real.[2] The Christian lives in the truth as in a power tending towards historic reality, nay, in history

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 7.

[2] §§ 11, 12.

become real, and in historical Christianity as in the truth.[1] Whereas in all extra-Christian religions the ideal and historic remain apart, in the founder of Christianity, according to the faith of Christendom, idea and reality are in absolute union. But the idea of the God-man is cognizable as one destined to realization, not merely possible but ethically necessary, because the person of the God-man is not like other members of humanity, which are unintelligible taken by themselves, but is destined to be the living centre of humanity.

1. The meaning of the text is, that neither the form nor the content of Revelation (§§ 52–61) attains its perfection and the goal which revelation cannot but propose to itself, until it has passed into Incarnation. On God's side, the purpose of His love from the beginning is perfect self-communication; but this is Incarnation. Let us consider this with respect to the form and contents of revelation. No doubt inspiration is a far higher *form* of revelation than revelation through impersonal nature—light, sound, etc. For whereas Nature is impersonal, an inspired man is a far more adequate organ of revelation, both as regards receptiveness for it, and the work of guarding and cultivating it. But still the divine communication is imperfect even in Inspiration. For even if it is not momentary in duration, as in the O. T., still an external relation to each other of the divine and the human is inherent in inspiration, because in the life of every inspired man there was a period when he was not such, a period which cannot be without after-consequences. For this reason, the completing of revelation (and of humanity) cannot fall within the sphere of Inspiration merely. The most perfect organ of revelation can only be the man who, from the first moment of his existence, in his entire person lives in a sphere of being pertaining to revelation and never separated from God. But in the circumstance of his entire person being made an organ of revelation is given at once in inseparable unity external as well as internal revelation and the completion of both. For now the divine life itself enters into a human life. It assumes a shape that embodies and manifests the divine life in human form, and is therefore divine-human. In the God-man the inner spiritual miracle is so united with the outer world-

[1] John i. 17.

reality, that the union of the divine and human life, implied in the idea of inspiration without measure,[1] forms a man who in the midst of the world is a personal miracle,—the God-man who, possessed of absolute worth in himself, fully answers to the communicating will of divine love, and is withal destined both in himself to give perfect expression to human nature, and outside himself to consummate human nature.

The same result is arrived at by considering the *contents* which revelation is intended to communicate to humanity. These consist not merely in divine powers, as in inspiration, but in the entire fulness of the Godhead, which is to be communicated to humanity. Nay, God Himself wills to live and dwell in the absolute organ of divine revelation. In harmony with His own form of being, belonging to Him as λόγος or the Principle of revelation, He wills to possess existence and self-consciousness in man, forming with him one unity of life, willing even in the world to live His triune life. Since it is God's will in His eternal love to make an absolute communication of Himself as regards His entire communicable being, in the world-idea or world-counsel He willed not merely the spiritual existence of relative receptiveness for Him, but as Revealer or λόγος He wills absolutely such cosmical existence as is endowed with perfect receptiveness for Him and His presence, *i.e.* He wills the perfect divine image in the form of realization in the world, which again is the Son of His love.[2] In Him as λόγος the Godhead as regards its absolute, intensively spiritual being gains real existence in the world; and the man in whom this is carried out, is not merely His dwelling-place or vestment, but Himself the embodied expression of God's eternal image in time. In His love He so makes this man His own that He regards him as pertaining to Himself—Himself, the living potency of revelation.

2. Examination of the Chief Objections.—The Incarnation, we said, has its verification in God's ethical Essence. But the question arises: Even if God, in accordance with this Essence of His, can will the Incarnation without contradiction, is the human race really receptive for a union and dignity so high and wonderful? Is there room within its idea for a form of this divine-human character? Let us first examine the objec-

[1] John iii. 34. [2] Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 4, 6; Col. i. 13

tions, and then pass to the positive exposition. *A priori*, indeed, there would be no possibility of a divine-human personality within the limits of our race, supposing human development were inconceivable apart from sin. But how can the ethical element—that power above Omnipotence—as respects the realization that it craves, be at the mercy of its absolute opposite—evil? More plausible is the allegation that the infinite cannot be comprehended by the finite. But if this means that it is utterly incomprehensible, it proves too much; for in this case there would be no real participation whatever in the divine, the infinite, neither in an ethical nor intellectual sense—not even in religious feeling. For even participation in this sense, because receptiveness for the infinite, implies a corresponding receptiveness. Certainly God cannot communicate His self-existence. That would be to abolish the distinction between God and man; but this is not required by the idea of divine Incarnation.—But were it alleged that at least humanity is not receptive for the totality or entire fulness of the Godhead, but only for a part, it is to be considered that God must not be contemplated as a Quantum, an infinitely extended, extensively infinite quantity. Else certainly there were no room, so to speak, for God in the narrow limits of humanity. On the contrary, we have recognised as the innermost Essence or heart of God His intensive infinity (§§ 27–32), His love, upon which everything physical in God must be regarded as dependent. But that intensive infinity, God's love and wisdom, finds room even in a human heart destined to partake in the divine likeness.—It is finally objected: "Were God to become absolute man in one, nothing would be left for others. Were the divine fulness to exhaust itself in one, originating cause would be wanting for others, who could only represent a *minus* of the same. Moreover, an absolute God-man would be withdrawn from the race of human beings, and lack *homoousia* with us. It is therefore rather to be held that God is eternally becoming man, while perfect in none."[1] Here the idea of Godmanhood is not meant to be denied altogether; but absolute or perfect Godmanhood is said to be impossible. But after it is conceded that God wills to become man, and live His life in the

[1] Baur, *Geschichte der Menschwerdung Gottes*, III. p. 994 ff.

world, it were a contradiction to the divine idea of the God-manhood for God never to attain what He wills, but only to be ever seeking Himself in the world, to be ever occupied in fruitless attempts, without finding Himself. Further, in this objection we have to find fault with the conception of God as an extensive quantity, a divisible Quantum, in which case certainly, supposing God to communicate Himself perfectly to one, nothing would be left for the rest.[1] The fear, that an absolute God-man might not leave room for other men participating in God, or that the *homoousia* might be lost, must vanish of itself, provided His unique character be so blended with His true relationship to the human race, that the very thing raising Him above the rest, and apparently separating Him from them, proves the bond of union and relationship with them, and provided the perfection given in Him, by which they are supposed to be stripped of intrinsic worth, is the very thing by which alone they themselves are able to attain their distinctive worth. But both conditions are secured, when the communication of the Godhead to humanity in Him is the perfect satisfaction of the craving for God and receptiveness for God in human nature, and when His uniqueness and dignity, turned towards them in love, proves the necessary basis and living principle of their consummation, in which in Him they participate.

3. With the possibility of Incarnation on God's part, moreover, *the idea of humanity* cannot be incompatible, because the form of this idea is not to be determined arbitrarily, nor by the results of daily experience, but, man being a progressive creature, by the idea or destination of humanity. But its *God*-imaging destination is to be defined by the idea of God, or by what God has in view as its goal. We must therefore maintain, that *the absolute God-man* finds room in the idea of

[1] The merely physical, *i.e.* unethical conception of God, appears without disguise, when Baur, *ut supra*, p. 997, supposes: "If the idea once attains its absolute form of existence in a definite, particular individual, it is deprived of the impulse to realize itself in other individuals." And the conception of God as a Quantum is evident from the fact, that in case the idea is realized in one individual, he denies to it the possibility of realizing itself in other individuals. Even Origen is in advance of this view, when he says: It is not with spiritual as with external things; no one loses in wisdom, etc., by others partaking therein.

humanity, nay *is part of its perfection*, first *because only through Him can the perfect Church of God become realized*, and again *because even the personal consummation of each particular individual is conditioned by Him*. For the verification of these propositions we cannot here go back to the fact of sin, because in the preliminary Part of Dogmatics merely their possibility, not their necessity, is before us. But if for this reason we must here forego proving the necessity of the God-man in order to *redemption*, we need not forego the idea of *consummation*, and what results therefrom. Humanity, although not created perfect at first, is created for the purpose of being perfected, not for the purpose of remaining a torso. In the divine world-idea the perfective will, because fixing the ultimate aim, is even antecedent in a logical respect to the redemptive will conditioned only by the Fall. On this account the preliminary Part of our science has primarily to occupy itself with the former, in which also the principle of redemption from sin will find its verification. The goal, which logically must be placed first in the divine thought, governs the way to the goal. Now it pertains to the economy of the consummation of humanity, that it be not a mere aggregate of spiritual atoms without coherence and unity, whether perfect or imperfect, neutral or opposing, but a self-enclosed whole. Humanity is to represent the house of the living God,—His most glorious work, upon which He pours all the beams of His glory. This Church of God must be a perfect, spiritual, and absolutely-realized organism, existing and conscious of itself as perfect unity. But this true humanity can only have the consciousness of perfect unity through a central person likewise real and actually existent in the world, not through the λόγος remaining in an ideal state or operative internally. We saw above (§ 49), that in order to the formation of all higher religious communities unity of founder is necessary, the common spirit of the body finding in him its visible point of departure. How much more does that community, which is to embrace for ever humanity on its way to perfection, and whose common spirit is to be identical with that of true humanity, need an objective central personage cognisable by all, union with whom will be the pledge to all of union with each other! But this central

personage must be of such a character, that before him all distinctions of time and space, all limits of nationality and individuality, vanish, because in him appears the central personality, the personality therefore having equal affinities with all, in which resides power to give unity and perfection to all. He is the *Head* of the entire organism, and in this respect fills a unique position. For this very reason he can be but one. The centre stands related to everything of which it is the centre. But this uniqueness does not cancel his essential parity with men; and conversely, His uniqueness is not precluded by His true relationship to humanity, just as the κεφαλή belongs to the σῶμα. But the Head can only have this central and universal position in the entire organism of humanity through, not a particular, but universal possession of the Spirit. He can only be qualified to be the Head of this absolute, universal organism, that will embrace the whole perfected spirit-kingdom, by God's self-communication to humanity being in him absolute and universal, or by the Principle of divine revelation, God as λόγος, issuing forth in Him, communicating Himself to man, or by the λόγος becoming man in him. He is the Son of Man by the fact of His being the Son of God. And from the converse point of view, One in whom God's revelation really attains its final consummation, because in Him God gains His perfect economical existence, can in humanity take no other position than that of Head. The Adamic humanity in itself indeed is a real unity, but only one of the natural order. Until One appears who realizes the divine idea of humanity, and is therefore rightly called the Son of Man, its permanent condition in itself is one of liability to fall asunder, without power and capacity for exhibiting the genuine, indestructible unity, which must perforce be of the spiritual order. He alone, as embodying the true reality of the race, perfects the generic consciousness. Full of spiritual energy, He is able to reconcile all contrasts and blend all distinctions. His designation is for the race. The first Adam, as a natural progenitor, could never have formed the true historical unitive principle of humanity,[1] being a mere particular, natural individuality. The true unitive principle must lie in the πνευματικόν, which Adam as

[1] Against Thomasius.

yet lacked. Nor, for this very reason, was the first man fitted to become by immanent development the God-man. But the God-man being the absolute spiritual personality, replete with universal spiritual power, it can no longer appear strange, that according to the N. T. the angels also with joy acknowledge their Head in Him, and that His kingdom embraces all orders of spirits, perfecting them or their consciousness of unity.[1] Reason and love know no distinctions of species (§§ 43, 44, 45).

Again, the absolute form of revelation, which is Incarnation, is necessary to the consummation of the *individual man;* for only thus can the generic consciousness, which is necessary to the completeness of human personality, attain its perfect realization. The individual cannot reach perfection outside the community, to which, as shown, the divine-human Head is essential. To this is to be added, that the first man, while sinless indeed, was not as yet pneumatic. No doubt, apart from further revelation, he might increase in his consciousness of self and the world, he might grow in knowledge even of the moral laws of human nature and of duty, grow in yielding obedience to these laws, and therefore advance from one particular to another. But the only issue of this advance from particular to particular would be a piecemeal combination, and there would still be wanting the comprehension and willing of the particular from the standpoint of the whole, and from the power of the whole, which is just the *πνεῦμα*. But it is part of the distinctive character of the absolute religion, founded by the perfected revelation, that it would not have man's perfect state made up of particular acts or many acts regarded in the light of duty, or of acts of obedience to moral commands gradually emerging in consciousness. Its purpose cannot be by good fruits to make man a good tree, but to plant a good tree—the boundlessly fertile, indivisible potency of good works. Just as, according to Aristotle, the whole must be before the parts, so the perfect religion begins with the whole,—as has been expressed, it leads its champions crowned into the strife. In it the unfolding of the personality begins from the whole as from a present, energetic power of life, which is of far greater ethical significance than a course of

[1] Eph. i. 10, 22; Col. i. 20.

obedience regulated by duty. But we come to participate in this spiritually energetic totality, when we come to participate in the God-man, who would fain dwell in us through faith, in order to glorify Himself in us and glorify us in His image. Thus, in every individual, there are no longer mere isolated beams of the divine, as in the time before the consummation of revelation, but instead of such dispersed existence the spirit of the whole or of the head may and ought to live in every one, only modifying its manifestation according to the nature of the individuality.[1] So, too, it is possible for the still remaining imperfection of the individual believer to be vicariously covered in God's presence. We must consequently hold, that the whole principle from whose power the perfect form of development must spring, is *realized* and given in the absolute God-man, and is therefore within reach of the individual. In presenting and offering Himself to all in His universal relation, He presents that original image of all, in which every one apprehends, not merely true humanity, but the true reality of his own being. And those who allow themselves to be drawn into communion with His life will participate in the principle of the whole that lives primarily in Him, but desires to become the productive, creative power, the πνεῦμα in all. Thus to all in union with Him He becomes the personal guarantee of their progress and spiritual perfection.[2]—But the question may still be asked: Whether an *external* revelation, and that of the God-man, was necessary to the advance of the individual from the initial, natural existence of the Adam χοϊκός and ψυχικός to the pneumatic. Might not a purely internal communication of the πνεῦμα by God, of course in the process of history, have sufficed? This will be made clear, if we consider what was requisite to that perfecting of the God-consciousness, by which manifestly the perfecting of the entire spiritual being of man is conditioned. God-consciousness cannot, indeed, be implanted without inner divine Revelation.[3] But the development of the God-consciousness is only possible by a historical path, which is not merely internal.[4]

[1] This and no less is expressed in the requirement, that Christ live in us, that we do not ourselves live, but Christ in us, Gal. ii. 20; Rom. viii. 10. The same is implied in the N. T. idea of the Holy Supper, John vi.

[2] Eph. ii. 5, 6. [3] § 50. [4] §§ 50–52.

Moreover, the perfect Revelation, which is no other than divine-human, is a union of the internal and external.[1] As to His inmost nature, God is holy Love, and until this is revealed revelation is not yet complete. But love, to be known, must manifest itself in *act*, and the adequate self-manifestation of God's love is His communication of Himself, in which He imparts Himself to humanity in His Son. Consequently, apart from the perfect revelation of love, which is divine Incarnation, even knowledge of the divine Love cannot be complete in us. We have here withal a confirmation, a new application of a former proposition. Our progress is dependent on external means of stimulus, which in regard to revelation are the vehicles of its self-communication. The external must also be in keeping with the contents to be communicated. We need in consequence a perfection of the external revelation actually presented in the historical God-man, that by its means God-consciousness may attain consummation. Rightly does the Evangelical Church repudiate fanatical enthusiasm, or the notion that, in order in our religious development to reach the appointed goal, we do not need external means, but are able to reach it in a purely internal manner. Such spiritualism is incompatible with the fundamental law of human nature alluded to by Paul, when he says: "Faith comes by hearing."[2] Thus, the higher knowledge of God, which man in his beginnings as yet had not, was only to be obtained through the medium of corresponding external revelation; and he can only be made partaker of the πνεῦμα, which he as yet lacks, by laying hold of Him, who not only exhibits in His personality the fully developed divine-human life, but at the same time becomes in His Word the σπέρμα or seed-corn, which received in faith proves itself the pneumatic principle. Only by the fact of revelation being external, not merely internal, is scope left for *spontaneous development*, because in this way the objective offer may be accepted or rejected, whereas a merely internal one must necessarily bear a magical character. Finally, the perfect *union of spirit and nature*, which can only at first be loosely connected, is only possible through the historically operative power of One who, by the very fact of God and man being united in Him, has power

[1] § 62, 1. [2] Rom. x. 17.

absolutely to unite spirit and nature, and who for this reason, laid hold of by faith, is able to operate as the principle of this union in us.

The person, in whom in the way laid down Revelation culminates, can in the nature of the case be but one. A plurality of adequate, and therefore perfectly equal organs of revelation, instead of ministering to the unity of God's kingdom, would merely involve a useless repetition.

4. ABSOLUTENESS OF THE RELIGION HAVING FOR ITS CENTRE THE ABSOLUTE GOD-MAN.—The religion whose centre is the absolute God-man, is the absolute one, or simply *the* religion that lasts for ever. In the lower stages of religion, the person of the founder has still an altogether contingent character: the organs are still contingent in relation to the contents to be communicated to humanity; form and contents are still external to each other. But in this very feature their deficiency is apparent. If absolute contents are meant to be imparted through revelation, the contingency of the form comes to an end. The form must be adequate to the absolute contents, in order to realize the idea of One, through whom the absolute revelation confers on the organism of true humanity its eternal Head, in whom absolute ideality and perfect reality are combined. We saw formerly[1] that Christianity is not a religion having to do with mere ideas, and just as little with transitory historical details, nor yet professing to be a mere sum or addition of the two, but that in essence it is the unity of the two in perfect mutual interpenetration. It is absolute ideality, which at the same time in itself tends towards equally perfect reality; and conversely, it is historical reality, which in itself is merely realized, embodied ideality. Anything higher than what is attained in the absolute God-man cannot be conceived even in thought. In Himself He is the flower of the universe, an absolutely precious Good, the personal embodiment of God's eternal Love irrevocably united with humanity. But in relation to the world He is One after whom no Second, as well as no second stage of religion, can be necessary; for He has the power to carry through the consummation of the world begun in Him, and to preserve humanity in the possession of divine, eternal life. Consequently this absolute religion, which has not the

[1] Introduction, Subdivisions I. and II.

naked Logos, but the God-man for its centre, while at the same time in Him effecting union with the Father through the Holy Spirit who proceeds from Him, is immortal, eternal. Immortal, too, is the love uniting us with Him. This religion will be followed by no other, such as would again have the naked λόγος, or the Holy Spirit apart from the God-man, for its centre; but although through the entrance of sin redemption has become necessary, and although when the work of redemption is done, He will then lay aside His redeeming office, yet will the world not lose Him, its honour and crown. He will still retain His place as the First-born of the household, the Head of the Church, His existence not being conditioned by sin. Were He removed from the kingdom of God, the Church of the saved would lose the eternal object of its gratitude and the source of its salvation. Therefore does the N. T. teach that His kingdom is an everlasting kingdom. He is the administrator of an everlasting priesthood. Out of His fulness, the fulness of the Head, God's Church receives and lives, suffers, prays, and toils. He never becomes useless or superfluous. The organism of glorified humanity and of the spirit-kingdom never loses its Head. Whatever lies beyond the religious stage, of which He is the centre, can only be something inferior, a mere Logos-religion, a church without a head homogeneous with itself.

Let us sum up the results hitherto gained. The idea of the perfect religion requires that of divine Incarnation, this being the consummation of revelation and humanity. The world is created for perfection. In the God-man this is given. Therefore is the God-man destined for the world by God's love, and through Him the perfect religion becomes reality. With this the claim of Christianity is in harmony. It *professes* to be the absolute religion, and in it the God-man is no subordinate or contingent person. The idea, therefore, of the absolute religion, such as Christianity professes to be, requires the manifestation and abiding significance of the God-man. And he as yet has no conception of the idea of the absolute religion, who supposes that he can conceive it apart from the absolute God-man.

5. But then, as we must dismiss the notion that the God-man, the revelation and consummation of humanity, is not necessary, so we must dismiss all wrong methods of maintaining the

necessity of the Incarnation; and this the more, as the foremost ground of opposition to the proposition advanced, that Christianity is the absolute religion, and the God-man a necessary part of its essence, may reasonably lie in apprehensions, to which certain ways of expressing it give occasion. The necessity of the God-man, which we are compelled to maintain in order to the consummation of man even apart from sin and redemption, is not grounded, as observed, in God's physical Essence, as if God, considered in Himself, stood in need of Incarnation in order to His being perfect. The doctrine that the necessity of the Incarnation for the consummation of the world flows from the perfection of God's love to us, does not differ from Anselm's doctrine of the necessity of the God-man in order to atonement, which has been held by Evangelicals since the Reformation, and which even Scholasticism, from solicitude for the divine freedom, felt itself compelled in part to deny. There is just as little arbitrariness in God as necessity of a physical order.—Just as little, certainly, can the mode of demonstrating the necessity of the God-man be approved, according to which sin is associated with humanity, and redemption with sin, so that the necessity of the God-man would depend on the necessity of sin. If God ordained sin, or made it inevitable by refusing the gift of His Spirit, this would tell against the *holiness* of His love. Moreover, love would be obscured, and would not be spontaneous, but as it were converted into indebtedness, if humanity helped to remedy a state of ruin ordained by God Himself. Nor do we speak of an absolute, fatalistic necessity of Incarnation on God's part, but only say, *if* God willed a world, and that in order to *consummation*, which no one can question, by logically necessary inference He willed the God-man, because in Him this consummation is attained. That it *is* found in Him is corroborated, apart from the above reasons, beyond reach of doubt by Christianity; for no one doubts, that according to Christianity no one but the God-man can be the Perfecter, and that He is not a mere Redeemer. The question, therefore, whether God might not have accomplished the work of consummation otherwise than through Him who actually accomplishes it,—the Redeeming God-man,—whether a perfecting process was not conceivable apart from the God-man, would

lead us into a region of arbitrary and untenable hypotheses on the topic: In what other way, without incarnation on God's part, consummation might have been attained,—hypotheses from which theology must hold itself aloof, because it sees in the historic God-man not the Redeemer merely, but the Perfecter, and because the task before it is to investigate the wisdom and intrinsic reasons of the act by which in the God-man God has united Himself for ever, inseparably, perfectly, with humanity. But in general this question may be regarded as a *fermentum cognitionis* or touchstone as to whether Christianity is really acknowledged as *the* religion, and therefore whether the absoluteness of the Christian religion, which apart from Christ is inconceivable, is recognised and duly weighed, or whether Christianity is regarded, so far as relates to the consummation of revelation and humanity, as something having its roots, not in a cognizable logic of divine Love, but in God's mere plenary authority, which simply ordained the God-man with a view to the work of consummation.

Observation.—The bearing of these propositions will be made still clearer by the following questions:—

As relates to the *idea of God:* Would the divine Love be just as strongly confirmed and clearly manifested in a pure Logos-religion without the Godmanhood as it is by the Incarnation? Supposing there were no God-man apart from sin, and thus the divine Love refused to man without sin the best blessing, would this not imply that a non-sinful humanity merited such a proof of love less than a sinful one?

As concerns the *world-idea:* Were the God-man not absolutely included in the idea of the consummated world, but only in case of a sinful course of development, would not this lead to a twofold, diverse idea of the consummation of humanity; and must not this diversity be more serious in proportion to the significance attributed without doubt to the position of the God-man in relation to the purpose of consummation? If the God-man is part of the absolute religion, even after sin has been vanquished, must He not be willed eternally and absolutely, and not merely on account of sin? Otherwise there would be two species of perfect, absolute religion, one with, the other without Him. Seeing that every one's Christian consciousness tells him, that the highest conceivable good on the soil of religion remains linked to the person of the God-man, a world-idea, assigning Him but a contingent or transitory position, would imply a religion

more imperfect than the Christian. But it is *repugnant to the spirit of Christian piety* to assign to Christ so subordinate a significance. How would it harmonize with the unity of the world-plan and the continuity of the human species, to assume two opposite orders of consummation as conceived by God, nay, innate by creation in man, one with the God-man as Head, the other without Him?

If all individual men have been already willed by God as *ends in themselves* and possessed of worth for their own sake, not simply as means, can He who is the true reality of humanity and the crown of the spiritual world be conceived merely as means (and by necessary consequence as a mere Theophany and therefore docetic)? Or does He belong to the original idea of the world and to the manifestation of God's love designed for it to such a degree, that without Him humanity, whose idea contains room and possibility for Him, remains incomplete? On this ground must it not be held, either that the God-man, because not an end in Himself, is not even homogeneous with us, or, that like us He is in very truth a primary end in Himself and the sacred shrine of humanity; and further, that for this reason He is indispensable to humanity, nay to the universe?[1] The opposition to our doctrine, not yet put to silence, appears doubly strange, when on the other hand, in reference to the doctrine of atonement, stress is laid upon Christ's having an essential, not a merely contingent, connection with our race, and this is advanced in explanation of the fact both that as man He was able and obliged to regard it as His appointed work to take our place, and that God could regard what He did as the act of the race.—When the N.T. ascribes judgment to the Redeemer, *because He is the Son of Man*,[2] while promising to believers that they shall be made like His glorified person,[3] this seems to imply an original relation of humanity to the God-man, an innate capacity for Him, and not merely for the Logos. For this very reason, also, in reference to *faith* it is not morally a matter of indifference, whether one regards a relation of our soul to the God-man as innate, a natural bias of the child-like soul towards Him, even before the awakened consciousness of sin, in accordance with Tertullian's deep-reaching saying about the *anima naturaliter Christiana*, and on this ground maintains the fact of an obligation, grounded in human nature, to believe in Him; or whether one says

[1] In this point the fact seems to be betrayed, that many still regard the humanity of Christ as a mere dress, a selfless, involuntary medium for the Godhead, and therefore deny the complete truth and reality of the humanity.

[2] John v. 26. [3] Phil. iii. 21; 1 John iii. 2.

that no such original relation of our nature to Him exists, but that faith in Him is a requirement standing in no essential connection with our original nature, which has rather been designed with a view merely to a Logos-religion. In the latter case, can opposition be offered on permanent and scientific grounds to those who to the historic God-man would ascribe nothing but a contingent, transitory significance, and an essential, abiding significance only to the ideal God-man so called, or the Logos? Thus, it is clear that the question discussed above bears upon the most pressing scientific questions of the present day, and that the felt Christian need of assigning to the historic God-man an essential significance (not merely to the Logos or ideal Christ) finds the solution of the enigma, the adequate verification of the absolute God-man, only in the doctrine just advanced.

6. Supposing, then, that the necessity has been established for religion to receive its coronation in the fact of divine Incarnation, it is no less indispensable that the absolute religion, after finding its realization in the God-man, permanently continue, propagate, and diffuse itself in order to its becoming the common inheritance of humanity. To this process of preservation it is of course necessary above all, that the person of the God-man and the union, perfectly realized in that person, of the divine and human life never again be dissolved or vanish from before the consciousness of humanity, but that He continue as the efficient Head. For upon His position in relation to the whole of humanity and to individuals depends the importance of a living, spiritual relation to Him as the centre, even supposing that, for the purpose of affording scope for development and moral discipline to the devotion to him, which does not see and yet believes, He retire from reach of sight at least until the time of the consummation of humanity. But the latter circumstance only makes it more imperative, in order to the preservation of the absolute Religion, after it is realized in Him in historical fact, to count upon the co-operation of those penetrated by His Spirit,—a topic calling for still more attentive consideration.

§ 63.—*Preservation of the Consummated Revelation.*

Revelation is consummated (§ 62) for the purpose of being preserved. It is preserved first of all by the community of those penetrated by the Spirit of the God-man. But, again, the absolute religion, forming the central point in the world-aim, guards against the power of space and time separating it from its commencement, and against the dangers threatening the secure preservation of the true and pure image of the God-man on the side of sin, supposing sin to exist, by the following means:—The persons forming the first link of tradition, having secured a clear and pure knowledge of the perfected revelation, make what they have received the common possession of humanity in all ages and places in the only possible way, namely, by *records* which, collected as memorials of the founding of the absolute religion, and accompanied by the Spirit proceeding from the God-man, possess power to make the Perfecter of revelation and religion live before the consciousness of humanity with the force of a perpetual and efficient presence. (§§ 57, 58, 59.)

1. In the manifestation of the God-man human nature generally is elevated and ennobled, while He, by virtue of the same Love that reveals its intrinsic glory in the Incarnation, condescends to make Himself a means in order to the world's good. The devotion of His self-sacrifice draws and allures the world into the fellowship of His Spirit, to the end that the world may repay the devotion of His love by the devotion of its faith, through which He is able to influence it and become the abiding principle of its life. The revelation of the Son passes over into that of the Spirit, through whom the higher life, instead of merely remaining objectively wrapped up in the God-man, becomes a subjective possession in new personalities.[1] These form a relatively independent life-centre, a focus of pneumatic life, a new hearth or altar, whereon burns the fire

[1] John iv. 14; 2 Cor. v. 17.

with which the Holy Ghost baptizes.[1] This spiritual baptism, presupposing God's accomplished incarnation and founding upon faith in Him, is no longer merely tentative, no longer remains in the sphere of growing revelation, but in virtue of participation in the whole perfected revelation (§§ 62, 63) now forms part of the life, acts, and words of the Church gathered round His name. By means of the testimony borne by word and deed to the perfect revelation as really existing, the new revelation is preserved and becomes a historic power. For the new revelation does not spread by magical means, nor yet simply by the unmediated action of the God-man or His Spirit, the aim of His working being not an idle salvation of believers, which would be eudæmonistic, but a fellowship of believing men with each other in giving and receiving. This is done, indeed, in such a way that to the end of the world He remains with them and in the midst of them, by His Spirit cementing the bond of the twofold, joyous communion that connects the members with the Head and with each other. The new revelation, accordingly, is preserved and disseminated in historical form, through the medium of those penetrated by the new principle as secondary causalities.

2. But supposing that the God-man has planted Himself through faith in humanity, so that the life manifested in Him has passed over in believing persons into the sphere of preservation, the question still arises, whether the testimony of believing persons by walk and speech is sufficient for the purpose of preserving the completed revelation. Nothing of it must be lost. Succeeding generations must not be placed in an inferior position to the first. The revelation must come to them just as it came to the first one, which could not be made partaker of the Spirit merely by the Spirit's internal influence, but by the historical activity of the God-man, who is to be apprehended by faith. Therefore must the historic objectivity of the God-man in a complete and pure form be made the well-attested, common possession of humanity in all ages, to the end that the testimony of faith, accompanied by the Spirit, may continue to draw to Him, although He retire from the region of sight.[2] Since we found that, in regard to

[1] John vii. 38 ff., iv. 14; Acts i. 5; Matt. iii. 11; Luke iii. 16.

[2] By the retirement of the God-man beyond the reach of sensuous vision, later-

a perfect religion, the passing into history, the historical reality, is an element of religion itself, that the form or history is no longer merely contingent with respect to the contents, but a part of the doctrinal contents themselves,[1] the historic consciousness is essential in regard to a perfect religion. No doubt, this historic objectivity is introduced by the Holy Spirit into the heart, and what the heart is full of the mouth will run over with. But not merely do the first promulgators retire again from the scene of action, but in no one of them alone is everything of moment, contained in the revelation of the God-man, translated into personal life. No single individual grasps, even in knowledge and memory, every important concrete event contained in the perfected revelation which is adapted to the most diverse individualities, and on this account universal; and yet of this revelation nothing must be lost. Now, the form of the provision made for securing the revelation with all its fulness of life to mankind is indifferent in itself, provided only the end be equally well accomplished. But, unless later generations are to be placed in an inferior position with respect to the first, provision must be made for bringing all, by means of the revelation, into immediate connection with the original founding. If revelation is really complete, it must possess power to maintain itself. But it will not effect its preservation by a new creative manifestation, such as would follow upon the old inspiration-doctrine (p. 186 ff.), but transmit itself by calling in the aid of secondary causalities (§ 60). Participation in the salvation and higher life, of which the completed revelation is the channel, will awaken zeal not merely to communicate it by a general testimony to it, but to preserve it as a permanent common possession for humanity. And thus this impulse to preserve cannot be dissociated from the means most effectively subserving the end in view. But for this end no means can be more appropriate than *written memorials*, nay, these are the only perfectly appropriate means, as is shown by the fact of so many nations, directly writing

born generations suffer no essential loss, for without faith even contemporaries could not know Him in His true reality. The only essential point was to secure to those coming later the possibility of a faith that conscientiously seeks and finds the truth.

[1] §§ 3, 11, 12.

arose, having used this in the cause of their religion as the most perfect substitute for living speech. Written memorials have the peculiarity, that through capacity of boundless multiplication along with abiding identity, they are able to penetrate into every age and every place, thus to vanquish space and time, and to combine perpetual duration or immortality with ubiquity among mankind. All the more will this decidedly effectual means of transmission be adopted on the part of the first promulgators of the absolute revelation, as on the one side historic objectivity is so indispensable for the perfected religion; and on the other, the highest seal of historic credibility depends directly on testimony conditioned by a body of eye- and ear-witnesses, or springing from such a body. For in such testimony the direct act of the founding itself is embodied. It belongs to the act of founding itself as an element of the same, the living mirror, so to speak, into which the God-man during His manifestation threw His image, and which thus bears upon itself the historic traces of His existence and work. If we call the first disciples, to whom the God-man entrusted the dissemination of the glad tidings, His apostles, we are shut up to the alternative, either that, not indeed the credibility altogether, but the highest seal of historic attestation of the perfected revelation will be lost with the last oral word of the last apostle, or that their immediate testimony has been made accessible to all ages by other than oral means, which can only be done by written records, by means of which, what they experienced, their immediate impression of the manifestation of the God-man and His labours, might be transmitted to all ages. And granting that the first generation lacked the consciousness of its unique and unrepeatable position among mankind, still the forward-looking spirit of the perfected revelation, observing the needs of the future, and providing for the secure preservation of its work, must at the right time create for itself the necessary organs and instruments, precisely as in the domain of living nature we observe such provision for future needs by the preparation of the necessary organs. Such provision, which is perhaps in the first instance designed for other ends, the divine Wisdom of revelation by means of a higher teleology is able to connect with a period, when alone this can be done most simply and yet securely, in the first generation after the

perfecting of revelation. But when one looks at the sinful character of the world, to whose influences even believers remain exposed, the necessity of such provision appears all the more imperative. Revelation, committing itself to the course of history, comes into conflict with hostile powers, is exposed to the combined influences of sin and error, and thus by mere caprice the purity of the image of the completed revelation may be obscured or falsified. When this takes place, if no recurrence to the original truth, to authentic records, were possible, faith would lack trustworthy, historical confirmation; and as it would be impossible to make out what primitive historical Christianity was, everything must go to ruin under subjective impulses. But a perfected revelation carries with it the power of faithfully remembering everything pertaining to its essence. History forms part of the self-consciousness of those who participate in it. Accordingly, revelation cannot be satisfied with merely being secured in living tradition in persons; but an objective representation of Christianity, independent of personal change and succession, needs to be given by those who must themselves have made sure of having received a clear and pure knowledge of the absolute religion, seeing that otherwise the latter would not have passed over to humanity at all. And thus, at a time when the stream of tradition still flows purely, and is under the control of eye- and ear-witnesses, the pure form of tradition is fixed for all ages as a primitive standard for the changing human race, as a shield to God's Church against the corruption issuing from the world, finally as a mirror for faith, which, if it is to be certain of its objectivity, must be able to strike back to the beginnings of the absolute religion, and be conscious of being acknowledged by them as partaking in the same spirit.

Observation.—Herewith we have established the necessity of the principle of the Evangelical Church on its formal side.[1]

[1] The above course of argument certainly makes it possible to assure the primitive, absolute religion to the Church of God also, in the first instance however to the Church in course of growth; but the Church grows through the *faith* of the individuals added to it, and these are added not through the authority of the Church, but through its Scriptural, self-attesting witness borne to the God-man (§ 11). The importance of the record of the absolute religion for the permanent Church will be more fully exhibited in the Second Part, in the Doctrine of the Means of Grace.

3. But we need to bring the transition to written documents into definite relation with what was said above (p. 189 ff.) respecting the personal inspiration of the first promulgators of revelation. Their full equipment for the work of perpetuating or preserving revelation in a pure form, which was their calling, is defined dogmatically by the "Inspiration" of revelation in the stricter sense. Little, then, as the nature and character of inspiration needs to be settled as to details, the correct sense to be attached to it must be agreed upon and demonstrated.

Outside the circle of the first promulgators of the absolute revelation, and apart from them as the first in the line of tradition, there can be absolutely no pure, and therefore no real, perpetuation of the absolute religion, because the historic aspect, which is so essential for the latter, cannot be carried into effect otherwise than in a historic way, and therefore through the historic knowledge and testimony of the first generation of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses. If it is part of the prerogative of the God-man, that He, although an individual, possesses universal importance for the race, next to Him in universal, official prerogative come those who are unique in this respect, that they are penetrated and led to faith by His direct teaching, and form the first link in the entire chain of tradition and generations, all succeeding generations of believers being obliged to enter into communion with Christ through them.[1] Thus, in reference to the begetting of faith in the world, the apostles of the God-man, in their collective capacity, are organs of universal importance; whereas in all subsequent times the circle of influence, even of the greatest men, can no longer extend to the entire Church on earth. They must therefore have received the absolute religion both in a complete and pure form;[2] for otherwise the God-man would have appeared in vain, and must needs appear again for the purpose of adding that which is indispensable to the preservation of His work—the securing of a pure tradition. If the God-man is the foundation sustaining the whole building, they are the master-builders,[3] carrying on the building in

[1] This is implied in the passage Matt. xix. 28, according to which they will be seated on thrones beside the throne of His glory, John xv. 27.

[2] With this agrees John xiv. 26, xvi. 13.

[3] 1 Cor. iii. 10 ff.

harmony with the plan given in the foundation. To vary the figure, they form, along with the God-man as the ἀκρογωνιαῖος, the foundation on which all are to be built up into a spiritual building.[1] Whatever they are, on their character depends essentially the Church of the future. With this lofty position a certain order of natural capacity will correspond,[2] inviting the training of the God-man[3] by whom they are called. But the elevation of their natural endowment into the apostolical χάρισμα must be brought about by special communication of the Spirit,[4] by which their natural receptiveness receives full satisfaction. Though they have not a specifically different πνεῦμα in comparison with others (p. 190 f.), still they have an equipment corresponding with their *position* in the building of the Church, and specifically different from all other Christian generations. In keeping with their specific position, they are so penetrated and illumined by the absolute revelation, that of them it is certain that they enjoy not merely a momentary inspiration, but a continuous and abiding possession of the Holy Spirit. They are not, as supposed by the old orthodox theory, filled with the Spirit for isolated moments, such as the moment of written narration. Rather, they must be filled with the Spirit who leads into all truth in all their official action, but especially when they exercise their office in written language. Certain as it is, that in contradistinction from the God-man they remain burdened with sin, it is easily compatible with this, that in spiritual things they do not give out error as truth.[5] Further, it is natural, on moral grounds, to suppose that their self-concentration and abiding in the atmosphere of the Spirit are more than usually intense in the act of drawing up written narrations. But the influence of the Holy Spirit in them is not simply negative, guarding against error, so that they are incapable of giving out error as truth, but positive, in imparting to them, to each one after his measure, a fulness of knowledge of divine things, which thereupon become their spiritual possession, and finally in

[1] Eph. ii. 20; Matt. xvi. 18, xviii. 18. [2] Gal. i. 15.
[3] John vi. 70, xv. 16, 19.
[4] John xv. 26, 27; Matt. x. 20; Luke xxi. 15, xxiv. 49.
[5] Though it is certain, *e.g.*, that Peter failed morally (Gal. ii. 12), he was far from teaching and laying down as a principle that Jewish Christians were defiled by eating with Gentile Christians.

exciting in them the impulse to provide, by word and deed, for securing the same among mankind. The historical knowledge which is theirs in a natural way becomes for them, in their inspired capacity, the material in speaking and writing, upon which the illuminating Spirit comes. Their historic consciousness becomes the object of training and cultivation by the Holy Spirit in distinguishing, arranging, and valuing the divine import of the historic, the Holy Spirit employing their new pneumatic man in all these ways. He recalls to their memory the primitive, historic matters of fact;[1] He discloses to them the inner significance and truth of matters of fact, so that in comparison with Him they are not automata, but depose to what they know. He sets themselves, *i.e.* their inner man, to work to discriminate what is erroneous; He sharpens their conscience, that they may not give out what is erroneous as truth; He is their continual impulse to a more and more intensive appropriation of the truth. Finally, in relation to the image of the God-man, dependence on their own resources comes into play, including, in opposition to the effects of still remaining sin and infirmity, complete knowledge, power of memory, and the influence of eye- and ear-witness (§ 60). The image of the God-man is thus formed in them with fidelity and in independence of the degree of their personal piety, and is not sketched altogether from the standpoint of the latter. Their piety is the effect, not the cause, of this image. Accordingly, this image purifies, elevates above their actual state. Moreover, through them it elevates above the actual state of God's Church, and is the normative objectivity which, counterbalancing the power of sin and error in the Church, draws more and more upward. Nor is it sufficient that true πίστις merely exist in the apostolic circle. Considering the close connection between faith and doctrine, the work of bearing testimony to the God-man is only perfectly done, provided pure *knowledge* is also given as an integral element in the collective apostolate with fulness and force sufficient for all ages; and with this, considerable diversity of knowledge as to kind and degree in the case of individuals, in accordance with their individual character, is easily compatible.

[1] John xiv. 26.

4. Certainly diversity of individual character carries with it the consequence that the first bearers of revelation will conceive the image of the God-man differently, for the most part under one aspect, whereas it is necessary to the preservation of the absolute revelation that none of the essential aspects of His image be again lost to mankind. But these different conceptions of the God-man under His essential aspects must also be preserved when combined in their mutually supplementary relations into one whole. This is the *canonical record* of Christianity. By forming a member in this whole, every individual gains a new and higher significance than before. Thus, the sacred authors form as it were the typical characters, whose collective testimony secures to the whole of humanity the objective and true conception of the perfected revelation, which must needs be completely enclosed within their limits collectively. Every country and nation is thus placed on a level with the first generation, nay, through the collective original testimony learns what as an eye-witness it would scarcely have met with. In the formation of the canon under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, conducing to the good of the whole Church and of every age of the Church, is fulfilled the divine will, to the effect that the succeeding age, instead of being dependent on the view of particular circles, shall possess the view of the collective apostolate as the message which they proclaim.[1]

5. In what has preceded, the *authority* of the first witnesses has been established, and indirectly the authority of those who, under their eyes and with their approval, were their co-workers. Their authority is enhanced to the point of complete normative force for the Church of every age and for individuals, when we regard them not individually but as members of the canon. Even granting that the individual member needs correcting and supplementing as to one aspect left by him in the background,[2] this is not to be drawn from without, but from their collective teaching, from

[1] On the mutually supplementary characteristics of the Christian typical representatives, Peter and James, Paul and John, Schelling has enlarged, *Philos. der Offenb.* II. Lect. 36, 37. He views them in the light of basis, mediating tendency and final aim, and sees prefigured in them the three chief epochs of the Christian Church.

[2] As an example of this, James in relation to Paul may be referred to.

the circle of the original teachers, in which it cannot be wanting. Thus *the Canon is its own interpreter and judge;* it needs no foreign standard. Just so the Holy Spirit evokes in believers a power of judgment, a criticism, which is not subjective, but in which freedom and fidelity are combined. The criticism and exposition of faith does not contemplate its subject-matter from without, either from a foreign or a traditional, servile standpoint; but living within the subject-matter, in its very heart, it does it increasing justice, because to every production of apostolical men it assigns its due place and distinctive canonical value. But finally, it should not be forgotten, that although the primitive collective testimony, reserved for the future, must be adapted to be a perfectly adequate substitute to succeeding generations for the historic objectivity of the God-man, and in this respect to take the place of the historic God-man, no one of His disciples can be placed on a level with the God-man Himself; for He alone has the Spirit without measure. To judge otherwise would certainly be to contradict the actual circumstances of the primitive memorial, and the idea which the authors must have entertained of themselves. Nay, in this a false position would undoubtedly be given to Holy Scripture in relation to faith (the material principle). It would become a mediator, as in Biblical Supernaturalism so called. As a source of certainty, the God-man and His Spirit would retire into the background. Accordingly, even the defects, which may perhaps appear in writings worthy of the Canon, and which cannot relate to the religious contents or be at all of an essential character in the case of a writing worthy of canonicity, are not indeed to be searched for and magnified with evil intent, but to be candidly acknowledged,—on one hand in the firm conviction that no injury can thus result to the certainty of tradition on the whole, because otherwise watchful divine teleology would have taken precautions against it,—on the other in the knowledge that these defects, which affect not the religious contents but the letter, and which should not, in violation of truth, be denied, form a perpetual motive not to rest in the external or to fall under bondage to the letter. For between the believer and the God-man no new wall of partition should be set up, by attributing the authority due only to Him and His Spirit, or

the power of attesting the truth, to an impersonal object or a man. True faith sees in the letter of the revealed record the religious contents expressed in irrevocable objectivity, which have the power of demonstrating their truthfulness through the Spirit of God, who can cause that the letter shall be rendered instinct with warmth and life, with a view to placing the living God-man before the eyes of faith.

SECOND DIVISION.

HISTORIC RELIGION.—(Cf. §§ 46, 50, 62.)

§ 64.

In the very fact that faith not merely sees in Jesus Christ the manifestation of the God-man (§ 3), but also recognizes that it is only in the divine Incarnation that the consummation and goal of religion and revelation can be contained, a twofold scientific duty is imposed on it, namely, while recognizing and verifying the preparation for or growth of the absolute religion in pre-Christian history, in Christ's manifestation to recognize and verify its realization in fact.

1. What has been advanced hitherto respecting the nature of religion and revelation, and the significance of the incarnation for both, has been deduced from the experience of faith reflecting upon itself, and giving account to itself of its contents.[1] Already, as regards its origin, faith had taken up historical matter, and blended in an immediate, *i.e.* religious, form with its real, spiritual contents. The historic, however, is and remains an independent power (*Grösse*) outside the sphere of faith as such. And just as it was a duty for faith, which has to develop its immediate into scientific certainty, to make itself master of its inner possessions by reducing them to inner objectivity (*i.e.* to the distinct perception that divine rationality or intrinsic truthfulness, and—despite their spiritual inwardness—the tendency to realization in history, inhere essentially and of necessity in its contents), so on the other hand it is faith, which forms the impulse, by the study of history itself, which occupies an independent position over against it, to gain scientific certainty that the

[1] §§ 3, 11, 12.

world of history stands not in contradiction but in harmony with faith. In this way faith comes to feel itself at home in history, because history presents to it in an independent form precisely the same reality, the same union of the ideal and historic, whose necessity as well as possibility faith had deduced from reflection upon itself.[1] For these reasons faith, not from external occasion, but from its own impulse and for its own sake, must needs use historical study as a test of its own validity.

2. This historical line of investigation must be definitely distinguished from the dogmatic one, and does not receive its law from the latter. It is just as independent in regard to faith as its historical sources are. The only harmony of the historic with faith that can possess value for scientific certainty and for faith itself is a free one. On the other hand, the historic method is not that of mathematics and speculation. In that case we should require of it what it has not to give. For this reason, moreover, historical investigation or demonstration cannot suppose either that it is under obligation or has the power to originate faith, so that its inability to do this would be proof that faith has no foundation, no title to certainty. We cannot by way of supplement fall back on the position that would make faith matter of demonstration (§§ 7, 8). This much only is certain, that if historical proof were forthcoming of the incompatibility of the history of religion with the necessary presuppositions of Christianity, or of the incredibility of the fundamental Christian facts, then faith could no longer stand. But for this very reason it cannot be a postulate of historical investigation, that faith which is not the fruit of such investigation should *a priori* and altogether cease or be suspended. This would not further but injure inquiry. Faith must at least continue as the power and inclination to advance with full intelligence into the religious world,

[1] §§ 14–63. The same relation of comparative independence and interdependence between two courses appears in the relation of the so-called material and formal aspect of the Evangelical principle. Though faith is not something altogether subjective, it yet desires to certify itself of its subjective-objective character in two ways,—first by bringing the intrinsic truth and necessity of its world of thought in connected form into the clear light of consciousness, and secondly, by testing itself by the independent historic objectivity of primitive Christianity, to see whether it is acknowledged by the latter.

and into the survey of every historic field. And in this view what has been laid down previously, from the Doctrine of God onwards, may serve to promote the understanding of the course of religious history, while on the other hand it has certainly to await its historic confirmation from the free course of the investigation.

3. The historical investigation falls naturally into *two divisions*, the first dealing with pre-Christian religions, the second with Christianity. It is a postulate of historical research, not to regard the numerous religions as powers that sprang up merely by accident and caprice, but to search for an intrinsic connection and a law which they follow, however far as yet science may be from having reached this point. But none the less does Christianity demand that all pre-Christian religions be arranged under a single point of view, and brought in some way into relation with the fundamental Christian fact. If the Incarnation is the supreme revealing act of God—the Logos—who made the world, who abides in it as the principle of conservation, and in it accomplishes His end—the world-aim—and if the consummation of the world could not coincide with its beginning, but presupposes different stages or stadia,[1] then will every previous phenomenon in the sphere of religion be related somehow to this goal in the character of instrumental means, and the expectation is warranted, nay essential, that what is extra-Christian may be placed in some way under the point of view of a *preparation for* or *prophecy* of this goal. If the facts of the case did not permit this, not merely would Christianity figure as an abrupt phenomenon, but the universality of its destination for all men in the multiplicity of their modes of faith would be in danger. If it could not be referred to as the goal and standard by which to determine the value and position of each one of these, *a priori* it could not be the absolute religion; for the absolute religion must preserve the truth contained in them all, emancipate and satisfy the best longing in each and all of them.[2] It is true that many nations have perished to the last

[1] See above, pp. 201–204.

[2] A. Ritschl, *Die Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 1874, III. 263: "If the final aim of God in the world is to bind the nations together by moral ties, the inference is unavoidable, that the preceding history of the nations stood

vestige; as to many others, we have but fragments of their religion. But the enumeration of every particular is not needed for our purpose. This we remit to the science that treats of the religious history of mankind from original sources. For us it is enough to glance at the leading, world-renowned, civilised nations, to come to an understanding with the present condition of the still comparatively youthful science of the history of religion, and to ask whether the history of such nations sanctions the laws which we have seen following from the nature of religion, especially whether in them can be detected traces of that tendency of religion, which finds its goal in the unity of God and man,—in a word, whether face to face with the history of religion it can be said that Christianity is the solution of the religious seeking and longing of the extra-Christian world. A good omen for us is supplied by the fundamental importance which the idea of God must needs have for every religion, as well as by the proof formerly given, that the chief categories of the Christian idea of God, such as form the centre of the various leading religions, are preserved in the Christian idea of God, while at the same time combined in a higher unity.[1]

FIRST SUBDIVISION.

EXTRA-CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

FIRST HEAD: HEATHENISM.

§ 65.

Even in heathenism a preparation for Christianity has been worked out, not merely negative, but to some extent positive in character.

in some designed relation to that stage of development, and their appearance in some degree prepared the way for it. The indications," he continues, "of an education of the human race for the kingdom of God need to be exhibited." —What Lessing in his *Education of the Human Race* attempted to show with a predominantly intellectual tendency and in a narrow circle, should be carried out on a more comprehensive scale.

[1] Cf. vol. i. § 20, p. 249, Obs. 2; and § 32.

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1. The combination of the pre-Christian religions under the standpoint of the growth of the absolute religion and revelation, is opposed by those who would reserve this work of preparation to the O. T. exclusively. Heathenism, that error of religion, they say, cannot be founded upon revelation; therefore only the Hebrew religion is warranted in laying claim to the character of revelation; according even to the N. T.

itself, God left the heathen to their own ways.[1] Heathenism is religion "run wild." But on the other hand, not only does it seem unjust to grant to the heathen no sort of share in preparing the way for the absolute religion, but it is to be considered that the all-embracing rule of divine Providence in these wide tracts of humanity cannot have been without result. Moreover, heathenism produced much that was noble of its kind, which, as we shall soon see, was of abiding value, although not directly, for the realm of the completed religion, especially as regards the moral side of its development. And when the fulness of time came, the nations who had passed through heathen religions showed just as much receptiveness for Christianity as the people of Israel, if not more. According to the definition of religion we have accepted,[2] no choice is left us. We must either deny to heathenism even the name of religion, or concede in it the presence of divine agency and revelation, although in a broader sense. The first is done without scruple by the theology of the 17th century, which looked upon heathenism as so radically false as expressly to refuse it the character of religion. For that non-religious character the following reason might be adduced: "The fundamental characteristic of religion is a sense of absolute dependence; but in Fetishism, Polytheism, and Dualism, the one divine principle is limited, finitized, and dispersed; accordingly, no consciousness of absolute dependence is here possible, and religion is out of the question."

2. But, in the first place, even the O. T. acknowledges religious elements and religion outside the Hebrew religion (*e.g.* Genesis in the case of Melchizedek, Isaiah in that of Cyrus, and similarly the Book of Job and Daniel). In the second place, not only has our position the sanction of Christian antiquity, of a Justin and a Clement,[3] but the N. T. says expressly, that in God we live, move, and have our being, that through nature and natural phenomena, history and conscience,[4] God did not leave Himself without witness even among the heathen.[5] As the Father of all, seeing that we are His

[1] Acts xiv. 16.

[2] § 50.

[3] Cf. Justin's λόγος σπερματικός; or Clement of Alexandria's calling Plato Μωσῆς ἀττικίζων.

[4] Rom. i. 18–21, ii. 12 ff.

[5] Acts xvii. 28, xiv. 17.

offspring,[1] He implanted in the heart[2] even of the heathen, a seeking after God, after the Eternal, and ever and anon quickened and shaped this longing in them by means of their training. Just as the greatness of Christianity does not depend on there being no truth whatever outside it, so the Hebrew religion must not borrow its greatness from the utter futility of all other religions. Its greatness must be intrinsic, and is shown in the fact, that without disparaging anything of kindred nature found in other religions, it yet retains a unique position. That even in heathenism really pious feeling may exist, no one can deny. We need only recall the priestly form of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Pindar, Sophocles. Although to the world of mental representation or logical thought mythology involves a rending to pieces of unity, and by necessary consequence is fatal to the consciousness of absolute dependence, yet a sense of absolute dependence may have found place among the actual contents of immediate consciousness. As in the prayer of Antigone, the good man may in the moment of worship, with a happy inconsistency, treat the particular deity as absolute God, although in the form of his conceptions and the world of phantasy the originally pure impulse is overpowered by a polytheistic mode of thought, a circumstance no doubt of far-reaching consequence for the common religious consciousness. Moreover, there is scarcely a religion in which relics or surmises of the unity of God are not contained.[3] Traces of this unity are—among the Hindoos, Brahma, and again Dyu or Dyaus (cf. Jupiter); among the Germans, Thiu and Zio (= Zeus), Allfadur; among the Chinese, Tien (heaven);

[1] Acts xvii. 28. [2] Eccles. iii. 11.

[3] In respect to Greece, the *Griechische Götterlehre* of Welcker, 1857, may be referred to. Numberless inquirers express themselves in various forms to the same effect, not merely Herbert of Cherbury, Cudworth, Selden, Pfanner, Creuzer, Schelling, but also Ewald, M. Müller, Bunsen, Haug. In favour of this is the historical fact that the multiplicity of gods grows as time goes on, which points back to more simple beginnings. The same inference must be drawn when we see that the essence of religion constantly makes itself felt even in heathenism as a struggling back to unity; for the first religious moment is undoubtedly that one in which an Absolute emerges to consciousness by the subject feeling itself absolutely dependent. The Absoluteness of the divine Essence, however imperfectly conceived, implies unity, although the reflective consciousness may very imperfectly express and interpret the immediate, religious impression of the divine Absoluteness.

among the Etruscans, Tina; among the Persians of the earliest ages, Ahura Mazdao (Ormuzd), of later days, Zeruane Akerene; among the Semites, Kijjun or Chon (Saturn); among the Chaldeans and Greeks, Fate, represented either as the ruling star or independent of Nature as *Moîpa*. Further, among the numerous deities one usually takes a specially high position, and in the tutelary deity of a country or city a certain unity is secured. Among the religions in which the sexual character plays a part, unity is given in the syzygy of the masculine and feminine principles, the two together being meant to exhaust the idea of the supreme Divinity, as Baal and Astarte, Zeus and Hera, Jupiter and Juno, Woden and Freya. Finally, where at a higher stage the plurality of deities seeks to contract itself into a finished circle, as in the Greek Olympus, the race of German Asen, the Persian Amchaspands with Ormuzd, a sort of unity is striven after by combining the deities into a system. Here also the *pluralis majestatis* comes in; for when prayer is made to the gods as a homogeneous, interrelated unity, the monotheistic element in religion is evident, and the plural, because compressed into unity, expresses the united fulness of divine energies.[1] Thus, we cannot well deny that man's rational character asserts its influence even in polytheistic religions, and that at least in the background of consciousness a unity is surmised,—a surmise to which missionary effort may address itself with confidence. The essence, therefore, of polytheism lies in this, that the *foreground* of consciousness is taken up all but entirely by a plurality of deities, without this being any warrant for describing religion as no longer existent. Wherever religion exists, it is essentially the decisive disposing (*Bestimmtheit*) of the heart by God; on the subjective side, longing after communion with Him in surrender of the heart. Where the

[1] So Hengstenberg, Ewald. Cf. also Diestel, "Der Monotheismus des ältesten Heidenthums besonders bei den Semiten" (*Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* 1860, V. 4, p. 747), who supposes in the primitive form of the God-consciousness among the Semites an undivided group of higher beings, who without name possess an inner homogeneity and are compressed into one plural word. Much else bearing on this point is collected by Pfleiderer, *Religionsphilosophie*, 1878, p. 325 ff.; M. Müller, *Essays*, I. 24 f. Especially worthy of mention is the phenomenon, that in early times the plurality of deities is treated by reflection, and still earlier by religious practice, as a plurality of designations of that which is the One.

communication of God gains foothold by a corresponding relation of man's will, certainly no such gross error as polytheism is possible, but knowledge, ideal representation, conduct will be monotheistic in character. But where the divine action, which is always a self-disclosure on God's part to man, and therefore a revelation in the broad sense, is able to shine into the heart and illumine the darkness of earth merely for a moment, there the divine ray is not in a position to assert its victorious power in every region; but from the point where man's activity has voluntarily to accept and make use of it, it is obscured by the character of this activity and the predominant sensuous consciousness. If then the feeling, thus enfeebled and obscured, is expressed in words, an impure idea of God must appear in the symbol or doctrine. We thus see that, despite a really divine impulse in the heart originally, polytheism may come really to exist.

3. Another consideration is, that all civilized nations, in their formative and better early ages, manifest great energy of religious feeling. Their occupations, public and private, are saturated with religious sanctions. Common worship, sacrifice and prayer, are for them a living need, a fact which we can only refer to impulses of the divine Spirit in their heart. They have fixed religious usages, possessing a more inviolable sanctity than all political or social ordinances. They long after messages or signs of the will and favour of the gods, as is proved by the matter of oracles and sacrifices and the whole elaborate system of divination. And as in this they seek a substitute for *prophecy*, so they possess also a carefully-elaborated *priesthood*, whose mediation is supposed to assure to them fellowship with the Deity. And the priests, *e.g.* among the Egyptians, Hindoos, Persians, and in the earlier ages of Greece, fill a significant position not merely in relation to religion, but to all departments of life. In many respects they are the foremost depositaries of culture generally.—But not merely does even the heathen world exhibit monotheistic elements in diverse forms as well as great energy of religious feeling and thirsting after God, but in all more considerable religions a forward effort and course of progress is demonstrable, and that in the direction of the stages indicated above as pertaining to the course of development in all religions. The

means by which this is brought about is the education of the moral consciousness, and its union with religion. For in the case of all more cultivated nations we find the beginnings of *legislation*, which are referred mediately or immediately to the divine will and held sacred. Here come in not merely the code of Manu and the sacred Persian law, "the living word" (Zendavesta), but also the legislative heroes in the west, Lycurgus, Solon, Numa, with Ægeria, to some extent the widely-diffused Sibyls with their books, and the gnomic poets. The maxims of wisdom inscribed in golden characters on the temple at Delphi, seek to corroborate the moral consciousness by reference to the Godhead. Upon the simple, patriarchal age follows in all nations of higher standing an age of heroes, as in the case of the Hindoos, Persians, Greeks, Germans, and Hebrews, and in the same age the founding of states. This represents an advance to the spontaneous exercise of freedom, a transition to moral duties. In reference even to the heathen world, it is partially true that law became a schoolmaster unto Christ; and this all the more in proportion as law is derived from the Godhead, the idea of God being thus enriched and assuming a more ethical form. The Godhead is honoured and feared as the avenger of all crime, the guardian of justice. Δίκη stands beside the throne of Zeus. Nemesis assigns to every one his destiny in proportion to the burden of guilt lying upon him, although this is measured, as in the old tragedies of destiny, less by the standard of personal than of family guilt. All this ministered to the efficiency and invigoration of conscience, which we cannot, however much error adhered to it, suppose forsaken of God's Spirit. Out of this another exceedingly weighty element developes itself. So far as humanity rises to higher self-consciousness and effort, it shows a lively sense of incongruity with God, of variance or conflict with Him; and since communion with God remains the aim of religion, the effort among all cultured nations is by doing away with the separation to restore relations of amity, and by expiation to procure again the favour of Deity, whether by presenting gifts or by bloody sacrifices or personal austerities. And heathenism is not content with seeking salvation through personal effort. There were even found in it mediatory deities, like Apollo the Pure God, who shrank not from taking

impurity upon himself for the purpose of slaying the dragon who would repel from the temple; nay, in the case of Admetus, took menial services on himself for the purpose of preserving him in life, and finally instituted in Delphi a sacrificial cultus with the sacred laurel. Heroic deeds, in which he risks life for the benefit of men, raise Hercules to a seat among the gods. In the heathen religions, also, are found images of aspiration of a religious or at least religiously-coloured order, in great number,—some images of a purer past, a golden age of peace among men not only with each other and nature, but also with the Deity, who still maintained gracious communion with them, ere wrong gained the upper hand,—others, images of the future, images of hope: partly of a more personal kind, promising to the good a blessed life in Elysium or among the gods, as in the case of the Greeks, Egyptians, Hindoos: partly of a cosmical kind, as among the Persians the victory of Ahura Mazdao (Ormuzd) over Angramainyus (Ahriman) after the lapse of the age of conflict; or among the Germans the age of the world's rejuvenescence after the twilight of the gods (*Götterdämmerung*), on the great judgment-day Ragnarokur, when Allfadur issues forth from his hitherto preserved secrecy; among the Hindoos Krishna's heaven; among the Buddhists Nirvana. Finally, in the heathen doctrines of the Incarnation of the Deity, to which also the actual incarnation in Krishna is supposed to belong, as well as in the deification of mortals, whose virtue is crowned with apotheosis, we are warranted in seeing, if not a presentiment, yet the expression of the need for the union of Deity and humanity, and therefore, although in impure form, an *anticipation of the idea of the Godmanhood*. Elsewhere, also, in heathenism prophetic features are not wanting (perhaps the strongest is contained in Plato's description of the just man in his *Republic*), although in it hope did not assume popular, firmly rooted, and constantly growing form.[1]—To all this is to be added, that not merely in the west, but in the east (especially China), heathenism has been beyond measure productive in the subordinate spheres of measure and order, beauty and art, poetic and constructive, wisdom and philosophy, law and

[1] In its wise man, who is a king, the Stoic philosophy also has set up an ideal wearing many features of the Messianic image.

government. In all these spheres divine rays shine, even as a divine afflatus is ascribed to masters in the same. By these means religion preserves peculiar modes of apprehending the Deity, which contain an element of truth.[1] The advances made in all these spheres certainly do not hold their ground. But after higher spiritual needs have been evoked in the most diverse forms, and the aspiration for the true good sharpened by their instrumentality, even their dissolution prepares the way in a negative respect for Christianity. But western heathenism was especially destined, through its wealth in the subordinate spheres of its time, to render essential service to Christianity, and to that kingdom of God which Christianity was to found; for that kingdom is not meant to be an abstract principle in the world, but to leaven all spheres, and out of them to build up its historical body.[2] On one hand the worth of the individual personality—at least in the case of the free-born—receives judicial acknowledgment; on the other, especially in the Roman world-empire, the State extends beyond the national limits, and the civilised nations of the west are gathered together under one law, the *jus gentium*, in which we rightly discern not merely a fulfilment of the Stoic ideal of humanity as a power embracing mankind, but also a type of Christian universalism, nay, a preparation for its realization in the world.

4. For obvious reasons, the science of history is not in a position to make any definite assertion from its own sources respecting the beginnings of mankind in a religious respect, and especially respecting the beginnings of heathenism.

[1] See vol. i. § 20 ff. p. 248 ff.

[2] Ritschl, *ut supra*, II. 263: The knowledge that the kingdom of God on the basis of God's love is the final purpose of the world, throws light on the regulation of the life lived by the nations up to the entrance of Christianity into history, and lived even by Christian nations, so far as they can be considered apart from their relation to God's kingdom. P. 267: I think that the fact of the moral communion of the family and that of the nation in the state, and, finally, the union of several nations in a world-empire, having existed beforehand, constituted a preparation for carrying out the idea of God's kingdom as the destined moral communion of men. The Christian idea of God's kingdom stands partly in the closest analogy, partly in genetic succession, to all the three graduated forms, so that it could not even be understood unless those forms were known and their distinctive value acknowledged. In all cases the family is the primary form of human community; but it needs to be supplemented by the legal community in the state, if the healthy conditions of independent moral conduct are to be secured. Cf. p. 269.

Accordingly, the only way of arriving at a more definite conception respecting these beginnings is with the assistance of other established factors, above all with the assistance of the light gained from the nature of man along with the laws of his development, and from the nature of God; and opinions vary respecting the beginnings of religion, according to the views held on these two points. One class assumes a golden age of mankind as the beginning. The idea of God, they say, forbids the thought of the Creator having implanted error in man, or the necessity of error. On the contrary, His goodness requires us to believe that He endowed them with lofty prerogatives of wisdom and force of will, and vouchsafed to them a holy, happy life, in close communion with Himself. In comparison with this state, the entire subsequent history of mankind represents but decline and degeneracy. On the other hand, the opposite extreme holds firmly that the nature of man is made subject to the law of development or growth, that everything higher is the product of this growth, and supposes, therefore, that the beginnings of mankind cannot be placed low enough, especially when it joins with hypotheses which regard man, even in regard to his spiritual nature, as a product of Nature. This second opinion, accordingly, supposes that mankind lived at first in a state of bestial savagery, and gradually rose out of cannibalism to humanity, out of Fetishism to Polytheism, and at last to Monotheism. We can subscribe to neither extreme. The latter theory overlooks the specific character of reason, which is destined for ends of boundless worth, and without which man were not man. Without rational capacity, which, supposing it to exist, cannot exist to no purpose, adequate cause for a rational course of development is wanting. What has been previously advanced shows numerous historic traces of a monotheistic basis shining through polytheism as its background; and since it cannot be denied that the history of religion, like that of morals, exhibits numerous signs of a fall from a higher stage, of a process of depravation and return to barbarism, there is nothing of a historical character opposed to the theory that Fetishism and Polytheism are simply after-births following upon a better age. This age, indeed, is not to be conceived as endowed in the way that

the theory of a golden period at the beginning of humanity would imply, because the latter would transfer to the creative beginning of man that which can only be a moral acquisition, thus ignoring the laws of development of man's rational capacity (§ 41). But if these two extremes are to be rejected, nothing but the following theory seems to remain, with which the historical traces of the beginnings of religion harmonize, as on the other hand it corresponds with the idea of religion, *i.e.* both with the fact of God's participation in the origin of religion which must necessarily be supposed, and with man's rational nature and the laws of its development.

The presupposition in all historical religions is a unity, but a unity not as yet combining in one all the essential elements in the idea of God, but still indefinite, and for this reason not secured against the danger of confounding the divine and the world. Such confusion is the origin of heathenism in all its multiplied forms. As soon as rational consciousness awakens, there begins also, not without God's revealing activity, and not without the stimulating co-operation of the world-consciousness,[1] a feeling of the nearness and presence of an invisible, higher, inexpressible power in the world, to which in the next place simple acts of homage are rendered by the first beginnings of worship. Of this beginning no clear historical consciousness is possible. Else, the subject must have been already self-conscious in order to observe the entrance of religion, whereas clear self-consciousness only begins by means of religion. This condition cannot be more fitly described than by the name of childlike. What this higher power is in itself is not yet evident to the subject, although he by no means positively identifies the world and God, or supposes the higher powers to be particular world-

[1] The world-consciousness is not merely of service to religion indirectly, *i.e.* through the inference from effect to cause. The finite character of the effect would not justify the assumption of infinity in the creative cause. We must rather fall back on the view that God is present in the world, and that through the medium of the visible world, which has an invisible background, man's rational nature is able spiritually to behold and apprehend this invisible object. Rom. i. 20: Τὰ ἀόρατα (τοῦ θεοῦ) ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται. Thus an immediate apprehension of the ἀΐδιος δύναμις καὶ θειότης takes place, not brought about by inferences; in such a way, indeed, that the rational nature forthwith co-operates, in so far as the law of causality is innate to its intelligence as the law of its procedure.

beings. The world is not taken for God, nor God for the world; but the distinction is not yet drawn out in an abstract form by the understanding. The higher object is simply present in a peculiar feeling of an invisible, infinite something, with which the world-consciousness also is bound up, and this only implies the possibility of distinguishing the divine from the world. Just as little is this higher object viewed at first as a plurality of persons. How long mankind continues in this condition of comparatively childlike simplicity, depends very much on the question how early the mode of life conducts the consciousness of the world and self to a higher point of development. The patriarchal age may be named; and the reminiscences of most nations point back to such a simple form of faith, when the gods, who afterwards fill up their field of consciousness, were not even born, but when the one, certainly as yet indefinitely held Divine, is worshipped without name.[1]

But this indeterminateness of the beginning cannot be permanent. Consciousness of self and the world must distinguish itself more definitely from God-consciousness, and to this end a continuously operative activity of God must be conceived as directed. But then two paths are possible. *Either*, consciousness advances in unison with the aim of revelation, and, transcending the merely quantitative distinction of God from the world given in the category of *power*, rises to the perception that God is not merely the Supreme, or One, because as it happens no other god is His equal, but that He is the Only one, beside whom no other *can* be, because He, and nothing else, absolutely and by His very idea is self-existent, and therefore must be conceived as the Creator, from this point advancing to ever richer and richer spiritual definitions. Next, the stage of *conscious Monotheism* is attained, *i.e.* monotheism that consciously excludes its opposite, and by the force of the ethical principle thoroughly vanquishes the possibility of retrogression to the standpoint of natural religion. *Or*, the definite carrying out of the distinction between world-consciousness and God-consciousness, which

[1] See above, p. 239. So not only among the Semites, but also among the ancient Hellenes. Cf. also Schelling, *Vorl. über Philosophie der Mythologie*, where he treats most instructively of the different species of monotheism.

must ever be aimed at by God, is left undone. Wherever this is neglected, instead of being done, wherever the spirit fails to attain the necessary elevation belonging to progress in knowledge of God, there acquiescence in the non-separation of the two elements is an act of decision. The previously innocent non-differentiation of the two becomes now a definite assertion of their non-distinctiveness or *confusion*, which is always associated internally with sin, spiritual sluggishness, and mistaken activity on the finite side. In the next place, this confusion, already pantheistic in principle, will continually operate as an assumed hypothesis, though it will not necessarily issue in a natural religion destitute of ethical import. The phenomena and elements of nature, such as the heaven, sun, moon, stars, ether, air, light, fire, sea, are capable of being a natural symbolism of the invisible and spiritual apprehended behind or in them.

5. But the confounding of the divine and the world may again assume two opposite forms, without, as will be apparent at the close, there being any essential difference between them. In this respect we see two main differences among mankind, the *oriental* and *occidental* form. The former is more directly addressed to the divine, of which it has a profound impression. The aspect of personality retires, the objective, divine element not being usually conceived as friendly to freedom. Where this element is conceived as One, it is itself defined in a physical manner; and it is especially the upper world, the heaven or the starry system, in which the Divine is contemplated. Thus the Divine is simply the nameless Alone, the limitlessly Infinite, the antithesis to the concrete world and its plurality, which is but a perishable, fragmentary existence. Nay, so lacking is the consciousness that the world and man have substantiality, that the disposition shows itself to treat them as mere illusive reality in the divine, and merge them in the illusion. In this absorption, which is as it were a taking back of the Cosmos, is discerned the one religious salvation, emancipation from the world of illusion. The Divine is in this case treated as the Whole and alone Substantial, the universal Life or the power in which, when the truth comes to be known, individuality and freedom vanish; for the finite is here withal regarded as the undivine.

The extreme of this tendency is Acosmism. To this category belong Brahmanism and Buddhism.

On the other hand, for the *occidental* spirit the emphasis falls upon the concrete, especially earthly, world, upon the human subject and his freedom, ascent being made from this point to personal deities. Here anthropomorphism and limitation of the divine find wider range of extension. Whereas in the east the confounding of God and the world would leave but one divine substance as the sole existence in all that is phenomenal, here consciousness of the world and self, personality, in the first instance preponderates.

Observation.—The above analysis proceeds on the principle that everywhere the positive (here a consciousness of God or sense of God) must exist before its contrary, the good before the corruption of the good. Polytheism is not merely a defect, an imperfect religion, but already an abnormity and affirmation of an error. For this very reason the history of religion cannot have begun with that which certainly is the lowest stratum of its domain, with perversion, which is a lower stage than mere imperfection. Fetishism, when it has become a matter of a stock, is the perversion of religion. Although originally a real sense of God may have been connected with a definite individual object, yet where, for example, a stock is made into a Fetish, not merely does a confounding of the divine with a finite individuality take place—with this of itself such a sense of God as does not exhaust the Deity in this individuality would be compatible—but there even the sense of dependence—that basis of religion—turns into the opposite, a sense of freedom. The Fetish-worshipper, while no doubt crediting his Fetish with higher, secret powers, desires by its help to play the magician, and demeans himself, when it does not humour his fancy, as its lord and master, punishing it, casting it away, and the like. There religion no longer exists, because even its last remnant, the sense of dependence, has succumbed to barbarism, and freedom in the form of caprice has taken its place. Mere freedom in relation to nature and natural things, whatever peculiar powers may be ascribed to these, is not religious in character, although it may have a moral significance. Supposing, on the other hand, a religious feeling of dependence to exist, no doubt the chief point determining the value of different religions is, whether and to what extent a consciousness of the moral and of freedom is combined with that feeling.

§ 66.

The confounding of God and the world in its two chief possible forms (§ 65), which constitutes the innermost essence of heathenism, does not indeed preclude heathen religions from having a history or onward movement, in which they enrich themselves with ethical contents. Moreover, they remain subject to a law. But heathenism is not able in virtue of this law to exhibit a rectilineal progress on to the consummation of religion, but merely a circular movement through opposite extremes, a fact involving its historical confutation.

1. Heathenism, although intimately implicated with Nature, which remains essentially the same, and to some extent with its periodical revolution, is still by no means a merely stationary natural religion, but there is in it, at least in its more considerable forms, movement and historical progress. Although heathenism is not to be explained primarily by the law of nature, not even of the nature of man, but by caprice, a sinful preponderance of consciousness of the world or self over God-consciousness, by self-willed creature-love in opposition to dependence on God and devotion to Him, still even a tendency originally based on caprice is in turn governed by a law embracing even what grows wild. In his *Philosophy of Mythology*, Schelling endeavours to trace out this subordination to law, and his most fertile thought is to the effect that the religions of the nations are to be regarded as one vast process, of which different nations, in connection with Nature around them and with their history, have become the representatives accordingly as different endowments have fitted them to apprehend one and another element of the idea of God. He consequently views even the divisions of mankind, the forming of particular nations, as a process standing, in its inmost nature, in connection with a modification of the God-consciousness. As far as we are concerned, the results just gained (§ 65) supply a starting-point for discerning the main lines or factors of the movement in heathen religions

as well as the law prevailing in them, by means of which, with all their diversity and division, they form one vast religious process. Let us consider this movement first in the oriental, and then in the occidental, religions of heathenism.

The purely *oriental* method, in excluding from the supreme existence all fixed distinctions and determinations, is unable to attain a decidedly spiritual character in respect to the divine. Accordingly in it, in the first place, the broad boundless heaven, then the elements—air, water, fire—those formless, universal principles, play a great part, primarily indeed as symbols or modes of existence of the sole existence, which is not conceived as exhausted in the sensuous phenomenon, although blended therewith. Even man has nothing really substantial in himself, but is a mere wave as it were in the universal life, or an unfree being subject to the universal world-order, bound over to obedience. This doctrine must needs, as comes out most positively in the form of Hindoo piety, be the death of independent life, and therefore of morality, unless a progressive culture of the self- and world-consciousness here intervene as an auxiliary. Personality thus gaining in importance, the attempt begins to conceive in personal form, or to personify, the indefinite sole existence, which as such cannot be apprehended, which is everywhere and nowhere, nay, can scarcely be distinguished from nothing; and this is done, in keeping with the physical character of the religion, for the most part after the type of the two sexes. Nevertheless, this attempt does not in the east take the shape of finding a definite personal form for the divine, as in the west with its prevailing tendency to the subjective; but it stops at personifications of a symbolical character, which, continuing to multiply *ad infinitum*, are scarcely held together by a few generic ideas. And when finally, in the course of further development, subjectivity and freedom begin to act with greater energy, as was the case in Buddhism,—the last form of the Hindoo religion,—these precarious personifications without moral import are again abolished, while retrogression to the one indefinite existence is felt to be so unsatisfactory and useless that this is now denied and treated as nothing. The heightened sense of freedom causes the personifications to vanish into an abyss as a mere figment of human imagination. In

contrast with the world of the divine, the empirical individuality, especially man, has a higher import and reality, man being able to become Buddha or to enter into Nirvana by deliverance from the misery of finitude. The *occidental* religions, in which the tendency to self- and world-consciousness preponderates, have quite the opposite starting-point and character. In the world of the West-Aryan nations, who are especially endowed with practical force of intellect, from the first the actual world is emphasized, not treated as illusion. There the heavenly powers, the worship of sun, moon, and stars, retire into the background. On the other hand, the earth (γαία), which is the soil of firm reality, takes a place in the circle of primary deities, and under the influence of a higher divine principle a new, younger world of gods emerges from the earth, is born upon it, or, as in the case of the heroes, is raised from the earthly, from the sphere of the human race, to heaven. So is it in the Hellenic religion, the richest in influence in ancient heathenism, so in the Roman. The German race of Asen, which is preceded by the world of evil giants, belongs to this class, whereas the Allfadur remains in the background. A reminiscence of the breach between the West-Aryans and the primitive oriental conceptions (of Uranos, Varuna, the heaven or boundless space, and Kronos, boundless time) is perhaps still to be seen in the story of Prometheus and his relation to Zeus, who formed man by the aid of the celestial fire he had stolen.[1] In the west, therefore, the deification of the *world* of divided existence has its proper place. Here alone the gods attain to more distinctive, definite personality, and a rich creation of myths along with histories of the gods presents itself; whereas in the east the particular divine forms remain without sharp outline, and never quite cast off the symbolic or general character, in virtue of which they represent the one existence merely under one of its aspects. Hence, for example, many arms, eyes, faces are attributed to them. Certainly, in proportion as polytheistic personification—which even in Plato's recollection is a later addition, dating only from Homer and Hesiod—makes progress, the absoluteness, or absolute infinity and unity, of the idea of

[1] He also predicts to Zeus the end of his dominion, as a similar destiny threatens the demigods.

God retires into the background. But this is not altogether a retrogression. For in the form of *personality*, now attained, scope is given for the more concrete divine attributes, especially those of a spiritual and moral order, to play a more definite part; and to this extent progress is to be recognised in the advance from the indefinite Divine, the Universal conceived in a physical manner, to spiritual individuality.[1] But, on the other hand, to these polytheistic personalities of the west *absoluteness* is wanting even in regard to the higher predicates now possible. Absoluteness stands outside and above them, impersonally, *e.g.* as εἱμαρμένη, serving most definitely as a counteractive to limitations of the Deity precisely where the divine personalities have assumed artificial forms and most fully cast off the merely allegorical signification. But the more the reason gains in strength, the more the idea of absoluteness makes headway against the multiplicity of divine personalities, without yet being in a position to conceive the one absolute in a personal manner; for, so long as the confounding of God and the world is unsuppressed, so long as God or the Absolute is supposed to be merely the universal substance of the world itself, it is impossible to conceive Him in a personal way. Thus, the fair, rich world of gods falls a sacrifice to scepticism, which lays bare the irreconcilableness of absoluteness and personality necessarily belonging to the heathen standpoint. Thus, these sharply-cut forms of the gods withdraw into the abyss of the One existence, so that, where religious feeling continues to operate, the One only existence, τὸ ὄντως ὄν, is the final goal, a process fully carried out in the religious philosophy of Neo-Platonism.

In taking a general survey, therefore, of the western and eastern fields, we see that the religious process in heathenism, instead of advancing in a straight line, moves in a circle. The two essential factors in the idea of God, absoluteness and personality, substance and subject, diverge in opposite ways. In both cases heathenism so apprehends them as to make it impossible for them to unite,[2] while, on the other hand,

[1] Whereas formerly the Deity was worshipped without name in the breathing of the wind in the oak-tops at Dodona, the oracle is said to have commanded a name to be given to the Divine.

[2] Personality is conceived simply as finite individuality having the principle

it is of supreme religious importance for the divine to be conceived both under a personal and absolute aspect. Accordingly, these two factors seek mutual combination and interpenetration; and this is the precise reason why the two principal groups in heathen religious history exchange places by a circular course. In this subjection to the necessity of circular movement may be seen the incessant toil both of human reason and divine government. Heathenism, indeed, thereby fully confutes itself, but without getting farther, and without being able to do away with that confusion between the divine and the world, which is the ultimate reason why personality and absoluteness cannot find, but necessarily exclude, each other. On heathen soil no union of the two aspects is reached, but merely a transference from one extreme to the other, and thus each of the two principal forms of heathenism ends in the opposite of that which was its chief element and point of departure. The eastern form, starting from a profound sense of the infinite being or substance, ends with denying it, and nothing is left it but an undeified subjectivity. So in the Chinese religion and Buddhism. The west, beginning its independent life with freedom and subjectivity, ends with the oriental absorption of the world and freedom in the substance of the *ὄντως ὄν*, with which oriental heathenism had begun. Each of these principal forms runs through a long career and attains high culture, but of such a kind that in both cases the spirit sinks back into a state of unsatisfied poverty. But while these two great masses, despite their opposition, are mutually transposed, because they confound God and the world, either deifying the world pancosmically, or dissolving it in God acosmically, the *dualistic* schools endeavour to escape this circular movement, at least those which establish the ethical antithesis of good and evil, of which physical dualism[1] is merely a prelude. They clothe the absolutely good Being with personality,[2] although not as yet with omnipotence, since they rather assume a simultaneous anti-

of the universal, the absolute, outside it, while the absolute substance is conceived, not as self-existence (with which personality is easily reconcileable, as it contains the causal principle of everything not having self-existence, see above, §§ 31, 32), but merely as the universal world-substance itself.

[1] In several religions of lower standing, such as the Slavic and Celtic.

[2] So Ormuzd in the Persian, Allfadur in the German, religion.

thesis of absolute good and evil, an antithesis which they endeavour to transcend by their eschatology, or by hope.[1] But it is in the Hebrew religion first that the two factors, absoluteness and personality, not merely seek, but begin to find each other, by incorporating the ethical idea into the divine personality conceived as almighty. The absolutely Holy One, who is also almighty, is able and willing to stand security for holiness even in the world; and this very fact is the beginning of a process of revelation advancing from moment to moment, although at first merely ideal, the final goal of which is divine Incarnation.

2. But the fundamental defect in heathenism, just instanced, is a rich source of further perversion of religion and morals. It is a direct consequence of the breaking up of the idea of God that none of the personal deities possesses absoluteness in regard to the properties attributed to it, whether of a physical, logical, or moral order. None of these deities is endowed in heathenism with omnipotence, nor therefore with omnipresence and omniscience. Just as little does eternity belong to them; for even if, *e.g.* in the Hellenic and German mythologies, despite their vulnerability and liability to suffering, they are immortal, still they are not gods that have always existed, but gods that have come into existence. Nay, they are threatened by the decree of destiny with the destruction, if not of their existence, of their rule. In India they have even to do penance in order to their existence as separate beings. On the other hand, the unity, into which the world of gods returns, possesses absoluteness indeed, but is a cheerless void and waste, without life, consciousness, and ethical character. Destiny, it is true, is the absolute power superior to gods as to men, but blind, hard, pitiless. It is nothing but the impersonal law, the iron necessity of nature, which owes its only glimmer of righteousness (*e.g.* in *Νέμεσις*) to the fact that, as formerly shown, the idea of righteousness has some connection even with the logical and physical.—Because in heathenism either absolute power or absolutely conscious will is wanting to the divine, heathenism fails to reach *the idea of*

[1] Other religions, like the Egyptian, Syrian, Phœnician, arrive merely at a successive dualism, *e.g.* an alternating victory of the good and evil powers in every annual cycle,—a circular movement precluding, again, all advance.

creation. If one of the Hindoo cosmogonies says: "Thought was," and from the act of thinking derives the being of a universe, the apparent loftiness of the conception vanishes when we reflect that what is thought, the universe, reaches merely an illusive existence, a fact which is evident in other supplementary cosmogonies, *e.g.* in the deceptive mirror of Maya, or in Brahma's world-sacrifice, according to which the self-partition of the divine, and therefore mere negation, is supposed to be the principle of the world's origination. The dualistic element lying in this is condensed in other religions into eternal matter, whether this is conceived as primeval chaos, as in the Phœnician, Syrian, Hellenic, Roman religions, or as the world of giants, as in the German. The Persian religion conceives the Deity as merely forming the world, while moreover making the evil power take part with the good in the work. Zeruane Akerene, the supreme formal unity of the two principles, appears to be simply a later addition, perhaps from without. In older Parseeism the monotheistic element is contained in Ormuzd, who figured as the pure primeval spirit, over against whom certainly stood a world of evil spirits, at first without a head.—But the chief consequence of the confounding of God and the world, which is common to heathenism, was, that the *unholy* could not be kept aloof from the Deity. That the Deity indeed, especially the king of the gods among the Hellenes and Romans, maintains justice upon earth, is a widely spread conviction. But the Deity is not known as *holy* in Himself in a positively ethical, not merely negative sense. This is especially shown in the *jealousy* of the gods. Although they are the bulwark of justice in men's relations to each other (so much so, that a confounding of the religious and civil is prevalent, and that in a form making the former in the main a means in order to the latter), still they are inflamed with jealousy of all approach of mortals to the greatness, power, and dignity of the gods. In this respect the justice of the Deity or His self-affirmation has not yet overcome a certain Egoism, although He may be conceived as communicative and gracious in so far as the majesty of the gods is not obscured, but confirmed by the act. The reason why the self-affirmation of the Deity must needs assume this jealous character lies in the fact that, taken strictly, heathenism

does not advance beyond a mere quantitative distinction between God and man, and does not know that the Deity is absolutely assured of His greatness, nay uniqueness, by self-existence pertaining to Him alone and of necessity.

God's holiness not being known, the consciousness of the *destination of man* must also be wanting. Heathenism has but a superficial apprehension of the moral evil and impurity defiling man; for, to say nothing of the moral blemishes with which, according to mythology, the gods are afflicted, and in which indifference finds excuse, a physical mode of apprehending evil prevails in the ancient world in diverse forms. In one class of religions it is identified with finitude,—so in Brahmanism and Buddhism; others discover its reason in matter or the body, the dualistic religions in an evil Deity and his kingdom. On one side even such acts as the conscious will has no share in, are regarded as evil or as penal guilt (even through destiny man may fall into guilt that dooms him with his posterity to irretrievable ruin); on the other side the subject ascribes to himself virtue and merit, if he has omitted certain external actions or performed certain external works. So in the self-righteous speeches of departed souls before the Judge in the other world in the Egyptian Book of the Dead. On the *one* side, what is not evil is shunned more than evil, *e.g.* defilement in the region of caste affairs, and mankind is rent into sects by substituting the physically impure for the morally unholy; national pride and hate seek to legitimate themselves on religious grounds, nay, between classes of the same people insuperable walls of partition are set up, so that the idea of humanity experiences the same fate as the idea of the Godhead, breaking up into mutually conflicting fragments. On the *other* side, what is not good, but inhuman and immoral, is regarded as good, or even as sacred duty. This is especially shown in the heathen *cults*.

Heathenism does not lack forms of worship, in which the favour of the gods is sought. But it is not so much deliverance from guilt, purification of the heart, that is sought in them, as the goodwill of the gods and the dispensing of temporal gifts, or at best the bestowal of good fortune in relation to the civic commonweal. Under this aspect, an Egoism, although unconscious, lies at the foundation of heathen acts of

worship; they are means of bribery and flattery. For the Deity not being conceived as holy, He is represented as accessible to such means; and man's destination to the divine image not being understood, temporal blessings alone remain his highest ends. This motive governs both the system of sacrificial worship and inquiry into the divine will in the oracles; for the usual cults, often performed with mechanical accuracy, are indeed an expression of dependence on God, but less of gratitude than of desire to obtain the favour of the gods who dispense future benefits. The moral significance of the cultus—the cleansing of the disposition and the purifying of the heart, as well as deliverance from guilt—comes less into view. Expiatory sacrifices occupy a quite insignificant position in the cultus. Certainly, when great national calamity threatens, worldliness in its terror betakes itself to horrid sacrifices. So especially among the Phœnicians and Carthaginians even in later days. It would seem also that among Greeks and Romans in older days more than afterwards the consciousness of guilt, the feeling of separation from God through sin, lay heavy on the spirit, and the dearest (not merely foes, as among the Germans) was ready to be offered in atonement. Human sacrifices seem to have been far more widespread in earlier antiquity than afterwards. But in this the disposition is always shown either to transfer the guilt of evil outside self, or at least to seek an expiation outside one's own person. But where the expiation is taken upon one's own person, the guilt is at least discovered outside the soul itself—in the body, and attempted to be erased by means of negative, lacerating or life-destroying, ascetic practices; or the lusts of the flesh put on the garb of devotion, and require or present the sacrifice of innocence in pretended honour of the gods. So especially in religions where the supreme deities are separated into the two sexes, in Middle Asia, Syria, Egypt. Sacrifice must have assumed another shape if the inquiry into the divine will in oracles had borne a more ethical character. But the oracle-system again, in its wide ramifications, ministered rather to the temporal ends of individuals and communities. An advance towards the development of a coherent moral order of life in relation to marriage, family, education of youth, is only partially found in heathen religions, and is disfigured by striking

perversions of the moral consciousness. Such was the case in relation to the right of personality as against the State both in the west and east, save that in the east the State culminates in despots, while in the west the commonweal is regarded as the supreme good, and over against it individuals fail to maintain the independence of ends for their own sake. Among the Romans the father has power of life and death over the children. The slaves, who belonged to the foundations of the ancient state-polity, are almost destitute of rights.

Nevertheless, the heathen nations mentioned all had their flowering time, which continued a longer or shorter period, and gave birth to works in some degree imperishable, especially in art, science, and law. This flowering time was coincident with a religious faith still in its integrity. This faith was the source of enthusiasm for everything great that these nations produced. But the faith-dissolving process described above ran its irresistible course, and destroyed the basis of ancient popular life. The faith that the gods heard those who cried to them vanished. While the public forms of worship continued in their regular order, rationalism and scepticism subverted private religion; substitutes were sought according to accident and fancy in mysteries, and presently in a jumble of all religions, but with no other result than religious and even moral chaos. The old nations, after squandering the spiritual wealth with which they had been endowed, were without power of recuperation, felt themselves poor, desolate, dying. At the time of the Roman empire the feeling was widespread, that the world had entered on its dotage. The once most buoyant of nations were seized with weariness of life. Their wise men spoke of death as a relief, and declared that the highest good was not to be born.

SECOND HEAD: THE RELIGION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

§ 67.

Characteristics of the Hebrew Religion, its Foundation and Stages.

The distinctive peculiarity of the history of the Hebrew religion is seen in this, that the course of development in revelation, which everywhere else, even if set afoot, is carried on only under one aspect, and sooner or later comes to a standstill, nay begins to retrograde, here makes continuous progress without such falling back, until it reaches the destined goal. And the cause of this among the chosen people is the great definiteness with which the God-consciousness and world-consciousness are here distinguished from each other, their relation to each other being only based upon this distinction. Here God reveals Himself as the *Almighty Creator*, Preserver, and Ruler of the world, and attests the fact of His government by ever new communications, above all by the revelation of His *holiness*, which is the basis on which the system of the law is reared. Upon the ground of consciousness of the divine holiness and righteousness *Prophecy* grows up.

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1. In the pure consciousness of unconditional dependence, provided it is held firmly and established in intelligent view of its contents, monotheism is involved, and the possibility of a real consciousness of freedom implanted. There, too, God is able to reveal Himself as regards His ethical nature. When man recognizes God as almighty,[1] and not merely feels himself

[1] Gen. xvii. 1.

dependent in God's presence but desires to be so, he longs to know the will of his almighty Lord, that he may reduce the desired dependence to practice in his life; for it is a fixed principle with the good man that it is the Almighty's to command, man's to obey, whatever the nature of the command,[1] and further that he is responsible to God.[2] Thus, upon the basis of God's recognized omnipotence, and man's desired dependence on it, receptiveness is formed for the revelation of the divine will, whether this will be a requirement to do something or to expect and receive something. But again, when God reveals Himself as to His moral nature, this by a decisive reflex influence adds strength and keenness to monotheism, because it is only then that the idea of God raises itself definitely above a physical character.[3] None of the heathen religions, indeed, is entirely without the idea of communion between God and man; for without this no religion would exist. Nay, anticipations of the idea of that divine-human life, in which the communion of God and man culminates, are wanting in none of the more fully developed religions (p. 242), either in the form of God becoming man or man becoming God. But these are premature flowers of imagination, resting on the ground of a mere quantitative distinction between God and the world. They are consistent with the absence of the profounder distinction between the divine and human as well as of the moral medium by which the distinction is brought about, and without this no true union is possible. The products of imagination, although not without presages of the truth, have therefore no power or stability. The Hebrew religion, on the contrary, attains to rich development and real progress through the fact that here the distinction between God and the world receives clear and definite

[1] Gen. xxii. (the offering of Isaac). [2] Gen. xviii. 25.

[3] The recognition of God principally as almighty, no doubt, includes the recognition of His majesty, in presence of which man feels himself to be mere dust and ashes, Gen. xviii. 27. But this alone would only include the unapproachableness, the negative side, of holiness, which would not rise above the physical, jealous, destructive character of the Deity. This character is only transcended, provided God assigns to man a vocation of boundless importance, and thus himself confers on him higher worth, Gen. xii., xviii., xxii. But a moral vocation can only be vouchsafed to man on the supposition that God is holy in Himself in the positive, ethical sense. Nothing but man's moral destination makes room for such a communion with God as secures existence to man.

acknowledgment, while the knowledge of the distinction, nay, what is more, of the antithesis between God and man, has in it capacity to awaken the need of reconciliation and longing after real unity.—In simple monotheism as such this distinction is not involved, even pantheistic and emanationist systems claiming to be monotheistic. It is the force of the pure consciousness of absolute dependence that first goes beyond the point of conceiving God merely as a supreme being homogeneous with the finite, and grasps the idea of the absolute being existing through Himself, whereas nothing else exists through itself. Thereby the *idea of creation* becomes possible, which is wanting to the whole of heathenism, and already implies that God possesses majesty of a unique order, while at the same time He is gracious and ready to communicate, showing favour especially to man.[1] If then upon this basis the definite knowledge of God as *holy* in the positive sense is added, this confirms on one side monotheism and the distinction between God and the world, while also adding the consciousness of a new bond of union, *i.e.* to the bond of physical dependence adding the moral bond of unconditional obligation and of destination to the divine likeness.[2] On the contrary, where the pure sense of dependence on God—humility—is not the basis, there any pure and vigorous elevation even of the moral consciousness is out of the question; for there a false sense of freedom is an obstruction to religion, and separates from the Supreme Good. This is seen even in the nobler forms of heathenism and in the fact of their decay. Not all extra-biblical religions are eudæmonistic, not all make God a mere instrument of human wellbeing. Even among the Persians the Divine forms the primitive element, man is God's minister and co-worker. But in the earlier ages the consciousness of dependence on Ormuzd is corrupted by the idea of his only being the World-framer, the highest among spirits, in the later ages, when a strictly dualistic form prevailed, by the idea of his being fettered by a hostile, divine principle. In this way reverence and trust lose their unconditional character, while wider scope is given to a false consciousness of dependence as well as to the laying of guilt on powers outside man. On the other hand, the dualism of evil, baneful and good powers, always assumed

[1] Gen. i. 26–31. [2] Lev. xi. 44, 45; cf. with Gen. i. 26 f.

by ethical religions either in the world only or in God, while kept at a distance from man's inmost nature, thus giving rise to an insoluble enigma, finds its spontaneous explanation on the soil of the Hebrew religion. Here—the heroes of the Hebrew nation avow it—the dualism is adopted into the individual's own spirit. Here it is recognized as a truth, that man is at variance with himself and the world, because separated from God by sin, which must also be the root of evil.[1] But the humbling process implied in this is the step to a new advance. The upright soul, its glance sharpened by the law, recognizes at once its own abasement and lofty destiny, and is sustained and rewarded by an undeceptive hope of the consummation of all things through reconciliation and redemption.[2]

2. The stages in the Hebrew religion are three.[3] *First*, the Patriarchal one, where the idea of God as the Almighty One (Elohim, Eleljon, El-Shaddai) is present, to which the feeling of absolute dependence, humility, and readiness for all obedience correspond subjectively.[4] Man stands in God's presence with childlike devotion, and rejoices in His nearness. A developed consciousness of sin as little exists as a concrete system of law. But man has no desire arbitrarily to make his own law, but is ready to obey and adapt himself to God's will in proportion as this is revealed, and faithfully to judge himself thereby. At no stage is law altogether absent. Even among the heathen conscience is not silent. But in the ethnic religions conscience in its legislative capacity is fettered and restricted in many ways. Like an unsteady, flickering light, it shines but uncertainly. In Israel, on the contrary, *in the second place*, through the revelation of God as the Holy One[5] to Moses, conscience emerges to light in objective, although national, definite form, and in this divine law the innermost and best ideal life of the nation is reflected.[6] God's holy personality, recognized by Moses the bearer of a new

[1] The epitome of evil, according to the O. T., is death, which springs from sin, Gen. iii.

[2] Gen. iii. 15, ix. 12, xii. 3, xxi. 12, xlix. 10, 18.

[3] Cf. § 61.

[4] Gen. xvii. 1; cf. xvii. 10, xxii.

[5] Pure, but not consuming, Ex. iii. 1–5, xix.

[6] Deut. xxx. 12; Ps. xix., ciii., cxix.

revelation, becomes the archetype or law of the nation, which is to reflect His holiness in its conduct. "Be ye holy, for I am holy,"[1]—this sentence is the ground-tone, nay, the principle and epitome of the entire law in relation to worship (holy persons, acts, places, and times), to national regulations and private life. The nation's vocation is to reflect the divine holiness in a holy State—the theocracy, with promise of prosperity and blessing even in outward life. Under David, the foundation of the theocracy was firmly laid. Under Solomon, joy in what has been gained applies itself to contemplation, to study and admiration of the divine Wisdom. The natural revelation in the creation of the world,[2] and the second in the law, are brought into relation to each other, studied in their mutual connection, and referred to one principle—the divine wisdom. By the recognition of the intrinsic excellence and wisdom of the law the Hebrew spirit begins to advance beyond the mere external authority and positivity of the law. It is seen that the law finds and must find an echo in the hearts of the good, and in the Psalms are heard clear notes of pleasure and delight in the law.[3] The revelation in Nature and that in the law are recognized as mutually related. The view of their relation is, that Nature is a ready, willing instrument for realizing what is good, for rewarding the just and punishing the evil.[4] But observation then finds crying contradictions to the just government of the world. Nature remains obedient to its law, to God's will, but man not. Nay more: the world's course seems to contradict the revelation of the law and its promises; the righteous man suffers, the unrighteous prospers.[5] Observant wisdom, as it leads to the knowledge of the ideal interconnection of the law and nature with their benefits, so also does it lead to the knowledge of the still existing dissonance in the present, to the perception that God's works cannot yet be regarded as complete, and that therefore the solution of the enigma is reserved to God's wise, almighty working. Especially does retributive righteousness point to a future, when the harmony between the two revelations shall be

[1] Ex. xix. 6; Lev. xi. 44; Isa. vi. 13. [2] Prov. viii.; Ps. xix.
[3] Ps. xix., ciii., cxix. [4] Ps. xix. 12; cf. Deut. xxviii. 30.
[5] Ps. xlix., lxxiii.; the Book of Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes.

perfect.[1] Such is the process among *those* Hebrews, in whom the *instinct of knowledge* predominates. Others, in whom the moral and religious consciousness is more vigorous, fix attention on the contradiction still existing between the law and the sinful actuality of the nation itself. But the law being God's will, which keeps unconditionally in view the realization which it finds not, the honour of the law, so to speak, nay of God Himself, is concerned in this condition. To this is to be added, that the farther believers penetrate into the nature of the law, the more their gaze is directed to the requirement of inner holiness instead of mere legality. A broken heart is more than the slaying of sacrifices; ceasing from evil is the true fasting.[2] Moreover, growth in this respect is paralleled by growth in the knowledge of unholiness, of the power of sin, nay the weakness of the merely preceptive law over against this power. The legal means of expiation—sacrifices, Levitical purifyings, and the like—fail to satisfy the awaking need of a deeper-reaching reconciliation; and thus the most enlightened spirits under the influence of the law begin to hope for the advent of another than the legal covenant,—a new one endowed with power to give the conscience permanent relief, to purify and dispose the heart to good. This leads to the *third stage.* This stage must include progress in relation to the idea of God, who is seen to be holy not merely in His character as Legislator and Judge, but also as One who wills the good purely and absolutely, who therefore plants it in the world, and in doing so is also righteous, inasmuch as at the same time He remains true to himself (see vol. i. p. 322).

§ 68.

Through the history and prophecy of Israel, the Hebrew religion grew into one great prediction of the consummation of revelation and religion.

LITERATURE.—Hengstenberg, *ut supra*, IV. Appendix. Tholuck, *Die Propheten und ihre Weissagungen.* Riehm, *Messianic*

[1] To the certainty of God as the righteous Judge joins on subsequently the announcement of the great judgment-day of Jehovah.

[2] Isa. i.; Joel ii. 13; Ps. l., li. 16, 17.

Prophecy (T. & T. Clark). Bertheau, *Jahrbücher f. d. Theologie*, V. 1860: *Die alttest. Weissagung von Israels Reichsherrlichkeit.*

Observation.—We must distinguish substantive prediction through facts and persons (type), and prediction through language (prophecy in the narrow sense). The first must be taken into account for the very reason that the latter arises on the basis of the history and guidance of the Jewish nation, draws a large portion of its best strength from that history considered as an earnest of the future, keeps it faithfully in remembrance, and by assiduous meditation on it is able to perceive and declare to what point God's further leadings tend. Even the form in which the verbal predictions are announced joins on to the previous fortunes of the nation. Involved in this is a fundamental assumption, pervading the entire O. T., and only to be explained by the consciousness of a perpetual living relation between God and the Israelites, to the effect that God will, so to speak, keep as little as possible to Himself, cannot hide from His friends what He intends to do, and therefore makes known His secret wisdom to privileged men, and imparts to them a divine-human knowledge of truths and things bearing upon the realization of God's kingdom, while at the same time desirous to see this higher knowledge diffused for the benefit of a wider circle.[1]

1. Whereas the name "Seer"[2] refers to finite matters, and still remains allied with sorcery, the leading name for the Prophets is נָבִיא. A foreknowledge referring to anything besides religion, were it ever so correct, may still be based on natural powers of divination, instead of on God's Spirit. Into such matters, therefore, error may creep.[3] But although, no doubt, prediction in the Hebrew nation has a reference to the fortunes of this particular nation, in its particularity a universal reference is involved, and for example in Joel, Micah, Isaiah, the vision becomes less and less limited. And as the selection of this race was the announcement beforehand of a universal purpose, so the subsequent history confirms this with richer and richer evidence. Moreover, in the loftiest productions of prophecy we find the clearest self-possession, a pure elevation and enhancement of the higher self-consciousness, by means of which the prophets are qualified for communications re-

[1] Gen. xviii. 17; Ps. li. 8, xl. 6 ff.; Isa. xli. 22–26, xliii. 9, xlv. 19–21.
[2] 1 Sam. ix. 10. [3] Tholuck, *ut supra*, 105 ff., 138 ff.

specting the future of God's kingdom. Nevertheless, no *à priori* historiography down to minute details, as many suppose, is to be found in them, important as history is to them. This would imply somewhat of a Docetic character, and to make it a postulate would be to lead exposition astray. Rightly interpreted, the prophets by no means present a concrete history of the future, but leave a multitude of points in obscurity. Nay, their language proceeds for the most part on the stipulation, presupposed as self-evident, of the future religious and moral character of the nation necessitating or permitting the result announced by prophecy, and thus their fore-announcements of historical events are in many ways hypothetical.[1] Further, local and temporal circumstances form the framework, nay the garb, or let us rather say, that we may preclude the idea of intention in the choice of phraseology, the body,[2] which the new prophetic intuitions appropriate to themselves out of the given natural or spiritual material. But although it would be wrong to suppose that the prophets positively distinguish their ideas from the figure or body which they make for them, thus first possessing the idea simply *per se* and then inventing its dress, still the creative idea in itself is different from its body. And that they lay stress not so much on the figure, which is the means of representation, as on the idea, is evident from this, that the same idea occurs in very different clothing not merely in different prophets, but in one and the same prophet. In this is evinced the non-dependence of the contents on the form, and in the latter the evidence of human exertion, which is also suggested by the different degrees of prophetic clearness.

But the non-historic view of prophecy was, again, opposed by another, essentially deistic view, which saw in prophecies nothing but purely human productions. The predictions were said to be derived from purely human intelligence and reflection, from a clear political vision and power of combination; or by means of the exposition given they were stripped of all concrete import, which was ascribed altogether to oriental imagination. What was left was general religious propositions, *e.g.* that goodness will not suffer defeat. This would all but entirely abolish the idea of prediction, and

[1] Cf. Bertheau, *Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie*, V. 1860. [2] § 60, 5.

make of the prophets mere popular teachers, a view with which even their outward bearing is out of harmony. But when, in presence of the facts of the case, the acknowledgment was inevitable that the prophets made more definite announcements bearing on the history of religion, whether of a painful or joyous kind, it was said that prophecy is merely an expression of the consciousness of God's penal justice in reference to existing sinful conditions, or an expression of aspiration out of the gloom of the present, of vivid longing picturing to itself a consolatory future. That the co-operation of such inward emotions is to be supposed, ought not to be denied. Out of the pain and discord of the legal stage prophecy raises itself to the loftiest pinnacle. But to reduce it altogether to such natural, psychical emotions, would be again to deny it. If it exists, it cannot be a mere human function. So far from this, it is impossible to regard even religion in general as a mere product of man. But since in the O. T. startling predictions are undeniably found, such as cannot be resolved into colourless generalities, but on the contrary having a very definite relation to the future history of religion and the kingdom of God, *e.g.* Israel's significance for the history of religion and the idea of the Messiah, nothing is left but to acknowledge prophecy to be a manifestation essential to the growth of religion and revelation, and to study its meaning and significance.

2. In the broader sense, the entire history of ancient religion generally may be called a prediction of the perfecting of religion, *i.e.* of the unity of God and man. Just as the lower stages in the life of nature are as it were predictive of the higher, and give intimations of a type after which nature strives, so the same law is seen in religion. Even the religions of nature contain intimations of the spiritual, nay, as we saw, of a unity of the divine and human. The work of God's government of the world ceases not until history is completed and woven together. The unity of the world-aim in all the manifoldness of form visible in the world is evinced by this fact, that the shadows which higher coming events cast before them, are discernible in what precedes. We consider first the system of Types.

Its scientific thought is, that the divine idea of the world

and humanity is from the first so pervaded by the idea of completeness, that rightly understood, in harmony with the world's unity, everything must needs carry in itself its relation to the consummation of the kingdom of God through the consummation of revelation and religion. Nature itself may be used as a symbol of higher spiritual truth, as is seen in so many of Christ's parables.[1] Scripture itself describes this application of nature as an utterance of what was hidden in the world from its foundation, so to speak, its secret meaning.[2] According to the theory of typology, the laws in the lower and higher fields are identical, the higher being viewed as the true,[3] perfect manifestation of the same law or relation that was announced at a lower stage. Thus typology addresses itself to that which before the advent of the absolute religion was in sympathy with it in the world of nature, and thus forms the right counterpoise to an absolutely supernatural notion of miracle, maintaining, as it does, the continuity of revelation and the unity of the world. The same thing is repeated in the sphere of humanity. There the most sacred human relations—marriage, the family, the civil and political community—are seen to be symbolical announcements of that which attains its perfect expression in the religious field; *e.g.*, Christ is the Bridegroom of humanity, King of kings, or the Head actuating and controlling the Church as His body.[4] Thus, whatever typical significance belongs inherently to earthly relations, *e.g.* kingship, the representatives of such relations share in. The more, therefore, that any one embodies in himself the idea of kingship, the more will it be possible to regard him, as is already done in prophecy, as a real, although unconscious, type of the still higher thing to be expected, *e.g.* David as a type of the Messianic king, because uniting the kingly with the prophetic spirit. In this way it may be affirmed (such, in fact, is the view of the O. T.) that there are typical persons—prophets, kings, priests—types of the archetypal form of the Perfecter of religion and God's kingdom. And if the persons were not such, still the office would be. The older theology, which no doubt often pushed

[1] John xv. 1, xii. 24, x. 1 ff.; Matt. xiii. [2] Matt. xiii. 35.
[3] John xv. 1: ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ἄμπελος ἡ ἀληθινή; just so vi. 32, x. 11, iv. 14.
[4] Matt. ix. 15; Rev. xxi. 9, xvii. 14; Eph. v. 23 ff.

the cultivation of typology to fantastic extremes, showed in this way a presentiment of what we now call the gradual, continuous growth of the absolute religion. For this very reason, also, institutions are typical of the perfecting of religion; so especially the sacrificial cultus and the temple, as is shown at length in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The temple is the place where God's presence is; but it is in His living temple—the Son of Man—that He dwells in a perfect manner.[1] And the sacrifices, in the character of covenant- and peace-offerings, express the communion of men at God's table. This is the type of perfect fellowship with God, such as is embodied in the holiest act in the cultus of the new covenant.[2] The *propitiatory sacrifices* are still more definitely related to the Perfecter of religion as the Redeemer from sin that had intervened. In all this, regarded from the highest standpoint, the absolute religion is announced, and that as the completion of a process already begun, a completion standing in intimate alliance and sympathy with the world of the first creation and history, with the laws or ordinances in that world. It is seen in this, that the first creation and the second finished work are governed by one and the same divine principle of revelation, that what came late as to time was first as to idea and power, and that the principle of the absolute religion was active from the beginning in furthering preparations for its perfect manifestation, and through its imperfect forms of existence advanced to its adequate or supreme form. And so far as such living pre-existence of the principle of the perfect religion pertains to its very idea, typology is the expression of a weighty, essential element pertaining to the doctrine of the historic preparation for the perfect religion. Undoubtedly it would be erroneous to suppose that the exposition of the typical element as a substantive prediction may form, or is meant to form, a proof of the absolute religion in the proper sense. On the contrary, the shadowy outline can only be rightly understood by means of the archetype. Still it is part of the prerogative of the

[1] John ii. 19, cf. Rev. xxi. 22.

[2] Similarly the manna, John vi. 31–49; Rev. ii. 17. The Deluge also, and the passage through the Red Sea, are treated as types of baptism, 1 Pet. iii. 21, and 1 Cor. x. 2, 3.

absolute religion, which carries its proof within itself, and of its vocation, to demonstrate its right of property in the entire foretime. Just so, typology would make a mistake were it so to handle its material as if something took place for the mere purpose of pre-signifying the future. This would be a false hunting for teleology, and would imperil the historic apprehension. Rather, a type is only such by its not being merely a type,—not merely a means of intimating something else than itself,—but having a significance of its own in its historic place. Typology is only possible on the basis of history. But all significant history points forward, and has relation to the consummation.[1] Especially is every new revelation, previous to the supreme one, a new pledge of its advance towards the destined goal.

3. Whereas, then, typology has regard principally to the similarity of the former and later stages, and thus brings to light the close interlinking of history, on the other hand it is difference—more precisely, the imperfection of the former stage, and the sense of that imperfection—which is the negative factor in progress. This is evinced in a quite peculiar manner in the religious history of the O. T.; for the consciousness of defect in the previous stage, however the latter had developed, or of the imperfect reality, was the psychical preparation for or presupposition of *prediction* in the strict sense. Thus typology and prediction are mutually opposed. The former searches after the similarity of the stages, and assumes continuity; the latter, different new stages. It is therefore not correct, or requisite for the knowledge of historical progress, to resolve all prediction into types.[2] Apart from verbal prediction, typology may give rise to an inclination (*e.g.* to read back the N. T. into the Old) to efface the differences, and to leave nothing but a difference in form and clearness. On the other hand, we must of course acknowledge that the consciousness of possessing much which is an earnest of what belongs to the consummation, or genuine delight in what has been already gained, must both sharpen the vision for still existing defects and strengthen confidence in the consummation.—Accordingly,

[1] Cf. Schleiermacher, *Christl. Glaube*, vol. II. § 89, 3.

[2] A certain inclination to this is shown in von Hofmann's *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, as formerly in the Cocceian school.

verbal prediction, with its forward look, or prophecy, stands higher than mere substantive prediction through types. Prophecy, indeed, can only have its place where the Spirit of God, along with deeper consciousness of the defects of the existing stage of revelation, evokes firm faith in the certainty of its progressive development. But its most important place must be between the second and third stages.[1] Through the revelation of the holy law man becomes conscious of the dignity to which he is called, but at the same time of how much he lacks, and that even apart from sin. But after sin has intervened there incorporates itself into the consciousness the opposite feeling,—the feeling of the baseness, nay, culpability, of the empirical Ego, and of the greatness of man as to his idea and destiny. But in this way the consciousness is plunged into misery and discord, and the suspense connected therewith can only be relieved by hope of divine acts in the future. In comparison with the patriarchal stage the revelation of the law is an advance, but one that apparently repels, because the law, while it does not indeed form, is still the first rightly to disclose, the chasm between the holy God and unholy man; for the revelation of the law in the first instance merely originates knowledge, it does not prove stimulating to the will, to which it addresses itself. Thus the subject standing in the line of revelation must await the lacking consummation from the same God, from whom every previous gift originates, —even the *law*, which cannot remain a barren idea, but, rightly understood, points to a further revelation destined to conquer sin. The law in its secret depths is itself prophetic, and points to a future. Now, through the Spirit of God prophecy perceived that, unless a further concluding revelation were given through whose means the law first acquires operative power, the law remains an ineffectual message doomed to failure.[2] The ideal element, the knowledge of what ought to be, longs after its complement and correlate, the side of reality. Now, through this operation of the spirit of revelation prophecy in the strict sense is introduced between the *second* and *third* stages. Raised by God's Spirit above the narrowness and constraint of the present, as also above the imperfection and sin of the world, the prophets apprehend the divine certainty

[1] §§ 60, 61, 67. [2] Isa. lv. 8–11.

of the consummation of religion upon earth,—not in individuals merely or in a nation, but in a *kingdom* all-embracing and indestructible,[1] where God draws near to men and His tabernacle is among men,[2] where, in the new covenant or the religion that makes all things new, the divine law is no longer written on tables of stone, but on the tables of the heart,[3] and God's Spirit is poured out on all flesh,[4] where, finally, Nature is privileged to participate in the glorification of spirits.[5] But the prophets not merely behold the consummation of God's kingdom, but the more truly they ponder the previous course of revelation, the theocracy and its history, and search into the divine laws ruling therein,[6] the more assured they become of a spiritualistic tendency desiring a full-grown consummation, and the more the image of God's kingdom in course of completion is able to unfold itself to them, and the knowledge of the historical media of the consummation to be disclosed to them. Thus the Spirit of God is able to bring before their eyes what He intends to do, nay, that consummation of which their prophetic message prepared the way. And thus, again, the consciousness is not wanting, that as God everywhere carries on His work by human instruments, so the final revelation requires a historical organ.[7] And since further prophecy, although specially directed to what is still lacking, cannot overlook what is implanted and given in the previous stages or the prefigurements of the consummation, it adds to its stores by making use of the preceding types, of the significant phenomena or divine acts of the foretime. Thereby its image of God's perfected kingdom was enriched both in itself and as to the means of its accomplishment, and the essential features of the image were filled in. The theocratic dignities especially —kingship, prophecy, and high-priesthood—are known to be divine ideas, institutions destined yet to find a new and higher realization, to the salvation of the nation, to the glory of Jehovah, nay, to the salvation of the world. The prophets perceive that salvation cannot lie in a line of kings or priests,

[1] Isa. ix. 7; Ps. ii., xlv. 7, cxlv. 13, ciii. 19, cx. 2; Dan. iii. 33, iv. 31, vii. 13, 27.
[2] Jer. iv. 3 ff. [3] Jer. xxxi. 31–33; Deut. xxx. 6; Ezek. xi. 19.
[4] Joel iii. [5] Isa. lxv. 17, lxviii. 22. [6] 1 Pet. i. 11.
[7] Deut. xviii. 15–19.

or in a succession of prophets, nay, that no one of the offices can desire its own perfection apart from the rest.[1] And thus even in the spirit of the prophets the offices converge to each other, and (while prophecy is presupposed as divine inspiration, the basis for the two others) from each one of them, according as in the given circumstances it forms the centre of the nation's guidance, during the course of prophecy the others are born as the essential complement of its perfection. But at the same time, all the rays, everything highest contained in the world previously in scattered features, converge more and more to the *centre of an ideal personality*, destined to be the divine instrument of consummation, and never again to give way to another, because when the perfect is present, reason for change no longer exists. And this is the idea of the personal *Messiah*, such as was looked for without doubt in Israel, nay, beyond Israel, far in the depths of the East, as the bringer of a golden age of peace and righteousness, not merely embracing Israel, but destined to form a universal kingdom. As the day of the Lord, the great judgment-day, will be One and all-decisive (for otherwise nothing but a vacillating, restless movement without fixed aim and progress would be left, out of harmony with the teleological character of the Hebrew religion), so also the perfecting of the world's course hitherto will be and remain for ever One. This Saviour will be *King* in power, glory, and righteousness, mighty for conflict, still mightier in His grace as Prince of Peace.[2] On Him God's Spirit will perfectly abide,[3] and by this very means His person be raised above the measure of inspiration. He will be the personal embodiment of the communion of God and humanity, the personal covenant between God and the nation,[4] the true *Priest* between God and man, having also kingly power at His command.[5] He will be not David's Branch alone, but Jehovah's.[6] But while this Branch from David's stem is at the outset adorned with all images taken from the flowery age of the kingship,—in His character of martial Leader and victorious Hero, Ruler in wisdom and righteousness as well

[1] Deut. xviii.; Ps. cx.; Zech. vi.; Isa. lii. 13, liii. 12.
[2] Isa. ix. 7; Ps. lxxxix. 28, 29, lxxii. 3, 5, 7.
[3] Isa. xi. 1.
[4] Isa. xlii. 6, xlix. 6, lv. 3, liv. 10, lxi. 8.
[5] Ps. cx. 1-4.
[6] Isa. iv. 2; Jer. xxxiii. 15; Zech. iii. 8, vi. 12.

as Peace-bringer,—the consciousness of sin, more and more awakened by the operation of the law and the idea of God's holiness, seeks likewise the reconciliation, seen to be necessary, nowhere but in Him. The way being prepared by the idea of substitution, as well as by the development of the race-consciousness in general and the sense of common guilt, prophecy in its further development teaches that while the Messiah will not in the first instance appear as king, but in *servant-form*, nay, as a sufferer, He is able, in virtue of His lofty personality, to represent the nation before Jehovah and Jehovah before the nation, and that by vicarious suffering and obedience He expiates the nation's guilt and intercedes for sinners.[1] And now, having passed through the high-priestly service and suffering, the kingship, along with prophecy, is re-born in new, glorified form.[2]

4. The consciousness of the high destiny of Israel, from which the consummation of the kingdom is to spring, holds together the kernel of the nation even after the overthrow of the State in the year 589 B.C., in order to make ready a place for the Messiah's birth. After the exile the nation comes into contact with the Persians and Greeks, and the influence of the latter grew into special importance. In opposing the religions of nature which confounded God and the world, the idea of God in Judaism had gradually assumed a somewhat rigid and one-sidedly transcendent character, such as was not inherent in the O. T. idea of God itself. A preparation could not then fail to appear, doing away with the repugnance which the strict Judaistic spirit felt towards the idea of incarnation. After Israel had fulfilled its task of maintaining the elevation of the one true God above the world in opposition to the entire world, heathenism rendered to Israel a counter service in being compelled to help in opening Judaism to the idea of the God-man, in again freeing and reviving the prophetic beginnings of the combination of the divine and human, and overcoming the abstract monotheism of Judaism in the interest of the Trinitarian idea of God.—Meantime the Romans,—those antipodes of the Hebrew principle,—in the name and in accordance with the oracle of the Capitoline Jupiter, had set up their world-dominion, the ethnic

[1] Isa. liii.; Zech. ix. 9, xii. 10, xiii. 1; cf. Dan. ix. 26. [2] Isa. liii. 12.

caricature of the Hebrew theocracy which likewise laid claim to universality. About this time they came into collision with the Jewish nation. The iron arm of the Roman began to shatter the theocratic husk which yet must be the cradle of the Messiah, whether He appear as a Hero and victorious Prince or as a spiritual Ruler and King of Peace. Now or never must the Redeemer looked for by the nation appear in it; for soon it was scattered to the four winds, and its independent nationality for ever broken. While these parties within contended with each other,—the one, through delight in the foreigner, sinking the national along with faith in the nation's destiny and duties in the materialism of unbelief without hope and progress, the other remaining faithful to the letter, but at the same time falling into stagnancy, emptying the Messianic hopes of spiritual import, and thus falling victim to the materialism of superstition,—the Jewish nation was on the point of spiritual extinction, unless the Deliverer came, for whom at this very moment the simple Israelite believers were waiting with most eager expectation. Then the time was fulfilled,[1] Jesus of Nazareth was born. Before, however, we pass to this point, another religion has to be mentioned which appeared after Christianity—the Mohammedan. For, Christianity, claiming to be the ever-sufficient and universal religion, while on the other hand even after it the power of producing new religions cannot yet be held to be exhausted, the question is: In what relation does Mohammedanism stand to Christianity?

§ 69. *Appendix.—Mohammedanism.*

Destitute of religious originality, Mohammedanism is a rigid Judaism, based on abstract monotheism and divested of the prophetic character even in its eschatology, with the addition of the claim to be a universal religion, and can only be regarded as on the whole a means of preparing heathen masses for Christianity by the instrumentality of law and monotheism.

[1] Gal. iv. 4.

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1. Mohammedanism cannot lay claim to giving anything higher than Christianity or even than the Hebrew religion, but on account of its impure moral contents stands lower than both. Even if we disregard the impurity of the founder's character, which more than throws suspicion on his faith in his divine mission and infallibility, the incongruity between his claim to be the Paraclete sent to establish a religion of eternal validity on the one hand, and his personal qualities as well as the import of his teaching on the other, is evidence against Mohammed. He declared himself called by the Holy Spirit, his words were divine thoughts existing eternally in God. Hence the Koran is said to be "uncreated." Nevertheless, he himself altered many of the revelations first published, and again repealed them, alleging as a partial excuse that Satan suggested them to him.[1] But Mohammedanism itself lacks originality. It professes to recognize and unite Judaism and Christianity, assigns to Christ a

[1] According to Sprenger, II. 9 ff., Mohammed once even relapsed into heathenism. He was willing to approve the Arabian deities Lat, Oza, Manâh, as secondary goddesses, if the worshippers would acknowledge him. He also continued and adopted into his religion heathen ceremonies. Along with angels, demons resembling human beings (Genii) play a prominent part.

high position as a Reformer of Judaism,[1] accepts His virgin-birth and Ascension, and even holds the doctrine of His Second Coming. But Mohammedanism itself yields no new religious truth, merely recurring to the simplest elements which seem to it to constitute primitive religion, and that in such a way as to extirpate the germs of development lying in these elements, which thus themselves undergo alteration. The best there is in it is borrowed from the Hebrew and Christian religions, while it passes by and corrupts the best in both. As concerns Christianity, under pretence of purifying it from polytheism it opposes the Trinity and Incarnation, preaches the meritoriousness of works, especially of prayers (the law is to pray five times a-day), and war against unbelievers, and denies the Crucifixion, the Christian dogma of atonement and justifying grace. In the same way it denies the Messianic idea, which even modern Judaism partially retains. Of both religions, therefore, it rejects the most essential parts. The Trinity, which through the fault of the Christendom of that age and neighbourhood it knows only in the form of God, Christ, Mary, is opposed to its rigid monotheism, which leaves nothing but a monotonous, lifeless relation to the world. This dead relation is interrupted by Mohammed's supernatural call and the celestial origin of the Koran, but it receives thoroughgoing sanction in Mohammedan fatalism. His fundamental thought and fundamental religious sentiment is: "Great is Allah!" With him God's might and majesty are uppermost, the consequence being an idea of God in its essence merely physical in form. For although God as Lord reveals His will through Mohammed, still for him God's innermost nature is neither holiness nor love. Hence pure moral knowledge is also wanting. This is evinced even in his very influential eschatology. The judgment and hell-torments, as well as the blissful kingdom of believers, are depicted in sensuous colours.

Observation.—The *Gabarites* in Persia teach a mystic Determinism; and *Sufism* is pantheistic Mysticism, joining on to the physical idea of God. The Motazilim, moral Rationalists, Indeterminists, form a reaction against Fatalism.

2. According to what was advanced above (§ 62), he who

[1] C. F. Gerok, *ut supra.*

is to be the founder of the absolute religion must embody perfectly the unity of God and man, and thus be God-man absolutely. That Mohammed belongs to one of the subordinate religious stages, is shown by the fact that he does not even claim to be God-man. This connection of Mohammedanism with previous religious stages is again shown, *first*, by its deficiency in inner universalism, although by the instrumentality of fanaticism and external force it aims at universal extension. The servant-form of the good man is opposed to its Eudæmonism. Under this aspect, in the capacity of an "esthetic" religion, it belongs to the religions of Nature. *In the second place*, the connection of the State and its power with religion is essential to it. The successor of the Prophet, the Caliph, to the orthodox Sunnite is priest and king at once, and only limited by the interpreters of the Koran, who are both theologians and jurists. This interlacing with the State not merely prevents the development of the State, which is bound for ever to follow the laws given it 1200 years ago, but also menaces religion with destruction, in case the State falls. For if this takes place, Mohammedanism cannot, like Judaism after its incorporation with the State had ceased, fall back upon an inner unity through the Messianic hope; but Mohammed professes to be the last prophet, and the Koran presupposes victory over unbelievers. Supposing, therefore, this religion, which is not adapted to a servant-form, to lose its material basis, confidence must be alienated from it. But, *further*, in its cultus and rules of life Mohammedanism has not kept itself free from limitations and customs which suggest the Arabian nationality and locality. The Kaaba in Mecca is the place especially worthy of God, and the worshipper must everywhere turn towards it. Further, here come in the permission of polygamy, slavery, the prohibition of wine. Blood-revenge also is merely limited. In conversion to Islam by fire and sword it finds nothing contrary to religion. To speak generally, it suffers beyond hope of cure from internal barrenness and incapacity for internal progress and development, the fault of which in a religious respect rests on the rigid simplicity of its idea of God, in a moral respect on the corruption of the very bases of a genuine human existence—marriage and the family. We are thus

justified in calling this religion, stripped as it is of original spiritual truth, of a living idea of God, of prophecy and the idea of incarnation, in brief of everything which forms the soul of the religious historic process—a mere after-birth of unbelieving Judaism. In Mohammed appeared the Messiah, whose aim was universal empire, such as was longed for by the Judaism that rejected Christ.

3. However unfavourable must be our judgment of Mohammedanism in itself in comparison with the Hebrew religion and Christianity, our view of it assumes a more favourable form in comparison with the heathenism previously existing in the countries of Asia and Africa, where it found, and to some extent still finds, very rapid extension. In this way also we understand approximately what is the meaning of its appearance in history. Even after the advent of the perfect religion, side by side with the latter the preparation for it must still continue; for its universal diffusion is conditioned by the previous formation of receptiveness for it, and can only take place historically and gradually by means of human agency. This preparation of heathen masses for the perfect religion where the influences of the latter have not yet penetrated, is furthered by the appearance of Mohammedanism; and in this way at any rate is brought about an advance from Fetishism and idolatry to a sort of monotheism and a system of law, by whose means the dissolving human consciousness of numerous tribes is again knit together and led in a higher direction. The mission, fulfilled by Hebrew monotheism in the centuries before Christ and in its colonies, Mohammedanism continues, more imperfectly indeed, but in far more comprehensive extent and in a form more practicable to numerous nations, because it allows the nationalities to subsist, whereas the Jewish proselyte had to renounce his nationality. No doubt Mohammedanism exerts a pernicious and restrictive influence in regions which the Christian Church already occupies or was on the point of occupying. But, by the judgment which it was ordained to inflict on a great portion of the Church, it has been compelled to serve a useful purpose in warning the Church against the heathen elements which it had again permitted to intrude. In the conflict with it, the Church, in order to gain the mastery, has been

compelled to contend against the impurities within its own borders, and to put in exercise its innate powers and weapons. In accordance with all this, Mohammedanism, however hostile its attitude to Christianity, can only be regarded as a religion which, standing below Christianity as to its import, is ordained reluctantly to minister to Christianity in its historical course.

SECOND SUBDIVISION.

RELIGION AND REVELATION IN THEIR HISTORICAL CONSUMMATION.

§ 70.

Christianity is the higher unity, and thus the end, of heathenism and Judaism, through its fundamental idea and fundamental fact—the absolute divine Incarnation in Jesus Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit, the source of which is the God-man and the aim the realization of the kingdom of God. The consummation of religion and revelation has proved itself to be a historical fact in *Jesus of Nazareth,* through His holy personality, His witness to Himself and His work, namely, the transformation of those of mankind who are penetrated by His influence. And in the same way, to every one who believes in Him He proves Himself perpetually the all-sufficient Redeemer and Perfecter.

1. That Christianity furnishes the solution of the enigma of pre-Christian humanity and the satisfaction of its longing, is incontestable. This follows from the great fact that the greatest schism among mankind—that between heathens and Jews—has been done away in Him, both, when they accepted Christianity, finding in Him the truth they sought. In this way the expectation is justified by anticipation that Christianity, which has mastered such deeply-penetrating antitheses by means of internal union, will be able, without needing any improvement in itself, to prevail over the differences emerging

within the circle of Christianity in the course of time, especially since it is demonstrable that the errors involved in these antitheses are simply repetitions in ever new or more refined forms of those errors of heathenism or Judaism which Christianity has already vanquished in principle. In respect of the Doctrine of God this is shown in the fact that, as we have seen, the *Christian idea of God* gathers into itself all those elements of truth which exist in a scattered condition in other religions, and by the new element which it brings—the Trinitarian idea of God—vanquishes and abolishes the last antithesis—that of the one-sided Transcendence and Immanence of God. According to this idea of God, God neither stands over against the world as Almighty Lord in legislative and judicial majesty, nor does He, as in heathenism, lose Himself in the world, being confounded with it. On the contrary, here loving self-communication is blended with His self-affirmation. Accordingly, the fundamental Christian idea is this: In Jesus Christ is given the perfect union of the divine and human, *i.e.* Godmanhood.[1] By means of this idea the opposite erroneous theory of the ideal relation between God and man is precluded, both that contained in heathen doctrines, physical in character, of God becoming man or man becoming God, and the Judaistic conception of an unapproachable Transcendence of God, which left as a bond of union between God and man nothing but law and retributive justice. By the perfect ethical character of this Christian idea the errors on both sides are corrected, while the elements of truth are realized in pure form. But the Godmanhood subserves the realization of the divine world-aim, the founding of an organism animated with divine life—the kingdom of God, and proves itself a victorious power over the hindrances to its realization, over error, guilt, and sin.[2] Before we can accept the notion of defects in the Christian religion, and therefore of an objective perfectibility of Christianity, *either* a religious principle must be proved to be conceivable higher than that which historic Christianity

[1] Matt. i. 20; Luke i. 35; John iii. 34; Matt. xi. 27, xviii. 20, xxviii. 20, v. 17; John i. 14, x. 30; Rom. i. 4, xiv. 10; Col. i. 13 ff.; 1 Pet. i. 21, ii. 7, 25; Jas. ii. 1; Heb. i.

[2] See above, pp. 26, 200–202.

claims to be, *or* it must be shown that the reality of Christianity does not deserve to be regarded as the reality of the absolute religion which it professes to be. But as concerns the first point, those who talk of a perfectibility of Christianity have hitherto been unable (§ 62) to sketch anything higher even in thought. Rather they have fallen behind the Christian idea, as well in their estimate both of the deep need and high capability of human nature, as in knowledge of the blending of God's Transcendence and Immanence in holy love. It must be maintained that absolutely nothing higher is conceivable in the domain of religion than absolute incarnation or the Godmanhood. But this the Christian religion claims for itself as its fundamental *fact*, in such a form indeed that the God-man does not desire to retain His possessions for Himself but to communicate them to others.[1]

2. If, then, it is admitted that Christianity professes *to be* the highest conceivable form in the religious domain, the historical question still remains: *What is the attitude of history to this assertion of Christianity, that in it the highest form of religion has appeared?* Does it assent or not? But first of all we must settle how far historical testimony is necessary to Christianity, if this is what it professes to be; how far He who is the absolute God-man receives and needs testimony from man; for plainly there must be definite limits to this.[2] He could not be the absolute God-man at all, and could not have brought the consummation of religion, if external testimony were meant to be the evidence for Him in the proper sense, either for the truth of the idea of Incarnation in general or for its realization in Christ. As the Introduction has already shown, so far from the truth seeking its support in attestation by mere human testimony, it must reserve to itself the prerogative of being its own attestation, this supreme work being able to cede the decisive testimony to nothing outside itself. On this point Christ Himself declared: "I receive not testimony from man; the works that I do, bear witness of me;"[3] and in respect of His words He said: "If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God."[4] But the works meant in these words

[1] John i. 14, xii., xiii.
[2] Cf. §§ 11, 64. 1, 2.
[3] John v. 34, 36.
[4] John vii. 17.

are not merely those of the past; for the past as history falls again within the province of mere human testimony. But in the works meant by Christ are included the works which He has promised continually to do, and by which in deeds He bears continuous testimony to Himself, namely, testifies to this, that in Him the idea or the truth has become reality, and become a power over the world of reality.[1] In order that even at the tribunal of history Christianity may be able with good conscience and success to maintain its claim to be the absolute religion, in what respect and how far does the historic testimony come into consideration? Two points are essential in order to ensure the genesis of well-grounded faith.

Firstly. The image of Christ must be cognizable from the primitive Christian records with sufficient certainty and credibility. Consequently, according to the laws of historical inquiry, which are different from the laws of *à priori* construction, it must be demonstrable that the image of Christ, which lives in the Church and which we have in the primitive Christian records, cannot be the invention of the authors, neither intentionally nor in unintentional poetising; and that this image does not contradict but harmonizes with the expectations which must needs be formed on the historical side respecting the Perfecter of revelation and religion. The test of this will be the

Second point: The image, as it lies historically before us, must perforce have the power to set in action the best—the ideal—existing in man, whether by nature or otherwise, to arrest and awaken self-devoting confidence. The image of the God-man must be of such a nature as to appeal to man's inmost heart, and appear to the soul so worthy of confidence that surrender to it seems to the conscience not an act of caprice but a duty, in order that He may then by His Spirit accomplish the decisive act which He must needs reserve to Himself—the creation through the experience of faith of the inner conviction that in Him truth has become reality (cf. Intr. § 12).

More than this the historical argument should not desire to do; for otherwise we fall back into the mistake of the

[1] John i. 17; Matt. xiii. 33, xxiv. 14, xxv. 31 ff.

Biblical Supernaturalism which tried to establish the Christian faith by means of ingenious demonstrations. When Strauss, although an opponent of that Supernaturalism, proceeds on the same assumption, namely, that no certainty is possible to Christianity except that of the *fides historica*, and that any one has a right to reject it unless it can be demonstrated by historico-critical proofs, he overlooks the fact that Christianity is not content with mere historic proof, be it ever so perfect, but desires something higher, promising a firm, assured heart; whereas, in the nature of the case, mere historic argumentation as such, because it cannot coincide with mathematical or logical argumentation, is only able to attain to a high degree of probability. But just as little does he see that this insufficiency of mere historic evidence is a beneficial arrangement, serving as it does a moral purpose in bidding us seek after a higher conviction, the fruit of intrinsic truth and of the strength of the case. Christianity refuses to stay in the antechamber of the spirit—the memory and understanding. It refuses to thrust itself upon men in a sensibly palpable manner and compel them to believe, for this would not be faith, which is a moral act. It is an inviolable part of its moral character, that it withdraws from unconsecrated hands and spirits, that it has power to leave the profane to themselves, that in the first instance it veils the external power over reality, absolutely inherent in it, in servant-form, in order to leave scope to free decision, whether favourable or adverse, and then in due time to pronounce judgment on the use of this freedom. First it would have its *inner* divine energy and glory recognized. And thus there is always something of the false Judaistic Messianic idea in the demand that Christianity shall create faith by external means instead of in a free ethical way, or, which is really the same, that by proofs such as constrain universal reason it should commend itself just as much to the profane as to those who sincerely seek God and their personal salvation.

3. Thus the only remaining question is: Does the history of Jesus of Nazareth satisfy the demands which, to the extent described, we are warranted in making? Now by anticipation an important negative testimony in favour of Christianity is supplied in the fact that the pure idea of the absolute God-

than has only existed in the world since Christ appeared, although germs and presages of this, testimonies to the destination of human nature for the God-man, are found in various forms in history. But in addition, history affords most abundant positive proof that this idea has become a fact in Christ.[1]

Not merely is there nothing of a historical nature that would justify the denial of this dignity as belonging to Christ, but whatever might *a priori* be expected to belong to the figure of the absolute God-man, is given abundantly in the history of Christ. Nay it is exceeded, and this in such a way that the most important features carry in themselves the proof that they could not have been invented, and therefore possess historical credibility. Above all, we must name here His *holy personality*, which both fulfilled and revealed the moral law in its purity and perfection, and which implies uniqueness in his union with God and His blessedness. Those great contrarieties in the world and in the breast of the individual between spirit and flesh, between God and man, are seen to be reconciled in Him and brought to perfect harmony. No one dares to deny to Christ high moral pre-eminence. But those whom He deemed worthy of more intimate converse were penetrated by the loftiness and purity of His person, of His wisdom and love. Even the betrayer bears testimony in his own way to the unspotted purity of His character. If we ponder the biblical records, which so graphically and in such lifelike colours picture His image in scattered traits before us, we not merely perceive in Him particular virtues, but the irresistible fascination of His person lies especially in the pure symmetry, in the spontaneous self-possession and clear-sightedness free from all fanaticism, in the vivid harmony, maintained even amid the extremest clashings of circumstances and opinions, and exhibited just as perfectly in a dignity that never forgets itself, as in His humility and condescending sympathy and love. Not merely do we find nothing inconsistent with His sinless perfection,[2] but there is a series of historically-attested traits, which would be incomprehensible,

[1] As was set forth in a preliminary way, vol. i. pp. 48 ff. Cf. therewith pp. 148 ff.

[2] See a fuller exposition of what follows in my treatise on "The Sinless Perfection of Christ," *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* vol. vii. 1862.

unless He were conscious of standing by His sinlessness in contrast with us. If, then, Christ has directly or indirectly, while regarding all men as sinners, ascribed sinless perfection to Himself, then in view of His lofty moral pre-eminence, which no one denies, the inference follows, that His self-consciousness must have acquitted Him of sin and guilt; for it would be irreconcilable with the most ordinary measure of love for truth, that with the consciousness of being a sinner, He should have represented Himself as sinless. The stress we lay upon this is all the more warranted, as it is this very love of truth, this shrinking from all hypocrisy, self-complacency, and deceitful pretence concerning Himself that is so outstanding a feature in His character.[1] He, further, declared without doubt the deliverance of men from sin and their reconciliation to be His life-work and mission.[2] He knows that He has come as a divinely sent σωτήρ to seek the lost, to heal the spiritually sick.[3] But He could not speak thus if His self-consciousness told Him that He belonged to those who need redemption. He was therefore conscious to Himself of mastery over sin, and of ability to introduce to communion with God. Moreover, as judge of the world He puts Himself, as even the most thoroughgoing scepticism confesses, in contrast with the whole of mankind.[4] Not merely is there no vestige of His having felt the need of conversion and forgiveness, but He lays express claim to having fulfilled God's will without defect, not merely the prophets, but also the law.[5] He could only speak thus, provided His self-consciousness were constituted altogether differently from ours, acquitting Him of sin and guilt. All men not wantonly oblivious of sin, because conscious to themselves of sin and guilt, stand under the law, and upon remembrance of God are so burdened with the consciousness of discord, with fear or anxiety, that of themselves they have no power to stretch their gaze beyond the legal position, and to form a vivid conception of a higher stage of existence than that of the law. Nay, they involuntarily regard the legal stage of piety and devotion to duty as the highest attainable

[1] Cf. Matt. vi. 2, 5, 16, vii. 5, xv. 7, xvi. 3, xxiii.
[2] Matt. ix. 13, xx. 28, xxvi. 28.
[3] Matt. xi. 27 ff.
[4] John v. 22–27; Matt. xxv., xiii. 41; Luke xxi.
[5] John viii. 29, 44; Matt. v. 17.

by man, because they are altogether without experience of any higher stage of the spirit. But Christ's position is that of the free Son in the house. In Him the law has become life and power. He is in the law (ἔννομος), and the law in Him is transfigured into freedom, into delight in love. This position of His, not legal but free and evangelical, also proves with certainty that the image of His life cannot be the invention of His disciples, but that they describe Him as they do, full of grace and truth,[1] because they so beheld Him. His being was the ground and source of their image of Him. Only through Him did the intuition of freedom, of a stage above the law, become theirs. The first step was, and must necessarily be, the actual manifestation of the oneness of God and humanity in His person. The second was its intuition, and the delineation of what they beheld in testimony and life. This original, altogether new stage of freedom He assumes in relation to the law of the O. T. as to cleansing, food, the Sabbath, in relation to sacrifice and the temple of Israel, nay, in relation to all O. T. institutions. The Son stands above Moses and the prophets, who, although faithful, were but faithful servants.[2] Finally, the pure historic character, the credibility and uninventibleness of the image of His life is especially seen when we consider the nature of the Messianic hopes cherished by His disciples on their joining themselves to Him, and on the other hand, the plan, and the independently-pursued course of His work; for to the expectations which had led them to Him He presented the sharpest contrast. His work was laid out on a scale of such peculiar grandeur that His disciples could scarcely grasp, to say nothing of inventing it. Without haste, with divine calmness, with wisdom and unwearying patience, He pursued His way. Restlessly He laboured in word, in act, in doing good, while it was day, to gather His people round Him. When the teachings of His wisdom, when His holy walk and the acts of His power and love done to friends and foes, even those of healing, are unable, as He knew before they would be, to evoke any response but treachery and denial, and to impart to them a new and higher life, even then His faithfulness does not give men up. He is conscious of possessing yet another power,

[1] John i. 14. [2] Matt. xi. 11, xxi. 33–44.

which can only operate after His death. This is the power of His death itself as a loving sacrifice for a thankless world that rejects Him. The fact that of His own free will, defenceless and unarmed, He gives Himself up a complete sacrifice, while not giving up the love which with a Redeemer's heart embraces His people and humanity, and dying, implores forgiveness for the sinners, His foes,—this it is which disarms the enmity, the pride and deceit, the resistance of the stubborn, self-conceited, and self-righteous heart, in altogether another way than could be done by manifestations of power and law, judgment and penalty,—this draws forth even from hard hearts the last sparks of human feeling, and by awakening penitence and shame, as well as by encouraging the desponding and self-despairing, makes way for the Spirit of love, who leads those who believe in Him up above the law into a realm of peace, to the stage of freedom belonging to the perfect religion. What can be conceived more daring and withal more humble than the apparent contradiction, that on one side He desires to be king of spirits in a realm of freedom, even as He is in Himself full of a kingly spirit, but desires to become such by giving Himself up a complete sacrifice, allowing sinners to work their will on Him, undergoing thus the death of a transgressor, while not giving up the certainty of the divine force of suffering, dying love? In complete self-forgetfulness of love He would educe blessing from the curse and the curse-deserving, life from death. This is a divine conception so sublime, so full of wondrous originality and wisdom, so opposed to every wish and expectation of His disciples, so contrary to all human calculation and putting it to complete shame, formed in the lonely stillness of His heart at one with God, apart from all fanatical enthusiasm, but carried out in spontaneous obedience to the known will of His Father, with calm energy, patience, and collectedness, that nothing but obtuseness can call in question the uninventibleness, the historic reality of this wondrous character. And this divine folly of self-sacrificing love, how it has proved itself to be divine wisdom, the unveiling of a mystery that contains the power to vanquish hearts, and thus the world, and to unravel all the world's disharmonies! For all strife and discord within us and without us, springs only from the spirit that shuns sacrifice, that

shuns the blessed death of the self-willed, selfish nature. Such love as He displayed is the outflowing of the eternal divine life, the flame of the divine love itself, which was immortal, inextinguishable, "because it knew how to convert even the most hostile element into a stimulus to its own pure energy," so that in contending against hostile powers its fire could only shine the brighter. Moreover, on these grounds this historical manifestation is still warranted in asking to-day, "Which of you convinceth me of sin? But if I speak the truth, wherefore do ye not believe me?" On every one not destitute of susceptibility it must make the impression: Here is holy ground, here is the temple of humanity! He stands there in the character of a phenomenon inexplicable by the continuity of the species. His person is a miracle, consummating the miracle of creation. Such holiness and love of itself suggests a quite peculiar relation to God as its ground, and that from birth, because a previous life of sin could not fail to render itself perceptible in still operative traces. But this union of His with God is also expressed in numerous passages, in which His self-consciousness finds utterance, as when He calls Himself, not merely in John, but also in the other Evangelists, the Son of God and Son of man, who is in the Father as the Father is in Him; or describes Himself as He who brings to completion the O. T. revelation, and as He who realizes righteousness in a perfect, truly human life, and through both together as the establisher of the new eternal covenant between God and humanity, the founder of the kingdom of heaven.[1]

To this is to be added another aspect of His manifestation closely connected therewith. In general He displayed a freedom in relation to nature that was in close connection with His moral perfection. The stage of moral, divine freedom, is far above the powerlessness of the mere legal standpoint, and presupposes an endowment with real force, which is in itself a new creation, through which the first creation is perfected, and which points back to a divine fountain. In this way it is only in harmony with such a personality, that it did not remain powerless in presence of death, but that after being tested

[1] Matt. xi. 25 ff., xxii. 41 ff., xxiv. 35, v. 17, xviii. 20, xxviii. 19 f.; Luke iii. 22, iv. 18, v. 24; John xiv. 6, x. 30, vi., vii.

by death it raised itself to a glorified form of life free from the dominion of death. To the same freedom in relation to nature we are also referred by those works which form a weighty portion of His official life, and are so closely interwoven therewith, that they could not be taken out of it without tearing to pieces the entire web. If it is certain, as was formerly established,[1] that in order to the introduction of a revelation, miracles are necessarily to be expected, if Christ's elevation and force of will, such as are bound up with His sinless perfection, are certain, then the reasons which are supposed to justify doubt of the historical credibility of His miraculous power lose their force, then His miraculous acts in general are not less attested than His just as miraculous personal manifestation. This being so, that we may be able to recognise His dignity, we have beside the moral aspect of His being the evidence of His peculiar power over Nature, a power which, in accordance with His declarations, suggests again His peculiar vital connection with God and souls, as a testimony on His behalf until a body of spiritual testimony to Him has had time to grow up. And thus our summary conclusion is: His moral character, like His endowment with power over Nature, points back to the supreme meeting-point of spirit and nature —to God; and because He is the manifestation of this meeting-point in a human life or God-man, He was able, along with words of divine wisdom and works of love, also to do works of power, which were themselves again works of love; and by making the impression of power upon those about Him He became worthy of their confidence, and that all the more, since He never used His power for mere exhibition, or attached it to His doctrinal teachings in the character of a demonstrative seal. Rather His miraculous acts were at the same time the ethical works of His mission, designed as acts of love to attract to His person, and by means of faith in these to bring about in the next place inner certainty of the truth of His words. Never, on the other hand, did He desire to substitute sight for faith, the physical for the moral.

4. He in whom God's revelation to humanity is to find its consummation must evince Himself to be the centre of the world's history, whether regarded backwards or forwards. Considered

[1] See above, p. 142 ff.

backwards, He must be seen to be the goal of all pre-Christian prophecy in human nature and history. The consideration of the history of religion shows how the religious history of humanity turns on one point—the search after the true and perfect union of God and man, or the God-man.[1] To such a degree is Jesus Christ the fulfilment of pre-Christian history and prophecy, that the best longings of human nature, as well as its religious aberrations, only receive their explanation through Him. On this point, therefore, it is needless to linger. On the other hand, casting a glance *forwards* at the history of humanity after Christ, we ought certainly to keep in view that the course of the development of Christianity among mankind requires an ethical process, is conditioned by human freedom, and for this very reason, in its extensive diffusion and intensive operation, as well as in the elaboration of its contents, remains subject to the law of gradual progress. In regard to the influence of Christ's manifestation, testimony is borne in another way, namely, by history after Him, to Him as the manifested Perfecter of religion and humanity, and to the truth of His declarations concerning Himself. If heathens and Jews found each other in Him, He must be the reconciling medium and higher unity of both. And if the knowledge of heathen and Jew as to their needs being satisfied in Him, their sin and guilt expiated and subdued by Him, holds good of all who by faith join themselves to Him, so that unrest of conscience, nay, the unrest of the religious-historic process altogether, comes to an end through Christ's manifestation received in living faith, then must a redeeming, reconciling energy, a higher substantive vital power, have issued from Him, then can He not have revealed a mere idea, such as would simply impart doctrines and impose duties. Thus history, as it is affected and determined by Him, agrees with what He asserts of Himself. He is for the good of humanity, and is revealed in it as saving, redeeming righteousness. But further, that conquest of heathenism and Judaism did not merely take place once for all, but is continually taking place. Both, as has been shown, have not merely the significance of the historic forms bearing these names in the first instance. They are withal the universal principles or

[1] § 64 cf. with § 62 ; next, §§ 65–68.

fundamental forms of human sin and human error. In their historic manifestation, the universal principle of sin and error was concentrated in its two main forms. Christianity then having vanquished both these by its appearance, the only task of apologetic labour is in every new opposition raised against Christianity to discover the recurrence in new form of old principles already vanquished by Christianity, and thus to prepare ever renewed triumphs for Christianity in its process of perpetual rejuvenescence.

5. Finally, the predicates belonging to the definition of revelation[1] pertain in quite a special manner to Christianity—the character of Originality and withal Historicality, special Individuality distinguishing it from all other religions, and, on the other hand, Universality. It shows its Originality and Novelty in distinction from all other religions, especially by its idea of God and the God-man, by the idea of sonship to God, yea, and especially by its power always to lead one who gives himself up to it away to the supreme divine fountain, to direct divine fellowship, and to open up in its true confessors a distinct spiritual well of life.[2] And despite this Novelty, it shows its Historic character in an eminent degree in this, that the entire remaining history of religion leads up as a preparation to it, that it joins on strictly to existing susceptibility and longing, that it penetrates into history with such force as no other phenomenon does. Further, by that which forms its centre it is marked on one side by sharp distinction from everything non-Christian, by unique Individuality and distinctiveness, and at the same time by Universality, because that which is peculiar to it (although not realized even seminally in any other form of faith) carries in itself the destination and the power to become the common possession of all, to summon up in the natural human race the true humanity, birth from God or sonship to God, and thus to bring about that the Christian communion of faith and humanity shall be co-extensive. A negative feature of universality is freedom from all sensuous and telluric admixtures which have a particularizing effect. The Christian religion is the only one adapted to the nations of the north and south, whereas all other religions still carry in their root, so to speak, the soil

[1] § 51. [2] John iv. 14, vii. 39; 2 Cor. v. 17.

from which they sprang. But this freedom from external limits has its reason in what is inward and positive, in the free spirituality and inexhaustible fulness of this religion. It is the religion of the eternal life resident in humanity. Despite this spiritual character, it is not spiritualistic, but transcends with victorious power all contrarieties of races, ages, and nations,—not destroying, but informing and renewing them. Without loss to itself, it is able, as it has proved and proves, to enter into the most manifold forms, by its vital forces to lay hold of and fructify the most diverse individualities. But every individuality penetrated by it testifies that it has found in it the principle of emancipation and perfection. In the same way it is adapted to all forms of government. It has enriched and civilized all departments of life, marriage and the family, private intercourse, the State, art and science. Christian piety possesses eternal youth, because its nature and element is to be in course of perpetual rejuvenescence, and more and more to live in Him from whose fulness it receives grace for grace. But what is most important and replaceable by no demonstration is this: Christianity only continues to subsist through continuous divine action, through the perpetuation of the divine act of its founding, through the *Holy Spirit*. Through the Holy Spirit it is that Christ is as it were born anew in believers, that believers know themselves to be indissolubly united in Christ with the Father, and to share in the indissoluble, essential unity with God set forth to view in the Son of His love. From this fundamental knowledge, which is withal a form of Being, rich in grace, issues, as explained in the Phenomenological Part, all higher religious knowledge as from its organic centre. Thus we have again arrived at *faith*, in whose intuition is wrapped up all radical knowledge, nay, a totality divine and human, of a subjective and objective kind. But this immediate intuition of faith we have attempted to expound scientifically and reconcile with thought, by considering the—as to substance—mutually corresponding doctrinal and historical course of the matter, in order in this way to religious to add scientific certainty concerning the God-man as the fixed objective principle of the Christian religion. This principle now awaits from the Second Part of Dogmatics its

exposition with special reference to sin, and therewith awaits the concrete demonstration that life and light, indissolubly blended in the incarnate Logos, stream forth from Him, in order, through illumination, reconciliation, redemption from error and sin, to effect the consummation of the individual and the race in the kingdom of God.

PART II.

SPECIFIC CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE;

OR,

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN AND SALVATION.

FIRST PART: THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.
SECOND PART: THE CHRISTIAN SALVATION.

FIRST PART.

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

§ 71.—*Introduction.*

WHILE Specific Christian Doctrine, as the Second Part of the entire system of Christian faith, presupposes the first Fundamental Part or Apologetics, its function is to consider the way in which the consummation, on account of the actual occurrence of sin, is carried out by means of redemption.

1. The result of the First Part of Christian Doctrine or Apologetics in its constructive or speculative part is, that the idea of revelation and of humanity culminates in the idea of the absolute God-man.[1] The result of the historic part of Apologetics[2] is, that this and nothing else is the goal of pre-Christian religious history, both heathen and Jewish, and that Jesus of Nazareth is seen and proved to be the Son of God and Son of Man, in whom the longing of the nations finds its fulfilment, and divine revelation and humanity find their consummation; and further, that this perfect religion possesses the power and the means to perpetuate itself, a result materially served by its being fixed in sacred writings, which form the original record of the founding of Christianity. This end of Apologetics: "Jesus Christ, attested documentarily in Holy Scripture, is the God-man," becomes in the next place the beginning or principle of Christian Dogmatics in the strict sense. It also falls to the province of the latter to elaborate the doctrine of Christ's Person and Work, whereas it was enough for Apologetics to limit itself to a general view, which

[1] Vol. ii. §§ 62, 63.
[2] Vol. ii. §§ 64–70, Subdivision II. in Third Main Division.

can only be called the germ of the Dogmatic doctrine of Christ's Person and Work.

Observation.—Just as primitive Christendom mainly looked forward to the end, the *consummation* (because a Redeemer worthy of confidence can only be One who carries in himself the power of consummation), in order retrogressively from this point to make itself more and more master of the particular contents of faith, so the First Part followed this tendency which is innate in faith. But as succeeding ages advanced to the consideration of particular dogmas, so also have we now to proceed to details.

2. Decisive on this subject is the fact that the manifestation of Christ's Person and His Work, although not exclusively motived, are essentially modified, by sin. The Christian Church knows itself to be a Church *redeemed* by Christ from sin. It knows Christ not merely as a Perfecter (a point which Apologetics has to place in the foreground), but as One who came to perfect it solely by means of redemption. But the most intimate connection obtains between the two views, and by His divine-human nature, such as was sketched in its barest outlines in the First Fundamental Part, a general definition has already been given of the relation He will sustain to sin. But the actual filling up of this outline belongs to specific Dogmatics. The latter has, therefore, in the first place to discuss the fact, by which it is proved that the perfecting of humanity was only possible through reconciliation and redemption, not immediately or in the way of immanent development, *i.e.* it has first of all to treat of *Ponerology.* It is true that sin itself, as regards its possibility, was necessarily verified in the doctrine of man's original capacity, and therefore in the First Part. But this does not involve its realization, and least of all the fearful character of its realization.—Apologetics, indeed, in its historic part has already passed over into the sphere of realization, but only under the point of view and with the aim of showing in a general way, that the idea of Godmanhood, acknowledged in the constructive part to be necessary, was the impelling power in pre-Christian religious history, there paved the way for its realization, and was perfectly realized in Jesus of Nazareth. Our present business is to exhibit

the relation in which Christ, who came into existence despite sin by a volition of God's transcendent, almighty love, stands to sin, in order to make it clear how He came on account of sin, and for the purpose of destroying the existing state of sin. Only such an exposition can give us the more concrete image of His historic manifestation and work.

3. Accordingly, the Doctrine of *Sin* will have its place as an *Introduction* to the Second Specific Part, especially to the exposition of Christology; for sin is the most immediate condition of this form of Incarnation or Godmanhood, which intervened for our reconciliation and redemption in reference to sin. But Ponerology divides into Three Heads. The *First* has to treat of the *nature* of evil, and in the first place of its idea in general, then of its partition into the two forms: actual and inherent evil,[1] by which the different stages of evil are brought about. At the same time, this will lead to the consideration of evil as a generic offence.—The *Second* Head considers evil as to its origin, where the leading hypotheses, bearing on its explanation or derivation, must come under discussion.—The *Third* Head treats of evil in its relation to the divine government of the world. It is a *disturbance* of that government, an *ill* both in itself and in its effects, nay, ill absolutely. God's gracious and *just* government of the world counteracts it by pronouncing men *guilty* and *punishing* them. But the divine government cannot rest content with this. With the will of punitive justice there is also conjoined the sacred will of grace, or the determination to effect reconciliation and vanquish evil.

4. The First Head will not merely treat of the *idea* of evil in the sense of an abnormal possibility, in which light it was considered in Apologetics; but the following exposition has to start from the idea of evil as one that has become actual fact, but in such a way as amid the multiplicity of its forms to seek the unity of its principle or the essence of evil, that by which evil is evil. It is possible to understand this without affirming or knowing anything definite beforehand respecting its ultimate origin, because the two things are

[1] [*Actuelles und zuständliches Böse.* In the following pages, for brevity's sake, *evil* stands for *moral evil, Böse; Uebel* is represented by *ill, misfortune, physical evil.*]

different, and definition is not derivation,—a point certainly often overlooked. The order of treatment indicated commends itself all the more, as it is only when the elements entering into the nature of evil are clearly understood that anything certain can be affirmed respecting its origin. On the other hand, it is important to reach clear affirmations respecting the origin of evil, and consequently not to stop at the bare fact of its existence, because mistaken conceptions of its origin would react on the definition of its nature. After thus glancing backwards at the origin of evil, in the Third Head we must look forward to the relation of the divine government to evil, and the connection of the divine world-order therewith.

FIRST HEAD.

EVIL AS TO ITS NATURE.

A.—*Biblical Doctrine.*

I.—THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE OF EMPIRICAL EVIL, AND ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS.

§ 72.

BOTH Testaments concur in acknowledging the universal reality of evil. The factors which combine to form the Biblical idea of the nature of evil are given in the fact of both Testaments implying that evil or sin has the law of God for the objective presupposition of its possibility, and religious-moral capacity for the subjective.

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Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, vol. iii. 1859. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk,* vol. i. 1853; *Die Voraussetzungen der Christologie,* 2d edit. 1856. F. C. Baur, *Theol. N. T.* 1864; *Paulus,* 1845. Holsten, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes σάρξ im N. T. bei Paulus,* 1853; enlarged in the work: *Das Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus,* Rost. 1868, p. 367 ff. Greatly influenced by him is Lüdemann, *Anthropologie des Ap. Paulus,* 1872. Schulz, *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 1875, 2. Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch,* 1878. Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus,* 1873. G. Heinrici, *Die Sünde nach Wesen und Ursprung,* 1878. B. Weiss, *Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie N. T.,* 3d edit. 1880, §§ 21, 46, 56, 66, 70, 100, 115, 148, 151, 157. Kähler, *Das Gewissen,* I. 1, 1878, p. 216 ff., 294 ff.

1. According to Holy Scripture, evil actually exists in all men. Even the O. T. expresses a profound consciousness of sin, of which no good man acquits himself, and this applies to the most distinguished among the O. T. people. This truthfulness and uprightness, this humility and fidelity, forming an essential peculiarity in Israelitish piety,[1] preserves in the people of the O. T. a lofty consciousness of duty and antagonism to sin, whereas the final seal of sin's victory over men is seen in their obliviousness and blindness to their state of bondage. True, the O. T. does not expressly say, that all belonging to the race fell in its first progenitors, or that the fall of the first pair at any rate decided the sinfulness of their posterity. According to Genesis, even the race only gradually sank deeper and deeper through the flesh obtaining increasing mastery over the Spirit of God,[2] and preventing the latter constantly carrying on His office of inward rebuke. Doubtless, the presupposition underlying the punishment denounced against the first pair is, that their posterity also will be partakers with them in misery as well as in sin. But according to the O. T. there is no such bare equality in sin in all men after Adam, as an abstract doctrine of original sin would assume, but two lines are always distinguished, one pious and good, another worldly and bad.[3] Moreover, in

[1] John i. 47.

[2] Gen. viii. 21, vi. 5: "By reason of their going astray they are only flesh," *i.e.* without spirit.

[3] Such are the Cainites and Sethites, then the Semites with the Hebrews and the other Noahites, who afterwards fell a prey to heathenism, finally within Israel

Israel limits were set to the extension and dominion of evil by the choice of Abraham and his race, by promise and law. Thus, even before Christ evil was unable to develope all its effects upon the whole of human life; its disorganizing, downward-leading tendency has its stages and halting-places. The bases of morals and society, such as marriage, family, property, are guarded by the commonwealth and its laws, which are not without power of resistance; and even in a religious respect mankind only sinks step by step from initial, although imperfect, monotheism down to polytheism, idolatry, nay Fetishism. Still, even the piety of the better line is not pictured as having been exempt from sin. If individuals, like Enoch, Noah, Abraham, are called righteous, this must only be understood relatively, and refers to the upright disposition of the heart that seeks and obeys God. On the contrary, it remains certain that O. T. piety and righteousness are marked by that form of humility which rests upon the sense of sin.[1] No doubt this becomes more evident the more the influence of the Law is felt, whereas a shimmer of child-like unconscious innocence is still spread over patriarchal days. Accordingly it is in the Psalms, in the Book of Job, and in the Prophets that specially strong testimonies to the consciousness of sin are first found.[2] There the consciousness of the universality of sin finds expression even in Israel. Moreover, the thought of the guilt resting on the entire community lies at the basis of the purifyings and sacrifices for the whole nation. Without cessation the command peals forth to resist evil and seek righteousness. This certainly assumes the existence of a good power in order to resistance. But therewith the command to trust in God and His Spirit is not wanting. Nowhere is it taught that, left purely to himself, man has the moral strength to maintain himself against sin. On the contrary, such self-confidence is counted sin.[3] It is said, indeed:[4] "Do this and thou shalt live;" but this

the "holy remnant" and the body of the people in the maxims of the prophets. Cf. Kühler, *ut supra*, p. 322.

[1] Here applies the saying from the earliest age, Gen. viii. 21: "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth."

[2] Ps. vi. xiv. 3, xxxii. xxxvii. li. cii. cxliii. 2; Job iv. 17, ix. 2, xiv. 4, xxv. 4; Prov. xx. 9; 1 Kings viii. 46 f.; Isa. lxiv. 5, 6; Zech. xiii. 1.

[3] Hosea xiii. 9. [4] Lev. xviii. 5.

command of the law includes also the requirement of humble reliance on God and faith, and is not fruitless in case it keeps man in the acknowledgment of the holiness of the divine law and its claim, and consequently in consistency with his destiny. The law did a great work, if the willing of goodness and inner delight in the law led to the knowledge of distance from God and of the need of divine help, and issued in longing for such help. Thus prophecy declares: Jehovah is our righteousness, our own is as filthy rags.[1] Such language of humiliation is the last word of the O. T.

It is also the *first word* of the N. T.,[2] in the case of Christ as in that of the Baptist. "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Such is the close relation between sin and Christ's appearance, that the coming of God's kingdom is above all the most powerful call to repentance, nay, completes the possibility of repentance of the right kind by the hope that it will be effectual. The N. T. works in the O. T. spirit, implying and producing a still profounder knowledge of sin. It is observable in the apostles, that only after they have entered the kingdom of light and life do they thoroughly understand the danger and depth of the night, from which they have been rescued;[3] for whereas evil loves to hide and deny itself,[4] it is the prerogative of the light to illumine both itself and its opposite. To look down into the abyss of evil is only tolerable to one who is acquainted with a power delivering from it. The knowledge of the power of sin had followed in the O. T. more as an accompaniment of the striving after legal righteousness, and as an unlooked-for, spontaneous result in virtue of God's secret counsel. But this effect of the law in giving the knowledge of sin assumes in the N. T. the following form: The confession is demanded, as the fruit of striving after righteousness before the law, that our own righteousness is inadequate, and that striving to fulfil the law by means of our own strength is of no avail. In this way the N. T. draws away the gaze from the circumference to the centre, from the fruits to the tree, from particular acts to the totality and the permanent incapacity of

[1] Jer. xxxiii. 16, xxiii. 6; Isa. lxiv. 5, 6. [2] Matt. iii. 2, iv. 17.
[3] Rom. v. 12–21, xiii. 11 f.; Col. i. 13; Titus ii. 11 f.
[4] John iii. 20, ix. 39.

the personality. Hence expressions like "the old" or "the psychical man." Finally, in the N. T. this way of looking at things argues from individuals to the totality of the race.[1] Distinctions of degree in wickedness and guilt, indeed, are not denied.[2] But these distinctions vanish in presence of the redemption, which all equally need. This equality of all men is especially emphasized by Paul.[3] This is the evil, negative comprehension into unity of the entire race, which before the days of Christianity was rent into fragments in every other respect. The universality of liability to condemnation or guilt is the presupposition underlying the all-embracing significance of redemption, which addresses itself to universal receptiveness for it and for that restoration of the unity of mankind, which Christianity will effect. With this view John, Peter, and James agree.[4] The law leads not directly to righteousness of life, but to Christ.[5] It is true that in pre-Christian sin, according to the N. T., there is always an element of ignorance.[6] Hence on the divine side the pre-Christian time is called a time of forbearance,[7] of comparative overlooking, *i.e.* a time when, although humanity was not cast off, still sin was not forgiven. But this ignorance does not cancel sin and guilt;[8] the need of atonement remains a fact, and forgiveness is not a matter of course, as if before Christ there were nothing to forgive. By no means is it the teaching of Scripture that the sole punishable sin is the sin of definite unbelief in Christ. In this case there would be nothing to be forgiven, because what is punishable in real earnest could not be forgiven; on the other hand, what is not punishable needs no forgiveness.[9] But

[1] Rom. iii. 20 ff., v. 12–18. [2] Luke xii. 48.

[3] Rom. i.–iii., iii. 23, xi. 32; Gal. iii. 22.

[4] John iii. 3 ff., 31, 13: Whoever would ascend to heaven must let himself be raised thither by Him who came down from heaven. 1 John i. 8, v. 19; 1 Pet. ii. 24; Jas. i. 13, iii. 2, i. 18.

[5] Gal. iii. 24; John v. 39–45.

[6] Luke xxiii. 34; Acts iii. 17, xvii. 30; Heb. v. 2, ix. 7; 1 Pet. i. 14.

[7] Rom. iii. 25 ff.: ἀνοχή, πάρεσις, still not ἄφεσις.

[8] Luke xii. 48.

[9] Intentionally or unintentionally, Ritschl's theory tends in this direction. According to that theory, all sin, about which we are able to affirm anything (whether the sin of definite unbelief will ever occur, we know not), is said to be sin through ignorance (*ut supra*, iii. § 43, p. 334), in spite of which *God* loves

the very reason why the capacity of redemption still exists is, that before Christ the perfect revelation could not be rejected.

2. As concerns, first of all, the *objective* presuppositions of sin, according to Holy Scripture the possibility of sin is based on the fact that a *law* exists for man, to which he is under obligation, and the validity of which does not depend on his choice. Certainly this obligation rests for us on the ground that God is the *Lord*, on whose power man is absolutely dependent, and who has a right to command. But with the right of God which flows from His creative power, Holy Scripture at once combines the further consideration, that God's preceptive will is in harmony with His holy nature, nay, so far as essential destination is to be reckoned a part of the nature of anything, in harmony also with the nature of man who was made in God's image. This is summed up in the O. T. in the general command: "Be ye holy, for I am holy," in the N. T. in the command: "Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect."[1] This inner goodness of the good, which accords with the nature of God and man, and is therefore intelligible to reason as such, is made prominent both in the Old and New Testaments.[2] God's laws are truth, *i.e.* not bare words, arbitrary thoughts or commands, but in harmony with true reality, with God's nature, which is essentially good and holy. Because the law issues out of this essential goodness of God, it is called Pneumatic.[3] That this law harmonizes also with the nature of man, who is in God's image, is expressly testified.[4] This law, then, conditions the possibility of evil. Were there no law, there would be no sin,[5] and of course no moral good. The

man (p. 335), whereas it is allowed ignorance may make *man* an enemy to God (p. 334), namely, in so far as it erroneously looks on *God* as angry with the sinner, an error which separates him from God, and may issue in hardened hostility of will to God. Accordingly, the main task of redemption is said to be the removal of this *error*, the opinion of *God's* enmity and anger.

[1] Lev. xix. 2, xi. 44; Matt. v. 48.

[2] Ps. xix. 10, 11, xxxiii. 5, cxix. 7, 30, 43; Rom. vii. 12, 14; 1 John iv. 16.

[3] Rom. vii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 16; cf. Lev. xix. 2, xi. 45; Ex. xxii. 31.

[4] Deut. xxx. 14; Rom. vii. 22, 25, according to which the inner man, his rational nature, delights in God's law.

[5] Rom. iv. 15. Cf. also Rom. v. 13, where it is said: Sin, even if it exists, is not regarded, if no positive law or no consciousness of law exists; and 1 John iii. 4: ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία.

words denote an estimate of worth, and presuppose a standard, nay, an absolutely binding norm. To this position, then, that the law is the necessary objective ground of the *possibility* of sin, nothing more or less, objection is raised from two opposite sides, in both instances with an appeal to the Apostle Paul. One theory says: The law springs from Sisin, *i.e.* sin is the ground of the possibility of law; the other: Sin springs from the law, the law begets sin, and is the ground of its existence.

The attempt to deduce the position, *that the law springs from sin*, from the line of Pauline thought takes the following shape: "The state under the law is wretched, a state of bondage, which already presupposes sin. The sinless, normal state is that in which the law does not exist above or outside man, in which rather no law exists for him;[1] for the mention of law implies that man is not as he ought to be. Where the good exists in man, in desire and will as well as in knowledge, there it no longer figures as law. The latter always implies an existing discord between what ought to be and what is. The law and the consciousness of law originate in this discord." But this theory is untenable. The theory itself acknowledges as normal the state in which goodness is man's inwardly actuating motive. But in this very circumstance goodness is acknowledged as a norm; and it would be an arbitrary proceeding, to regard it not as the norm or measure of worth absolutely, but only when being is out of harmony with it. Certain as it is that the law may have diverse modes of existence in man, either in his intelligence only or in his will and being also, still in its essence it is immoveably the same. Frequently, indeed, to the apostle the *νόμος* is the law of God standing outside man as *γράμμα*. But this form of existence is not essential to it. On the contrary, it seeks to exist in the will and being of man.[2] Paul therefore speaks also of a law of the life and spirit in man; and the very means by which the gospel establishes the law is by the latter becoming the animating, will-inspiring principle.[3] From another point of view, man is said to be *in* the law.[4] Were the law born of sin only, it

[1] 1 Tim. i. 9: *τῷ δικαίῳ νόμος οὐ κεῖται.* [2] Rom. iii. 31, x. 3.
[3] Rom. viii. 2 f., iii. 31.
[4] 1 Cor. ix. 21: *ἔννομος Χριστοῦ.* Cf. with Rom. x. 4; 1 Cor. i. 30.

would be simply doomed to abolition.[1]—The notion of the law as such springing only from a sinful state must by logical sequence resolve evil into subjective illusion, or issue in a Manichæan theory. For how can anything be called evil, unless it deviate from an obligatory good, and be therefore a violation of what ought to be (*Seinsollendes*)—of the holy law? If evil exists in the world before law exists at all, it is of a merely physical nature, and is traceable to the Creator or a primary evil Power.—But this theory relies also on the fact, that man cannot be morally perfect from the beginning, but must first fulfil his moral duty, and that therefore the law presupposes initial imperfection. Since, then, in the beginning goodness exists as a duty outside man, *i.e.* outside his will and being, although not outside his intelligence, this certainly seems to imply an antinomy between what he is and what he ought to be (*Sein und Sollen*); and if this antinomy is identified with evil, we necessarily have evil as the presupposition of law, at least in the beginning of moral development, progress in which then takes this form, that the goodness which stands outside man's will, while seeking its place in that will, appears as law which disapproves this beginning. But Holy Scripture does not call every imperfection evil, least of all the inevitable imperfection of the beginning. Man is not made evil by the fact of his will still having duties to fulfil in order to self-improvement, but simply by his will not overtaking the duty of the moment, but instead obstinately lagging behind.[2] Thus, according to the apostle, it is certain that so little does the law spring from sin, that it is rather the objective ground of sin's possibility.[3]

But it is not on this account the ground of sin's actuality, as supposed by those who teach, that *sin springs from the law.* It is true, the apostle teaches that the law excites mistaken, previously slumbering desire, and further that the law multi-

[1] In opposition to Rom. iii. 31, vii. 14, x. 5; Gal. iii. 12.

[2] This is implied in 1 Cor. xv. 45 f. (cf. Rom. v. 12 ff.); χοϊκός and ψυχικός are clearly conceived in the passage as imperfect, but not on this account sinful, stages, which are followed by the completion of the creation of man. And in Adam ἁμαρτία (Rom. v. 12) is referred not to the creation, but to the παράβασις (Rom. v. 12–18), which presupposes a law (Rom. iv. 15).

[3] Rom. iv. 15.

plies sin, and not merely the consciousness or the knowledge of sin, nay, that the law is the strength of sin.[1] But the first of these statements already presupposes disorderly, although slumbering, desire, so that the law is merely the occasion of that actual delight in forbidden objects which false desire for freedom excites; for he does not say, the law of itself impels to sin and necessitates it. Nay, it urges to the opposite, to conflict with the false desire for freedom. Just as little certainly, according to the apostle, does it compel to good. On the contrary, it shows itself in part powerless in comparison with the strength of evil desire,[2] in part multiplies or strengthens sin in the following way (as the latter passages affirm): irritated by the limits which the law would impose on false desire for freedom, sin overpowers the hindrance or resistance which the law offers to evil. But self-evidently this result is not a positive effect or act of the law, but a consequence of the power of the flesh, in comparison with which the law proves itself too weak an impulse to good. In addition, the law unintentionally multiplies and becomes the strength of sin[3] by revealing God's wrath or displeasure, and thus forcing the evil state to a crisis; for through the law it comes to pass that the sinner sees himself placed in inner discord with and alienation from God. Fear of the Holy and Just One drives him into sullen flight from God,[4] and therefore into an aggravated, worse condition, unless a saving counteractive power intervene. The law, which implants the idea of moral determination in man's consciousness, and, appealing to the will, awakens the sense of freedom, thereby no doubt establishes the possibility of variance with the law, but not the actuality. But for the existence of wrong desire, with which is also associated God-fleeing remorse as wrong aversion, the law would impel to obedience, although it is unable, in consequence of the isolated character of its requirements, to lay hold of the entire man or be to him a spring of moral life. This is the impotence of all mere law. Hence the Gospel must be added

[1] Rom. vii. 7 f., v. 20; Gal. iii. 22; 1 Cor. xv. 56.
[2] Rom. viii. 3: ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου.
[3] Rom. vii. 13.
[4] What the apostle calls ἔχθρα θεοῦ, *e.g.* Rom. viii. 7, cf. 15.

to the law. But although the law of itself is powerless to overcome the evil which it punishes, still, according to Paul, it is not the law that works evil, but the flesh.[1] Nor is it correct to say that the law, because it appeals to man's own strength, diverts him from God and teaches him self-sufficiency; for humility and faith are part of the contents of the law, *i.e.* it requires right reception and willingness to be led (*Sichbestimmenlassen*), not mere originative action. Still less does sin follow from the consciousness of law; not even the consciousness of sin does so. The non-coincidence of what ought to be and what is remains innocent, unless the will is wanting at once to set about the duty of the moment. That the knowledge of duty should precede its discharge, is indispensable, if the will is to take part in that discharge.—The result of what has been stated may be thus summarized: Neither does the law spring from sin, nor sin from the law as its cause, but the existence of the law is merely the necessary objective presupposition or condition of the possibility of evil as of good, and therefore in general of an existence subject to moral estimate. On the other hand, the actuality of the one or the other requires yet another factor.

3. The presupposition of evil on the *subjective* side is the moral capacity of man, to which, according to Holy Scripture, two elements belong—*Conscience*, and the *Will* subjected by conscience to the objective law.

The existence of *Conscience* is acknowledged throughout Holy Scripture as regards the *thing*. So in the case of the first man before and after the act, as also in that of Cain.[2] The O. T. uses for this the general word "heart" as the centre of man's whole life.[3] The N. T. has a word of its own, although an ambiguous one—συνείδησις.[4] It is described as an eye in man, and as light,[5] which implies that a faculty of moral vision is inherent in man, and that

[1] This must by no means be confounded with "ignorance." It is the mere issue and effect of ignorance.

[2] Gen. iii. 4; cf. xlii. 22, xliv. 16.

[3] 1 Sam. xxiv. 5; 2 Sam. xxiv. 10; 1 Kings ii. 44. Cf. Rom. ii. 15.

[4] Rom. ii. 15; 1 Pet. iii. 21; John viii. 9; Heb. ix. 9, 14, x. 2, 22, xiii. 18; Rom. xiii. 5; 1 Cor. viii. 7, 10, 12, x. 25, 27-29; 1 Tim. iii. 9, iv. 2.

[5] Luke xi. 34; Matt. vi. 22.

according to the degree of his participation in truth, he is able to distinguish and pass judgment on good and evil. No doubt this inner eye may be darkened and obscured, the voice of conscience may be stifled, nay, the moral ideas which are conjoined with conscience may receive a wrong development. But the intruding falsehood is again removeable, because in contradiction to man's abiding nature.[1] The entire Gentile mission of the apostle proceeded on the true assumption, that behind the rubbish of corrupt morals and heathen conceptions lay an awakenable, pure conscience in the form of a knowledge of duty and responsibility, of guilt and liability to punishment, to which appeal might be made.[2] No doubt, according to Holy Writ, in that innate conscience, which is universal, in the natural feeling and sense of right and wrong, concrete moral (or religious) knowledge is by no means involved, and what of this exists may be overborne by the power of desire. For this reason the Mosaic law, the national specification withal of the universal moral law, was given to the people of the O. T., and in the N. T. especially frequent appeal is made to the Decalogue. Moreover, because that which is innate is insufficient, growth in moral knowledge is often required.[3] But still a better knowledge, slumbering in the background and capable of awakening, is presupposed even in the case of the heathen, nay, a faculty of moral judgment able rightly to reprove wickedness in others. Christians, therefore, are required to walk without offence even in the judgment of those who are without.[4]

The *second* element is moral capacity on the side of *will*. The N. T. indeed, where it treats of freedom, does not speak, as we might expect, of moral freedom of choice. It knows no ἐλευθερία outside the unity of the will with goodness, with God, reserving the noble word freedom for the normal development which proceeds without check and is unfettered by sin (the so-called theological freedom).[5] For freedom of choice no word occurs in the N. T., although διαβούλιον was

[1] Acts xvii. 28 f.; 1 Pet. ii. 25; Eph. ii. 1–3; cf. Kähler, *ut supra*, p. 301, 303 ff.

[2] Rom. ii. 12–16.

[3] Heb. v. 14; Rom. xii. 2.

[4] Matt. v. 16; Phil. i. 10; 1 Pet. ii. 12.

[5] John viii. 32; Gal. iv. 26, v. 1, 13; Rom. viii. 15, 21; Jas. i. 25, ii. 12.

at hand,[1] while *αὐτεξούσιον* was quite usual among the philosophers. Only in one passage is the word *ἑκουσίως* found in describing the strongest form of personal sinful self-will, the rejection of Christ. But although, in keeping with this, sinfulness in the N. T. is called bondage, not freedom,[2] still personal volition is not on this account denied to man.[3] A will exists, on which the law is binding in full force, and on which influence is brought to bear and claim made as a determining cause, that man may become what God wills. Even in evil there is will,[4] although in bondage; in good also there is will, which implies that good and evil cannot be imposed on man merely from without and passively. His will, his inclination must take part, in order that good or evil may belong and be imputed to him. And through this participation of inclination or will the idea of guilt is possible, the *ὑπόδικον εἶναι* and condemnation.[5] Although, therefore, an abiding injury to freedom is the result of sin, still, according to the N. T., this bondage and what follows from it come under moral condemnation, the N. T. regarding as evil not merely the abnormity which is consciously such at the given moment and is avoidable for freedom of will, but abnormity in general.[6] Paul's teaching, that man ever retains unchanged his power for good and for avoiding all evil, was not intended as a reply to the sinner's self-justification. On the contrary, he explains, how the heathen in consequence of their sin, *i.e.* of their apostasy from God, have been given up to a reprobate mind, to do what is not convenient, their self-defence being simply refuted by the statement that men are not what they ought to be, even granting that they lack the consciousness of the fact. Enough that evil is culpable in itself, and better knowledge, like better will, in harmony with the moral capacity still remains possible for the future. If knowledge and condemnation of evil are lacking, this is evidence of deeper moral degeneracy. There is a guilty ignorance.[7] But even where the individual has not contracted a darkening of the moral judgment, the verdict remains fixed

[1] Ecclus. xv. 14.
[2] Rom. vi. 18, 20; John viii. 32 f.
[3] Matt. xxiii. 37; John v. 40.
[4] Eph. ii. 3: *θέλημα σαρκός*; Rom. viii. 5.
[5] Matt. vi. 12, xxiii. 32-37; Rom. i. 32, iii. 19; Gal. vi. 5.
[6] 1 John iii. 4.
[7] Rom. i. 21.

that his state is culpable. Nor are obligation and responsibility abolished in the case of deeply fallen man, because a possibility lies open to him of attaining unity with the law. By the help of the exposition given, which has established the universal actuality of evil among mankind as well as its pre-conditions, we are now able to apprehend the nature of evil according to Holy Scripture.

II.—THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE OF THE NATURE OF EVIL OR THE IDEA OF EVIL.

§ 73.

Despite its endless diversity, sin has, according to Holy Scripture, a similarity, nay unity. It is contrariety, opposition to God and His holy precepts, which embrace the individual and the whole race. In man himself it is the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, manifesting itself not in mere passivity, but also in false energy, in falsehood, arrogance, and hate.

LITERATURE.—See § 72.

1. In the O. T., as in most languages, one and the same word (רַע) at first denotes two things, moral and physical evil. That a norm of goodness or a goal to be striven after is always presupposed, is clear from the fact, that the words for the act of sin denote etymologically a deviation, namely from the straight path or goal. So חָטָא, עָוַל. Therewith a distinction finds place according to the degree of conscious will present in the action. שְׁגָגָה (mistake) is opposed to אָשַׁם as *culpa* to *dolus*. In מָעַל and פָּשַׁע also, which refer to actual wickedness, more intention is expressed than in חָטָא. רָשָׁע is the offender against God's holy precept. But the worst kind of offences consists in the sins done בְּיָד רָמָה (with uplifted hand), *i.e.* in rebellion against God. These are punished with extermination. But along with these conceptions is found another, according to which evil is the unsubstantial, the idle and futile in itself (הֶבֶל); the untrue, the irrational, nay foolish

(נְבָלָה and סִכְלוּת). In the N. T. also evil is measured by the norm of the law.[1] But according to the different aspects of the law which it violates, it is now represented more ethically as opposition in man himself through the predominance of the lusts of the flesh, which war against the soul, resulting in inner disorganization,[2] while the dissolution of the harmony in man himself introduces in the next place conflict into the world and into his relations to his neighbour;[3] now it is represented in an ethico-religious aspect, *i.e.* as contrariety to his moral and religious destination,[4] and finally in part more objectively as a state of real alienation from God,[5]—all these views not excluding each other. Everywhere in the N. T., the law, which embraces love to God, to one's self, to one's neighbour, in brief, morality and religion, is the fixed point, by means of which all evil is apprehended in its homogeneity and under its different chief aspects.[6]

2. In the didactic discourses of Christ it is emphasized as the ground of the sinful conduct of the Jews, and consequently as their fundamental sin, that they have not the love of God in them, love not the light, and have not God's word abiding in them.[7] If all this is primarily merely a defect, a negative, it is still a defect in that which they ought to have, for the love of God and our neighbour is the all-embracing fundamental command.[8] Hence in the absence of love all good is wanting to them. Moreover, such defect alone does not describe an entire element or state. The converse of the non-existence of that which ought to exist, is the existence of that which ought not to exist, a false love which introduces disorder into man and into the world. They love darkness rather than light, love themselves and their own honour, the world and its glory more than God.[9] The moral weakness, torpor, or obtuseness of the flesh[10] in relation to goodness does not exclude, but has for its converse, a false strength, sensitiveness, and love. This false love, when it would assert itself against

[1] 1 John iii. 4.
[2] Gal. v. 17; Rom. vii. 15 ff.; Jas. iv. 1.
[3] Jas. iv. 1.
[4] Eph. iv. 17–19; Col. iii. 5 ff.; Rom. viii. 7.
[5] Eph. iv. 30; Rom. viii. 7, 8.
[6] Matt. xxii. 37 ff.; Rom. xiii. 8–10; Jas. ii. 8.
[7] John iii. 19, v. 38, 42.
[8] Matt. xxii. 37 ff.; John xiii. 34; Rom. xiii. 9.
[9] John iii. 19, xii. 43, v. 44.
[10] Matt. xxvi. 41.

God and His Spirit, has for its result,[1] that deficiency in love to God advances to the positive form of hatred to what is divine. And with hatred is joined the falsehood which blinds man in self-complacency to his own character.[2] The worst form of this pride, which is an abomination before God, is the spiritual arrogance, the conceit of self-righteousness, which is at the farthest remove from salvation.[3]

3. Let us turn to the separate New Testament authors. *James*, although presupposing the Christian faith and divine revelation,[4] moves especially in the ethical sphere. He starts from the mature course of moral observation peculiar to a genuine converted Israelite, who adopts the idea of unity, which distinguishes his faith in God from heathenism, as the supreme moral principle, and works it out under every aspect. He regards sin above all as antagonism to that rounded unity and completeness which the individual man as God's image, and the human community as a family, ought to represent.[5] To him, evil is man's disunion with and in himself. The dualism on the side of knowledge is doubt, on the side of will doubleness of soul,[6] a welling of sweet and bitter from one spring; a conflict of lusts and desires one with another;[7] in relation to others, the dissolution of unity in strife and hate,[7] —all which is also disunion with and enmity to God.[8] The most explicit passage in James respecting evil[9] does not treat of the origin of evil in the world in general. Otherwise, its meaning must be: Evil is innate, which would not harmonize with James's teaching.[10] It rather depicts the process through which existing sin runs; for the desire, from which the passage starts, is already disorderly desire. The temptation which springs from our own lust, is not for James something innocent. Otherwise, he had no need to say: "God tempts no one." The passage rather describes the issuing forth of

[1] John iii. 19 f., xv. 19. [2] John v. 44; Matt. ix. 12; Luke v. 31, xvi. 15.
[3] According to the Synoptics also, along with the sensuous form of sin (Matt. vi. 31), Christ signally emphasizes the specifically Jewish one, the δικαιοῦν ἑαυτόν, Matt. xxi. 31 ff.; Luke x. 29, xvi. 15, xviii. 9 ff., v. 31; Matt. ix. 12; Mark ii. 17. But the parable of the Prodigal and his brother is specially pertinent here.
[4] i. 3, 18–21. [5] i. 4: διολληρία. τελειότης, iii. 9 f.
[6] i. 6, 8, iii. 11 f., iv. 8. [7] iv. 1, 2, iii. 14–16. [8] iv. 4.
[9] i. 13 ff. [10] i. 17, 18.

the evil act from the evil ἐπιθυμία, in which as to potentiality it slumbers, while at the same time individually and definitely emphasizing the psychological factors which co-operate in producing the evil act. In contrast with the actual sinful lusting, the ἐπιθυμία itself is the propensity or tendency thereto. When then the stimulating, alluring object, which is represented under the figure of a bait, approaches the slumbering desire, a surrender to that object, an evil conception (συλλαβοῦσα) takes place. Not merely does the stimulating object evoke the *thought* of lust, which is sin, but the evil propensity, even in view of the law, unites, at first inwardly or ideally, with the object that is holding out promises of pleasure. Thus, through the surrender to the deceptive bait (or falsehood) is brought about the coalescence of the will with the forbidden pleasure, evil resolve or the conception of actual sin. But the sin conceived in the heart is like an evil living being, which has its course of development and is destined to emerge to the light of day. Thus the inward sin brings forth the evil act. And with the evil act, and the pleasure gained thereby, the process is not yet at an end. Necessity is laid on sin to bring forth another offspring—death, and this is done when sin is finished. This end, then, discovers or unmasks the connection of evil with falsehood. Therewith it becomes manifest that the bait which promised pleasure was a deception. But according to James, the falsehood is begotten "of one's own sinful lust," which imagines an illusive good in the object of its pleasure.

Peter, indeed, has laid down nothing distinctive respecting the nature of evil; but among the many kinds of sin which he enumerates,[1] he not merely mentions the heathen forms, but no less condemns the sin of pride, the disposition which fancies that it has no need of the gospel of free grace.[2]

Allied with James by his anthropological starting-point, *Paul* is distinguished from him by the fact that he views evil, not for the most part as the discord of man with himself and the world, as a conflict of lusts, but as discord with God. He specially emphasizes evil on its religious side, or as sin. He starts, therefore, from idolatry,[3] apostasy from God, as the

[1] 1 Pet. i. 14, ii. 11, iv. 1-3, 15.

[2] 1 Pet. iv. 18, v. 5, 6; cf. Acts xi. and xv. [3] Rom. i.-iii.

inner cause of the heathen forms of evil, *i.e.* of the setting loose of ἐπιθυμία. But his uppermost thought respecting even the Jewish form of sin is its irreligious character. To him it is pride and arrogance before God in imaginary righteousness, in self-satisfied seclusion (*Sichabschliessen*) from God and divine revelation, in unbelief. Even the Jewish form of sin is a sort of idolatry, as the consequence of inner apostasy from God, but it stands nearer to self-deification than to deification of the world; and the falsehood, which here also is connected with evil, is not the bait of sensuous pleasure, but the conceit of personal superiority, to which God means a Being who rewards the merit of legal observance. On the other hand, God is not here regarded as the Giver of all good, even of moral strength, still less as the supreme Good itself, with whom community of life is possible and necessary, in order that true life, holiness, and blessedness may exist in us. As, therefore, to the apostle that moral conduct, which harmonizes with the fundamental relation of the creature, is *faith;* and faith does not limit the vital connection between God and man to the beginning, but would see it perpetually renewed, in order that God may impart His πνεῦμα, and by this means the harmony of man with God, with himself and the world, may be established and increase,—so to him unbelief is the root of all abnormal conduct. To him, faith is the revocation of the apostasy from God, the restoration of the normal ground-character in humility and self-surrender, by which man is brought back to his true divine centre. But it must be faith in Christ; for this to Paul is the point where humanity unites pneumatically with God, the true centre of humanity. But unbelief is the centring of the creature in itself, on which account the apostle so jealously excludes self-glorying, pride in spiritual things, this being pride before God.[1]

This conception of evil must be considered still more exactly in its main idea, that of the σάρξ, which, although found in others, is specially distinctive of Paul. It is an erroneous conception,[2] that σάρξ to him is merely the material substance, different from matter only as animated, or that the

[1] Rom. iii. 19, 27, iv. 2, ix. 32 f., x. 3; Gal. vi. 14; 1 Cor. i. 29, 31, iii. 21; 2 Cor. xii. 1, 5; Eph. ii. 9; 2 Cor. x. 17.

[2] *E.g.* von Holsten, *ut supra.*

ψυχή animating it is identical with σάρξ. Σάρξ denotes to him not merely the sensuous *body*, which in this case he would oppose dualistically, according to the Hellenic or Platonic mode of thought, to the pure, innocent spirit. It is wrong to suppose that Paul[1] describes Adam's initial constitution as evil, although he does not regard mankind in the beginning as pneumatic, but only as receptive and destined for the pneuma. That to the apostle the sensuous material organization is not the real ground of evil is evident from this, that for him all things are from God,[2] therefore matter also, and that he makes corporeity part of man's perfect condition.[3] A certain identity of the resurrection body with the present one is presupposed, as is especially clear from the passages respecting the transformation of the latter.[4] Nay, even in the present state Paul knows of a possibility of uniting the πνεῦμα with our sensuous material organization. The body may become the temple of the Holy Ghost, its parts may become members of δικαιοσύνη.[5] Thus, according to Paul, the Manichæan theory, with which also the Pauline Christology would be inconsistent, is untenable, even to the extent of supposing that he attached himself to the dualistic world-theory of the Hellenic philosophy.[6] Nor is even the O. T. dualistic. Nowhere has Paul described the destruction of our material body, or even the mortification of its impulses, as redemption. On the contrary, it is spiritual death and resurrection, faith in Him who died and rose again, that brings redemption.[7] But no doubt σάρξ occurs in Paul in a great variety of applications. First, in the *innocent*, psychologico-anthropological sense, in distinction from bone or connected with bones and blood,[8] synecdochically the body.[9] Hence the whole man as an individual manifest

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff.; see above, p. 308.
[2] 1 Cor. viii. 6; Rom. xi. 36; cf. 1 Tim. iv. 4.
[3] 2 Cor. v. 2 f.; Phil. i. 23, iii. 11, 21.
[4] 1 Thess. iv. 13 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 51; 2 Cor. v. 2, 4; Phil. iii. 21.
[5] 1 Cor. vi. 19; Rom. vi. 13, xii. 1.
[6] Cf. even Weiss, *ut supra*, § 68.
[7] Certainly to the apostle Christ's bodily death has its reference to sin, but not in the sense of delivering Christ from a sinful existence; and just as little in the sense that in Christ our body also is now really dead, and that this deliverance from the sinful body has become to us a redemption from sin (against Holsten; cf. Weiss, *ut supra*, p. 243 ff.).
[8] 1 Cor. xv. 50. [9] 1 Cor. xv. 39; 2 Cor. vii. 5; cf. John vi. 52.

to sense is called σάρξ.[1] The word σάρξ receives a more concrete meaning, and withal one implying an estimate of value, when it is contrasted with something higher, without on this account being described as evil. In this case it is the unessential, outward, subordinate, perishing, in comparison with the essential, inward, abiding, with the νοῦς or πνεῦμα.[2] But Paul cannot have derived sin from the weakness and corruption of the flesh,[3] because conversely he derives corruption and death from sin. But especially frequent is the use of the word in a decidedly *bad* signification, namely when the flesh takes up ground in opposition to the νοῦς or πνεῦμα and God, asserts and closes itself against the higher life.[4] In this case the flesh embraces, *first*, the sensuous heathen form of sin, a supremacy of fleshliness (*Fleischlichkeit*) emancipated from the spirit, and therefore abnormal,[5] although even here the organism with its natural appetites is not described as evil in itself. *Secondly*, the word flesh signifies to Paul a perversion of the rational nature, a contradiction to the spiritual character or the divine πνεῦμα, from which it is clear that he cannot intend to find all sin merely in a predominance of the body over the spirit. He speaks of a wisdom after the flesh, a mind and will of the flesh,[6] from which it is plain that ψυχή is viewed as connected with σάρξ, and the whole of man standing in opposition to the spirit is called σάρξ.[7] How is this phraseology to be explained? According to the apostle's view, the σάρξ, considered as man's centring in and living for himself in his material, physical nature, may also be drawn into his rational nature, into knowledge and volition, and thus arises the tendency to what is base and undivine. Pre-eminently "fleshly" to the apostle is the God-resisting disposition, in virtue of which, man in self-sufficiency and pride opposes

[1] *E.g.* Rom. ix. 5, i. 3, and the phrase πᾶσα σάρξ.

[2] 2 Cor. v. 16: "I know Christ no longer after the flesh," *i.e.* according to His outward, perishing, earthly relations, x. 3, 4; Phil. iii. 3.

[3] As Theodore of Mopsuestia supposes.

[4] Rom. vii. 23, cf. 18; Gal. v. 16, 19, cf. 22 f.

[5] Rom. vii. 5, 14, 25, viii. 4–13.

[6] Col. ii. 18: νοῦς σαρκός; 1 Cor. i. 26; Eph. ii. 3; cf. Gal. v. 19 ff.; 2 Cor. i. 12, 17.

[7] Cf. 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4; Rom. vi. 19.

himself to God, and withdraws himself, in his Spirit-forsaken finiteness and individualism, from the Spirit of divine life and divine love.[1] Accordingly to him even the rational, especially the Jewish form of sin is "fleshly," namely, self-conceit, greed of praise, self-confidence, and self-righteousness.[2] If, therefore, it is asked how it is that Paul so frequently describes sinfulness in general by the word flesh, whereas the word seems only to suit the sensuous form of sin (the proud man, for example, not sinning with the flesh), it is not enough to say that the most common form of sin, and that most obvious to sense, has given the name to the whole. Rather, we should remember that so far as man is without the πνεῦμα, Scripture calls him σάρξ in general, or describes him in his extra-divine, natural essence.[3] If then he chooses, although designed for fellowship with the divine, in self-satisfaction to be self-centred and self-enclosed, he is no longer a being in a state of innocent nature,[4] but a natural creature asserting itself against the divine, and in this his physical and rational totality is called flesh; and that with the greater right, since now the God-allied spirit is no longer the ruling power in him, but the God-forsaken spirit is shut up within laws and pursuits, such as a merely finite being alone can have. In the godless relation to himself in his isolated naturalness lies the possibility as well of worldly love and sensuousness as of pride, the possibility of idolatry of the world and self, the heathen and Jewish forms of sin. The apostle describes both forms by their characteristic essence.[5] But in both cases, ἔχθρα θεοῦ is set forth as the other side of such creaturely self-will.[6]

Whereas *James* and *Paul* proceed anthropologically (the latter, however, ascending from man's true nature to the absolute antithesis which sin forms to God's πνεῦμα), *John*

[1] Heinrici, *Die Sünde nach Wesen und Ursprung*, 1878, p. 10: "The flesh means more than sensuousness. In the apostle's sense it denotes man's entire life, so far as it is not determined by the Spirit of God. It forms, therefore, the antithesis, not to higher powers, but to our higher destination. It no longer denotes frailty, as in the O. T., but a perverted moral character."

[2] 2 Cor. xi. 18; Gal. iii. 3, v. 17-21, 24; Phil. iii. 4.

[3] Cf. Isa. xxxi. 3, xl. 6 ff.; Job xxxiv. 14 f.; Ps. lvi. 4; Jer. xvii. 5.

[4] [*Er ist nicht mehr unschuldige Natürlichkeit*, He is no longer innocent naturalness.]

[5] Rom. i. 21-32, ii. 17 ff.

[6] Rom. viii. 7, i. 25, 30, ii. 23.

proceeds theologically. Not indeed in such a form as to derive evil from God, or to assume a primal power of evil and two natures opposed from the time of creation, good and evil.[1] But in keeping with his fondness for vast objective antitheses, he goes to the heart of the matter when, starting from God, he opposes the κόσμος in general to God, and discovers the entire evil life in its innermost essence as antagonism to the divine. The word κόσμος takes in John just the same commanding position as the "flesh" in Paul. The "world" has in him, first of all, the usual *physical* sense, without secondary evil meaning. Thus he calls the universe, the earth and this earthly system of things bound to time and space, especially the human world, κόσμος.[2] The word already contains an *amphibological* meaning, when God, who is the truth and light, the life and love, is opposed to the world. All this the world is not in itself. But still it is receptive of God. While it is not itself the supreme good, and ought not to be treated as such, it is capable of receiving, and destined to receive part therein.[3] Of itself the world knows nothing of God and of fellowship with Him;[4] in itself it is without truth, light, and blessedness, on which account Christ comes into it to speak and work. Nevertheless, this imperfection[5] — its distinction from God — could not be described as sin. Only aversion from God, wilful ignorance of the truth and light, of life and love, and therefore the wilful self-centring of the world in its finitude, its exclusive self-attachment (*Insichfixiren*), as if it were the light and life, is sin and evil.[6] But such living of the creature in itself, as if in self-glorification it were the real good, is based upon falsehood. In part it loves outward show, and lets itself be drawn

[1] The Prologue of the Gospel derives everything finite from the life and light of the λόγος. The finite is indeed without light in itself, and in so far darkness; but this innocent absence of light only becomes sin when the darkness asserts itself against the light (John i. 5), instead of accepting and retaining it. This is not prevented by its nature (i. 11, 12), which on the contrary needs the light (i. 4, xii. 35 f., 46).

[2] John xvii. 5, 24, i. 9, 10, ix. 39, xi. 9, xii. 47, vi. 14, vii. 4, viii. 26, ix. 5; cf. Rev. xiii. 8, xvii. 8. The entirety of men: John iii. 16, 17, vii. 4, xii. 19.

[3] John vi. 33, 51. Receptiveness: John iii. 16, 17, iv. 42, xii. 47, xvii. 21, 23.

[4] ix. 39, 41, xii. 35 f.; 1 John ii. 11.

[5] John i. 5.

[6] John ix. 41.

from God by sensuousness;[1] in part it seeks its own honour, will not give it up,[2] cannot submit to be rebuked by the light, but proudly closes itself against God. Thus, in John the world is called both the object of false, God-opposing love, and the subject. As the world, it loves not what is from God, but what is from the world.[3] Both subject and object are combined, when it is said the world loves its own, *i.e.* the world loves itself.[4] As the world, it cannot hate what is opposed to God, but loves it; it cannot love the good, but only hate it.[5] In thus turning away from God and falling back on itself, it seeks to organize itself into a self-sufficing circle of its own, to which Christ and His people belong not, of which they are not, although found outwardly in the same world. And this it succeeds in doing to a certain degree. The whole world lies in wickedness through him who is in the world, the wicked One,[6] Satan, who is the centre of all that is opposed to God, and who, as the world's false principle of unity, seeks to organize it into a counter-power to God, a kingdom of evil; for he is called *ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*.[7] The world is thus a compact power,[8] banded in conspiracy against Christ, and destined to be overcome. It would fain close itself against Christ; but it cannot prevent Him entering into it, into its compact unity, as light into its darkness.[9] It may render itself insensible and blind to the light brought by Christ and His servants;[10] it may hate and slay His servants, but it must submit to have its nature judged by this light, nay, by its very opposition to the light, submit to pass unwilling judgment on itself, to exhibit itself as darkness,[11] and also to be judged at the last day.[12]

4. In thus thoroughly grasping evil in its absolute significance under its two main forms,—one more passive (where the spirit falls a prey to false dependence on the sensuous world, to deifying of the world), the other more

[1] 1 John ii. 16, 17.
[2] John v. 41–44.
[3] 1 John ii. 15.
[4] John xv. 19.
[5] John xv. 18, 19, xvi. 20; 1 John iii. 13.
[6] 1 John iv. 4, v. 19.
[7] John xii. 31, xiv. 30, xvi. 11; cf. Eph. ii. 2, vi. 12.
[8] John xvi. 33.
[9] John i. 9, ix. 5, xii. 46.
[10] John i. 10, ix. 39, xiv. 17, xvii. 25; 1 John iii. 1.
[11] John iii. 18 ff., xii. 31, 47 f., xvi. 11; cf. 1 Cor. vi. 2, xi. 32; Rom. iii. 6.
[12] John v. 29, xii. 48.

fective, deifying of self in pride and arrogance,—while deducing both from alienation from God,[1] whose converse is some kind of false love, the New Testament leads at once to a standpoint, from which evil appears in a new light, namely as the irrational, as *falsehood*, as hollowness and emptiness, which has nothing but outward show and folly for its contents. To be falsehood is essential to evil in its *sensuous form*. For this form only gains acceptance through falsehood, as if the creature and not God were the supreme good,[2] as if the world with its lusts did not pass away,[3] as if the law were not given, and therefore God not holy, or in giving it not good,[4] and finally as if, when the law is transgressed, God were not the righteous, almighty Judge of evil, and as if sin would lead to a higher state of existence in knowledge, freedom, and delight.[5] Evil arrogates to itself a power which it possesses not; in order to cause despair of the triumph and power of good,[6] it pretends to an immortality of pleasure, or at least impunity. But this falsehood is dissipated, and sin exhausts itself. The end of sin is the dispersion of the attractive show of false good; for all sin is a fantastic and false simulation of illusive benefits, a sort of superstition and deifying of the world. The end is death and destruction instead of life, bondage instead of freedom.[7] The second chief form also only gains acceptance through falsehood. Pride before God rests upon untruth, upon denial of the creature's position. The "strong" are "weak."[8] Self-righteousness is but a worse form of sin, because it denies the basis of morality and religion—humility.[9] Whoever thinks himself pure deceives himself, *i.e.* untruth and falsehood is such a power in him as to deceive the deceiver who believes in it.[10] The pre-Christian heathen religions, which exhibit an ethical character, like the higher dualistic systems, began indeed to grasp the fearful nature of evil, but not its reality

[1] Rom. i. 21 ff., ii. 17 ff.; John iii. 19 f.
[2] This is the ἡδιλαρ in Jas. i. 14; the πάγις in Paul (Rom. xi. 9), 1 Tim iii. 7; 2 Tim. ii. 26.
[3] 1 John ii. 17. [4] Gen. iii. 1. [5] Gen. iii. 4, 5.
[6] Matt. iv. 8 f.
[7] Rom. vii. 15: θάνατος; Jas. i. 15; Rom. vi. 18 ff., 23. [8] Matt. ix. 12.
[9] Matt. xxi. 31 ff.; Luke v. 31, x. 29, xvi. 15; Mark ii. 17.
[10] 1 John i. 8.

and depth. They believe in the evil, which attributes to itself a power belonging only to God. They hold it to be inevitable, a view which maims the moral impulse, as it obscures the consciousness of guilt. On the other hand, in the O. T. and far more decisively in Christianity, the consciousness of the victorious power of goodness shows that the hollowness and folly of evil have been seen through. It is recognized as springing from falsehood, maintaining itself through falsehood, and also as ending, through the manifestation of its falsehood, in judgment. Satan is already judged.[1]

5. The superficial conception of evil stops at the evil acts, and does not recognize the evil state in which it culminates, and from which the evil act again issues. On this view it appears as consisting in mere isolated acts[2] of momentary significance. But the N. T. recognizes also inherent sin.[3] According to the apostle, alienation from God is accompanied by an evil state. He speaks of deadness to the divine, of insensibility, of a hard heart and conscience, of an old man.[4] Christ speaks in the same way.[5]

III.—SIN AS A POWER IN THE HUMAN RACE, OR AS GENERIC SIN.

§ 73*b*.

According to Biblical teaching, the actual, like the inherent, sin of the individual does not stand as something isolated, but is in most intimate connection with the entire race.

LITERATURE.—Oehler, *Theol. of O. T.* I. 235 ff. [Clark]. Weiss, *ut supra*, §§ 67, 153.

Observation.—As the generic character of evil is of the highest importance, both for a correct idea of evil and for redemption, it is worth while first of all to review the

[1] John xvi. 11; Luke x. 18.
[2] [*Blosse Einzelheit*, mere individuality.]
[3] ἁμαρτία νεκρά, Rom. vii. 8, is sin not yet active.
[4] Eph. ii. 12, iv. 17 ff., 22; Col. iii. 9.
[5] Matt. vii. 18, viii. 22; John iii. 5, viii. 38.

Scripture history of the relation between the genus and the individual in reference to sin.

1. In the O. T. are already found the materials for the conception of evil as a generic characteristic, and not merely as a matter of the individual person. A common life in a good and evil sense is often spoken of, the ruling assumption in general being, that the members of a general body, kinsmen in race, are homogeneous by nature or by example and custom, specifically in a moral and religious respect, more certainly, however, in evil than in good. Here come in those two lines or circles of life in the oldest history of mankind, although the division is not such as to make all interchange in a good and bad sense impossible. In these circles the individual persons are considered as so bound together, that not merely is a general sum of evil spoken of (in which case certainly each individual might only be responsible for his share), but a general sin and guilt of this circle, and that the individual without more ado is regarded as jointly responsible for the whole to which he belongs, as involved in its guilt,[1] and conversely, the righteousness of one benefits the whole.[2] The less the advance in personal self-dependence, the greater the importance attached to the truth that the particular individual is to be estimated by the total life of which he is a member, and which exercises sway over him. According to the O. T., at first a preponderance of the generic over the personal life obtains. This is the *physical stage*, for the genus is necessarily preponderant, where the personal element has yet made no progress. Hence it is said,[3] that the transgression of the fathers is visited upon the children, who are also assumed to be evil, to the third and fourth generation. The proverb: "The apple falls not far from the trunk," as Hengstenberg rightly says, has its application where no principle of regeneration as yet exists. The same thought of the responsibility of the individual for his race, and of the whole for the individual, this solidarity of their relation is also a fundamental assumption in the obligation of the nation to punish the sin of the individual and do away with wickedness, in order that the whole

[1] Here the mention of the Flood is in place, Gen. vi.; the judgment on Sodom and Gomorrha, Gen. xix., and so on.

[2] Gen. xviii. 22 f., 31. [3] Ex. xx. 5, 6; cf. xxxiv. 7, and Deut. v. 9.

land may not lie under guilt, and in the sacrifice for an undetected murder. An unexpiated crime pollutes the land. Guilt like that of Achan or the king, is charged to the whole people,[1] to say nothing of the fate of the Canaanites, where the whole people suffered for offences which had poisoned the commonwealth. If we stop at this point, and the personal factor remains excluded, it would not be wrong for the individual to be deemed better for the sake of his better race, *e.g.* the Abrahamic, and others to be deemed worse for the sake of their worse ancestry,—an idea present to the minds of the disciples[2] as possible, but rejected in the O. T.[3] This leads to the *second* stage.

The Hebrew people advances to the standpoint of *legal personality.* Since the law appeals to the will of the individual, with the consciousness of personal duties it awakens the consciousness of personal responsibility, and in this way over against the physical factor of the generic life emerges more and more consciously that of the *subjectivity* of the individual. But to this an opposite extreme attached itself, mentioned by Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Under the pressure of the burden afflicting their days in special measure, the opposite pole to physical generic life, namely personal consciousness, made itself felt to such a degree, that during the sufferings of the people the proverb grew up: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge."[4] Here, therefore, every one would fain exist by himself and answer only for his own guilt; the hearts of the children are turned from the fathers; the sons, instead of acknowledging a common guilt which connects them with their fathers, accuse their fathers, or even God Himself, because they suffer, as if there were no common guilt. Jeremiah, on the contrary, reminds of the fact that the sons do not suffer without participating in the sin of their fathers. And similarly Ezekiel shows how such language itself is sin, and that God punishes no one for the fathers' sin unless he is like his fathers in sin, that He punishes no one if he improves, and thus by righteousness releases himself from the power of the generic life.[5] But he

[1] Josh. vii.; 2 Sam. xxi. 1, xxiv. 2, 13–15. [2] John ix. 1, 2.
[3] 2 Kings xiv. 6; Deut. xxiv. 16; 2 Chron. xxv. 4.
[4] Jer. xxxi. 29 f.; Ezek. xviii. 2 f. [5] Lam. iii. 39.

says also, that for this a new heart is necessary. Jeremiah assumes, as an essential, distinctive feature in his Messianic picture, that no one shall any longer suffer for others' sins.[1] The preponderance of the generic life shall cease. In virtue of the new covenant and by means of the new heart, the personal factor, freedom, shall gain the preponderance. Then shall it be true, that every one shall die only for his own sin. But meanwhile the prophet would not have the individual release himself from the guilt of the race, but connect himself with that guilt by repentance, acknowledging that the physical continuity, in virtue of which the individual shares the character of his race, has its truth. The subjectivism of the legal standpoint, on the contrary, would stand absolutely alone. It regards the sin of a neighbour as not affecting it and its responsibility, and would say with Cain, Am I my brother's keeper?[2] Further, it deems itself justified in demanding from the divine government of the world every moment an immediate, uninterrupted equalization of sin and punishment, of merit and reward, even in behalf of individuals, and therefore in inferring special guilt from special misfortune, and special virtue from outward wellbeing.

Certainly the expectation of equality between moral worth and outward destiny involves a justifiable element, to which the reality does not correspond. And out of this grew for the pious of the O. T., especially considering the great significance which the idea of justice had in their eyes, inner perplexity, doubt of the justice of the world's government or of the law,[3] nay, of God Himself. Observation of the course of the world gave rise to the problem of Theodicy,[4] with which also Greek tragedy to some extent busied itself.

But this difficult problem, how the disproportion between worth and destiny in reality squares with God's justice and holiness, led ideally to the *ethical conception* of the relation between individuals and the common life in which they stand. It is recognized that the good man, by disproportionate suffering worthily borne, renders high service to the common

[1] Jer. xxxi. 29 f.; Ezek. xviii. 30.
[2] Gen. iv. 9.
[3] Ezek. xviii. 29.
[4] So in Ps. xlix. lxxiii.; Jer. xii. 1; in the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and especially the Book of Job. See hereafter, §§ 86, 89.

weal; he is a living proof that love to God and righteousness need not be a politic form of Egoism or a mere show, but that goodness has its disinterested, true friends. So to suffer that the non-dependence of love to God upon reward and advantage stands forth to view, is a distinction, is a suffering in honour of goodness, for the common benefit, and therefore a suffering for others, and substitutory in kind. And this subserves the Messianic idea, which carries on the same thought and the ethical connection of the personal and generic consciousness to this point, that the Servant of Jehovah suffers not for His own sake, nor merely for His own distinction, also for His brethren, that therefore the constitution of the common life, by which an innocent person is involved in suffering, must subserve this ethical duty,—that the pious sufferer regard not the guilt of his brethren as not concerning him, but bear it as his own, and that in this way healing accrue even to this common life by the substitutory effects of a healthy personal power belonging to it. The Servant of Jehovah is not humbled by being placed on an equality with the race. On the contrary, His righteousness only shines the more brightly and works the more powerfully, since He spontaneously acquiesces in the disproportion of His fate with His personal worth.[1] Thus in the Servant of Jehovah prophecy brought the personal and generic consciousness into intimate, ethical interpenetration, certainly at first only in ideal intuition. But when the Servant, nay Branch, of Jehovah, although without transgression of His own and by a juridical standard unparticipant in the sin and guilt of the people, nevertheless mindful of the real physical continuity which forms the centre or reality of the people, in free redeeming love treats what belongs to others as pertaining to Him and His responsibility, and bears the people's sin, how could a pious, upright Israelite, who denies not his sinfulness, wish to sever himself from his people, and place himself in contrast with them, instead of blending himself with the sinful nation, without any reserve, in the feeling of a *common guilt?* We find this done in part even before that high development of

[1] Isa. liii. 10. With this may be compared what Plato requires in the Republic in reference to the just man, in order that he may be irresistibly acknowledged as such.

the Messianic idea, *e.g.* in Moses.[1] Of course the whole of mankind is not yet comprehended under the unity of a general sin and guilt, nor is a participation of Israel in the sin of the heathen world expressed. Only a germ of this advance can be found in that Psalm,[2] where the poet seems to derive the beginning and origin of his sinfulness from his connection with the race.

2. By Christianity indeed the personal consciousness has been intensified, nay perfected; for the worth of each individual is now described as infinite,[3] and in the last resort the decision lies with his personal volition or non-volition.[4] But the very perfecting of the personal consciousness leads man in love back to the genus, as we have just seen in the Messianic idea. At Christ's birth the angel announced,[5] that now the hearts of the fathers are again turned to the children. But that which binds them together is a new principle, higher than nature and the family bond, stronger than a common descent and history.[6] In Christ has appeared the founder of a new humanity, and therefore of a new generic consciousness, both of which, however, are the perfecting of the original ones. He is the Head, and all men are living members of the organism of His body only when one is responsible for another, bears another's burdens, suffers with him and rejoices with him, in love esteeming what is another's his own.[7] When the interests of the whole are taken up into the personality, nay, when the latter spontaneously makes itself a means for the good of the whole, this is a raising of the powers of the personality itself. Then it is morally impossible for one to isolate himself, to wish to have nothing to do with another's guilt or the general guilt. Love it is which restores in higher fashion the consciousness of unity among mankind, shattered by sin, and freely makes acknowledgment of common guilt.

Let us now consider still more closely the N. T. doctrine of the generic constitution of man in relation to evil. That, according to it, not individuals, but all are guilty, we have

[1] Ex. xxxii. 10 ff., 32, xxxiv. 9; Isa. i. 4–6, cf. lix. 4, 9–16. Respecting Jeremiah, cf. 2 Macc. xv. 14.

[2] Ps. li. 5.

[3] Matt. xviii. 12, xvi. 26; 1 Pet. ii. 5, 9.

[4] Matt. xxiii. 37; Gal. vi. 4, 5.

[5] Luke i. 17.

[6] Matt. x. 37 f., xii. 47–49.

[7] Gal. vi. 2; 1 Cor. xiii.; Rom. ix. 1–4, xii. 4, xv. 1; Col. i. 24.

seen. But perhaps along with this equality of all, every one still stands absolutely alone. Or is there not merely an equality, but also a real continuity, of whatever kind, in their sinfulness? Every one would stand absolutely alone, if all first became sinners by a personal fall taking place freely and consciously, whether in this state or a pre-temporal state.[1] The N. T. teaches neither of these views, but a real continuity of sinfulness in men. This real continuity is not found in an evil matter as the pre-existent cause, in which all participate; for it knows no such matter.[2] The power of evil example is acknowledged,[3] and therefore warnings are given against offences.[4] An influence is also ascribed to Satan in disseminating hatred and falsehood,[5] and that in respect of the beginnings of mankind.[6] But the N. T. does not stop at this. Satan is nowhere credited with immediate power in causing our race to sin. He gains power only through the mediation of a causality in consenting man himself. And as concerns evil example, according to the N. T. even before experience of the influence of others in temptation, nay, before one's own action, no one who comes into existence in the continuity of the race in the usual way is in a normal state. On the contrary, universal sinfulness is based upon this fact, that "what is born of the flesh is flesh," and not spirit.[7] But in this passage "the flesh" is viewed not merely as an innocent defect which makes sin possible, but as an antithesis to spirit; for otherwise the flesh could not be excluded from the kingdom of God, nor conversion be demanded as essential instead of a mere advance from a lower to a higher stage. Although the passage may not expressly require a new birth, but a birth from above, still the latter can only be conceived as a divine act, by which a life displeasing to God is changed into one pleasing to Him. Thus the sense is: He that is born of the flesh, which is in nature opposed to the πνεῦμα, *i.e.* he who springs from a sinful sphere of life, is homogeneous with that sphere; the effect is determined by the cause. For this reason a second birth is required for all members of the

[1] As, *e.g.*, Jul. Müller supposes. [2] § 73. [3] 1 Cor. xv. 33.
[4] Matt. xiii. 41, xviii. 7; Luke xvii. 1; cf. 1 John ii. 10.
[5] John viii. 38–44. [6] 2 Cor. xi. 3; cf. 1 Tim. ii. 14.
[7] John iii. 6; cf. Matt. iii. 2, iv. 17, xviii. 3.

race, a new and pure beginning, not a continuance in the same line, perhaps with enhanced energy, but a turning back from the wrong path. But by this universal sinfulness, the personal participation and guilt of the individual is not meant to be excluded.[1] As then *John*, in respect of universal sinfulness, does not so introduce the power of the Prince of the world as to overlook the fact of its being based on the natural interconnection of men, so Paul, while adhering to the Mosaic Hamartigeny, goes yet a step farther back to an historic cause within the human race, and in this way brings to a conclusion what is left still indefinite in the Johannæan passage under consideration. He goes back to the first progenitor and his actual sin,[2] not to an irregularity in human nature due to creation, by which sin was brought into the world. Just as surely as he regards Christ not merely as the first in a series, but as the cause, the progenitor of a new race, so surely must he also have thought of Adam as a causality of the sinfulness of the entire human family, although he does not more particularly specify the manner in which the cause operated. And as he had described heathen and Jews as equally in need of redemption, so now, by recurring to their common progenitor, he combines the sin of both as a whole, describes it as chargeable with general guilt and subject to general punishment,[3] to a *κατάκριμα*, with which is contrasted as a healing, indivisible power the *δικαίωμα* of Christ, our receptiveness for which is just as great as our need.

3. *Distinctions of degree* in evil and in guilt. The first men are not cursed, but only the serpent and the earth for man's sake; but in the case of Cain the curse is added, and similarly in the case of the Flood,[4] a fact implying greater guilt. The O. T. does not favour a rigid, abstract doctrine of original sin, according to which all actual evil was the consequence of the evil generic constitution without assistance of personal volition, and according to which, therefore, all men would stand on the footing of a bare equality in sin. It rather acknowledges a difference of degree in evil and guilt. We might think ourselves compelled to decide for the

[1] John iii. 19 ff., v. 38, 44; Matt. xxiii. 37.
[2] Rom. v. 12 ff.: *παράβασις*, *παρακοή*. Cf. Weiss, *ut supra*, p. 238 ff.
[3] Rom. v. 18, xi. 32; Gal. iii. 22. [4] Gen. iv. 11, vi. 5–7.

former view by reason of the need of redemption, which is ascribed absolutely, and therefore uniformly, to all; whereas the moral consciousness, which is aware of degrees of guilt and sin, and that not merely in respect of the sphere of civil justice, testifies for the latter. The importance of this question is great, as on its decision depends whether we are committed to absolute predestination (either in the Monistic form of the restoration of all things, or in the Dualistic form of the antithesis between the eternally reprobate and eternally elected), or whether a place remains for human freedom and responsibility. Now Christ gives distinct intimation[1] that in different persons a different amount of evil volition may be involved in an act. Even in the other world it will be more tolerable for some than for others.[2] Jesus glanced lovingly at the youth who had striven to observe the Ten Commandments, although he had not gained life and peace thereby.[3] And a difference is made between those who are not far from God's kingdom and others. But it seems to be in contradiction to these statements that not merely Paul,[4] but the entire N. T., places all men on a level as those who in a moral and religious respect are destitute of praise before God; for by such language all worth seems denied to all pre-Christian virtue, (and that according to the true standard (*ἐνώπιον θεοῦ*),) and all distinctions in moral and religious character rendered indifferent. Nay, when Christ frequently prefers those who are stained with the most conspicuous vices and sins,[5] Christianity seems directly to wish to build itself on the overthrow of all law and all effort after observing it. But just here the solution, and the harmony with the law, are disclosed. For the Pharisees are not pronounced worse, because they are really zealous to conform to the law, and the publicans and sinners better, because they are indifferent thereto; but the former are pronounced worse because their zeal for the law forgets the fundamental virtue of humility and faith in a soulless observance of the letter, and the latter are pronounced better, because they may be and usually are nearer to the acknowledgment of their need of redemption, and therefore to humility, than the uncreaturely spiritual pride which bases

[1] Luke xii. 47. [2] Matt. xi. 22, 24; Luke x. 12. [3] Mark x. 21.
[4] Rom. iii. 19 ff. [5] Matt. xxi. 31, 32; Luke xv.

ôtself on legal righteousness, and is therefore pretence or hypocrisy. Accordingly, on the basis of the essentially equal, *i.e.* absolute, need of redemption by all a distinction arises, accordingly as one possesses more or less living receptiveness for redemption. To this more or less of receptiveness corresponds a distinction in the degree of sin and guilt. A higher degree of both lies in those acts or states of sin, by which the consciousness of sin, and therefore of the need of redemption, is stifled, and the possibility of conversion imperilled. This is done to the greatest degree by the sin which regards the sinful state connected with falsehood as righteousness, and thus uproots receptiveness for redemption. Although, therefore, outside Christianity all are alike in not being redeemed, while needing redemption, still one may stand farther from or be nearer and more accessible to actual redemption, accordingly as he is in a state which holds him back from redemption as supposed to be needless, or as his form or stage of sin is such as renders it difficult for him to deem himself righteous and obscures his need of redemption. But the sin against the Holy Ghost is described as the most grievous although avoidable sin, *i.e.* the rejection of Christ as Saviour in definitive unbelief,[1] after He has begun to reveal Himself in man's spirit. Nowhere is it said that man must needs commit this sin on account of his natural sinful constitution. On the contrary, it is Christianity which so perfectly restores personal responsibility, that no one can be finally lost or forced to reject Christ on account of his connection with the race.

From this it follows that sin is more perilous and deadly in the degree that it urges to unbelief in Christ.

[1] Matt. xii. 31 ff.; Heb. vi. 4, x. 26. That definitive, irremoveable unbelief forms part of this sin, follows from this, that there is no forgiveness for it either in this world or the next. According to the Epistle to the Hebrews, it cannot be committed, unless free, prevenient grace has been previously lost; for only thus is it possible for the rejection of Christ not to take place in ignorance of Christ's significance.

B.—*The Ecclesiastical Doctrine.*

§ 74. *The Historic Founding of the Doctrine of the Reformation.*

After the physical conception of evil in Manichæism had been overcome, and the doctrine of natural goodness and the power of self-redemption or Pelagianism renounced, the dogmatic development of the idea of evil still remained entangled in the juridical conception until the Reformation advanced beyond it.

LITERATURE.—Fr. Nitzsch, *Grundriss der christl. Dogmengeschichte*, pp. 348–370 (for earlier works on the History of the Doctrine of Sin, see p. 360; on Pelagius and Pelagianism, p. 370; on Grace and Freedom, p. 383). Worthy of special notice: Vossii *Hist. de Controversiis, quas Pelagius ejusq. reliquiæ moverunt*, lib. vii. 1618. Walch, *De Pelagianismo ante Pelagium*, 1783. Jacobi, *Die Lehre des Pelagius*, 1842. Jul. Müller, *Der Pelagianismus, Deutsche Zeitschr. für christl. Wiss.* etc. 1854, N. 40 f. Wiggers, *Pragm. Darstellung des August. und Pelag.* 2 vols. 1821–33. Wörter, *Der Pelagianismus nach seinem Ursprung u. seiner Lehre*, 1866; Theil ii. of *Die christl. Lehre von Gnade u. Freiheit von der apost. Zeit bis auf Augustin*, Freiburg 1860. Landerer, *Das Verhältniss von Gnade u. Freiheit in der Aneignung des Heils, Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* ii. 3, 1857 (the pre-Augustine doctrine). Dieckhoff, *Augustins Lehre von der Gnade*, see *Kirchl. Zeitschr.* 1860–65. Marheinecke, *Ottomar*, Berl. 1821. Bindemann, *Der heilige Augustinus*, ii. 1855. Thomasius, *Die christl. Dogmengeschichte als Entwicklungsgeschichte des kirchl. Lehrbegriffs*, vol. i.: *Die Dogmengeschichte des alten K.* 1874, pp. 438–558. A. Dorner, *Augustin's theol. System und s. religions-philosophische Anschauung*, 1873.

1. A deeply earnest conception of evil in its fearful character was widely spread in the East from early days, most of all in the Dualistic system. In the West also, through the influence of Platonism, a doctrine of matter was not rarely found which regarded the body as the grave of the soul. These modes of thought, so repugnant to the buoyant light-heartedness of the Hellenic spirit, were indeed attracted by the earnestness of Christianity; but in Gnosticism, to which even in its monistic forms a dualistic element belongs, and

still more in Manichæism, which arose in Persia in the third century and found great acceptance in the more earnest Latin world in North Africa, Italy, and Spain, they threw their shadows into the church then in course of extension among the nations of the East. *Gnostic Dualism* divides mankind into two classes, Psychic and Pneumatic. As to substance, the one is evil and unspiritual, the other good. In both cases no place remains for a divine act of redemption, nor yet for a real second birth of man, but only for an intellectual process, an attaining by one class to true knowledge through the πνεῦμα. The acquisition of true knowledge redeems, *i.e.* shows the Pneumatic man his inborn nobleness. *Manichæism proper* does not, like Gnosticism, divide mankind into two classes, but assumes that, while in themselves all are capable of redemption, there are opposite natural principles in every individual man. According to it, the spiritual side in itself is good and pure, allied to the divine; but mankind are evil and in need of redemption by reason of gross matter, which is alien and hostile to spirit, and springs from the primal evil principle (ὕλη, Satan). This second form, therefore, finds *evil* only in the *body*, and is consequently superficial, nay, in course of approximation to the other extreme, to certain forms of Pelagianism. The body, this evil substance, according to it, is bound to man as by fate, a view which abolishes the idea of guilt. Evil being treated as something merely physical, *redemption* is properly to be found only in deliverance from the body, which again is a physical conception of morality. To this, in the next place, attaches itself, since there is no disposition to proceed to the annihilation of the body, a negative asceticism (*signaculum oris, manus, sinus*), which is the issue of true, redemptive knowledge. This Dualism also impinges upon the idea of God, because, although God is conceived as good, He is neither the sole primal principle, nor invested with creative, spontaneous power. Rather, in the rigid, unspiritual character of matter He has an eternal, undivine principle opposed to Him, which even His omnipotence is unable to control.

The unsophisticated Christian consciousness of the church, therefore, opposes to Manichæism religious as well as moral reasons. The one absolute God, beside whom an eternal,

undivine principle has no place, can neither have originated nor permitted evil substances; and since He alone can be the Creator of substances, evil ought not to be regarded as a substance. Thus Augustine's canon: *Nulla natura malum, sed quod contra naturam, id erit malum.* Just so the Greek Fathers teach: *Τὸ σῶμα οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχή.* Evil belongs essentially to the psychical side. Again, in opposition to all Fatalism, the imputability of evil is firmly held, this being based on human freedom, whereas in Manichæan, as in Gnostic Dualism, the existence of evil has its ground in an unhappy fate. It is the merit of the Greek Fathers, up to the beginning of the fifth century, to have rejected this physical conception of evil. To this category belong the Alexandrian Fathers: Clement, Origen, Athanasius, and the Antiochian Diodorus of Tarsus, and Theodore of Mopsuestia. But their positive doctrines of the nature and reality of evil are less satisfactory. In order to avoid the error which makes evil a substance, which would require the disruption of one aspect of man's nature, they treated it more as a defect, certainly as a nonentity which ought not to exist. But again, in order to avoid an unethical Fatalism, those Fathers go back to the natural capacity for virtue in such a way as to impinge upon the rights and the necessity of grace. As concerns the former, the negative idea of evil, the one class of more Hellenic spirit, like Clement, found evil in the want of true knowledge, depriving the will of power to control the desires, or generally in infirmity of will, which is inherent in a finite nature. Here the influence was powerfully felt of the notion shared by an Athanasius and Augustine, that reality in the strict sense properly belongs to God alone, while the creaturely world, which arose from nothing, hovers between being and non-being, and tends back to nothing. Infirmity, corruption, or mortality, the physical element (therefore physical *evil*) was thus specially viewed as that from which redemption by God is necessary. Evil for them is severance from the true divine life, so that death, from which redemption is necessary, has also for them in part spiritual significance, and the dominion of the devil, "who has the power of death," refers to his power in temptation. But seeing that the Greek Fathers ascribe even to fallen man a moral power

and freedom, which although weakened remains essentially unchanged, scarcely anything is left but physical death and corruption, as that from which only divine intervention can redeem. This would imply a Manichæan remnant, if they did not again derive the necessity of death from sin. Theodore of Mopsuestia, who, like Origen, lays stress on the freedom of man, although not to such a degree as to derive man's present mortality from the personal guilt of individuals in a pre-existent state, attempts on the other hand to reconcile the need of divine redemption with freedom, by supposing that mortality was man's destiny from the beginning, and not merely on account of actual sin, because God foresaw that he would sin; this mortality or physical disorganization renders man weak and unfree, and is empirically the cause of his actual sinfulness. The vanquishing of death by the resurrection is redemption. But since even believers must die, such a limitation of the meaning of redemption would imply that redemption in Christ has not yet come, but is only promised. The following may be taken as the general doctrine in the fourth century: Man needs redemption, because the divine image is obscured in him, and he needs a higher knowledge and incitement of the will to good, as well as deliverance from Satan's dominion, especially from the curse of death—the punishment that has come down from Adam. On this view, Christ's example and doctrine, especially that of the resurrection, form the characteristic elements of Christianity. On the whole, therefore, the rejection of Dualism in the Greek Church was purchased by inadmissible sacrifices. That evil might not be conceived as substance, it was stamped as mere defect. Further, and this took place in increasing measure, that capacity of moral imputation might not be infringed, a doctrine of freedom was set up, which left little room, as concerns sin and guilt, for the need of a divine act of redemption through Christ,[1] and which was little in harmony with those doctrines of grace and the efficacy of the divine Spirit, which entered at the same time.

2. This was destined to be revealed in the conflict between *Pelagius* and *Augustine*. In strict antithesis to a merely

[1] The forgiveness of sins indeed always took an important place, chiefly in the rite of baptism, but not a central place governing also the life after baptism.

physical idea of evil, *Pelagius* maintains the subjectively moral standpoint exclusively:[1] *Non naturæ delictum est, sed voluntatis; omne bonum ac malum non nobiscum nascitur, sed agitur.* The act, the self-determination of the free will, is to him the sole source of that which is subject to moral estimate. On this account not only is all determining power of moral significance denied to the material and physical, but all inwardly determining divine influences (*gratia interna*) are excluded; there is merely an *adjutorium Dei externum*, consisting chiefly in Christ's teaching, example, and promise. Even mortality does not place man in a state needing redemption. It neither results in nor springs from sin; to the spirit it has not the force of pollution or punishment, but is an innate necessity of our externally limited nature. On the contrary, man has in himself power for a holy life, which pious heathen have proved. Man certainly has not this indestructible power of freedom for virtue from himself, but from the Creator. If we wish, we may refer it to grace, *i.e. gratia creans*, a view which no doubt involves the refining away of the distinction between nature and grace. But there is no further supernatural and internal grace in history, because it is superfluous. But as all good in man springs from his freedom, so too all evil in the world springs from the action of freedom in the individual. He makes evil example the means by which evil is diffused, but behind that he conceives freedom to be man's unchanging power over himself. To the doctrine of inherited sin he opposes the inherited blessing of freedom. Evil can never be a *vitium naturæ*, an inherited misfortune. This doctrine may appear strictly moral, because it strongly emphasizes personal responsibility and guilt, and satisfying in a religious aspect, so far as it absolutely transfers all causality of evil from God to individual men. But it assigns a foreign, deistic position to God in relation to sin. Under this aspect it is impious, and lacks, therefore, ethical depth. Self-sufficient centring in one's self, isolation from God is thereby sanctioned and invested with the appearance of ethical dignity. We can only agree with Pelagius by

[1] Cf. the works of Jerome (ed. Vallars. xi.), where along with the *Epist. ad Demetriadem* are printed the books *Expositionum in Epistolas Pauli*, revised in the sense of the Church. Cf. Nitzsch, *ut supra*, p. 362.

finding the good, which we ought to possess, merely in single acts and outward works (as Pelagius lays great stress on monkish virtue so called), without reference to the totality of disposition, to the living unity of the person, who only acquires a holy character in that child-like communion with God, which, where God's law is unmutilated, must be accounted man's moral duty as well as the highest moral good.

With *Augustine* the Christian idea of evil begins its course; for by excluding Manichæism as well as Pelagianism—those fundamental anthropological heresies—he began to lay the foundation for Christian anthropology. It is true, he opposes Manichæism, as even Anselm and Aquinas did, by affirming that evil is a nonentity. To desire, he says, to know what evil is, would be to desire to see darkness and hear silence. But still to him evil is not simple non-being or potential being, but a less degree (*Nichtmehrsein, privatio*) of a being which ought to be, privative negation. And the origin of evil lies to him primarily neither in God, nor in matter or nature, but in freedom of will in the first man, by which means he endeavours to secure the moral imputation of evil. But, on the other hand, he is no less anxious to interpret the Christian consciousness of man's need of redemption in a more thorough manner than was possible to the Easterns, who were so fond of referring simply to the darkened mind and the mortality inherited from Adam, or than Pelagius did. His central feeling is expressed in the saying: *Jacet ab Oriente ad Occidentem usque ingens ægrotus. De cœlo venit Dominus, ut sanaret ægrotum.* In keeping with his profounder religious sense, the main thing for him, in order to goodness in man, is not singleness of acts, but his entire habitual character. He regards evil not as mere limitation from without, but as contrariety to a pure beginning, *vitium privatio justitiæ originalis*, the obverse of which is *amor inordinatus* or *concupiscentia.* But whence then this universality of corruption, which is a *necessitas naturalis* in respect of every one newly born? The Greek Fathers, although teaching a transmission of the curse of death, stopped at the freedom of every individual with or without supposition of pre-existence, and either maintained innocence and purity in children, or along with mortality spoke only in general of an evil, natural

desire, or impurity, from which baptism delivers; or again they referred to the temptation of Satan, to which they do not attribute compulsion. The Westerns very early taught differently. One class say (so Tertullian first of all), Adam is *fons generis et princeps*, his soul is *matrix omnium*, who arise out of it like shoots (*per traducem*). But they cannot be other than homogeneous with Adam, who became corrupt by his apostasy; and the *malum originale* constituted by Adam's free act of sin extends by generation to posterity, producing death in them and making regeneration necessary for all. In a similar sense speak Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose. But with the corrupted nature, propagating itself from Adam, is transmitted also the *culpa* resting upon it. This theory of Tertullian of Adam's soul as *matrix omnium*, is that of Traducianism proper. Adam is therewith conceived as a single historic person, but one who stands at the head, and occupies a historic position unique in kind. The sinfulness of all, without their personal participation, is supposed to be absolutely grounded in Adam's free act, by the consequences of which they are affected as by a misfortune, which is also a punishment for the inherited *culpa*. But another theory, found in Irenæus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, is, that Adam is not merely an individual, but the universal man (ὁ καθ' ὅλου ἄνθρωπος), and we were really embraced in him, so that we sinned in him. This would be a species of Pre-existentianism in more religious form connecting with Adam. According to the first theory, the entire genus, developing itself from the first pair, suffers through the single historic person—Adam; according to the second, all the members of the genus are considered not as passive, but as active, but active in Adam. Both theories are found maintained in Augustine. On one side he speaks of a *propagatio*, by which the sin of Adam first passed over to posterity. On this view, therefore, they are not conceived as present and co-operating in Adam. Also when he says: *In Adam totum genus humanum radicaliter institutum est;*[1] or:[2] *ipsum esse totum genus humanum*, so to speak as a germ, this may be uhderstood in a Traducian sense. But, on the other side, he does not quite give himself up to

[1] *De Genesi ad literam*, l. vi. § 14, ed. Ven. vol. iii. 267.
[2] *In Johannis Ev. Tract.* x. 11, vol. iv. 494.

Traducianism, leaving a place open for Creationism. He is sharp-sighted enough to perceive that, on the view of pure Traducianism, posterity are innocently involved in Adam's guilty sinfulness and mortality simply as in a penalty, and that this mode of conception bears too physical a character. He is therefore never able to decide altogether in favour of Traducianism. On the whole, his aim is, with the universality of sinfulness, for which Traducianism seemed to give the surest guarantee, to connect something which it does not supply, namely, to conceive individuals as having participated with their will and fault in their sinfulness (whereas the latter again is certainly supposed to be connected with Adam); *sine voluntate peccatum esse non potest, nec originale peccatum.* He endeavours to unite the two by affirming that all were that One; he was nothing but their entirety. Only to one *peccans volens* can sin be *recte* imputed; but *omnes fuimus in illo uno, quomodo omnes fuimus ille unus.*[1] Thus all are jointly guilty of Adam's free act, and liable to punishment, to spiritual and physical death, a *massa perditionis,* absolutely incapable of good, salvable only by divine elective predestination, which is the irresistible cause of faith in the one class. He does not say that all personally pre-existed in Adam; but as regards their *voluntas,* they existed in Adam. But without personal life, no rational *voluntas,* but only nature could exist, which must operate as it is, which therefore cannot even corrupt itself, but can only produce what is defective, in case it is itself originally defective. Thus, if in the idea of Adam as the *homo generalis* something were meant to be advanced towards solving the enigma why sin and guilt rest upon all, an actual, personal pre-existence of all must be assumed, a pre-existence which, if it were placed in Adam, would involve a monstrous thought; for then Adam could no longer be a single historic person, but merely an idea, or symbol of an idea, namely of collective humanity, whereas Augustine, on the other hand, decidedly contemplates him as a free, acting person, and as a historic progenitor. Thus Adam is to him a double amphibological notion, which

[1] *De Civ. Dei,* xiii. 3, 14. Cf. *Contra Fortun. Manich. Disp.* ii. 23; *De peccat. meritis et remiss.* l. i. § 11, iii. § 14; *De nuptiis et concup.* l. ii. § 15; *Op. imperf. c. Jul.* l. iv. § 104, p. 1466.

seeks to combine in thought irreconcilable factors, in order to satisfy those two interests. The fixed element, which to him is the main thing, consists therefore only in this, that all posterity participated in Adam's guilt. He therefore does not deem it unjust for children who die unbaptized, and the heathen, to be damned on account of the *peccatum originale*, because every one springing from Adam is *damnatus antiqui debiti obligatione*, from which nothing but election can set free.

Great as is Augustine's merit, his system suffers under various considerable defects. Although an Infralapsarian, he values freedom far too little. He invests the original state with a perfection which anticipates the work of freedom, while it makes the Fall inexplicable. His conception of the power of *peccatum originale* is such that he not only regards the virtue found among the heathen as insufficient and imperfect, but simply stamps it as moral corruption. After the Fall he no longer leaves any place for free will, neither in passing over to faith, nor for the preservation of faith. Rather, faith to him is exclusively God's work in virtue of absolute and particular predestination, God also endowing all the elect with the *donum perseverantiæ*.

Not merely did the Oriental Church never accept his doctrine, but in the West also many voices were raised in opposition. Thus John Cassian, Vincentius of Lerins, Faustus of Rhegium, and Gennadius, and the so-called Massilians generally, who taught that fallen man can do some good, namely, begin, while grace alone can complete the good work. This is the later *Semi-Pelagianism* so called, to which original sin is a disease, but which still leaves some freedom, namely for the beginning of conversion.[1] But later, again, Avitus of Vienne, Cæsarius of Arles, and Fulgentius of Ruspe, excited a reaction against the Massilians, and thus at the Synod of Orange 529 a more moderate Augustinianism carried the day, which did not teach absolute and particular predestination, while laying down the proposition: *Primum peccatum primi hominis originaliter in omnes transiit.*

3. In the following centuries opinion fell still further behind the position of Augustine, and in the Middle Ages it rested at an externally *juridical* conception of *malum originale.*

[1] Cf. Wiggers, *ut supra*, ii. 6 ff.

Opinion, it is true, was unanimous on this point, that the loss of Adam's high prerogatives, and especially of *justitia originalis*, passed over to his posterity. Nevertheless, for the most part this was not understood in the sense that posterity on this account were corrupt in themselves. Those prerogatives were conceived as a supernatural addition to Adam's free personality, which was sinless in itself and complete without them, and posterity, although inheriting that loss of *justitia originalis*, are still in possession of freedom of moral choice pretty much like that which Adam had. Only offences, it was said, which are the results of freedom can be called evil. But this, taken alone, would have led to the Pelagian doctrine of natural purity and moral strength, and have left but a precarious position for the need of redemption and reconciliation. And this all the more, since for the most part pure Creationism prevailed in the Middle Ages, which, seeing that nothing sinful can spring directly from God's hand, would lead to the supposition that the soul of every man is really pure originally. Only when, as often happened, a corrupting influence of the body and its disorderly desires upon the soul was assumed, did a certain place remain, on the view of pure Creationism, for the necessity of redemption,—an insecure one, however, when the natural moral strength for virtue was conceived as still existing in Adam's posterity. But in order to obtain a place for the universal necessity of redemption and reconciliation, a sort of *law of inheritance*—an externally juridical standard—was applied to the relation between Adam and his posterity. As children, who inherit the property of their parents, are bound also to assume their debts, so men, who have received through their parents the blessings of their life, are also under obligation to answer for their debts, here the guilt of their first parents. Moral guilt (*culpa*) is thus treated as a species of private debt (*debitum*), and when with this was connected an inherited infirmity of spirit or concupiscence in the lower parts of man, the question still was, whether concupiscence bears a sinful character, which many doubted. Abelard went the farthest in this direction: sin is not transmitted, but penal liability. In this case the only thing left, from which certainly redemption is necessary, is punishment, as formerly according to the Greek doctrine death. Thus the Lombard

could say: All men sinned in Adam, in the sense that as Adam's posterity God regards them as jointly responsible for the sin, by which the *donum superadditum* was lost. But thus men are regarded under one aspect as mere generic beings, not as free persons, and under the other are merely treated as self-dependent persons with capacity of moral choice, not as generic beings. But this is simply the contradiction which during the Romish period is repeated in so many dogmas. The one aspect by itself inclines to entire dependence on the race, and with this corresponds the magical influence of grace through the Church; the other inclines to Pelagianism. One tempers the other, but only in an external manner. No interpenetration of the two legitimate factors—the personality and the genus—is attained.

In the Tridentine Creed the definition is formulated, according to which an inherited penal liability of the race is indeed decisively adopted, and so far Adam's *peccatum transfunditur in posteros;* but otherwise no secure place is preserved for the universality of the necessity for redemption from sin. According to the Tridentine Creed, man's nature is weaker since the loss of the *donum supernaturale,* but is still uninjured, so far as it consists in freedom, *i.e.* in capacity of moral choice. He only lacks now the golden bridle, by which he would have been able with ease to control the lower powers and desires. Nevertheless, the defect of *justitiæ originalis* does not involve sin proper. The concupiscence, which remains even in the regenerate, can only improperly be called sin, although Paul occasionally calls it sin. Therefore, according to this view, strictly considered, reconciliation and redemption would not be necessary for man on account of his personal character. No sinful corruption exists, nor is any inherited from Adam; but only in virtue of a mysterious imputation of Adam's sin have men to suffer for something of which they are not personally guilty. But when it is not a sinfulness inherent in man, but merely a *debitum aliena culpa contractum* which imposes the need of redemption and reconciliation, it is no wonder that the necessity of Christ's redeeming work remains in suspense, and indeed in the days of Scholasticism after Anselm was often denied; for if man does not carry evil or guilt in himself, but has only to bear

another's guilt by a sort of fiction, then the simple omission of the divine imputation of sin would have sufficed for redemption.

Observation.—If we say with Bellarmine, that the *donum supernaturale* is not an incidental, superfluous addition, but necessary, in order to keep under the natural *rebellio carnis* against the spirit, this involves a Manichæanizing tendency, because involving an innate insubordination of the lower powers. But since he regards this natural *rebellio carnis*, now obtaining in us, without the restraining counterpoise of the spirit as just as little evil as the Tridentine Creed regards *concupiscentia*, this mode of representation avails nothing towards establishing the necessity of redemption, but only issues in a lowering of moral duty and an exculpation of man. For this reason Luther's doctrine of *justitia originalis* is a loftier one.[1] He reckons *justitia originalis* a part of man's original nature (*natura*), *i.e.* of his idea, so that, when it is absent and its opposite is present, the idea of man suffers grievous injury. It is the *vere naturale, non donum, quod ab extra accederet, separatum a natura hominis.* In Adam's case, indeed, Luther made too little distinction between the idea and its realization; but he saw that *justitia originalis* cannot be something incidental to man, like a superfluous ornament, but that it forms the centre in the very idea of man, and makes such unconditional claim to realization, that, where it is consciously lacking to man, whereas it ought to be present, sin exists. The mistake of identifying realization in Adam's case with idea, and of making him in the beginning not merely innocent and good in tendency, but already perfect in all virtues, persists long in evangelical theology, although this might have been obviated by the circumstance that self-preservation in the primal state, which confessedly remained a duty, must needs have involved discipline, and therefore growth in moral power.[2] But still the advance in teaching, that perfect righteousness belongs to the nature, *i.e.* to the concept or idea, of man, is independent of this uncorrected mistake.

§ 75.—*The Doctrine of the Evangelical Church.*

The Reformation brings to completion the opposition to Manichæism and Pelagianism; for, while rejecting the

[1] *Comm. on Genesis*, Walch, I. 258 ff. [2] See above, p. 77 ff.

conception of evil as a substance, and holding fast the original equality of all in moral destination, it refuses to consider evil as mere finitude or defect and disease, or as sensuousness, and just as little to find it only in actual sin springing from free volition, but contemplates it as a perversion (*corruptio*) of man morally and religiously, a perversion due to the abuse of freedom, and becoming part of the moral constitution. This ethico-religious idea of evil, although the continuance of free volition in reference to civil justice is taught, includes the absolute need of redemption, but in such a way that at the same time the capacity of redemption is involved in the contrariety of evil to the true nature of the spirit. Accordingly, even generic sin is not conceived as mere misfortune without guilt, nor as hereditary guilt in a mere externally juridical sense without intervention of personal sinfulness, but as culpable abnormity, as sinfulness associated with *culpa* and *reatus*, and implicating in general guilt. On all these points the two Evangelical Confessions are in essential agreement. But none the less they agree also in this, that in several respects their doctrine of the origin of this universal sinfulness remains unsatisfactory in relation to guilt and punishment and to actual sin.

1. As the last word of the O. T.—the word of the Baptist —was the first of the N. T.,[1] so the first of Luther's ninety-five Theses begins with the doctrine, that the life of the Christian must be a continuous repentance. The condition of the knowledge of grace in its significance is knowledge of the significance of sin, according to Melanchthon's saying: *Beneficia Christi non poterunt cognosci, nisi intelligamus mala nostra.*[2] Deeper insight into the nature of sin was necessary, in order that the doctrine of justification by faith might be seen with a clearness such as had been unknown to the Church since the days of Paul. The Reformers stop not at

[1] Matt. iii. 2, iv. 17. [2] Cf. also *Apology*, 56, 33.

single acts or works, but go back to inner movements, and from these to their source, or the state of which they are the manifestation. According to them, there is evil which is not actual and yet culpable. Far removed as they are from Manichæism, because God can create nothing evil, and the devil can create nothing at all, while such a theory, moreover, would be incompatible with the truth of Christ's Incarnation,[1] still they do not consider *concupiscentia* as the mere innocent occasion of sin (*fomes peccati*). It consists in the emancipation of the flesh, which in the normal condition of reason would be kept in subjection to the spirit.[2] Little as they call the body evil in itself, just as little do they make the spirit unparticipant in evil. Rather, to them even sensuousness has a spiritual relation. They see therein *reatus* and *culpa*. And again they teach that there is more than mere defect in the spirit. Evil is not different from good in a mere quantitative sense, a minus of good; but lust tempts the spirit, because the spirit is weak; and it is weak, because it is corrupted by God-opposing tendency. In the spirit itself there is not a mere *defectus*, but an *affectus*, which ought not to be.[3] *Peccatum originis est totius naturæ corruptio.*[4] Thus is man in a state of contrariety to *justitia originalis*, to likeness to God, and therefore to his idea and norm, by which he is judged.[5] But in the last resort this is a state of contrariety to God.[6] Thus the complete Reformation conception of evil includes the elements of *defectus, affectus* (or *concupiscentia* as evil desire in the soul), and *corruptio*, corruption of the good nature. These also form the basis of the sin of the race. Luther specially insists that the departure of the soul from its true centre, apostasy from God or unbelief, and not sensuousness, is the root of all evil.[7] The doctrine of Zwingle, who found evil predominantly in sensuousness, or regarded it as infirmity,[8] was not adopted in the Reformed Symbols.

2. *The Existence of Race—or Original Sin.*—The *Augsburg Confession* teaches: All who come into existence in the way of

[1] *Form. Conc.* 573, 564, 578, 647, 41, 648 f.; *Conf. Belg.* Art. 13–15.
[2] *Conf. Aug.* II. [3] *Form. Conc.* 574. 8, 642, 643; *Conf. Belg.* 15.
[4] *Heidelberger Cat.* Qu. 8–10. [5] *Belg.* 15. 14.
[6] *Apology*, 57. 42. [7] *E.g.* on Ps. li.
[8] *E.g.* in the treatise on *Eternal Prevision.*

natural propagation are born with sin, *i.e.* without fear of God, without trust in God, and with evil desire; and this disease or original fault is truly sin, damning all who are not born again, *i.e.* it is not a mere misfortune or a foreign *debitum* or punishment, but something to which punishment is due.[1] In spiritual things the natural man is the same as dead,[2] but a dead man cannot raise himself to life. It is not the fact that we only need redemption, because another's guilt was imputed or transferred to us apart from corruption of our nature.[3] So Luther says: When we are born, that which comes to us from Adam is no longer another's sin, but becomes our own.[4] The Catholic theory is pronounced superficial and Pelagianizing, because at most it charges our own nature with another's sin, while considering that nature as uncorrupt in itself, at most somewhat stained and weakened for what is good.[5] On the contrary, the entire nature is corrupt, poisoned as it were by a spiritual leprosy, and a depth of *corruptio* exists which cannot be understood without the light of God's Word.[6] The normal state of man's power is such that without grace he is unable to begin any spiritual good, or even by nature alone to co-operate.[7] He is without the *capacitas, aptitudo, habilitas* to begin or co-operate in spiritual things, but, in Luther's phraseology, must at first remain *mere passive* in the work of conversion. Original sin, indeed, is often called a disease; but at the same time it is asserted that it has the character of sin,[8] because even depraved tendency is displeasing to God and damnable. Accordingly, original sin is neither bare guilt inherited from Adam without an evil state, nor is it indeed inherency (*Zuständlichkeit*), while a mere ill or misfortune, without imposing guilt; but it is above all an abnormal sinful character, and thus carries

[1] *Conf. Aug.* II. Quite similarly, *Belgic.* xv.: Peccatum originale est fœdum et exsecrabile coram Deo, ut ad generis humani damnationem sufficiat. *Heidelberger Cat.* Qu. 8–10.

[2] *Form. Conc.* 639 *a.* 2.

[3] *Apology*, 51. 5; *Form. Conc.* 575. 11, 642. 17. Original sin is not merely a debitum ex alieno debito in nos derivatum. Similarly, Melanchthon on Rom. v. 12.

[4] *Walch.* VIII. 1236 f.

[5] *Form Conc.* 642.

[6] *Form. Conc.* 639 *b.* 8, 645. 33, 574. 8.

[7] *Form Conc.* 654. 61. In altogether a similar strain the *Heidelb. Cat.* says: We cannot do good, and are prone to all evil.

[8] *Form. Conc.* 641, 642.

guilt with it. But on the other side, the Manichæan or Flacian theory is rejected, according to which man himself has become sin, evil has become his substance, and he, from being an image of God, has become an image of the devil. Sin is not a substantial poison infused by Satan, as poison into wine.[1] A corrupt nature can only be admitted, if by "nature" is understood not a substance, but a settled condition of the same, which in comparison with substance is nothing but an accident, although habitually fixed in it.[2] Accordingly, even after the Fall a distinction always remains between the nature or substance of the man himself, which as God's work is an object of conservation, and *peccatum orginale*, that corruption of nature.[3] There is still acknowledged a good *scintillula* of divine knowledge, as well as the capacity of free will to pursue the *honestum* in civil concerns.[4] The *Schmalkaldian Articles*,[5] it is true, abolish even the latter, if the words are taken strictly; but *liberum arbitrium in civilibus* remained the common Evangelical doctrine, only that all repeatedly affirmed: If *justitia civilis* were sufficient before God, there were no need of the Gospel. The *Formula of Concord* also declares against Fatalism and absolute Determinism,[6] and censures the doctrine, that the relation of man's will to the Holy Spirit before, in, and after conversion, is one of mere resistance; for this rather is the nature of conversion, that God makes the unwilling willing.[7] Thereby, it is plain, a point of connection is meant to be left for grace in opposition to everything magical, which must the more certainly be the meaning, since it is asserted that in conversion the old man with his rational soul is not annihilated and then a new soul created, but the old soul is born again. Luther's saying, that *in conversione* man's attitude is purely passive, must not be understood absolutely, but comparatively. Rather, the good impulses kindled in man are to be conceived in the sense, that the divine act evokes the human act, and primarily faith.[8]

3. *Relation of Original Sin to the Idea of Guilt* according

[1] *F. C.* 576. 17. [2] *F. C.* 573, 577. 20–22, 643. 26.
[3] *F. C.* 645. 32 ff. [4] *C. A.* XVIII.; *Apology*, 61, 64. 23; *F. C.* 640.
[5] In *A. Sm.* 318. 5, it is denied, hominem habere liberum arbitrium faciendi bonum et omittendi malum et e contra omittendi bonum et faciendi malum.
[6] *F. C.* 580. [7] *F. C.* 581, 582, 673. 60. [8] *F. C.* 582, 583.

to Evangelical teaching. We saw that no guilt is affirmed in Adam's posterity, which had not sinfulness for its basis. Nevertheless, the character of guilt is ascribed to innate sinfulness. Whence, then, is guilt obtained in the case of original sin? Here the controversy between an *imputatio peccati Adamitici immediata* and an *imputatio mediata*, not brought to an issue in the old Dogmatics, has its place. Adam's actual sin, and therefore guilt, might be immediately imputed to us, if we were really present and co-operant with our personal will in Adam. Then neither innate sinfulness in itself, nor the fact of guilt being in it, could cause difficulty. Incurred by us, it then became the source of new sins chargeable with guilt. For this reason, *imputatio immediata* was only given up most unwillingly. The theory is put thus: Adam was the physical head of mankind, in Adam's will *locatæ erant omnes voluntates posterorum.* But, on the other hand, the difficulties could not be concealed of a theory which would ascribe pre-existence to us, while transforming Adam into the mere symbolic idea of the genus (see above, p. 341). So far the Traducian theory of Tertullian, more favoured by the *Formula of Concord*, was preferable, according to which we were not present in Adam as distinct *voluntates*, but only sprang from Adam. We sprang from him, however, in such a way that the guilt was not immediately transferred to his posterity, but the sinfulness. Out of this inherited natural sinfulness guilt might then be mediately developed, in so far as that sinfulness, as the sinful character of each individual, through the medium of his conscious will is again the active cause of sin. But the guilt of that sinfulness itself belonged not to the individual, but only to Adam's actual sin; and only mediately, by means of our sinfulness, could there be a question of an imputation of sin at all, like Adam's. But then arose the enigma, how it consists with God's righteous government of the world to permit a sinfulness to pass over to posterity, from which guilt in itself deserving damnation is developed. The theory of *imputatio mediata* gives no help towards solving this difficulty. In order, therefore, to evince the righteousness of all being involved in sin, recourse was had to the following expedient, which has a meaning on the view of *imputatio immediata.* Adam is not merely the physical,

but also the moral head of mankind.[1] This expedient—the one most current—was further elaborated thus: Adam is the *moral representative* of mankind before God, so that what he did was in God's sight as if his whole race had done it. But how can Adam *personam omnium gerere*, if every one is a person responsible for himself, and none can be good or evil for others? This theory is nearly akin to the Reformed Federal Theology, according to which Adam was the *Covenant Head* of mankind and beforehand concluded the *fœdum* or *pactum*, that his action for good or evil should count as the act of mankind, an expedient which gained a footing in the Lutheran Church in the 18th century, *e.g.* in the case of Bengel. Only it remains unexplained, how such a *pactum* could be binding upon posterity when their consent was wanting. Hollaz finds a solution in the *Scientia Dei media* or *futuribilium*. Although men did not pre-exist really, they existed ideally before God. But God saw that in Adam's place they would have acted in like manner. Therefore sinfulness, guilt, and punishment might justly pass over to them. But the moral consciousness cannot approve when it sees individual guilt, not really existent, treated and punished as real. The attempts of Lutheran Dogmatics not merely, as the Confessions do in the main, to derive sinfulness from Adam, and only by means of this sinfulness to derive the guilt of posterity, but also to harmonize guilt, and thus the divine direction of the world, with God's justice by means of the sinfulness itself, must therefore be described as failures. The sense of this is betrayed in Baier's warning against prying into the question *how* the imputation of Adam's sin and guilt takes place; we must be satisfied with the *that* of the imputation.[2] But this is scarcely explicable, if, as was commonly done, the fact of the transference of sinfulness was brought about by a Traducian theory, which, as was formerly shown, does not contain, but excludes, our personal participation in Adam's actual sin.

Observation.—For the rest, Melanchthon and Brentius did not accept Traducianism, and the Jansenians of the 17th century did not allow it to pass current as an unquestionable

[1] According to Quenstedt, II. 111 and 53, especially Hollaz, *Examen*, 1733, p. 556.

[2] Baieri *Compend. Theol. posit.* Lips. 1750, p. 376, part ii. C. 2, § 8.

doctrine. The Reformed frequently taught Creationism, like the Scholastics, and, in modern days, among Catholic teachers, Günther, Balzer, Staudenmeyer, in opposition to whom Klee and Oischinger favour Traducianism, and Frohschammer, under the name of Generationism.

4. *The Modern Period.*—In the situation just described, it is easily comprehensible that the last century sought to solve the enigma, how innate sin and guilt agree with the divine justice, by denying it. This was done by transforming natural sinfulness into a morally neutral semblance, after the example of the Arminians, especially of Simon Episcopius and others. Döderlein, *e.g.*, holds that original sin can neither bear the character of evil nor be chargeable with guilt, unless with the consent of the person. As there is no room for such consent in the beginnings of human life, *concupiscentia* is neither guilt nor sin, a view akin to the Romish one. But this would lead to laxity in judging. Everything now morally important would become neutral. All moral importance would depend absolutely on subjective freedom, while generic continuity would no longer count in relation to the moral nature of man. Moreover, to attempt on this ground to justify our participation in inborn sinfulness would be unsatisfactory to the moral consciousness, because on this view we should indeed, with Rothe, recognize in original sin something incorrect, something marring the idea of man, but at the same time something physically necessary, *e.g.* necessarily given to God by the constitution of matter, and therefore not the result of actual sin. No better would be other makeshifts, which also abandon the normal dogmatic path, *i.e.* the problem of reconciling the personal and generic interests. Such, for example, would be the case if, approximating to Deism, we were to say, with Frohschammer: Individuals are originated (*gesetzt*), without divine co-operation, by the genus, —which was originally good, but fell through Adam's free act,—in virtue of the power delegated to it by God; God has nothing to do therewith. This may serve as a basis for a Catholic theory of the Church as the vicegerent of God, to which power over individuals is supposed to be committed for salvation as to the natural race for injury. Akin to this view, also, is Von Hofmann's doctrine, that the divine will, even the

creative will, is not at all directed to individuals, but that man in general,—humanity,—considered as one, is the object of the divine will; for on this view, individuals, without divine co-operation, would be simply an act of the genus conceived, so to speak, as the world-soul. Still more doubtful is Philippi's expedient, who holds: As certainly as, according to Rom. v., justification of life is imparted not on account of inherent righteousness, but only by imputation of Christ's righteousness, so certainly does the condemnatory judgment fall on us *only* on the ground of the imputation of Adam's transgression.[1] This would be in conflict with the opposition of the Reformers to *culpa ex alieno delicto contracta*. In contradiction herewith he again supposes that all participated in Adam's sin itself, because their nature is Adam's nature, although not their person, upon which we have only to ask, whether then the nature, *i.e.* the impersonal generic nature, sinned in Adam, not his person,—a view which must lead to an innate existence of evil, or to some one of the theories, according to which the universal creative government is responsible for its origin.[2] Finally, Delitzsch, with a harsh reproduction of Traducianism, has advanced the opinion that all men are to be regarded as leaves on the tree of humanity.[3] In opposition to all such notions, the doctrine of man had to show that humanity is contained in the divine world-idea just as much in its aspect as a plurality as in its aspect as a unity, *i.e.* as an organism, and that Creationism, and not merely Traducianism, maintains an element of the truth.[4]

The result, therefore, of the history of this doctrine is as follows. The relation between the genus and individuals in reference to *peccatum originale* has not yet been clearly formulated. It has neither been made sufficiently clear, how a government of the world, in which sinfulness is innate in individual posterity, consists with the divine holiness and justice, nor again, admitting the sinfulness, what significance remains to the idea of guilt.

5. But with the idea of guilt the idea of *punishment* is most intimately connected. The latter might come into consideration on evangelical ground in a twofold way. *Original*

[1] *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, III. 209 ff.
[2] See under Second Head, § 80.
[3] *Biblische Psychologie*, p. 80 ff.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 94.

sin might be regarded, either as *itself* punishment (either of the race or individuals), *or*, conversely, as the *cause* of *punishment.*

As relates to the first view, since original sin without doubt only bears the character of misfortune, while all misfortune, according to evangelical teaching, is referred to sin as its cause, the opinion recommended itself, that original sin is to be regarded as a punishment of the race. This notion was feasible, if posterity themselves were posited and sinned in Adam; but not, if while the first sin was indeed the act of the person, not of the nature, of Adam, it was not also our act. A passage in the *Apology*[1] seems to place original sin itself under the point of view of punishment, when it says: *Defectus et concupiscentia* are both *pœnæ* and *peccata.* Especially is the conception of original sin as a punishment of the race familiar to the Reformed view.[2] The transference of Adam's sin to posterity as a consequence by mere physical necessity did not satisfy the Reformed. They wished to regard the action of divine Omnipotence as governed by ethical law, and said, therefore, that this sinfulness is transmitted *justo Dei judicio,* that the race is in a state of sinful corruption as a punishment for the fall of Adam, its representative. But as punishment is connected with guilt, a penal corruption could only stand its ground if the guilt of posterity for the sin causing the penal sinful state was more satisfactorily established than we saw it to be. The proposition also, that God may punish evil with sinfulness, needs to be applied in such a way that His justice come not into collision with His holiness, lest God seem, in His judicial capacity, to cause what, in His legislative capacity, He absolutely condemns. It should therefore not be overlooked, that in the passage of the *Apology* quoted, it is at once added: Death and misfortune, along with the *tyrannis Diaboli,* are *proprie pœnæ,* which implies that sin is not *proprie pœnæ,* but only, *in so far* as it is a misfortune, a bondage, not in so far as it is delight in what is forbidden, or sin. Similarly the *Heidelberg Catechism* does not regard original sin itself as punishment, but along with the actual

[1] *Apologie,* 58. 47. Cf. *F. C.* 641. 13. Similarly Gerhard, *Loci Th.* iv. 366, ed. Cotta.

[2] Cf. *Libri Symbolici Eccl. Ref.* ed. Augusti, p. 219.

evil (*Böse*), which is its consequence, as that which is punished, or that for which punishment is inflicted. Calvin also is satisfied with saying:[1] By God's just judgment, through Adam's actual sin, a *corruptio* originated in *him*, which is transmitted to us, and only by means of this transmission do guilt and punishment pass over to us. But the Reformed theologians usually would have our inherited *corruptio* regarded not merely as punishable, as incurring guilt and punishment, but as punishment,[2] just as this *corruptio* was a punishment to Adam, *i.e.* of his actual sin; a view which could only be vindicated upon the theories of guilt previously considered, which make Adam's posterity participate in his sin. As these theories are unsatisfactory, all apparently that can be said is: The Reformation canon, that all misfortune is only comprehensible as correlated with sin, and therefore as punishment, applies also in the case of original sin in so far as it must be called a misfortune, and is observed in so far as this misfortune is caused by sin, namely, by Adam's actual sin. But that which is thus punishment to Adam, namely his *corruptio*, cannot, for this reason, have the character of personal punishment to his posterity. The punishment affecting them can only be the consequence of their own sinfulness.

This leads to the *second* view, namely, innate sinfulness as the *cause* of punishment. The attempt being unsuccessful to prove that the transference of original sin itself to individuals is a punishment in relation to them, the greater stress was laid, especially on the Lutheran side, upon the position that original sin renders the entire race, in which it exists, liable to punishment. That is to say, sin, where it exists, is utterly displeasing to God, and the Holy God must regard every being to whom it belongs with displeasure and anger.[3] From natural sinfulness then follow defects and crimes of various kinds, aversion to good, inclination to evil, and, no less, misfortune up to the point of physical death. But can the relation of the divine anger to inherited sinfulness be just the same as to sinfulness incurred through guilt? This matter reaches its climax in the

[1] *Heidelb. Cat.* Qu. 10. Calv. *Instit.* i. 8. 8.

[2] A. Schweizer, *Die Glaubenslehre der evang. reform. Kirche*, vol. ii. 83 f. 1847.

[3] *F. C.* 640 b, 10.

question as to the relation of damnation or eternal death to original sin. Both Evangelical Confessions teach that original sin of itself renders liable to damnation.[1] But, on the other side, the *Formula of Concord* says,[2] that every one perishes by his own fault (*sua culpa perit*), as in fact only on the supposition of the personal, spontaneous fault of the individual does his damnation seem possible. An unsolved problem is therefore left here. But the full and serious penal desert of original sin *per se*, up to the point of damnation, must needs find its clearest decision in the question whether all men and nations (even children) who die non-Christians, are eternally damned for original sin. Those words of the *Augsburg Confession* do not contemplate the possibility of redemption beyond the grave, the *terminus gratiæ* for all thus seeming to be concluded with this earthly life even in relation to those who have not heard, and therefore have not rejected, the Gospel. Luther, indeed, in his private writings, will not deny salvation to children dying unbaptized, but cherishes the hope that God has purposes of good concerning them. But the Confessions leave open the possibility of any one, nay, of entire masses, being actually and eternally damned on account of original sin alone, without the intervention of a free personal act involving responsibility; whereas Adam himself, despite his actual sin in a state of innocence, was still capable of redemption. But this would come into collision with the universality of God's gracious will, to which the Lutheran Church otherwise holds fast, as well as with the stress which it lays upon the non-resistance of the will in relation to the appropriation of salvation and the doctrine of predestination.

Observation.—For these reasons, respectable theologians, even in the 17th century, teach that original sin alone is not *adæquata causa damnationis.*

6. The necessity of further development in the Evangelical

[1] *Conf. Aug.* ii.: Vitium originis is vere peccatum damnans et afferens nunc quoque mortem æternam his qui non renascuntur per baptismum et Sp. S. *F. C.* 642. 19: Hoc malum hereditarium est proprie et vere tale, propter quod homo filius iræ et damnationis habeatur, nisi Christo miseratur. And similarly, *Heidelb. Cat.* Qu. 8, 10; *Belg.* 15: Sufficit ad generis humani damnationem (so according to Augustine).

[2] *H. C.* 818. 78.

Doctrine is made specially clear by what the Confessions teach respecting the relation of *actual* to *inherent* sin. In opposition to the Romish errors, behind actual sin inherency is acknowledged; but *peccatum actuale* is too little considered in its gravity and distinction from *originale*. In matters, indeed, of civil justice, recourse is apparently had in relation to crimes to another causality than original sin, sins of this kind being described as avoidable by every man, although not always and everywhere,[1] and consequently derived from the remains of freedom. But if man possesses in his *liberum arbitrium* a second causality of possible moral evil, it would follow by logical sequence, as well as by the teaching of experience, that as the nature was depraved by Adam's free act of sin, so this is done in increasing degree by the abuse of the remnant of freedom. But, on the other hand, the *Formula of Concord* makes all actual sins arise out of original sin,[2] which it calls *principium et caput omnium peccatorum*. In describing men as *truncus* and *lapis* in a spiritual respect, it seems to regard original sin as a rigid, immoveable, everywhere identical quantity (*Grösse*), on which view we do not see how degrees of guilt, and of still increasing corruption, are to retain their place. And as the conception of all actual sins as mere fruits of original sin, must needs come into collision with the still surviving remnants of freedom, and imperil all responsibility of individual persons in the stricter sense, so still greater difficulties arise therefrom when attention is directed to the sphere of grace and damnation. For if all sins were fruits, physically necessary consequences, of original sin, then the sin of unbelief, which rejects the Gospel and exposes to damnation, must be the effect of original sin, and as the latter is in all, in all. They, therefore, who are saved, despite the fact of original sin urging them to the sin of unbelief, could only be those in whom divine Omnipotence irresistibly overcomes unbelief; and they who are damned, only those who are irresistibly led to unbelief in virtue of original sin, without, like the

[1] *Apology*, 64. 23; *C. A.* xviii.

[2] *F. C.* 640 a, 5, cf. 2: Original sin is *radix et scaturigo*, from which *omnis generis actualia peccata promanant;* 577. 21: Originale p. etiam scaturigo est omnium aliorum actualium peccatorum, ut sunt pravæ cogitationes, prava colloquia, prave et scelerate facta; and similarly the *Belg. Conf.* 15: Malum hereditarium omne peccatorum genus producit.

first class, experiencing an irresistible counteracting influence on the part of grace. We should thus arrive at a twofold *decretum*, a *decretum absolutum Electionis* in respect of the one class, *Reprobationis* in respect of the other, and should also adopt a sort of irrestibility of *gratiæ*, which would have a necessarily magical character. But the *Formula of Concord*, on the other hand, rejects this view. In the section *de æterna Predestinatione et Electione*, the attempt is condemned to regard a *decretum Reprobationis*, even in the sense of a prætermission of the one class and a non-supplying of the indispensable means to faith, as a cause of the damnation of the wicked. There, recourse is also had to the *resistibilitas gratiæ*, in order not to reduce grace to a physical process.[1] There the universality of God's gracious counsel is taught, that counsel being represented as only frustrated in its execution by the fault of man. But it is inconsistent with this to make all actual sins, even unbelief, issue from original sin as its adequate necessitating ground.

We may therefore comprehend those points in the teaching of the Evangelical Church in reference to the sin of mankind, which stand in need of development, under the following heads:—

1. What pertains to the generic life, and what to the personal life, has not been adequately distinguished, defined, and harmonized, either as regards the share of the individual in sin generally, as well as in the guilt and penal desert of sin, or as regards the relation of actual to inherent evil.

2. As concerns the divine government of the world, it has not been sufficiently shown how the *Holiness* and *Goodness* of God consist with the universal and natural diffusion of evil; and finally, how the application of the ideas of guilt and penal desert to original sin agrees with God's *Justice*.

But although in the points mentioned the ecclesiastical doctrine lacks completeness, and the *Formula of Concord* particularly is lacking in the harmonious interblending of the different elements, since it presupposes personal guilt in relation to the damnation of individuals, while, on the other hand, by its doctrine of generic sin leaving no room for such personal and avoidable guilt, still that doctrine accurately and

[1] *F. C.* 808. 40 ff.

faithfully expresses the religious consciousness so far as relates to the following propositions:—

1. Nothing evil comes from God, while all good in the last resort springs from Him.

2. Where redeeming grace has not reached, there evil is supreme.

3. Although evil has its ground only in the creature, so that the creature perishes through its own fault, this does not imply that salvation and goodness are its work, or meritorious.

4. To stop at the power which evil has gained among mankind would be to leave man to misery and perdition.

C.—*Dogmatic Doctrine of the Nature of Evil.*

§ 76.—*Review of the Possible Definitions of the Idea.—Introduction.*

Since evil is always contradiction to the divine, the correct definition of the idea depends in the last resort on the true idea of God. That idea does not permit evil to be conceived merely under a physical and æsthetic aspect, merely under a juridical or subjectively moral aspect, or finally, under an exclusively religious aspect, but requires the truth in all these standpoints to be combined.

LITERATURE.—See above, § 74, especially J. Müller and Rothe. Liebner, *Kieler Allg. Monatsschr. f. Wiss. u. Lit.* July 1851, p. 163 f. Martensen, *Die christl. Ethik*, I. ed. 3, 1878, p. 441 ff.; II. 1878, pp. 1–164. Chr. Fr. Schmid, *De Peccato.* Ritschl, *Rechtf. u. Versöhnung*, vol. iii. pp. 286–338. Kreibig, *Die Versöhnungslehre auf Grund des christl. Bewusstseins*, 1878, pp. 21–46 (condemns J. Müller and Ritschl). Biedermann, *Christl. Dogmatik*, 1869, pp. 411 ff., 594 ff., 669 ff. Schweizer, *Die christl. Glaubenslehre nach protest. Grundsätzen*, I. 329, § 97, 1863. W. Vilmar, *Was fasst der bibl. Begriff d. Sünde in sich und gibt es nach diesem eine Erbsünde?* Cassel, 1840.

Observation.—The Christian idea of God, as treated of in the First Part, must preserve its fundamental position because of the regulative influence it exerts in reference to all the principal doctrines, securing in this way systematic coherence.

In point of fact, even the objective scientific idea of evil, of which we are in search, is only possible by recurring to the idea of the absolute Good, *i.e.* God, whose opposite or contradiction it is. *God*, the primal Good, is the self-certified standard for all estimate of worth. The light reveals both what it is itself and what its opposite is, while darkness cannot illumine itself. *Verum index sui et oppositi.* It might doubtless seem more natural to recur to the primal state instead of to the doctrine of God, since the normal must decide what the abnormal is. But of the primal state, which still was not the absolute realization of the idea of man, we have no such immediate knowledge as of God; and since man was created in God's image, the latter refers us to God as the ultimate and surest source of scientific knowledge both of good and evil.[1] But then, just as evil antagonizes the various definitions of the idea of God, so just as many conceptions of evil are possible. Even in its manifoldness evil has also its unity, but only through the fact that, in all its forms, it is antagonism to the good. The manifold conceptions of evil possible are therefore construable by means of the idea of the perfect Good or God, which is unfolded in the Doctrine of the Attributes. But the true or Christian idea of God comprises, first, physical definitions, and that in the character of holy Love; for God is infinite Being, omnipotent Life, absolute Harmony and Beauty. Further, He is absolute Intelligence and Omniscience. He is also, in a negative ethical aspect, absolute Justice, in a positive aspect, holy Love and Wisdom; and in all these the absolutely perfect, blessed, and glorious Personality who is to be conceived in Trinitarian form. If, then, the fulness of the good lies in these definitions, from this standpoint it becomes possible to survey, divide, and pronounce judgment on the sphere of the possible contradiction to the good generally, as well as of the conceptions of this contradiction. The differences in the conceptions of evil have their reason in this circumstance, that they confound the good in its entirety, to which the evil is opposed, with this or that particular moment of the idea of God, which yet is not the whole, whereas the standard for judging all possible conceptions of good is given in the totality of the idea of God. Certainly those conceptions of evil, which regard it as mere appearance, do not seem to be reached by this way of derivation. But these either utterly deny the existence of evil, renouncing therefore the very problem with which we are occupied, and thus we have nothing to do with

[1] This does not exclude the relative independence of morality and its distinction from religion, but reminds of their common root.

them. Or they acknowledge, at least, the appearance of evil as existing, and have therefore to explain it; and, for this reason, since God is Truth and the primal Knowledge, they are compelled to regard it as contradiction thereto, and thus likewise fall into our way of arriving at the possible contradictions to God.

1. THE PHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF EVIL.—Great as is the power of evil according to the testimony of experience, it is still not first, absolute, coeval with good, but shows its dependence on the latter in this, that it cannot be conceived in thought as first, nay, cannot be conceived apart from the good, whose antagonist it is. The good can be conceived without contradiction even apart from actual evil, but not so evil. It is contradiction to something good, which it presupposes, and without which it would have no standing-ground and existence. In this also is shown the contradiction in which evil is involved with itself and the overmastering power of the good, in contrast with which evil is forced to confess itself an afterbirth, something non-original, which therefore, in a metaphysical point of view, cannot lay claim to absoluteness. But the perception of the truth that evil cannot subsist by itself, that it must ever borrow substantial existence from the good, whose powers it perverts and abuses, is not universal. The inability to perceive that absoluteness belongs to good, and to it alone, affects in different ways all merely *physical* definitions of evil, which assume two essentially co-ordinate real powers in the divine sphere and in the world, or at least in the latter, and on the supposition that good exists not, and by the laws of thought cannot exist, without its opposite, favour some form of Dualism. *Theological* Dualism, which posits two hostile principles in the divine sphere itself, has been already refuted by the Doctrine of God. *Cosmological* Dualism, which alone more nearly concerns us here, would be generally refuted, if we could show that theological Dualism follows as its necessary consequence. But among the various possible forms of Cosmological Dualism we may leave out of sight that which regards the existence of the world altogether as sinful;[1]

[1] As, *e.g.*, Buddhism and modern philosophical phenomena of the Schopenhauer species, which with special distinctness attribute Dualism even to the primal Being.

for this form would no longer imply discord in the *world* taken alone, but merely a discord between God and the world, or that God in constituting the world comes into contradiction with Himself. If the whole world belongs to the sphere of evil, it could have no moral aim, nothing but its annihilation would be good, and the world could only comprise a dualistic element in so far as it was conceived to be approximating to the annihilation or nonentity, which must be regarded as the good. But even then from this standpoint every positive moral ideal, and therewith even the idea of evil, must be entirely denied, unless again the good is illogically found in something else than annihilation.

On the other hand, other dualistic conceptions of evil are possible, which see a *mixture* of good and evil in the world, and that as essentially inhering in it. This is possible in three ways. First, evil may be found in the natural *limit* imposed on the finite either by its *existence* alongside God, or by *development*. In this case it would be evil, because not possessing infinite and perfect reality like God. But evil may also be found in the fact, that there are in the *Macrocosm* not harmonious but conflicting natural principles, which evoke disorders and disharmonies in life. And finally in *man*, the Microcosm, especially a co-ordinate natural mixture of good and evil may be supposed, because a material, unspiritual nature is correlated in him with the spiritual principle.

The meaning of the *first* opinion, to the effect that evil is a *limit*, may be more definitely expressed thus: God is pure, infinite *Being*, the alone True, Real, and Good; the world indeed has a share in Being alongside Him, and therefore in good, but it is imperfect, because limited good; for the world is not God, but distinguished from Him by finitude or by being clogged with a limit (*limes*). It is woven out of Being, not Being. Thus Leibnitz in his Theodicy. In confounding metaphysical with ethical Being, it is here assumed that the real, so far as it is only good, ought not to be limited, and that limitation therefore necessarily involves the character of evil. It is assumed also, that there is only one kind of reality, namely, that of God, in which everything finite has received a share in different proportions, an assumption which overlooks the fundamental distinction between the Being of God

and that of the world (in contradiction to the idea of creation), which consists in this, that the reality of God alone is self-existence, while the reality of the world is originated by God. Hence this theory is allied with Emanationism. The latter saw in the locally represented distance of that which flows out of God a power dividing or limiting the good. But in this case the world would be simply the divine element itself divided, that element being passive in the process in contradiction to the idea of creation. Evil would be a defect of Being, inseparable from an actual world, and the world could only come to perfection by becoming infinite Being and therefore God, while as the world it would cease to exist, and therefore be again annihilated. But as finite the world would be evil. Certainly it is only too common a makeshift to suppose, that as finite, limited, and feeble beings we are laden with evil, and that perfection cannot be required of us in real earnest. But the nature of finitude consists essentially only in this, that the world's existence is not out of and through itself; on the other hand, by the divine act of origination (*Setzung*) as such no imperfection is originated, to say nothing of moral evil; for the world is not meant to be God. It is true that God unites all kinds of perfection in Himself, whereas finite beings can only be many and diverse by their not all having these perfections in equal measure. But as defect of metaphysical perfections is not sin, so conversely ethical perfection is well compatible with finitude. Only this must be affirmed: Evil is possible only where finitude exists, for it is a defect, and defect can only exist where finitude exists; but evil is also something further, namely, defect of that which ought to exist, a defect forming a contradiction to the idea of man—that finite being. The defect, which exists in evil, is not at all involved in the fact of finitude. Nay, energy is associated with evil, and there are very energetic forms of the negation, which evil is, namely, through abuse of energies good in themselves, which evil employs for its own purposes. On one side, therefore, the definition of evil as limit or finitude goes too far, ascribing to evil too great influence and extension, for if finitude as such is evil, evil is unavoidable and eternal; on the other side, the power and influence of good are thought too meanly of. The direct claim of the latter is that the finite

be transformed into the embodied reality of good, and the obverse of this apparently strict form of Dualism would therefore be the abandonment of moral duty. Moral perfection would then be the abolition of separate existence, and could not really be duty. But what is the cause of this error, which is constantly recurring in various even mystical forms? Nothing but the failure to distinguish extensive physical infinitude, which certainly can only pertain to God, not to the creature, and the intensive infinitude of good and infinitely precious Being, for which there is room in a being, which metaphysically considered is finite; for metaphysical finitude adapts itself readily to the realized form of the intensively infinite.

A better definition of evil is that which is based on *development*, finding in the latter an essential limit, and saying: Where development is, there imperfection still is, and nothing living, nothing creaturely can be conceived in the world without development. Here at least the requirement to advance to a better condition is reserved. But still, if the finite is to be called evil, because it has still to become perfect, this again would only be the semblance of great moral strictness; for if evil is supposed to consist only in development, which God has willed in His character as Creator, then its absolute wrongfulness must come to an end. The non-realization of the idea cannot be blameworthy in itself, if the innate law of life itself prescribes progressiveness of development. Progressiveness only becomes evil when development comes to a stand instead of advancing. Then something else than mere defect in perfection of knowledge and volition begins, namely, restriction and disorder, a perversion of development in harmony with idea into development contrary to idea. Then, instead of forward, there is backward movement, which ever originates abnormal forms of development; or, to change the figure, instead of advance in a straight line, there is divergence into a bypath, return from which alone can give salvation.

Observation.—This *Cosmological Dualism* must also in point of fact introduce falsehood into the *idea of God;* for in order to create a world, God is supposed to have been obliged to call to His help something undivine, nay, contrary to the divine. Let this something be merely called negation. In it

evil is supposed to be already involved. So far as the opinion just discussed finds a positively restrictive power in limitation, this leads to the theory which condenses the limit, as it were, into an evil or unyielding *matter*, which resists good order.

The *second* physical conception sees in evil the antithesis to order, harmony, beauty, arising from contradictory principles in that order. But if this harmony is only viewed as physical or æsthetic, evil would be merely the hurtful or hateful, identical with *physical evil*, at most the unbecoming, and therefore only a contradiction to finite beauty, order, and design. But the hurtful and hateful, like decay and death, is not evil, the German language [1] at least definitely distinguishing everything of this kind as *physical evil* (*Uebel*) from moral evil (*Böse*). Nay, that which in the finite, taken separately, is hurtful or a dissonance, may on the whole be useful or contribute to the impression of beauty, *e.g.* in the drama and in music. On the basis of such an æsthetic definition it must be affirmed that evil may also be good in its place (an assertion on which the stricter Dualism does not venture), and the distinction between good and evil would then vanish. This theory may perhaps be more satisfactory in a logical point of view than Dualism proper, because it does not brand what comes from God as evil. But it offends the moral consciousness the more profoundly, because it is compelled to transform all evil into mere subjective appearance, which arises whenever observation fails to look at the individual in connection with the whole. The ethical sphere would thus be injured, and laws sacrificed which do not belong to that sphere, whether those of Nature or the Beautiful, laws according to which the contrast even of good and evil belong to the idea or perfection of the world. Not less certain is it that the ethical lays claim to universal validity in the sphere of rational beings, than that a moral order cannot consist with the subjection of morality to æsthetic laws. The view, therefore, is preferable which sees in God the principle of *order*, in evil that which contradicts good order, the principle of caprice or chance, the Chaotic. But then, again, all turns on the question, Is this order thought of merely as useful and beautiful, or also as the absolutely and necessarily good? For if evil is not contemplated as

[1] [This cannot, alas! be said of English.]

contradiction to an order of absolute worth, retrogression to the æsthetic standpoint will always follow,—a retrogression which sets itself right with evil by saying that, although evil causes disorder in the individual, it is good in the great whole of the world-system. But if we attempted to find evil merely in an objective chaotic state, it must be affirmed: Without subjective volition there is no evil. An objective cosmical chaos is not evil.

A *third* form of Dualism would, in fact, discover evil in *man* himself, in whom two essentially contradictory principles exist by nature, spirit and matter, the latter as animated becoming his body, but following its own laws. The material corporeity drags down the spirit, contaminating it, and by means of the lower appetites of the body introducing contradiction into the original constitution of man. But on this theory, purity would be impossible to corporeal-spiritual beings. And not merely would the ideas of freedom, guilt, punishment be injured or rendered precarious, the process of improvement also must become a physical one; deliverance from evil must be sought in separation from the body, in order that the spirit, pure in itself, may only have to do with itself. If the pressing weight of the corporeity united with the spirit so influences the latter that sin is the result, the cause of this is not bare weakness or passivity of the spirit, but in order that evil may become actual the spirit must be present with its volition and consent to the desire. But the fact of this taking place does not follow, as this form of Dualism itself must confess, from the idea of spirit, but is in contradiction to the law of spirit, a law whose claim upon spirit is unconditional. But if the fault lies necessarily in the spirit itself, the direct point at issue is to discover this germ of evil in the spirit, with which sensuousness is bound up.

Observation.—Rothe also goes back to matter for evil, and in his theory even concedes something dualistic, regarding matter as the God-opposing element without which a world could not have been created, not merely as the material, which is a presupposition of the created structure in general. But along with this he also takes freedom into account as an essential factor in evil.

2. All the possible physical conceptions of evil hitherto

considered point back by their defects to the idea of an absolute universal *law*, without which there can be no question of moral evil in the proper sense, in distinction from limit, imperfection, physical evil,—the idea of a law to which finitude, development, and corporeity are not opposed, which rather includes and comprehends these, but which also does not produce good by necessary effect, like a mere physical law, but leaves room for possible disturbance of the moral order and harmony. Before we pass to the theories which accept this position, the purely *intellectual* conception of evil is still to be considered.

Here, first of all, the opinion finds its place, which is unwilling, indeed, to deny the very existence of evil, regarding it as a really existing appearance, which cleaves directly to the consciousness of a law. It is said that the idea of moral perfection or the consciousness of law penetrates back to the beginnings of mankind, which cannot possibly correspond to that idea; and this causes the beginning, which is not evil in itself but good, to appear culpable and evil to man, and this appearance forms an impulse to advance beyond the first, imperfect stage of existence. The consciousness of a universal, absolute law begets, therefore, the appearance of evil, even where it does not exist, or a mistaken form of evil conscience. On this view redemption would consist in deliverance from such error, and therefore in perceiving that development and the relative imperfection involved therein are not evil, but from an absolute, divine point of view something good. But such an appearance, which certainly ought not to exist, does not coincide with or comprehend the idea of evil generally; for evil is also and above all contradiction to that *normal* form of development which is contained in the law rightly conceived.—Akin to this is the often-heard formula: The Fall is the first step in the way of moral development, the giant-stride of humanity,[1] the beginning (instinct, natural impulse), being mere moral indifference, immaturity, and

[1] Cf. Schiller, *Etwas über die erste Menschengesellschaft*, *Werke*, 1838, IX. p. 387 ff. In a similar strain Hegel calls Paradise a garden of animals (*Thiergarten*), and exit from it the beginning of human development. The initial innocence is rather crudeness which has to be left behind; but departure from this unscriptural state takes the form of loss of innocence and internal discord.

therefore pre-moral.[1] Certainly advance to the knowledge of law and the exercise of freedom is in itself really good and necessary; but that this exercise can only be one opposed, instead of according, to law is not implied in freedom, and knowledge of the necessity of advance to free action is not knowledge of the necessity or goodness of freedom in opposition to law, so that the nature of evil is not reached or rightly defined when it is defined merely as transition to conscious, free existence, which transition to one who had quitted the state of childhood wore wrongly the appearance of sin.

Another form of the intellectual conception of evil is the one especially at home in the philosophy of Greece. Along with the sense of the beautiful the Hellenic spirit is especially filled with enthusiasm for wisdom. If this is regarded as the centre and energy of all good, the opposite of good or evil is the irrational, ignorance or folly. And in fact, not merely have Socrates and Plato so described evil, but the O. T. also (see above). It is an important aspect of the idea of evil that it lacks truth, that it is false semblance or illusion and falsehood. Nay, it must also be conceded that evil could not co-exist with perfect knowledge, just as without moral knowledge there would be no evil. Only it does not follow from this that evil is mere abnormity and feebleness of reason, that it yields to mere intelligence without will, or that knowledge certainly determines volition. Knowledge itself is dependent in its action on good *volition*, and as Aristotle objects to Plato: Ignorance, error may even be a fault. Evil therefore has its place midway between ignorance of good—it presupposes a certain moral knowledge—and perfect knowledge, which again is conditioned by will. A further reason why the definition of evil as mere ignorance or folly is insufficient is that mere cleverness, even if it avoids evil, is still not morally good. Finally, evil cannot be identical with ignorance, because deficiency in knowledge necessarily marks the beginnings of innocent human development.[2] The *will*, there-

[1] Cf. Biedermann, *ut supra*, p. 600, § 666.

[2] Ritschl (III. 338) comes under this head in supposing that *God* regards all sin, which is without the definite intention to resist God's known will (and whether there is such sin he leaves in doubt), merely as sin of ignorance, and cannot punish men for it,—a proposition on which he builds up his entire theory of Reconcilia-

fore, must be taken into account in relation to the idea of evil. This is done in the case of the remaining conceptions of evil.

3. THE JURIDICAL CONCEPTION OF EVIL.—Firm ground is only gained for the definition of evil as to its nature, when the idea of objective right and law emerges, or with the juridical standpoint, which sees in evil the violation of absolutely warranted law. Thus evil is wrong, contrariety to law,[1]—a fruitful idea, from which guilt and punishment may be developed in relation to man as endowed with will. This standpoint emerges most definitely in the legal religion of the Old Testament, in which the law of conscience attains to objective solidity. There it is no longer possible in pagan fashion to call evil good in any sense, or to place it on a par with good in right to existence, a view implying the Dualism which is a renunciation of the exclusive absolute right of moral good. Nevertheless, the juridical standpoint has also its imperfections. It is even exposed to dangers peculiar to itself in estimating evil.

In the first place, the legal standpoint obtains the more concrete knowledge of good and evil only by means of concrete precepts and decrees, which require definite actions as good and forbid definite forms of evil.[2] But the diversity of life is infinite, and particular precepts, although numbering thousands, never embrace the entire sphere of morality, but always leave much morally indefinite, and therefore much evil

tion. If the divine treatment leaves the will entirely out of account, human treatment must do the same, if it would be true. But if, according to the true mode of treatment, the will and freedom are to be left out of sight in respect of evil, then evil only comes into existence by a necessity imposed on man and in mere blindness. But then one does not see how the Christian view of the world can "judge" sin to be something "which finds a necessary ground neither in the divine order of the world nor in man's capacity of freedom." These propositions do not harmonize except by the supposition of a twofold, contradictory form of truth. Scientific theological knowledge has to make the divine mode of treatment its own, whereas the popular mode will persist in judging sin to be not a consequence of the divine order of the world, not the work of a compulsory exercise of the capacity of freedom (which were a contradiction in terms), but the work of the will, on which it is not forced. For the rest, we shall see below that Ritschl's "sin of ignorance" is also an exaggeration and perversion of an undoubtedly weighty aspect of truth.

[1] 1 John iii. 4.

[2] The definition of evil as contradiction to law is merely formal.

unknown. If that only is taken for evil which is forbidden by positive prohibition, much remains morally indifferent; and therefore Christianity seeks to complete the moral knowledge of good and evil not by multiplying decrees and precepts, but by contemplating the living personal law—Christ, in whom good appears as a living, infinitely fruitful force, in which man obtains a part through the spirit of love and wisdom, thus obtaining ability to exercise moral mastery over that infinite diversity.

Further, the standpoint of mere legal positivity lacks knowledge of the intrinsic goodness of the law and of its ideal beauty, and therefore spontaneous delight in the same. Then, a mechanical treatment of moral duties would not be seen to be sin. Insight into the inner goodness of good, that it may be willed because it is good, would not be seen to be a moral requirement. A *third* defect is to be added.

With the splitting up of the one law into multiplicity an externalizing of it is connected, *i.e.* a tendency to obedience by means of outward performances or works, inner, uniform disposition being put in the background. Man may desire to observe the letter of the law from egoistic motives of fear or hope of reward. But such Egoism is unknown by the legal standpoint as such. Thus, the merely legal standpoint fails to perceive that blind legal obedience is not sufficient for the goodness of actions, and that both personal moral knowledge and inner delight in the goodness of the law are necessary thereto. Therefore very much evil must escape it, and the sinfulness of a mere slavish attitude to goodness remains unknown. But because no doubt the letter of the law is capable of being observed in many respects, general good character readily retires from contemplating isolated details full of pride and work-righteousness, although even the O. T., in forbidding evil lust, directs the moral judgment inwards.[1]

4. The importance of disposition for the right conception of the nature of evil is acknowledged by the SUBJECTIVE-MORAL

[1] To the moral conception of evil belongs the exceedingly common definition, that its principle is self-love, φιλαυτία. This is insufficient, because the true self ought to be loved, and this definition does not indicate wherein the error consists. By it, and still more by "Egoism" in the social relations, is usually meant the disposition which proposes self as its end, and for which others are used only as means, instead of being willing to be means for others. But in

STANDPOINT. This harmonizes with the divine law in so far as the latter addresses itself primarily to the spirit and requires from it the surrender, which would not be sincere without good disposition. Nevertheless, if good disposition alone were laid down as the all-decisive element, a wrong conception would again be the result. If good meaning or intention *per se* and generally is supposed to give action the character of goodness, then the end might sanctify the means, and it need not be considered whether the objective end is good in itself, but only whether the subject regards it as good. But in this case the objective world of ends becomes a matter of chance and indifference; for if everything depends on subjective goodness of intention, it is indifferent what is willed, whether right or wrong, provided only it be willed with good intention. But in this way the entire objective moral world might be inverted by the so-called good intention or meaning of the subject. For this reason it must be maintained, that subjective good disposition must also be directed to what is objectively good; and only when the *right* is willed and done in the *right way* can goodness be spoken of. Form and contents are absolutely inseparable, because moral wisdom also is a virtue. Hence, more closely considered, it is part of the goodness of volition to know and aim at right contents. But again, even in relation to the formal side—disposition—there may be defect in this respect, that while conscious, free volition of the good is indeed insisted on, with Kant only *reverence* for the law of the practical reason, and therefore reverence for human dignity, is required as the soul of disposition, while the connection of morality with religion is overlooked. Kant knows only of evil, not of sin. But in this case an entire aspect of evil remains disregarded, nay sanctioned, if it is not even regarded as good, namely deficiency in humility, the maintenance of absolute autonomy. And with this centring of man in himself, this divorcing of morality from religion, another fault is conjoined in making reverence sufficient and

this case Egohood and Egoism are to be distinguished, and that definition does not indicate by what the two are to be known. 'Moreover, its scientific value all the less as it takes no account of the relation to God, who comes into account partly as lawgiver even in respect to social relations, partly indirectly as the object of a moral course of conduct; for piety also is a part of the moral sphere. For more details on this point, see below, § 77.

regarding love as pathological in character. Then, deficiency in love were no sin, not even imperfection.

5. We have seen the necessity of forming not merely a moral conception of the nature of evil, *i.e.* as contradiction in man to himself,[1] but also a RELIGIOUS CONCEPTION as *contrariety to God*, and thus it is *sin*. But even this true and highest standpoint may be maintained in a one-sided way. Thus, the Mystics frequently find goodness in the absorption of consciousness of the world and of self in consciousness of God, and therefore find it in exclusive God-consciousness. Then consciousness of self and of the world must necessarily be regarded as estrangement from God and as evil. Then religion would come into collision with morality, as if God did not will relatively self-dependent likenesses of Himself, endowed with moral powers, whose free exercise in well-doing constitutes goodness. Were spiritually concrete being and its individual activity regarded as ungodly, the result would be retrogression to the physical standpoint first considered. But it is wrong to suppose that God requires absorption in Him, which would be self-annihilation (*i.e.* creation is said to be revoked, that God may be all in all). This would be in opposition to God's love, which proposes to itself man as an end. And even such love of man to God as would involve man's self-destruction would be no true love, but a violation of justice as well as a neglect of those duties of love which the relations of life impose, but which would be ignored in quietistic fashion, so that here also an entire aspect of evil in concrete relations is disregarded.—But an erroneous religious conception of evil may attach itself even to the Evangelical standpoint — justification by faith alone. This is the case when faith, in false self-assertion and in an abstract religious way, would convert its joyous certainty of salvation, which implies no immediately positive relation to the entire moral world, but primarily only to God, into the sole virtue, and would treat unbelief not merely as the root-sin, but also as the sole sin. Then an egoistic anxiety merely for one's own enjoyment of fellowship with God and for one's own salvation, and an antinomian indifference to that form of sin which is related to the world and to ourselves, would have crept in.

[1] Whether in the form of act or even evil inherency, see below, § 78.

Whereas the Mystics make God alone their end, while not even wishing to find the permanence of their own moral personality secured in God, here the believing subject knows himself, it is true, as an end and object of divine love, but abuses this knowledge to purposes of spiritual selfishness, is eudæmonistic, and refuses to notice moral evil in finite relations, if only faith exists. But such faith is illusive. It has to do, not with the true, holy, and righteous God, but with a self-invented conception of God as unethical goodness. Truly religious contemplation rejects the severance of religion from morality,[1] both in the Mystic form, which thinks God egoistic, and in the second form, where man egoistically makes God a mere instrument for his own good, nay, makes Him a minister of sin.[2] While a Christian man is "a Lord of all things through faith," he is also "a Servant of all through love." As, therefore, the previous conceptions of evil urge forward to the religious, so the religious conception has no desire to hold its ground in disparagement of the moral. The truly religious conception leads to the acknowledgment of what is true in the previous standpoints, and these true elements must be united if an exhaustive definition of evil is to be obtained. God and the world come into consideration in order to form the correct idea of evil, and they do so because this is required by the idea of God.

§ 77.—*Thetic Exposition of the Nature of Evil.*

In order to include the true elements in the standpoints considered, the right conception, leaving the unity of evil intact, must distinguish its formal and material side, and that in such a way as to bring into view also its different stages. *Formally* considered, evil is an abnormity, disturbing the right relation of the spirit as well to the natural and human world as to God Himself. But *materially* its unity or self-uniformity consists in this, that it is false love of the creature, or love averted from God. Thus, on one side it is turning away from God or

[1] 1 John iv. 20. [2] Gal. ii. 17.

sin, but on the other, and at the same time, false turning to the creature. And for this reason it consists in selfishness of one kind or another. That is, at the first stage, false creature-love is selfishness in passive form—deification of the world; while at the second, where the factor of personality co-operates with more energy, it produces spiritual selfishness or deification of self. In both there is a false centring of the creature in itself, but at the one stage in a partially unconscious and disguised way, at the other with more and more of consciousness and volition. From the unity of evil in a formal and material respect, issue its different positive *forms* according to the blessings to which its destructive and perversive effects relate. But the destruction, which it initiates, shows it to be folly, nay falsehood, which it is intrinsically from the beginning (John viii. 44).

Melanchthon, *Loci*, 1521. Fieri nequit quin sese maxime amet creatura, quam non absorpsit amor Dei.

1. The problem, how rightly to combine the possible one-sided standpoints, described in § 76, is narrowed and made easier by observing that they reduce themselves to two principal classes. The first start from *Nature*. Such are the Physical definitions (§ 76, 1), to which we may here add the Intellectual (§ 76, 2). The second, namely the Juridical and Subjectively Moral, start from *Freedom* (§ 76, 3, 4). But both classes are compelled to refer in some way to the idea of God, and therefore to the religious mode of view, inasmuch as God is the principle both of nature and spirit, and His will is the norm for both. The *first* find evil in the power of the finite over the spirit, and the concentration of this finitude may then be discovered in matter or the body, with which development is bound up. According to this view, evil consists in passivity of the spirit in presence of restrictive or tempting powers which are not spirit. The second find evil in an abuse of freedom in evil act and disposition, in religious phraseology in rebellion against God's government. The one find evil in sensuousness, at least in more refined forms of the

same, in a culpable weakness of the spirit, while the others discern a false strength therein. The first rather accentuate the abnormal weakness, the second the guilt in the idea of evil. Still there is agreement among the more important teachers so far as to perceive that neither of the two modes of view alone exhausts the nature of evil. They endeavour, therefore, to combine the two, apprehending evil as sensuousness and as selfishness. But then seeing that, as formerly shown, wherever existing and whatever its composition, evil must have an essential uniformity, the task arises of again tracing back sensuousness and selfishness to a unity. Thereupon, if no higher, *i.e.* broader generic conception, embracing both, can be found, a twofold possibility presents itself, either to derive selfishness from sensuousness, or sensuousness from selfishness. This forms the opposition between *Rothe* and *Julius Müller*. Both would have the conception of evil religious in kind, both seek to leave a place to freedom, and would place evil in relation to the body, without limiting it thereto. But the fundamental sin, according to Rothe, is *sensuousness*, which originates in the predominance of matter, and matter to him is the pre-existent cause of evil, which attains to victory or is overpowered through freedom. Thus, he would only derive selfishness from this fundamental sin of sensuousness. On the other hand, Julius Müller starts from the *selfishness* of the spirit as the fundamental sin, and seeks from it to reach the sensuous form of sin. We shall examine both these theories, which are scientifically elaborated, and at present, perhaps, the most influential. If neither of the two prove satisfactory, it will be necessary, instead of deriving either sensuousness or spiritual selfishness from the other, to seek a unity combining the two in another way. First let us consider Rothe.

2. Rothe had previously conceived matter as an involuntary, necessary origination (*Setzung*) of God. In thinking and willing Himself, God must absolutely distinguish Himself from everything which is not God, and thus the thought of the not-God is a necessary thought for His self-consciousness. But thought and origination are one in God; and accordingly even the non-divine, the contradictory counterpart of God, comes necessarily into existence as God's shadow, which Rothe even calls a counter-god, thus certainly limiting God's absoluteness.

But thereby God obtains the material out of which a world may be built. And by labour upon and dwelling in matter, which is ever undergoing a spiritualizing process, God gradually restores Himself to absoluteness, in which act, by means of the moral process, man is a co-worker with God.[1] In his second edition,[2] in presence of the objections against this theory, Rothe acknowledges that all that is necessary to the divine self-consciousness is the distinction from the *possible* non-divine, but that the realization of this possibility is not physically necessary, but is God's free and above all moral act. For this reason, matter to Rothe cannot be a limit of His absoluteness, because even its existence depends every moment on His will. Nevertheless, as to that which in his esteem is the chief point, in his second edition he has not abandoned but abides by the position, that God by the act of His eternal self-consciousness must place over against Himself the thought of His contradictory counterpart, because the exclusion of His contradictory counterpart is necessary to the clearness of His thought. It depends on His freedom whether He will or will not call into existence that thought of His contradictory counterpart which presents itself to Him by logical necessity. He *has* done it, in order thereby to obtain the necessary presupposition for a world. The contents of this contradictory counterpart, according to Rothe, are, first: So far as God is absolute being, that counterpart of Him is absolutely non-existent being, but still posited and thus existent non-being, *i.e.* end, limit, bound, the principle of finitude; secondly: But so far as God is *spirit*, the primitive creature is absolutely existent, non-spiritual being, *i.e.* matter, the sum of all negations of God, the real element in creation.[3] By God's influence this matter is differentiated and shaped, nay, by the creative operation and indwelling of His power, personality issues from its bosom; but this very origination of personality shows also its connection with matter. From these premisses resulted for Rothe the following theory of evil, which remained in his

[1] *Theol. Ethik*, 1st ed. vol. I. §§ 28, 31, 44, 98, 121–123. Vol. II. § 70 ff. pp. 170–251.

[2] The second edition, alas, was not completed by the author. In it, §§ 40, 55, 83 here come specially into notice.

[3] I. § 55, p. 234.

second edition, despite the modification of its fundamental dualistic character, essentially the same. That is, his doctrine of matter determines, although not exclusively, his doctrine of evil and also of good. Matter which is opposed in its essence to the divine, forms a relation opposite in idea to personality, although at the same time freedom is a co-operating factor therewith. According to Rothe, good consists first in this, that corporeal, material being does not exert a determining influence on spirit, but is determined by it; and secondly in this, that the personality which keeps the material in subjection, and thus remains at harmony in itself, opens itself to communion in love. In correspondence with this, evil has two mutually co-ordinate forms:[1] *first*, that of *sensuousness*, in which, with the assent of the spirit or of freedom, the flesh, *i.e.* the principle of matter, is autonomic; *secondly*, that of *selfishness* (Egoism), the opposite of love, in virtue of which the totality of man, but as natural personality or individuality, unlovingly shuts itself up, and egoistically makes itself its own end, and everything outside it a means. But these two main forms, he says, have their highest unity and root in the material principle. Even selfish sin is egoistic through the material or sensuous nature. In nature, indeed, *per se*, which is irrational, there is, as he concedes, no evil, although there is contradiction to God. God may therefore be comparatively indifferent to this contradiction in nature.[2] Besides, God is able to overcome the resistance of matter by ever new, endlessly progressing transformation, and ever advancing, higher organisation of the same (which continues until it is appropriated by the personality, by which act this becomes what Rothe calls "spirit;" and the ideal element in personality thus obtains a substantiality which it lacked *per se*). But it is otherwise with this resistance in man. Since the personal creature adopts this material principle, and so to speak serves as a point of support and means to it, through this material principle which is incorporated with the personal creature and determines it there arises a contradiction to the personality, which by its very idea ought to rule and to open itself in love. The combination of the two is naturally such, that every individual is an incorrect compound of the material

[1] Vol. II. pp. 170–251, 1st ed. [2] Vol. II. § 489, p. 194, 1st ed.

substance, not at once governed by the personality, but resisting it, nay determining it; thus sensuousness originates. Nay, the individuality as to its physical side is egoistically inclined, instead of at once opening itself in love. Consequently, that combination of the material principle with the personality carries with it evil in its two chief forms.

But we cannot concede that God, in thinking Himself, must or can think that which is contrary to the divine as capable of realization through Him. Although, of course, in the definite divine self-consciousness (or self-thought) God's distinction from everything which He is not, but which forms the logical boundary to His definite idea, is implied, still the non-divine *per se* is not contrary to the divine. Everything non-divine would only be opposed to the divine, if God's essence claimed to be all being exclusively. But in this case the creation of anything different from God, really non-divine, were impossible. For God can only think that which is contrary to the divine as that which is impossible through Him, absolutely excluded from His idea and volition. Did His will take part in its production, for this very reason it would not be opposed to the divine. Self-distinction from everything which He is not is adequately recognised, as Rothe in his second edition himself admits, whether that which is not God become actual or not, even if some of this be impossible to His volition, and other parts be capable of realization. In Rothe's representation of matter also, vacillation is unmistakeably apparent; for on one side it is said to be absolutely non-divine, nay contrary to divine; on the other side, by labour and indwelling on the part of God, a spiritualization of matter is said to be possible, and the initial Dualism is to be abolished in certain cycles of creation, at least in ethical respects. Nay, the interpenetration of matter and personality is said to beget spirit, *i.e.* true, substantial being. But if matter is receptive to God and His operation, it cannot be absolutely opposed to Him. Nor has Rothe proved, that beside creative power, capable of originating real being, more is necessary for the building of a world than the principle of boundary or limit, *i.e.* a non-divine, but by no means on this account contrary to divine. But if the contrariety of matter to the divine is not established, then his argument, to the

effect that the combination of personality and material nature in itself must become sin, loses its force. According to Rothe himself, this was not the case with Christ, despite His true humanity. Nay, since he says,[1] that by its idea personality is free and need not be governed by that autonomous impulse of matter, we are remitted for evil to the acquiescence of freedom in the allurement to sensuous Egoism, and therefore to the sphere of the spirit. The appeal to matter only gives us a possible ground of sensuous evil, not its actuality. And as concerns the sin of selfishness, which is said to be posited by the fact that the individuality as regards its physical side is egoistically inclined, the possibility of evil, as of good, is indeed conditioned by separateness or individuality (which for the rest is found just as much on the spiritual as on the material side of man), and this separateness carries with it a natural centring in self, a self-willing, knowing, and feeling. But this egohood or power of self-affirmation in the creature is still not evil in itself, but innocent, an expression of the divine creative thought, which willed individual Egos. On the contrary, the self-affirmation of the sensuous-spiritual nature of man is an essential side of goodness, and no love would be ethical, which required self-destruction in the service of others; on the other hand, this self-affirmation must not carry with it egoistic exclusion of others, and set itself in opposition to rendering service to others. The independence of the natural, corporeal individuality, the centring of the personality in itself, cannot be described as sin. Evil only exists when the personality, for which in accordance with its complete idea the universal and divine is an essential factor, in its finitude closes itself to the latter and to love. Moreover, as matter of fact there is sin, which cannot be described as a subjection of the spirit to the determining influence of matter, but which connotes an evil activity and energy of spirit, *e.g.* spiritual pride, which may even assume the form of hostility to corporeity and sensuousness, to the ἀφειδία σώματος, nay, to the material principle and the right Egohood.[2] To sum up all, it is an unthinkable contradiction to conceive matter as originated by God and yet contrary to the divine, to conceive this matter as the highest, uniform principle of actual, not

[1] II. § 475, p. 170, 1st ed. [2] Col. ii. 23.

merely possible evil, and yet as originated by God in order to the production of good (the spirit). Every theory, which believes actual evil to be in any way involved in material nature, leans to a physical conception of evil.

3. *Julius Müller* starts from the position, that conscious freedom is indispensable to the idea of evil.[1] But since sin shows itself in the beginnings of human life, where conscious freedom does not as yet exist, a pre-existent state has to be assumed in respect of original sin, where the spirit stood freely and consciously in the divine light and life, but fell away from God by free act into spiritual selfishness. Still he refuses to suppose a direct, conscious rebellion and enmity against God, *i.e.* demonic sin, in the case of all fallen spirits. Human sin, because leaving room for redemption, must be so distinguished from demonic,[2] that human spirits did not in open rebellion affirm their own selfhood or renounce God's law altogether, but merely preferred the tendency to their own selfhood to the divine will, while still not favouring the essential principle of sin. They willed God's will, but only to a limited extent, so far as it did not stand in opposition to the interests of selfhood. But their separation from God originates a weakness of spirit, which, after their transference to the earth, is unable to withstand sensuousness.

But by this step back into the pre-existent world, do we gain the conscious freedom, from which the sinfulness, with which we begin upon earth, could be derived? Those spirits are supposed to have stood in the pure intuition of God without consciousness of the world, which consciousness, like the body, only became theirs in the present state, not as a punishment, but as a supplement of their creation designed for them from the first. But if those purely created spirits could suppose a contradiction between God's will and their own interests, whereas what God wills must be good for them, clearly they possessed no perfect consciousness of themselves or of God; and, indeed, such consciousness is in itself unthinkable, if knowledge and wisdom are to remain ethical duty. Moreover, assuming the necessity of development for these spirits

[1] *Lehre von Sünde*, vol. II. bk. 3, 4, 2d ed. (*Christian Doctrine of Sin*, T. & T. Clark.)

[2] *Ibid.* vol. II. 508 ff.

in their beginnings, freedom again cannot be conceived as complete from the beginning, since it partly depends on the stage of consciousness. The will in any case could not be constituted perfectly good from the beginning. If, nevertheless, at the same time knowledge of God were perfect, will and knowledge would not be in harmony, and conversely knowledge by the side of will, if the latter or freedom were complete from the beginning. But even granting that there could be perfect consciousness at the first, and along with imperfect will, such perfect clearness of consciousness respecting the significance and consequences of falling away would make the latter all the more inexplicable. For how could a fall out of a state which contained nothing abnormal, but only impulses to good, a fall from the perfect intuition of God, be conceived? Only the co-operation of falsehood and darkening of the consciousness respecting God, respecting man's own destiny and the consequences of evil, and the fancy that the interests of selfhood required something different from the divine will, makes apostasy appear possible. Thus this theory makes the act of falling away inexplicable, and is insufficient to prove natural sinfulness to rest upon personal guilt, and to exhibit it as spiritual selfishness. If apostasy is to be explicable, we must go back to imperfect spiritual beginnings, where there is still a possibility of deception by the falsehood of sin, to a relative want of consciousness respecting its endless, ruinous consequences. But we have what we need, both defect in clearness of consciousness and imperfection of will, in the earthly human beginnings, such as we know. It therefore seems superfluous, nay a hindrance, to go back to pre-existence in order to explain the possibility of falling away. Nay, the distinction between human and demonic sin will scarcely be tenable, if we conceive man in his beginnings as pure spirit standing in the pure intuition of God. Apostasy from such a perfect state could scarcely be anything but demonic sin. The matter only takes a different shape, when we conceive man at first as a sensuous-spiritual being, so that he withdraws from the love of God, not for the sake of an abstract spiritual selfhood, but of a creaturely, sensuous-spiritual pleasure. Finally, the sin of selfishness is as little explained in a satisfactory way by purely spiritual

selfishness, as in the case of Rothe spiritual selfishness by matter. For the corporeal is, first of all, conceived by Müller as so alien and accidental to spirit, that it is unexplained how such a spirit could come to possess sensuous propensities, unless from the first a desire after corporeal existence is implanted in it, and the beginning or occasion of sin is found therein. But if this is done, Müller's theory ceases to consider spiritual selfishness as the fundamental sin and guilt, and a transition is rather made to the theory which regards sensuous sin as the fundamental one.

4. THETIC EXPOSITION.—Sensuousness and selfishness in the strict sense are, indeed, the two chief forms of sin, and are distinguished from each other, just as perverted passivity of the spirit, especially through the sensuous side, is distinguished from perverted energy or activity of the same. But neither, with Rothe, can selfishness be derived from passive sensuousness, just as little as the spirit can be derived from the body, nor conversely, with Müller, can passive sensuousness be derived from spiritual selfishness. But, on the other hand, if evil in its two chief shapes is to be recognized as a unity, it must be subordinated to a generic idea; and this unity, constituting its nature, must be found in those two chief shapes, however widely the two may diverge in their development.

We consider, first, this uniform, identical nature of evil as to form and contents, and then pass to the mutual relation of the two forms named.

The general, identical nature of the two, and therefore of evil generally, is *as to form a God-opposing abnormity*, disturbing the right relation of the spirit as well to the corporeal, natural life in a downward aspect and to the world, as to the divine life in an upward aspect. But what the abnormal is appears from the normal, *i.e.* the true ethical idea of God, whose image the rational creature is meant to be *in unity with Him* who is the principle of all good. Since, then, true love is the unity of self-affirmation and surrender,[1] evil, which dissolves this unity, whose only security is in fellowship with God, can only have a twofold form, that of false, God-opposing surrender, and that of false, God-opposing self-affirmation. *False surrender* of the spirit is absorption of the spirit in something else, in

[1] See vol. i. pp. 339, 443.

one's own physical side and the finite world. But all surrender of the personality without self-affirmation is passivity contradicting the idea of personality. In the next place, false *self-affirmation* of the spirit in an upward aspect closes itself to God in self-sufficiency and pride, and in a downward aspect may even despise corporeity. Just so, in relation to one's neighbour, self-affirmation without surrender is want of love—social sin. The person then makes himself the centre or end of the world, which is treated as a mere means for the good of the person.

But this formal description of evil as God-opposing abnormity, whether in false, passive, enslaving surrender, or in false self-affirmation, is only a general, indefinite definition of evil. We must therefore add, secondly: Regarded *as to contents*, a God-opposing, *perverted love of the creature* is included in sensuousness as in spiritual selfishness, in false surrender as in self-affirmation of the personality. The world and the Ego are both metaphysically good in themselves; but love of the creature becomes false, when that universal principle is excluded from it (which is done in sensuousness and in spiritual selfishness), which is necessary to the truth of the personal spirit itself, *i.e.* when it does not include the love of God, which alone gives right character and order to all love, and is the principle uniting surrender and self-affirmation. To exclude love to God is to exclude the primal image and principle of true love, and to give to the finite that place in the love of the heart which is due only to God. All false creature-love has therefore a coeval *alienation from God* for its coefficient, for its invisible negative factor, so to speak; for in unity with God no disharmony could be dominant. But therewith a separation from the absolute source of life is implied, although not at once an absolute one. This alienation from God is in contradiction to the nature of man, because living connection with God is a constituent of that nature. When the spiritual life lacks fellowship with God, man lacks the centre, to which all his powers ought to gravitate. And he cannot stop at the mere absence of a centre. The converse of deficiency in love to God is false creature-love, *amor inordinatus:* for as long as the human heart beats, it must love something. If it loves not God, it loves the world or

itself, falls a prey to false surrender or false self-affirmation, whose due union is only secured by love to God. But false creature-love need not be only the temporal consequence of alienation from God. They may very well originate contemporaneously; nay, the incitement to false creature-love may even be the first.[1]—False love therefore substitutes a false for the right centre;[2] and since the powers are not made for the false one, it deranges and dissolves the harmony of all the powers. Both God's working in man and man's tendency to God penetrate so deeply into man's nature, that the thought is inconceivable that his general organism can retain its integrity and healthiness, when religion—that heart in the life of man's spirit—ceases to pulsate. To such a degree is the religious function the fundamental religious function and the central power, that where it is wanting, human life can only preserve itself from stagnation so long as an attempt is possible to obtain some substitute for religion, at least an artificial false centre instead of the true centre which is lacking. Consciousness of God is so essential a factor in man, that, when he has not God, he must at least have an idol. And as the false order of the powers and instincts causes disorder in man himself, so also the consequence is disorder in the world, and the order and destiny meant to be brought about through man are now unrealized. The sinful person will also by his caprice introduce disharmony into the world, not rendering it the service which was expected, but abusing it to ends for which it was not designed. Thus sin becomes *social wickedness*, because he that loves not God can no longer truly love his neighbour, *i.e.* the divine image in him, and ruin and confusion result in the world. This logical advance from alienation from God to some form of idolatry, from that to unbelief or forgetting God, and from both to social sin and destruction of the blessings of creation in abuse of every kind in men themselves and others, has been most faithfully depicted by Paul.[3] The advance is also a cycle of evil; for false creature-love keeps under the love of God and confirms alienation from God, as the latter promotes false creature-love.

This false creature-love, *i.e.* creature-love devoid of love to God, has then *two chief forms* (p. 382). False love to the

[1] As in Gen. iii. [2] Matt. vi. 21. [3] Rom. i. 23 ff.

world, surrender to it as the highest good instead of and in opposition to God, is *deification of the world*—sensuous sin—the heathen form of sin; false self-affirmation, or the love of the Ego for itself in its isolation, its desire to be its own centre even in God's presence through pride and arrogance, is *deification of self*—spiritual selfishness—the fundamental Jewish sin. Both are false creature-love and *sin* because of their opposition to God.

The homogeneity or unity of the two chief forms of evil as God-opposing love of the creature having been described, their diversity and relation to each other and to that unity must be considered. Their diversity reduces itself to the different degree in which they participate in energy of will and consciousness, or in the principle of conscious freedom. In selfishness of the spirit there is not merely a higher degree of consciousness, but also a greater energy of will than in deification of the world, which originates in a passive succumbing of the spirit to the wiles of sensuality, a succumbing which does not cease to be bondage because an act of consent finds place in it; for it is consistent with an act of consent, that the will prove itself weak and powerless to escape the allurement of sensuousness, and that it surrender itself without resistance to be an organ of the same. So far as spiritual selfishness is conditioned by a higher degree of consciousness and force of will, sensuousness and spiritual selfishness are related as different stages, not merely as co-ordinate forms with different objects. Both may meet in one and the same individual, although at different periods of life. They are not distinguished by the circumstance, that selfishness is not latent in sensuousness, at least in germ and implicitly; for even in sensuousness the creature through false love seeks its own pleasure apart from God, *i.e.*, satisfaction of the lower side of the finite personality. If the creature learns the unsatisfying nature of sensuous blessings, it may abandon these and take a higher position on the side of consciousness. But even then, so far as false love of the creature remains in it, from this a more conscious spiritual selfishness arises, which seeks in arrogance and self-complacency to be its own centre, and to shut itself up unlovingly against God and its neighbour. Thus sensuousness and spiritual selfishness are merely different

stages of one and the same moral evil. They are distinguished, therefore, by the measure in which the conscious personality shares in evil, according as the subject is drawn more passively by fascination and temptation to love of the world, in which then no doubt the individual seeks his own in respect of the lower side of himself, or according as with the intensifying of self-consciousness and energy of will the higher powers and gifts are abused and made the servants of spiritual selfishness. Then the unloving, egoistic reference of the Ego to itself rises to such a point that it makes the Ego the exclusive end of the world.

Observation.—Will and freedom come into view in all evil at least as consenting, if not as already actually existing, still as future. But we cannot go so far as to say, that what is not due to free personal volition and conscious free act is morally indifferent, and cannot wear the character of abnormity and absolute wrong. No doubt guilt and punishment are so closely connected with freedom when already existing, that they are conditioned by it. But we cannot with Müller resolve the idea of evil into that of personal guilt. We cannot acknowledge evil merely where guilt is found. Insensibility to God, unlovingness or hate, wherever they are found in a rational being, are contrary to the idea of man, abnormal, nay absolutely wrong, and just so ungodly love of the world. We must therefore regard as wrong not merely purely spiritual conscious selfishness, and sensuousness as wrong only for its sake, but every abuse, every perversion of powers and spheres, contrary to man's moral duty. Since the law maintains his moral destination, it condemns even involuntary sin and appeals from the present absence of freedom to a freedom at least possible hereafter, which it is man's duty to acquire.

5. The different conceptions of evil discussed above, so far as they possess truth, may be included in the sketch of its nature just given. In the conception of evil as sensuousness, is comprised all that is true in the *Physical* definitions. Apart from body there were no sensuousness. With it finitude and development are bound up, which are not the actuality of evil, but part of its possibility. Just so the *Æsthetic* conception of evil is connected with sensuousness. The truth in this is that evil is a misfortune, but one incurred unintentionally through the pleasure-seeking sensuousness in its blindness pitching on a wrong object. Thus regarded, sensuousness

also includes deception and folly, and the defect in clearness of consciousness is unmistakeable, a feature characteristic of evil. This is the truth in the *Intellectual* conception of evil. In our human world, the sin of sensuousness is the most common kind of sin. With it the sinful course opens, so far as observation reaches. As if caught by a bait, man is transported into an inordinate passion of desire, so that in the moment of lust he deems the possession of the coveted object the highest good, in false imagination attributes to it a worth which does not belong to it, and despite the law prefers it to the highest good. When evil desire plays with the false good, the living God, who desires the whole heart, withdraws into the background of consciousness, and the history of religion shows how the converse of fading consciousness of God is the deification of finite gifts and things (p. 247). Thus, polytheism honours in its deities the ideas or realities belonging to the world—force, beauty, or wisdom, which it deifies. It is true, this pseudo-religious polytheistic process checks the tendency to irreligiousness; it is even compatible with growth in civilised life; but this process by a semblance of piety easily conceals the godless tendency of all religious disease, and the unbroken corruption reigning in all superstition. The heathen spirit seeks by its deifications to consecrate and sanction false love of the creature. It nevertheless treats its self-made gods, like worldly goods, as means for itself—the end; and in this selfishness is concealed, although unconsciously, a false desire for freedom, which again by dependence on finite blessings becomes bondage of the spirit. If we consider more closely this heathen form of sin, in which false love to the creature has taken the place of love to God, we discover two things united in love of the world which seem directly opposed, a false, slavish dependence on the world, and a false exercise of freedom. We find the *former*, because the personality which as spiritual craves for infinite good, sells itself to the finite, natural side of the individuality, to the law of its finite appetites, and therewith to the finite blessings of the world, with which they are related. The spirit thus throws its nobility away. Forgetting the inner dignity for which it was destined, forgetting God, the spirit becomes flesh; that spirit which designed to be God's image wears the stamp of

king over Nature, becomes a physical being, so far as it is able, and must use even its lofty intelligence in the service of the flesh. Thus it has no longer itself or spiritual blessings as its contents, but becomes, so to speak, a mere personal form for bestial contents; and this contrariety to nature (*Unnatur*) is the reason of the profound horror which seizes us, when the beast looks forth from human nature, and the human form is made a mere mask.

But with this dishonourable bondage of man a *false exercise of freedom* is connected. First, in relation to God; for through forgetting God man follows his own lusts. But he also loves to show in a wrong way his freedom and dominion in the world to its hurt, in opposing his caprice to the due order of the world. In sensuous sin there lurks a principle hostile to the goodness of nature or the world-order. The fleshly Ego acts practically as the centre, which everything is meant to serve as a means, whereas the due order of the world secures mutual freedom to all, by the fact that no single Ego, no majority, no nation is meant to be the sole centre or end, but all are meant to be subordinate to one absolute centre, and to be members one of another in such a way that every one is end, and every one means. Even the more passive form of evil—sensuousness and the worldly love of the fleshly Ego—is therefore already an unconscious selfishness, a striving after enjoyment, honour, and other worldly gifts. In seeking its own the Ego isolates itself, and wishes to serve as a false centre in place of the true one. Since, further, finite blessings are of an exclusive nature, so that what one possesses another is prevented from possessing, a conflict of envy and hate arises among individuals of worldly tendencies, when the desires of different persons cross each other. Thus, unlovingness and hate are the converse of false love of the world. What, therefore, in relation to God is merely disobedience in fact, not in principle, and submission to the dominion of the world, in the social conflict with others manifests itself more and more as exclusively self-willing Egohood, *i.e.* as social selfishness. That selfishness, self-love, false love of freedom already exist in sensuous sin, is intimated in the story of the Fall; and even in the child, along with dependence on its impulses, the germ of false delight in freedom shows itself, namely in its wilfulness,

which leads in the next place, where no counteractive power intervenes, to spiritual selfishness.

But sensuous sin may also be associated with a certain kindly disposition, especially when submissiveness in the subject unites with good education and force of good habits, by which the outbreaks of evil are repressed.

It is further important to observe, how the true elements in the *Juridical* and *Subjective-moral* conceptions find their place within the stage of more or less conscious Egohood, whose end is conscious selfishness culminating in enmity to God. The law, in addressing itself to the personality of man, awakens it, assigns it a duty, and renders it responsible for that duty. But the spiritual independence which it awakens, may, without the law being able to hinder it, issue in spiritual selfishness in a *twofold way;* and this takes place without fail, when the law does not effect what it wishes, namely, by initiating an earnest struggle with the flesh, lead to humility and the knowledge of sin, and thereby to consciousness of the need of redemption. Where the latter is not done, *in the first place* the effort may be directed to this end, to obey the law in the letter, although with inward aversion to the denial of the flesh required by it. The keener intelligence awakened may beget serious thought, which advises to obey the law for the sake of the good consequences, and to shun transgression for the sake of the harm and punishment which follow in the steps of wickedness. But there, again, as concerns disposition, a mere eudæmonistic disposition (in a more politic and refined form than in sensuousness) is plainly connected with obedience to the law. The subject may accustom himself as matter of policy to make such obedience a means of satisfying Egoism, the law thus giving occasion to more crafty and flagrant forms of sin which have this characteristic, that the subject, while living in Egoism, deems himself better than others. Thus, on one side, with mere legal obedience, which may be painful, nay scrupulous, a deceitful heart, a mercenary and selfish disposition, is associated, which calculates only its own finite advantage; and at the same time, with such obedience is usually connected a spiritual arrogance, which in self-enjoyment of its own superiority looks down upon others. Here goodness itself, even prayer and the

practice of devotion, are converted into instruments, so to speak, into merchandise.[1] This is the one form of spiritual selfishness,—the distortion of the Jewish spirit in Phariseeism, —which would still acknowledge, and perhaps with fanatical zeal contend for the holiness of, an objective law, while yet inwardly estranged from God and the law, and everywhere seeking only itself.

But a *second form* of spiritual selfishness is possible, one which breaks with the objective law, or in pretended piety places all objective law in subjective caprice, thus elevating itself above law. If the Pharisaic sin is a legal obedience, which would preserve the contents of the law, but not in the right disposition, Antinomianism extends even to the contents, and becomes rebellion against the law altogether. The subject may arrive at this emancipation from conscience or the revealed legislation, both from the heathen and the Pharisaic standpoint. The initial selfishness — world-deifying superstition—when it defiantly asserts itself against the consciousness of law, may pass over into unbelief, which renounces obedience to the law and conscience, and sets up in opposition the principles of false freedom and selfishness as justifiable moral maxims. But under the mask of the false legal obedience before mentioned, alienation from God and unbelief also may be concealed. The law then pierces deeper, and requires the subject to abandon the conceit of his own superiority. It makes known that self-righteousness is mere beggar's pride, and that grudging service deserves not reward, but the opposite. Then the law, penetrating with its requirement the very joints and marrow, may be repugnant to the Ego, which is unwilling to abandon itself and its conceit. In defiant assertion or murmuring against God, the subject may thus forswear every higher aim and all true purport in life, and regard capricious autonomy as its right, appealing to good disposition before its own tribunal. Thus the Pharisaic may become a Sadducæan sinner, retrograding to sensuous Egoism, which has no longer the relatively innocent form of its beginning, but passes, in virtue of a freedom supposed to be on an equality with God, into godless defiance and emancipation from all law.

[1] Matt. vi. 1 ff.

In harmony with the foregoing principles, we must regard as established the following proposition: that evil is a creature-love turned away from God, and therefore a false love, whether in the form of love of the world, *i.e.* disguised selfishness, or of spiritual selfishness.

6. EVIL AS FALSEHOOD.—We have seen indeed in general that evil is deficiency in true knowledge, nay error, and that both are pre-eminently involved in its sensuous form.[1] But we must dwell longer on the aspect of evil in which it is untruth or falsehood, because this affords the means of tracing the history of the progress of evil with special distinctness.[2] False love to the creature, apart from and instead of God, involves the error of supposing that the creature is the absolute good. But this intellectual error is not innocent; it cannot be forced on, but is adopted by, the will under the influence of false inclination to the creature without love to God. It is affirmed error; but a willing of untruth, although in self-deception, is falsehood. Since all stages and forms of sin are false creature-love, it always involves the double falsehood, that in some way the creature is the highest good, and God not, and therefore that God is not God,—an imagination which subverts essential principles, conceiving to itself an universe in which the lowest has become highest, and the highest lowest. Evil is the imagining of a perverted world, which it treats as the true one, while treating the true as the perverted one. But as certainly as all evil involves falsehood essentially, so certainly does falsehood mark its history or its stages.

In the *beginning* it promises at a seemingly small price (namely a self-chosen single act, which will remain without further consequences) great gain and enjoyment, enhanced life in a corporeal or even spiritual sense, enhanced freedom. In the beginning it denies its universal principle, so to speak, and does not permit particular evil to appear as evil in which an universal principle of evil is already implied, but entangles men in the notion, that good may retain its universal significance despite a single exception, or that the single evil action does not involve an attack on the law as a unity, and thus sinks men in partial unconsciousness. Further, in the beginning evil diminishes or denies the power belonging to it

[1] § 76, p. 368; § 77, pp. 381, 385.

[2] Gen. iii. 3 ff.

as a principle, and would have the good law acknowledged in general. It is thus hypocritical, and clothes itself in the veil of truth, because its true form would be too terrible. In this case it disguises its self-exaltation against God, and is cowardly through the self-esteem already latent in it.

But at the *second* stage it makes man a liar more definitely. If he comes to enjoy the blessings which had floated before his mind as the reward of sin, but which do not appease his hunger, as they cannot do, man deludes himself into supposing that a larger quantity or other kinds of finite blessings would fill the void. If he does not come to enjoy these blessings, he pushes restlessly on through falsehood into aggravated forms of evil. But even when they are reached, evil brings no enhanced sense of life, no enhanced freedom and harmony, because in such pursuits man contradicts his innermost nature or destiny. Conscience, whether he hears it or not, with its silent or loud accusation spoils his enjoyment and fills him with inner discord. Then the falsehood of sin imagines that an evil conscience is man's foe, and allures the will to covenant more firmly with evil against it. Thereupon, the more passive form passes into that of energetic and conscious evil volition up to the point of assenting to the very principle of evil. Now it strips away the veil, and appears in bold, naked form in opposition to morals and religion. It may then seem to have grown honourable in comparison with its beginning; but it is logical in the apparent inconsequence,—it remains falsehood. If at first evil looked as if it were not in opposition to dependence on God in general, as if it had not the power and effect belonging to it, now, as bold, defiant wickedness, it ascribes to itself a power which it has not, figures as the really sole, true power in the world, in this way exercising a more agitating influence than in others upon the weak masses of mankind, and gaining a fearful power of contagion.

But in the *third* place, the liar, who has deceived others and tempted them to embrace the fundamental principle of evil, falls into his own net and betrays himself in a twofold way. First, in this way, that, as is well known, with practice in lying the fancy is connected, that the lies produced are truth, whilst the truth, which man dishonours, withdraws from him. To the liar his own lie returns in the form of a power over him, to

which he falls victim. This is the first punishment which he receives in virtue of a higher righteous government. But it is seen still more at the end that evil is self-betrayed, inasmuch as the reward, which was the bait at first (namely enhanced life, wellbeing, and freedom), instead of advancing step by step with the growth of evil, recedes more and more. When, then, selfishness has lost everything of sensuous and spiritual worth which it could command, while satiated with or weary of all that substance which apart from God can give no enduring satisfaction, then selfishness and caprice, because they have run through everything, and united with nothing true or abiding, are left wholly to themselves and their own emptiness. If even then guilt is denied, and the way to redemption thus cut off by pride and defiant scepticism, this darker selfishness may enkindle disgust with existence, rage against all being and life. Then, if the Ego is unwilling to give up its selfishness, nothing is left it but to be filled with negation and seek its happiness in destroying, thus falling a prey to the spirit of pure negation, which ends logically in spiritual murder, and does not even spare itself. How can sin be more plainly revealed as falsehood, than by the fact that the self-seeker, who virtually makes himself the centre of the world and would put himself in God's place, who seeks to deny both God and the good world, in order to build up a kingdom of his own, ends by logical sequence in the effort to plunge himself into the kingdom of nothingness? Thus evil is falsehood through its whole course. In the end it shows a terrible candour and honesty in disclosing its innermost secret—nothingness, death, whereas the divine order abides firm.

7. The Ramifications or Positive Forms of Evil.—The positive forms of evil, in no way identical with its stages, must be distinguished from the nature of evil in its two chief forms and stages; for the same positive form may belong to very different stages intrinsically, and the same stage may have different positive forms. But this much is implied in the distinction of the stages, that the first will lean more to sins of passivity, enjoyment, weakness, and cowardly lying; the second more to sins of false strength and active energy, to pride and arrogance, ambition and greed of honour. We shall most accurately

describe the different positive forms of evil, by considering that in different ways they desecrate or corrupt the *system of blessings* through sensuous or spiritual selfishness. Different instincts and capacities in man himself correspond to these blessings, so that the corruption of objective blessings always recoils upon the subject, who is himself a little world, a system of blessings, and introduces disorder into that world. These *blessings*, capable of corruption by grosser or finer selfishness, or by spiritual selfishness, are, first, of a *finite* kind. To this class belongs, *firstly*, the *physical, corporeal* nature,—its strength, harmony, beauty. The sin related to this blessing is lust of the flesh and lust of the eyes in the widest compass,[1]—sensuality, intemperance, corruption of imagination, and on the other side the sin of arrogant contempt of the body through false spirituality. Fleshly lust corrupts as well its object (the connection of sensuality with cruelty is well known) as the subject himself and his organism. This is especially seen in the effect on that basis of human society—marriage and the family. *Secondly*, the perversion of the instinct of *property*. This on the one side is avarice and covetousness, on the other extravagance and arrogant contempt. The man of great self-conceit who boasts extravagantly of his contempt for money and means, by this very act attributes too great importance to it, namely, as if a purely negative relation thereto were enough to confer dignity and distinction on man. But the covetous and avaricious man expects more power from his means, and becomes a servant of Mammon. *Finally*, the perversion of the instinct of *power, honour*, and *influence* becomes ambition, greed of honour, lust for praise; and on the other hand, cringing, servility, and self-effacement. The issue of greed of honour and ambition is to make others selfless instruments for one's own glory. They imply, therefore, contempt for the dignity of personality; and yet power and honour only possess worth on the supposition that others are not contemptible, and that they render free tribute of acknowledgment. But still servility and cringing, through dissimulation, seek only their own, and in their own way make others mere instruments. Thus all these forms carry contradiction in themselves, and are only able to corrupt God's blessings and gifts and to im-

[1] 1 John ii. 16.

poverish man, not to build a harmonious, happy world upon the ruins of the law.

But evil corrupts and destroys *blessings of no mere finite order*. So in general the blessing of communion. Sensuous evil, like spiritual, is unloving, nay, comes into conflict with the claims of others, and thus as matter of course developes into hate. But it especially corrupts the different spheres of moral communion, in which as many kinds of blessing are included: Art and Science, State and Church. First, by *deifying* even their finite side. In every one of these, by virtue of their idea, something divine and of infinite value is contained, but in none *per se* the highest good. Again, conversely by *dishonouring* them. As sin treats blessings merely finite in kind as infinite, so it treats the infinite in these blessings of the second species as finite. These higher blessings show their more than merely finite character in this, that they do not necessarily belong to one or a few exclusively, but may be common property without loss to the individual. But even into these higher spheres, in which by their nature the spirit of the universal ought to rule, sin penetrates with corrupting or destroying effect. Science and art do not guard against it, although the eternal shines in them. Art may be degraded to mere sensuous enjoyment, and science to an instrument of intellectual pride. On the other side, there is certainly a sinful contempt of science and art, through rough practicality or false-spirituality, which prides itself upon itself, and thus thinks it right to despise divine gifts in God's name. But State and Church also may be corrupted, as by deification, so by dishonour or desecration, either by contempt and indifference, or by being degraded into mere instruments to the egoistic Ego, and made the arena of Egoism, especially of thirst for honour and ambition. But Egoism is the more hateful in these spheres, because it must unite with hypocrisy, since every one knows that these spheres demand honest surrender and living public spirit, enthusiasm for the spread of truth and beauty in science and art, patriotism in the State, self-forgetting humility and love, sincere piety, in the Church, and also that all influence would be forfeited by the avowal of the impure spirit, which, instead of treating these spheres as holy ground, seeks to make them subservient to egoistic interests.

But selfishness is most hateful when it penetrates into the sphere of religion, in appearance making it an end, while hypocritically debasing it into an instrument for its own interests.

Observation.—What has been advanced is opposed to the Stoic doctrine: *πάντα ἁμαρτήματα Ἴσα*, which looks exclusively at the admitted fact that all evil possesses a generic identity. The question is, whether the same one-sidedness is not involved in Luther's and Calvin's doctrine of unbelief as the fundamental sin in all evil, and in the doctrine that the virtues of the heathen are merely splendid faults (*vitia*).[1] The Reformers' doctrine is not identical with the Stoic formula; for the very fact which makes clear the intrinsic unity and uniformity of evil, namely, that all evil implies alienation from God, is not acknowledged by the Stoa. As concerns the other point, it were certainly wrong to say that humanitarian morality is worthless, and has nothing of true virtue in it. No one proceeds on this basis in the judgments he passes. Fidelity, bravery, diligence, piety, are esteemed by every one, and are not found merely in Christians. But the meaning of that doctrine of the Reformers is, that man cannot be perfectly and truly good in particulars, unless he is so in his central relation, *i.e.* to his living centre—God, the primal good.[2] And in this we may agree with them. Every one sees that to particular good, a good general disposition is necessary, of which it is the fruit. Else, something impure in motive or impulse will always cleave to an act in appearance perfectly good. Could we will a particular good virtuously by itself, without the willing of the good itself and in general being implied, virtue would be possible even in physical beings, as represented in fables of beasts. The Reformers, therefore, are perfectly right in meaning by that doctrine, although paradoxically expressed: Where fellowship with God and faith are not, there sin must have the predominance in the region of motive, and it would be so merely because defect in humility is sin, while there is no humility without the fear of God. And they also hit the right view in this, that every act of man is affected by his general state, which can only be evil, where redemption is wanting, although it is inexact to say: The virtues of the heathen are only faults. For, on the other hand, our Confessions do not put *justitia civilis* on a par with *injustitiæ*, although the former *per se* is not righteousness before God.

[1] Melanchthon, *Loci*, 1521, *Corp. Ref.* vol. xxi. p. 100.

[2] Although to the consciousness in the first instance God may be merely the universal good.

Nay, according to Holy Scripture, even among those who have no part in grace, a distinction must be acknowledged according to the amount of effort to improve or the inclination to repentance, and therefore according to the approximation to the possibility of being actually redeemed. The Confessions, while not denying this distinction, certainly make it too little prominent, because their pre-eminent concern is to establish the absolute need of redemption in all, which this distinction cannot alter.

§ 78.—*Actual and Inherent Evil.*

As there is actual sin chargeable with guilt, so also there is inherent sin. The former, where it exists, passes into an evil, inherent character, which again itself produces evil, so that evil, if it enter the world, cannot do other than originate a series of evil effects, which again themselves become causes. Evil, thus concatenated, through its own nature and through the abuse of the good order of the world forms a vast system, and becomes a common life of sin among those whom it embraces.

1. ACTUAL SIN.—If, as shown, evil as such cannot be regarded as the work of Nature or physical necessity, or as the mere consequence of blindness and ignorance, then the *will* has an essential part therein. But the will emerges in particular conscious acts. Thus it becomes a causality, to which the action must be assigned by logical necessity. The first, in itself still amphibological, signification of *guilt* is just this, to affirm that the will has become the *cause* of an action. If this action was evil, and was therefore contrariety to the law and its just claim upon man, the right of the law is not annihilated by his disregarding it. Based on God's own will, that right stands in its inviolable sanctity, it renounces not its claim on man. On the contrary, that claim remains binding upon him, and indeed in a twofold way, the idea of guilt thus receiving a more intensive signification. First, the law does not describe his act as culpable, but himself, so far as his personal will combined with the act, depreciates the worth

of his life, or charges him with guilt in the sense of pollution until purification takes place. Secondly, since by the evil act both a good is neglected, which man was under obligation to do, and the validity and honour of the law are called in question, the evil carries guilt with it in the sense that something neglected has to be made good, and that the divine law has to be asserted and preserved against the sinner as that supreme, indivisible power over the natural and spiritual world, which alone claims absolute authority. This is done in virtue of God's punitive justice. The law subjects him who in practice denies its validity to the judgment that he deserves punishment (cf. vol. i. §§ 24, 5, 6), and that guilt renders worthy of it. But the evil act has other consequences than the incurring of guilt in these various senses.

2. Transition from the Actual to the Inherent.

The will is a power not merely to determine and use other things than itself, but to determine itself, and through self-determination to influence other things. Every act is a determination, which the spirit gives itself, and originates a fixed characteristic in the spirit, which then continues to operate not merely by force of definite intention (as, for example, where the personality, in order to self-improvement, turns its attention to itself), but also spontaneously and unintentionally. The result or facit of the act becomes a factor producing the product. The act, which has become part of the past, while disappearing in the background of the personality, in the basis of the same, continues therein, unless a counteracting power intervene, as a determining element of the disposition and general tendency. The will, after determining itself, is also a result, and bears itself as its work, either as an oppressive burden or as the winged freedom thereof. As it is not indifferent to the body what atmosphere it lives in, what is its nourishment and employment, so the spirit retains traces of what it has been filled and nourished with, in thought, imagination, feeling, and will. These traces are characters, so to speak, in which the past of the spirit may be read; they form its distinctive character; nay, the longer the time the more they form its spiritual atmosphere, so to speak, or its spiritual body, by which it may be nourished, or hemmed in and severed from everything

else. Here, therefore, is the place where the transition to a nature acquired by the spirit must be asserted. This inherency, nay, second nature, resulting from act, because originated by the will, is so little opposed to the idea of personality, that, on the contrary, only through it is a moral character, whether good or evil, possible. Without this power of the will to determine itself and its nature, man would either be a mere physical being or remain for ever an indeterminate spiritual mobility. Nay, it may be said: Were man mere free caprice, so constituted that caprice were only able eternally to hover above objects, adhering now to this, now to that, without the capacity of uniting really and fixedly to a substance that became its second nature, and, at the same time, under no necessity of incurring the stain and burden of guilt from misdeeds, in such caprice (unworthy of the name of freedom) something evil would be created by God, and, moreover, in such shape that nothing but mere external punishment could affect it. All personalities would then intrinsically be completely alike and undistinguishable, because without inherent character, and, on the other hand, endowed with absolute freedom of caprice. This caprice could always be nothing but caprice, and therefore treat goodness only capriciously. And thus it were no longer a potentiality of ethical nature, but a mere physical one, strong enough to be able to corrupt everything, while not good enough to be created.

This law of the naturalizing of the will remains unaffected by sin, save that through it the formation of character becomes a perversion tending to false organization or systematization of the powers.[1] By this means freedom becomes more and more limited. Custom becomes like a second nature in vice, and, where evil advances unhindered, it draws all the powers with greater and greater polluting and perverting effect into the sphere of the false centre set up by it. According to James, the entire organism is set on fire by the same sad flame of selfishness, which burns in the centre and is set on fire of hell.[2] As then a part of the body often makes long resistance to a malady which has seized other parts, so the better nature

[1] This is the σῶμα ἁμαρτίας (Rom. vi. 6), by which the sinner sees himself encircled and hemmed in.

[2] Jas. iii. 6: τρέχοι τῆς γενέσεως.

may perhaps still maintain itself in one sphere, but not for ever, if selfishness remains at the centre. Evil waxes worse, and its efforts to render all the powers instrumental to its false unity are not without success. This leads directly to other effects of evil. We have seen how evil, in forming a false centre of the powers, withdraws them from their destination and sets them in contradiction to their nature. But this is an index of the dissolution of the harmony to which the powers are ordained, and the merely natural unity of the powers is not strong enough to resist this. Thus evil obtains an inherent, disorganizing significance. It arms, so to speak, one member of the whole against the others, now sensuousness against the spirit, now the spirit against the body in proud spiritualism, and one of the spiritual powers against the others. Inveterate caprice has no truly binding power, but under the semblance of freedom is dependent on that to which the inclination attaches itself for the moment. Thus the principle of self-emancipation acquires increasing command of the spiritual and bodily powers and impulses. These, too, emancipate themselves, nay, they bind the will and withdraw from its jurisdiction, after the will has deputed its authority to false freedom. One element now lives at the expense of the other, especially sensuousness at the expense of the spirit, and again one tendency of the spirit at the expense of another. Thus the evil principle produces nothing but disorder and disease. Instead of founding a kingdom of harmony, it issues in distraction and dissolution.

3. In a new aspect, the transition from actual to inherent evil, the necessity of which has just been verified on anthropological grounds, is also shown by *religious considerations.* Apart from violation of the religious relation, we saw, no sin would be possible. But after sin has entered, inherent evil of a religious kind arises; for after the sinner has turned away from God, he cannot again recover by his own power that self-communication of divine love which makes religion possible, and the false love admitted stifles or benumbs the true. The religious disorder remains without divine influence, whereas we can only know and love God through God. But the religious disorder, as inherent alienation from God, becomes the coefficient of all sin, after the powers and

impulses have once found a false centre. Moreover, God does not at once intervene by an act of self-communication, in order by reimplanting the good to extinguish the delight kindled in evil, but first of all permits it to run its course. This is not divine caprice or want of love, but the course necessary in the ethical sphere; for God's influence cannot be compulsory. This would be to degrade the ethical into the physical. No ethical result would be reached in this way. Grace cannot combine with actual, so to speak, budding lust.[1] In such circumstances it could not even be understood. Hence, Christianity only appeared when heathenism declined. The divine activity rather prescribes to itself a rudimentary spiritual economy of a subjective kind, consisting generally in this, that God causes sin to be revealed to man as falsehood, and compels it to disclose its disastrous effects.[2] This aim is supported by the education of the moral consciousness, and of self-knowledge which judges itself by the law.[3] Not that this is done in a way to imply that evil can be vanquished by a cognitive process alone, or come to an end by self-exhaustion. But a diversion of the will from the deceptive lust, a turning of the desire to something better, is indispensable, in order that grace may be fruitful, *i.e.* be understood and accepted. Therefore God in His long-suffering accompanies even the development of sin, nay, awakens and encourages such desire by gracious promises of His favour, in order to show the creature that, even when it is estranged from God, God has not given it up. But this does not prevent another process going on at the same time, apparently in opposition, really in harmony therewith, namely, an economy by which evil is multiplied, while also compelled to reveal its nature. But this point is dealt with more fully under the Third Head.

4. The *character of evil* is ascribed with perfect right to *inherent evil*, wherever it is found. This is opposed to the view which ignores the natural side in the idea of evil, and will only acknowledge evil in the act or actual sin, and further to the opinion that evil can only exist where personal, conscious guilt exists in the strictest sense. This opinion has been touched on and provisionally refuted before.[4] It must

[1] Matt. vii. 6.
[2] Rom. i. 18, 24 ff.
[3] Rom. iii. 20.
[4] § 77, 3.

now be examined more closely. The argument may be stated thus: Evil is not in the nature, Manichæism is to be rejected; there is only evil in free beings; therefore evil is only evil, so far as freedom actually partakes therein, so that through it in the moment of the act evil was always avoidable, and only in reference to such avoidable things is there participation in guilt and punishment.

We have seen already, how the abstract juridical standpoint, which is so fond of laying stress upon free acts, consists specially in this, that it will allow no responsibility except for free acts. But such isolated insistance on individual *acts* is not strictly consistent with the interests of right and law itself. Even law refers not merely to acts, but also to states. Its desire is not merely to have legal acts, but also to regulate Being, the latter being the consequence of the conjunction of the act and the disposition, which is something inherent, or the effect of the prohibition of evil desire. Even human justice, which, from its inability to discern the inner motives of man, must be chiefly directed to the acts in which the motives are expressed, must in more than one point proceed to such an estimate of evil as not merely looks at the act, but also takes into account the evil being, which, as every one concedes, does not depend on man's freedom at the given moment only; for in the eyes of human justice, even unintended evil is evil and punishable, if at least *culpa* was involved therein. The character of sinfulness and punitiveness may belong even to an unintended injurious act, if inherent deficiency in moral watchfulness, *e.g.* in regard for human life, was shown therein. It is punishable, because implying inherent indifference and torpor of the moral sense. Not merely, therefore, is the act of free choice and the act of distinct, definite resolve on the part of the will, evil and chargeable with guilt; but that which is inherent and breaks forth in act incurs responsibility, although in the moment of the act it may not be under the power of freedom. Nay, even in the case of *dolus*, justice acknowledges the punitiveness of inherent evil, in so far as in such a case it is not asked by what means the man became what he is, how far evil example or education, and how far free will, contributed thereto; but it is only asked how far the presence of inten-

tion obtained in the evil act, and how far the absence of intention, but yet culpable negligence obtained; and the crime would be regarded with perfect justice as evil and punishable, if it could be proved that the previous life of the evil-doer had reduced the freedom of the evil-doer in doing good to the smallest degree at the moment of the act. Justice also in the main disregards the possible effects of education, and in addition, in the case of a morally degraded state, punishment itself is an indispensable means of discipline or education to freedom. Thus, right and the consciousness of right directly suggest that it is not merely the evil, which is avoidable in the moment of the act, of which penal judgment takes cognizance, although it must always be reserved to God's all-seeing justice to determine the measure of personal guilt and punishment more perfectly than human judgment is able to do.

The same conclusion follows from the *moral standpoint.* If nothing ought to be reckoned evil which is unavoidable in the moment of the act, those forms of evil in which its power is most signally displayed would be innocent. Where the will is reduced to bondage by the spirit and practice of evil, we recognize not innocence, but profound degradation. Where even the knowledge of good is obscured and falsified by ancient national custom or former evil action, we recognize the presence of a truly fearful power, not the absence of evil. But even vice proves that anything being evil or not does not essentially depend on the question, whether in a given moment it was avoidable to freedom of choice. But it is then said: "No doubt the conscious free act wills what it pleases, even at the peril of the consequences. Therefore the willing of these consequences, or at least acquiescence in them, is included in the free act, and, as thus willed, inherency is evil and incurs guilt. For this reason, what is inherent (which may be conceded) may be evil and punishable, but only when it is the consequence of a former conscious act of the person, and therefore arose from personal guilt for that act." But are these consequences of the evil act really willed along with it? Is there acquiescence in the bondage of the will and the evil tendency? By no means, for in the moment of the evil these consequences are not recognized. Sin is essentially

bound up with falsehood, and is inconceivable without falsehood.[1] Clearness of consciousness is lacking, where sin is. In evil acts, such as we know, men will increased freedom, and will nothing so little as the inherent consequences of sin, which both enslave the will and give birth to new sins; but these consequences follow of themselves, apart from consciousness and volition on the part of the person. Nevertheless, we may not say that, because the consequences are not consciously willed, they are not attended with *guilt* or responsibility. For what should we say, if some one supposed that, by proving that he was brought into bondage to evil by former evil acts without prevision and volition of these consequences, he was justified in declaring himself innocent of everything which followed from the evil inherency incurred unintentionally? But still less can the *character of evil* be denied to will, on the ground that in the moment of the evil act it was not free. To dwell a little on this point, every one believes that a will and state in a rational being, which are in opposition to the good order of the world, to God's law and man's destiny, are evil and absolutely culpable; and the law is entirely within its right in requiring a change. We thus see that the question, whether anything is evil, and in what degree, cannot depend on the degree in which avoidable guilt in the subject lay at the basis. But instead of directing our thoughts to the possibility of being different, as to which deception is so easily possible, the better and only right course is to fix attention on the absolute duty of being different, on the opposition of volition and being to the obligatory law; and instead of going back to an avoidableness of guilt at any moment, we should rather go back to the absolute, unavoidable *obligation* to change the state, an obligation which, rooted in the nature of the spirit, condemns the evil state, even though one of bondage, as absolutely culpable. Instead of taking our stand upon the empirical avoidableness of evil any moment, instead of at least acknowledging the character of evil to exist only where a free act, consciously acquiescing in all the consequences of evil, is present (and no such act exists, or can exist), we must be satisfied in this respect with saying that, absolutely considered, *i.e.* regarded

[1] § 77, 4, 6.

from the standpoint of the divine idea of man, which also embraces his future, evil (which always remains a matter of volition) is avoidable. But there is no contradiction between such avoidableness and impotence towards evil existing at the time, and therefore an empirical unavoidableness of evil conduct, which nevertheless is condemned by the idea of man and by God's law, and is absolutely culpable. We are led to the same result, indeed a step further, by the consideration to be examined further on, whether, *e.g.*, other beings of our species are able by their influence to contribute to our moral worth or demerit.[1]

To all this is to be added the definite affirmation of the *Christian consciousness*. When the Christian reviews his life before conversion, he is far from only regarding that as evil, as his own evil and chargeable with guilt, which he was or did with the consciousness or existing possibility of something better. But the more he knows that he obtained true insight into the nature, compass, and consequences of evil, and into the powers of improvement, first in Christianity, the more he is inclined to acknowledge that the evil in his pre-Christian life was not avoidable in the sense in which he then perhaps supposed, and not accidental, but was grounded in his general state. And this state he now so clearly sees to have been one of bondage, that he sees something of sinful error in his former opinion, that he was able any moment to shake off evil, and therefore that it was avoidable. Despite this fact, the Christian regards his pre-Christian state as sinful, because in contrariety to the law and his moral destination, and also as chargeable with guilt, because he did not live in evil and become a causality in evil mechanically or under external constraint, but from his own desire and inclination. We therefore affirm summarily: Human nature is so constituted, both that evil acts pass into evil inherency, which again is the cause of evil, and also in general that evil, when it once exists, becomes a cosmical causality among mankind, a factor in the system of the world;[2] and the law of our nature, lying at the basis of this result, is part of the original perfection of its adaptation to that moral life, without which there could be no good being and no cosmical system of good.

[1] See below, § 83, 1. [2] Rom. v. 12.

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